VZCZCXRO1321
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGO #0492/01 1691245
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171245Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7786
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1285
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4821
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8373
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5935
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1656
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1763
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000492 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: REGIME BACKTRACKING ON ITS CYCLONE RELIEF 
COMMITMENTS 
 
REF: A. A: RANGOON 471 
     ¶B. B: RANGOON 468 
 
RANGOON 00000492  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Vice Senior General Maung Aye appears to 
have taken control over the Cyclone Nargis relief efforts. 
The UN obtained some flexibility from Minister of Planning 
Soe Tha regarding the procedures the Minister announced June 
¶10.  However, the back and forth for easier access will 
likely continue slowing relief efforts.  The Post Nargis 
Joint Assessment (PONJA) is going well, although the GOB has 
not yet shared data it had agreed to.  Assessment teams found 
five villages that had not yet been reached with relief 
goods, and nine WFP helicoptes continue to deliver relief 
supplies several times a day.  On June 10, the Minister of 
Planning ordered WFP to cease its cash assistance program in 
Rangoon Division because it was not using the official 
exchange rate of 6 kyat/1USD which no one in Burma uses.  End 
Summary 
 
¶2.  (SBU) UN Acting Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator Dan 
Baker told donor representatives he met with Minister of 
Planning Soe Tha on June 13, to clarify the new humanitarian 
assistance guidelines the Minister had issued to the UN and 
INGOs on June 10 (Ref A).  The two-and-a-half hour meeting 
began with Soe Tha giving a one-and-a-half hour monologue on 
his positive view of the relief efforts.  Baker responded 
that the Minister,s new guidelines had complicated relief 
efforts and the new guidelines were a roadblock.  NGOs were 
confused about which ministry to go to for travel permits and 
the line ministries were not granting the expedited approval 
the GOB had promised for international assistance workers at 
the TCG meetings.  Baker emphasized the NGOs needed clear, 
quick procedures and standardized forms, not another 
bureaucratic layer. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Baker reported that Soe Tha seemed surprised that 
the procedures caused delays.  The Minister agreed to 
Baker,s suggestion that INGOs with no clear or established 
line ministry could seek permission through the ministry of 
Social Welfare.  He also indicated that the Ministry of 
Planning would be flexible regarding the requirement that 
international staff travel with GOB liaisons.  He clarified 
that relief goods could go directly to the field and did not 
need to first be stored in Rangoon.  Soe Tha also said that a 
statement of intent regarding distribution of relief supplies 
would satisfy the requirement for a township-wide 
distribution plan, and international aid workers did not have 
to check in personally with Township Coordination Committees, 
but could rather send a representative to notify the 
committees of their arrival and departure in their respective 
areas.  Baker also recommended each ministry designate a 
focal person for the UN and INGOs to work with concerning 
necessary permissions. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Since the TCG had just been set up two weeks 
earlier as the relief coordination mechanism, the Minister of 
Planning had totally bypassed it.  Baker suggested that the 
Minister of Planning join the TCG.  Baker said that ASEAN TCG 
Co-Chair Robert Chua had forcefully raised the new guidelines 
with the GOB at a June 14 TCG meeting, as had ASEAN General 
Secretary Surin Pitsuan during a visit to Burma the same day. 
 UNDP Deputy Sanaka Samarasinha observed that Vice Senior 
General Maung Aye had taken authority over relief efforts 
from the more pragmatic Prime Minister, Thein Sein (Ref A). 
Since the Minister of Planning was close to Maung Aye, he 
speculated that the Planning Minister had also injected 
himself into the process. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Baker noted that during the last two TCG meetings, 
GOB TCG chair and Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu refused to 
say anything, which Baker concluded was Kyaw Thu,s 
recognition that his authority had been superseded.  Although 
Baker acknowledged that the new procedures had created 
further delays, he emphasized that UN and NGO international 
staff were obtaining permission to travel to the Delta, and 
had even obtained permission to be stationed there.  He had 
 
