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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW1688, REP. ROHRABACHER MEETS WITH ROSATOM'S KIRIYENKO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1688 2008-06-13 12:48 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1688/01 1651248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131248Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8590
INFO RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MOSCOW 001688 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP OREP PREL RS
SUBJECT: REP. ROHRABACHER MEETS WITH ROSATOM'S KIRIYENKO 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Rosatom Director General Sergey Kiriyenko welcomed 
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher's strong support for the U.S.-Russia 
123 Agreement during a June 3 meeting at Rosatom.  Congressman 
Rohrabacher highlighted the potential for bilateral collaboration in 
the development of a high temperature gas cooled reactor.  Kiriyenko 
agreed the technology was promising, but added that U.S funding for 
joint R and D should not come out of the $400 million the U.S. has 
pledged under the Plutonium Disposition Agreement.   Kiriyenko noted 
that Russia has called on Iran to cease enrichment and offered Iran 
ways to guarantee its nuclear fuel supply without enriching. 
Kiriyenko expressed concern about a bill drafted by Senator Domenici 
which would impose new restrictions on future Russian exports of low 
enriched uranium to the U.S. market.  End Summary. 
 
U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Rosatom State Corporation Director General Sergey 
Kiriyenko received Congressman Rohrabacher and Charge at Rosatom 
June 3.   Joining Kiriyenko were Rosatom Deputy Director General 
Nikolay Spasskiy and three Rosatom Department Directors.   Kiriyenko 
welcomed Congressman Rohrabacher's expression of strong support for 
the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. 
Congressman Rohrabacher confirmed that some of his colleagues on 
Capitol Hill opposed the Agreement because of Russia's involvement 
in Iran's civilian nuclear program.   Kiriyenko thanked the 
Congressman for his frankness. 
 
Bilateral Civilian Nuclear Cooperation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Kiriyenko was optimistic about the potential for expanded 
U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear and nonproliferation cooperation.  He 
observed that the best way to combat lingering cold war mindsets on 
both sides was to increase cooperation through concrete projects. 
He highlighted U.S.-Russian cooperation in bringing about the 
shutdown of the plutonium-generating reactor in Seversk.  He also 
praised the longstanding HEU-LEU program as a major achievement in 
advancing nonproliferation goals while supplying a significant 
portion of the fuel used by U.S. nuclear power plants. 
 
4.  (SBU) The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) offers an 
additional avenue for enhanced cooperation, Kiriyenko observed. 
GNEP is consistent with Russia's call for International Uranium 
Enrichment Centers, such as the one in Angarsk.  GNEP and 
International Enrichment Centers will help promote the safe use of 
nuclear power by developing countries. 
 
High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (SBU) Congressman Rohrabacher stressed that the development of 
high temperature gas cooled reactors could serve as a foundation for 
enhanced bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation.  He follows the 
development of the technology closely, since General Atomics is 
located in Southern California.  High temperature gas cooled 
reactors would be cleaner and safer and fit the goal of providing 
the benefits of nuclear power technology to developing countries 
without increasing the proliferation risk.  Rohrabacher recounted 
how he had met the day before with the Vice President of the 
Kurchatov Institute, Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy, who is a strong 
proponent of the gas cooled reactor.  In Stepnoy's view, this joint 
U.S.-Russian program was the only genuine current cooperative civil 
nuclear research project. 
 
Gas Cooled Reactors and the Plutonium Disposition Agreement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Kiriyenko agreed that since high temperature gas cooled 
reactors could burn plutonium efficiently they had strong 
non-proliferation potential.  He welcomed Russian cooperation with 
General Atomics and favored intensifying it.  Kiriyenko observed 
that Rosatom's twenty year strategic plan contained funding for 
research and development of the high temperature gas reactors. 
 
