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PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGR RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHDG #0929/01 1611838
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091838Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0900
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMISTA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 000929 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON DR
SUBJECT: ELECTION SHOWS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
DOMINICAN DEMOCRACY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The analysis of Post and other observers 
of the 2008 presidential election is that the Dominican 
democratic system has improved to the extent that widespread 
election day fraud, which occurred as recently as 1994, is 
now a thing of the past.  Other strengths of Dominican 
democracy that were displayed during the election process 
include the performance of the Central Elections Board; the 
contribution of civil society; and election observation 
programs.  The role of the USG was also a positive.  Key 
weaknesses and areas for future attention include the use of 
government resources to favor the incumbent; the prevalence 
of clientism and lack of policy debate; and the absence of 
legislation to combat electoral violations and campaign 
finance problems.  The election also showed that the 
once-dominant PRSC party is continuing its decline, and that 
President Fernandez's broad coalition played an important 
role in his first-round victory.  Upcoming issues in 
Dominican politics -- including the role of the opposition, 
constitutional reform, cabinet changes, and the 
sustainability of economic subsidies -- will be reported 
Septel. 
 
Central Elections Board 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Central Elections Board (JCE) was almost 
universally praised for its organization of the election. 
The JCE received a 72 percent public approval rating, far 
higher than other government institutions here, and was 
described by the OAS as "an institution that has an important 
amount of legitimacy, credibility, and prestige." 
Participacion Ciudadana, the influential local democracy NGO, 
concluded that, "The Dominican Republic appears to have 
definitively overcome the culture of (election day) fraud. 
No longer does there exist the uncertainty that in the past 
consumed Dominicans each time they held an election."  During 
the campaign, the JCE also showed its strength by standing up 
to the government and issuing a precedent setting ruling 
banning the so-called "Nomina CB," a special government 
payroll for members of the ruling PLD party. 
 
Civil Society 
------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Civil society played an important role in the 
election.  While for the most part the election was devoid of 
policy discussion -- Fernandez refused to participate in a 
formal debate with his two principal challengers and all 
three candidates stuck mainly to generalities and negative 
tactics -- two civil society groups pushed the envelope by 
organizing events in which the candidates went on record on 
key issues.  The NGO FINJUS held a series of forums where 
each candidate (on different days) gave a speech on 
corruption and fielded questions from a panel.  The American 
Chamber of Commerce hosted a similar series of events in 
which the candidates spoke and took questions on economic and 
trade issues. 
 
¶4. (SBU) A civil society organization, Participacion 
Ciudadana, also led a major election observation program. 
(Note:  Both FINJUS and Participacion Ciudadana have received 
considerable funding from USAID.)  Beyond these specific 
achievements, it is clear that the major NGOs here are key 
players.  These are not organizations shouting at the 
government from the wilderness:  Their reports receive 
front-page coverage in the press and their leaders circulate 
among the influential crowd. 
 
Election Observation Programs 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The domestic and international election observation 
programs were both successful.  Participacion Ciudadana, 
using a USAID grant of US$400,000, fielded 4,000 observers. 
The NGO was able to field observers at a cost of US$100 per 
poll watcher; in contrast, each OAS observer cost 
approximately US$8,000.  (Note:  There is a case to be made 
for the OAS rethinking its model for observation.  The 
current model was developed for countries with weak election 
agencies, which is no longer the case in most of Latin 
America.  A new model, centered on a much reduced mission 
which works closely with local NGOs, would reduce the cost 
and effectively expand and deepen the OAS's observation.) 
Participacion Ciudadana also produced four detailed reports 
which received widespread attention here, and conducted an 
election day quick count -- a key guarantee against fraud -- 
 