RANGOON 00000492  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
urged the GOB to grant "multiple-entry" travel permits to 
facilitate travel and minimize bureaucracy. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The ongoing Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) 
Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) teams had covered 84 of 128 
quadrants.  The World Bank representative reported good 
cooperation from local authorities.  Teams had already begun 
to analyze the data collected.  Although the Assessment teams 
had received some data from township authorities and 
ministries, the Ministry of Planning had not yet shared the 
aggregate data they collected on damage and loss in the 
cyclone affected areas, as previously agreed.  Baker said the 
UN had not been able to obtain this data from the Ministry of 
Planning either.  The DaLA assessors had to rely on secondary 
data so planned to compare the data they received with the 
more detailed data gathered by the Village Tract Assessors. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Baker reported that the Village Tract Assessment 
(VTA) was on target to finish on June 19, although the team 
was slightly behind on its data entry due to equipment 
breakdowns.  So far, the assessors had found five villages 
south of Labutta Township that had received no relief 
whatsoever, so the UN had dispatched its helicopters to 
quickly deliver food, shelter and water.  In response to a 
question by the AUSAID representative, Baker said the UN had 
no reports that the presence of Home Affairs (police) 
officials on the assessment teams had hindered cyclone 
victims from speaking openly about their needs. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Baker said some results of the assessment would be 
shared at the ASEAN roundtable planned for June 24-25, and a 
revised flash appeal would be issued in Geneva on July 3. 
The final assessment report was scheduled to be released on 
July 12.  Regarding financing for long-term recovery and 
rebuilding, the UN and the World Bank were taking a 
"wait-and-see" approach.  If the GOB remained "open and 
positive" to the relief effort, the international community 
would likely respond positively.  The UN would continue to 
evaluate how the relief effort was proceeding for a possible 
donor,s conference in September.  The representative from 
the UN,s Coordination Office in New York said it did not 
make sense to have another conference until donors had an 
opportunity to see how assistance was being implemented on 
the ground. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) WFP Representative Chris Kaye noted that nine WFP 
helicopters were currently operating and reaching villages 
with critical needs.  Kaye also reported that on June 10, the 
Minister of Planning ordered WFP to cease its cash assistance 
programs in Rangoon Division because it was not using the 
official government exchange rate of 6 kyat/1 USD which no 
one in Burma uses.  Kaye sent a letter to the Minister 
protesting the rationale of his decision and noting the 
Minister,s order challenged the WFP,s humanitarian 
imperative in Burma. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) UNDP noted that agricultural input needs must be 
integrated with other relief and early recovery efforts as 
the GOB was focusing its seed assistance only on farmers who 
own sixty acres or more.  Accordingly the UN would focus on 
small landowners and the landless.  UNDP suspended repayment 
requirements for the 50,000 active borrowers participating in 
its micro-credit program in the Delta, while permitting 
members to withdraw savings.  Thus, UNDP would need an 
infusion of cash to meet the liquidity requirements of both 
its micro-credit program, with $3million in outstanding 
loans, and funds for its self-reliance groups in the cyclone 
affected areas. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Comment: As we have seen too often the GOB will 
make a concession and then start backtracking.  The TCG 
mechanism showed some promise to facilitate access for 
disaster relief efforts.  It did succeed in getting a 
comprehensive needs assessment launched.  However, the senior 
generals cannot resist micromanaging everything and the 
disaster relief effort is the most massive international 
 
RANGOON 00000492  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
undertaking in Burma in years.  The UN and NGOs which have 
been working here are used to this behavior and adept at 
pushing back or going around the obstacles constantly being 
erected.  The UN and World Bank do not need to be planning 
ahead for longer-term efforts since there will be no donor 
money forthcoming if they cannot ensure adequate access and 
accountability.  That will continue to be a struggle. 
VILLAROSA