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DE RUEHSN #0750/01 1761721
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9684
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000750 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ES
SUBJECT: A PRAGMATIC SHIFT OR MERELY A TACTICAL MOVE TO 
WIN? HOW THE FMLN'S HISTORY IS INFLUENCING ITS ACTIONS 
TODAY. 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles L. Glazer, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In 1980 the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front 
Party (FMLN) began as a loose coalition of leftist groups 
united with the goal of bringing down the conservative 
government.  The tumultuous history of the FMLN continues to 
influence its actions and internal struggles today, as the 
party struggles with modernization and its various factions 
vie for greater influence.  As we move toward the 2009 
legislative and presidential elections, the ongoing struggle 
between the hardliners and the members who are pushing to 
modernize the party, will have an important impact on public 
perception as to who would really govern in an FMLN 
administration, more moderate presidential candidate Mauricio 
Funes or the hardliners that have historically wielded power 
within the party. End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
In The Beginning 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) was 
formed in 1980 when four left wing organizations and the 
Communist Party of El Salvador joined forces to overthrow 
violently the Salvadoran government.  Although the war 
officially began in 1980s following the formation of the 
FMLN, some of the groups had been waging a low-level 
insurgency against the government throughout the 1970s. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The FMLN was formed by a coalition of five groups: 
The Communist Party of El Salvador (PC), the Popular 
Liberation Forces (FPL), the Revolutionary Army of the People 
(ERP), the National Resistance (RN), and the Revolutionary 
Party of Central America Workers (PRTC).   At present the PC, 
and to a lesser extent the FPL, are by far the most 
influential factions. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Communist Party (PC) was formed in the 1930s, 
and although it initially sought to achieve its goals by 
political means, it did ultimately support military action 
during the civil war.  The Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) 
was founded by Cayetanio Carpio, former Secretary General of 
the Communist Party in the 70,s.  The FPL was essentially a 
splinter group of the PC that promoted armed struggle and 
rejected the PC,s attempts at non-violent change. They 
formally joined the FMLN as the Revolutionary Popular Block 
Party (BPR). 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Joaquin Villalobos founded the Revolutionary Army 
of the People (ERP) in 1972.   It focused on armed conflict 
and terrorism, and joined the FMLN as the Salvadoran 
Revolution Party (PRS).  The National Resistance (RN) emerged 
in 1975, after the ERP leadership allegedly assassinated a 
group within the ERP that supported socialist/communist 
indoctrination.  Their armed wing during the civil war was 
called the Armed Forces of the National Resistance (RN-FARN). 
 The Revolutionary Party of Central America Workers (PRTC) 
was an organization operating in El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala that advocated for 
regional revolution instead of individual movements within 
the individual countries. 
 
-------------- 
During the War 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During the 12 year Salvadoran civil war (1980-92), 
the FMLN attempted to overthrow the government utilizing a 
strategy that included armed struggle, terrorism, and 
socialist/communist political indoctrination.  The liberation 
theology movement within the Catholic Church and labor unions 
largely supported these efforts.  The group also received 
monetary support and arms from the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In January 1981, the FMLN launched a large military 
offensive, gaining territory in the northern and eastern 
departments of Chalatenango and Morazan, both of which 
continue to be FMLN strongholds to this day.  In October 
1984, President Napoleon Duarte (1984-1989) began peace talks 
with the FMLN; however, the final peace accords would not be 
signed for another eight years.  During this time thousands 
more died in the fighting and the FMLN committed several high 
profile killings, including U.S. Embassy Marine Security 
Guards and other official Americas. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In May 1987, the FMLN issued a lis of conditions 
for peace including the establishmnt of a transitional 
government without election, the imposition of a socialist 
economy, and onging government support for FMLN guerrilla 
forces 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In 1988 and 1989, the FMLN went on a killing spree 
that included several democratically-elected mayors, Attorney 
General Roberto Garcia, Minister of the Presidency Jose 
Antonio Rodriguez Porth, Supreme Court President Francisco 
Guerrero, and other high profile victims.  In November 1989 
the FMLN launched the &Final Offensive8 on San Salvador 
which resulted in more than 2,000 civilian deaths. 
 