SANTO DOMI 00000929  002 OF 004 
 
 
which was accurate to 0.55 percent. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The OAS's observation mission began poorly, 
suffering from a slow start (partly justified by the Paraguay 
election) and lack of significant funding from any country 
other than the U.S.  However, in the ten day period before 
the election, the mission made a quick recovery, facilitated 
by a large, late contribution by Canada. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The OAS's Preliminary Report made well targeted and 
timely observations:  The days immediately prior to the 
election and the report's release had seen serious complaints 
by the leading opposition party, the PRD, that the new system 
to scan and transmit results electronically could lead to 
fraud.  The PRD's persistent rhetoric raised the possibility 
that the party would use the new scanner system as a 
justification to dispute the results of the election.  The 
OAS's early statement effectively put the PRD on notice that 
minor technical problems should not be hyped, saying, "The 
Mission notes the parties' concerns...; however, (the 
Mission) also understands that the scanning of the vote count 
sheets does not influence the final result....  Political 
parties have a responsibility to cooperate with the JCE by 
not generating misunderstandings...." 
 
¶8. (SBU) The OAS report also provided helpful international 
backing to the JCE and Participacion Ciudadana.  Those 
organizations had stuck their necks out by criticizing the 
ruling PLD party for using government spending to favor the 
incumbent candidate, and the OAS -- by making similar 
criticisms -- helped support local efforts to strengthen 
democracy. 
 
The USG 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Throughout the campaign, the U.S. was seen as 
neutral and none of the major parties attempted to pull us 
into the policy debate.  Except for a few isolated voices, no 
one questioned the operational independence of Participacion 
Ciudadana and FINJUS based on their being USAID grantees. 
Early in the campaign, a JCE judge criticized the Ambassador 
for simply calling for a "free, fair, and transparent 
election;" however, the judge's comments appeared to have 
been based on a mistaken belief that the Ambassador's 
comments implied that the election process was being poorly 
managed by the JCE.  The attendance of the Ambassador and 
other chiefs of mission at an election observation briefing 
by Participacion Ciudadana -- an important demonstration of 
our support for the NGO -- received positive press coverage, 
as did his visit to polling stations on election day (also 
joined by other ambassadors). 
 
¶10. (SBU) After the election, the Embassy added its voice to 
local and international efforts to strengthen democracy here 
by stating in a press release that, "We share the concerns 
expressed by the JCE, Participacion Ciudadana, the OAS, and 
others regarding the need to establish a clear line between 
government spending and the expenditures of political 
campaigns." 
 
¶11. (SBU) The USG has played an important role in eliminating 
widespread election day fraud and assisting the other 
achievements of Dominican democracy that were displayed 
during the 2008 election.  Since the fraudulent election of 
1994, substantial USAID funds have been used to strengthen 
the JCE, make it more independent, and support civil society 
monitoring of the Board.  In addition, advocacy by 
Ambassadors, Public Affairs programming, and efforts by other 
Embassy sections has helped multiply the effects of our aid 
projects. 
 
Persistent Problems 
------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) While considerable progress has been made in 
strengthening Dominican democracy, the 2008 elections also 
showed that there is much work yet to be done.  Many of the 
weaknesses and areas for future attention here are common 
throughout the developing world. 
 
Abuse of Government Resources 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) In a country that saw a dictator (Trujillo) and a 
strongman (Balaguer) rule for all but 13 years from 
 
SANTO DOMI 00000929  003 OF 004 
 
 
1930-1994, the practice of Presidential re-election has been 
controversial for as long as anyone can remember.  In 1994, 
as part of the political agreement that settled the contested 
election results, a constitutional amendment was passed 
eliminating re-election; however, the issue resurfaced when, 
in 2002, President Mejia pushed through a new amendment 
permitting a second term. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Re-election remained highly controversial in 2008. 
In May 2007, the PLD's own Danilo Medina summed up his loss 
in the party primary by saying, "The state imposed itself." 
In March 2008, Participacion Ciudadana issued a damning 
report listing in detail a series of ways in which government 
spending was favoring President Fernandez's candidacy.  Also 
in March, the press revealed the existence of a special 
government payroll, the "Nomina CB."  The payments, which 
were not available to the public at-large, were made to 
members of the "Committee of the Base," which is the ruling 
PLD party's organization at the neighborhood level.  The OAS, 
for its part, reported that, "it appears evident that a 
significant part of the information that the government 
transmits has an electoral objective...."  In its final 
report, Participacion Ciudadana summed up the campaign with 
the conclusion that, "the use of public resources to benefit 
a single candidate... instead of diminishing, grew to a 
magnitude without precedent." 
 