7.  (SBU) Kiriyenko noted that the U.S. and Russia are still engaged 
in negotiations on the Plutonium Disposition agreement.  Kiriyenko 
maintained that when he and Secretary Bodman signed the Joint 
Statement on the Agreement in November 2007, Secretary Bodman had 
agreed to include research into the gas cooled reactors under the 
Agreement's auspices.  However, Russia believed that U.S. funding 
for R and D into the gas cooled reactors should be in addition to 
the $400 million set out for the Plutonium Disposition program.  The 
U.S. side wanted to take funding out of the $400 million. 
(Rohrabacher heard much the same from Kurchatov's Ponomarev-Stepnoy. 
 If the U.S. did not provide additional funds, Stepnoy warned, 
Kiriyenko would continue to support the effort, but not as a joint 
project, effectively cutting off the existing flow of R and D 
information.) 
 
8.  (SBU) Congressman Rohrabacher said he would speak with Senator 
Lugar and inquire whether CTR funds might be used for purposes of 
development of the gas reactor given its effectiveness in burning 
plutonium. 
 
Russian-Iranian Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Charge asked Kiriyenko to describe the state of 
Russian-Iranian civil nuclear cooperation.  Kiriyenko said Russia's 
position is clear: it firmly opposes Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. 
 Russia's analysis of the risk is similar to that outlined in the 
U.S. NIE on Iran: Russia has no evidence that Iran has an active 
weapons program but can not rule out that such a program exists. 
Russian leaders, including Putin, have told Iranian counterparts 
that if they seek only civilian nuclear power, then their enrichment 
program makes no sense.  Enrichment only makes economic sense if it 
can supply a base of ten or, preferably, twenty reactors.  Iran has 
only one reactor -- Bushehr -- and Russia will supply all the fuel 
for it and take away all waste.  From an economic perspective, the 
Iranian enrichment program thus makes no sense for civilian uses. 
 
10.  (SBU) The Iranians reply that they are moving forward in the 
fuel cycle in order to have an assured fuel supply, Kiriyenko said. 
Russia has responded that it is willing to provide Iran with 
assurances of supply, as long as Iran remains in good standing with 
the IAEA.  An international enrichment center, such as the one in 
Angarsk operating under IAEA auspices, can institutionalize such 
assurances.  Russia's provision of fuel to Bushehr demonstrates that 
Iran need not fear a cut-off of fuel and that its enrichment program 
is entirely unnecessary. 
 
11.  (SBU) Kiriyenko said that in his personal opinion, sanctions 
against Iran will not stop its enrichment program unless the 
sanctions target Iran's oil and gas sector.  Only then would Iran 
take sanctions seriously.  But the costs of such action could be as 
detrimental to the West as to Iran.  The spike in prices would, 
however, not hurt Russia, given its status as an exporter, he 
observed. 
 
Amendment to the Uranium Anti-Dumping Suspension Agreement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Kiriyenko recounted how in February he and Secretary 
Gutierrez had signed the amendment to the Uranium Anti-Dumping 
Suspension Agreement.  The amendment, Kiriyenko said, was important 
in providing stability by granting Russia a fixed percentage of the 
U.S. market.   U.S. utilities were in favor of it.  While Russia had 
hoped for more than 20 percent of the U.S. market, they had signed 
on.  With the advent of a bill by Senator Domenici, however, the 
Suspension Agreement appears in jeopardy.   Senator Domenici's bill 
would have the effect of voiding the Suspension Agreement, Kiriyenko 
said.  The bill would insist that imports of LEU to the U.S. from 
Russia could only be from down blended HEU, according to Kiriyenko. 
(Note:  We understand that the Domenici bill actually permits 
400,000 kg/year of Russian LEU imports to the United States 
beginning in 2014, but any imports beyond that would be linked to 
down blended HEU.)  Russia could not meet that condition.  Kiriyenko 
said he might write a letter to the U.S. Administration laying out 
the issue.  (Note:  On June 5, Kiriyenko did send a letter to Energy 
Secretary Bodman highlighting Russian concerns with the Domenici 
bill.) 
 
13.  (SBU) Congressman Rohrabacher concluded the meeting by 
reiterating his belief in the important role U.S.-Russian 
collaboration could play in developing a new generation of safe and 
clean nuclear reactors.  He underlined that success in that endeavor 
would spread the benefits of nuclear power worldwide while reducing 
proliferation risk. 
 
RUSSELL