----------------------- 
After the Peace Accords 
----------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The FMLN laid down its arms and became an official 
political party in December 1991, one month before the FMLN 
and the Salvadoran government signed the Peace Accords ending 
the 12-year conflict.  (Note: the Peace Accords did not 
mention amnesty for crimes committed during the conflict, but 
the 1993 Amnesty Law has been an essential part of their 
success. End note.) In March 1994, the FMLN, as an official 
political party, participated in its first presidential 
election. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Despite legal recognition as a party, the 
coalition groups that made up the FMLN retained their 
identities and organizational structure.  However, this 
arrangement quickly proved troublesome and the five groups 
formally dissolved in 1995 to create a unified party. 
Despite the unification, strong loyalties and divisions still 
exist today, and many members continue to identify themselves 
with their original associations.  Newer FMLN members, 
particularly those who joined the party within the last five 
years, are far less likely to identify themselves with the 
PC, FPL, or other factions that existed during the war. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Further tensions emerged in 1999 when the FMLN 
nominated former guerrilla commander Facundo Guardado as its 
presidential candidate. This caused a deep division within 
the party and two organized factions emerged, the 
"Renovadores", led by supporters of Guardado, and the 
Revolutionary Socialist Current (CRS), led by hardliners 
Shafik Handal and Salvador Sanchez Ceren.  Guardado, although 
a popular former guerrilla commander, was considered too 
moderate by hardliners within the party, particularly the 
CRS.  After losing the election and engaging in several 
public spats with other FMLN members, Guardado lost control 
of the party at the next national council (one of the FMLN,s 
principle internal governance bodies) when the majority of 
the posts went to Handal and Sanchez Ceren,s bloc. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Even though ARENA has won every presidential 
election since the Peace Accords, the FMLN has made some 
inroads.  In the March 2000 elections, the FMLN won 31 of 84 
Legislative Assembly seats and won 78 of 262 municipalities. 
In March 2006, the FMLN won 32 of 84 seats (ARENA won 34 
seats) at the Legislative Assembly.  In 1997, the FMLN formed 
a coalition with the Democratic Change Party (CD) and the 
Unity Movement Party (MU) to win the mayorship of San 
Salvador, the most populated municipality in the country. The 
FMLN's strategy focused on populous urban areas, in addition 
to retaining a few rural strongholds from the war years. 
Currently the FMLN holds 11 of the 14 municipalities in the 
greater San Salvador area. 
 
-------------------------- 
The FMLN' Leadership Today 
-------------------------- 

¶14.  (SBU) The current FMLN leadership is composed of three 
branches:  The Political Committee, the National Council, and 
the Department Coordinators.  The Political Committee, the 
real power within the FMLN, is composed of 20 people, most of 
them members of the Communist Party (PC) or the Popular 
Liberation Forces (FPL).  The National Council is composed of 
36 people and, much like the Political Committee, most belong 
to the Communist Party or the FPL, except for a few who are 
members of the Revolutionary Party of Central America Workers 
(PRTC). According to several long-time observers of the FMLN, 
the PC has steadily maneuvered its former members into key 
positions of power utilizing its superior organizational 
skills. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Current prominent members of the Political 
Committee include General Coordinator Medardo Gonzalez, 
Deputy General Coordinator Luz Estrella Rodriguez de Zuniga, 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal Magistrate Eugenio Chicas 
Martinez, Jose Luis Merino, Norma Guevara, San Salvador Mayor 
Violeta Menjivar, Deputy Blanca Flor Bonilla, Youth 
Representative Hortensia Margarita Lopez, Orestes Ortez, 
Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz, Sigfrido Reyes, and Vice 
Presidential candidate Salvador Sanchez Ceren. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Current representatives of the PC are Deputy 
Blanca Flor Bonilla, Jose Luis Merino, former Deputy Lilian 
Coto, San Salvador city hall counselor Norma Guevara, 
Director for International Issues Otto Sigfriedo Reyes, and 
Supreme Court Justice and 1999 Vice Presidential Candidate 
Victoria Marina de Aviles.  Representatives of the FPL are 
San Salvador Mayor Violeta Menjivar and Legislative Assembly 
Chief of Faction Salvador Sanchez Ceren, the current vice 
presidential candidate.  Representatives of the ERP are 
National Council Member and Youth Representative Gloria Maria 
Anaya Perla.  Representatives of the PRTC are Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal Magistrate Eugenio Chicas and National 
Council Member Carlos Rodriguez. (Note: The FMLN requires 
that at least 30 percent of elected positions be held by 
women.) 
 