Campaign Finance 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) A second key weakness of Dominican democracy is the 
virtual absence of regulations on campaign contributions. 
Currently, there is no requirement to list the names of 
contributors, which has made it difficult to investigate 
serious allegations that all of the major parties have 
received contributions from narcotics traffickers at one time 
or another. 
 
¶16. (SBU) On the positive side, the JCE has said that they 
will propose new Electoral and Political Party Laws intended 
to help prevent -- and if necessary punish -- these types of 
abuses.  Among civil society, there is widespread support for 
increased regulation; however, time and again the political 
parties here have blocked reforms of this type.  There may 
now be an opening to pass and implement these laws, since the 
PRD has indicated it would support the legislation.  (Note: 
In 2007, the PRD joined the other major parties in scuttling 
a set of JCE rules that would have restricted campaign 
activities; however, it is possible that the party will 
reconsider its position given the likelihood that it will 
remain in the opposition for some time to come.) 
 
Clientism 
--------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Another area where Dominican democracy needs to 
improve is the prevalence of clientism and lack of policy 
debate.  President Fernandez once complained to us that the 
election is "about jobs."  The tone and context of his remark 
made clear that he was not referring to the economic policies 
that help the private sector create jobs, but rather to his 
supporters requesting government positions. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Leaving aside for the moment the fact that 
Fernandez himself is well placed to put controls on 
clientism, the point we are making is that during the 
campaign many government jobs were given out and many 
promises were made to Fernandez supporters.  For example, 
noted political scientist Rafael Toribio told POLOFF that, 
after Fernandez has added positions to the Ministry of 
Environment for political supporters during the campaign, the 
Ministry had a total of ten assistant secretaries -- three of 
whom did not even have offices. 
 
¶19. (SBU) All three major candidates spent far more time 
attempting to win voters through clientism than via policy 
proposals for improving the life of Dominicans.  Neither 
Fernandez nor the PRD's Vargas published party platforms 
until the last month of the campaign, and the PRSC's Aristy 
never did.  In contrast, to name only a few examples of 
clientism, Fernandez created dozens of new government 
positions for supporters; Vargas handed out a card to low 
income voters good for "future" government benefits; and 
Aristy handed out large quantities of cash, as well as 
salamis, chickens, and live pigs at his rallies. 
 
 
SANTO DOMI 00000929  004 OF 004 
 
 
Toward a Two-Party System? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) For the Reformista Party (PRSC), the 2008 election 
was yet another example of their falling fortunes.  This year 
the party, which held the presidency from 1966-1978 and 
1986-1996 under Joaquin Balaguer, saw large-scale defections 
to other groups, principally Fernandez's PLD.  With their 
candidate having just failed to reach the 5 percent mark, the 
Reformistas will see a considerable drop in their public 
campaign financing (80 percent of the state funds go to 
parties receiving over 5 percent, while the remaining 20 
percent is shared by all smaller parties).  The reasons for 
the Reformistas' decline are varied, but most analysts 
believe the party has never recovered from Balaguer's death 
in 2002 and blame the strongman for neither establishing a 
long-term ideology nor naming a successor. 
 
The Big Tent 
------------ 
 
¶21. (SBU) The 2008 election demonstrated Fernandez's 
excellent political skills, which, aided by clientism, help 
him form a broad coalition and cruise to victory.  In a 
meeting with the Ambassador, a senior government official 
described the coalition as "the zoo" -- the alliance 
contained 12 parties from the left, right, and center -- but 
it was a winning formula.  In the final count, the votes of 
allied parties amounted to almost 9 percent of the 54 percent 
that Fernandez received -- putting him over the 50 percent 
mark to win in the first round. 
 
(U) Please visit us at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/  
FANNIN