¶17.  (SBU) In addition, there are fourteen Department 
Coordinators, one from each department. The Department 
Coordinators have closer ties to the party base and typically 
serve as a conduit between the FMLN leadership and the base. 
 
------------------------- 
Moving Toward the Center? 
------------------------- 

¶18.  (C) Although many in the FMLN continue to oppose any 
move to the center and cling to pre- and civil war rhetoric 
and ideology, the party leadership has apparently taken the 
decision that in order to win, some changes, particularly the 
nomination of a candidate without war baggage, are necessary. 
FMLN insiders, including Assembly Deputy Hugo Martinez, who 
has no clear association with the wartime factions, tell us 
that the Funes campaign is drawing new supporters to the 
party, many who are actively helping the campaign.  Some of 
these reportedly come from the ranks of traditional ARENA 
supporters, particularly small businesses, and (they claim) 
even some former ARENA members.  While they do not see these 
newcomers creating conflict with the hardliners in the short 
term, they do see a looming challenge in how to deal with 
these new additions after the election in order to keep them 
in the party.  This challenge will be easier if the FMLN 
wins, but if it loses, its rigid structure and ideological 
strictures are ill suited to keeping this new membership 
satisfied. 
 
------------------ 
Funes and the FMLN 
------------------ 
 
¶19.  (SBU) In November 2007, the FMLN nominated Mauricio 
Funes, a popular television personality, as its presidential 
candidate and Salvador Sanchez Ceren, a long-time hardliner 
from the FPL, as the vice presidential candidate.  Funes, 
relationship with the FMLN is, however, still uncertain and 
likely evolving. 
 
¶20.  (C) Although the FMLN,s Political Committee's support 
for Funes stems from an obvious desire to win the upcoming 
elections, potential rifts in the relationship have appeared. 
 The FMLN,s choice of Funes, a former television 
personality, as their candidate was an acknowledgment that 
the FMLN needed a new face, and not a longtime FMLN 
hardliner, in order to mount a serious run at the presidency. 
 Nonetheless, Funes, independent streak and sometimes 
prickly nature (he is currently feuding with El Diario de 
Hoy, a leading daily newspaper), have already resulted in a 
few public squabbles with party officials. 
 
¶21.  (C) The FMLN has loudly criticized both dollarization 
and CAFTA since their adoption in 2001 and 2004; however last 
year Funes stated that he would not reverse either measure. 
Sigfriedo Reyes, member of the Political Committee and 
FMLN,s spokesman and Director for International Issues, 
quickly countered that that if the FMLN won the election, the 
&party8 would analyze the situation and make a decision. 
Many political analysts see this, coupled with Funes, 
refusal to answer questions about Venezuela, as potential 
rifts between Funes and the hardliners that control the 
party.  Some analysts are predicting an early &divorce8 
between Funes and the FMLN if Funes wins the election. Some 
party insiders, in contrast, claim to see less conflict 
between Funes and the old guard than they had expected. 
 
¶22.  (C) Comment: The battle for the future of the FMLN will 
play out both publicly and privately over the remaining ten 
months of the campaign.  The legislative slate, which will be 
announced in July, will be a signal of party direction, as 
internal rules require that at least six deputies stand down. 
 It is clear that Funes' candidacy is causing many swing 
voters to give the FMLN a second look (at least for now), and 
demonstrates that some may be willing to overlook Sanchez 
Ceren on the ticket. But many months remain before voters 
must cast their ballots and ARENA will use this time to 
remind voters of the FMLN's bloody history. 
 
¶23. (C) Comment continued: While the FMLN has a history of 
expelling reformers who deviate from ideological purity, the 
defenders of the faith are now the ones taking small steps to 
modernize with an eye toward electoral victory. Neither 
extreme outcome (i.e. the FMLN turns into Euro-style Social 
Democrats or Funes wins and is expelled by hardliners) seems 
likely at present. We expect, rather, that the remaining 
months of the campaign will allow the FMLN and Funes to forge 
a modus vivendi and seriously challenge ARENA for the 
ultimate electoral spoils. End comment. 
GLAZER