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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW1587, DFM BORODAVKIN DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1587 2008-06-04 11:59 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO0897
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1587/01 1561159
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041159Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8413
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 2048
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4393
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2483
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0527
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL OREP CH PK TX RS AF
SUBJECT: DFM BORODAVKIN DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND 
CHINA WITH CONGRESSMAN ROHRABACHER 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In a May 31 meeting, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Borodavkin was pleased Congressman Rohrabacher 
valued Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, but explained that 
Russia was disappointed in the response received so far to 
its offers of assistance.  Borodavkin and Rohrabacher agreed 
on the need to eradicate the Afghan drug trade that financed 
extremists, and discussed a potential project to rehabilitate 
a Soviet-constructed aqueduct system as a means to provide an 
agricultural alternative to growing poppies.  Borodavkin 
expressed concern over attempts to integrate the Taliban into 
local governments, arguing that this simply concealed the 
re-Talibanization of Afghanistan.  He cautioned against 
placing too much confidence in the ability of the new 
Pakistani government to deal with extremists and reiterated 
Russian concern that authorities maintain control of the 
nation's nuclear weapons.  Borodavkin disagreed with 
Rohrabacher's assessment of the threat China presented to 
Russia and said that the GOR sought closer ties with both 
China and the U.S.  Borodavkin questioned Turkmenistan's 
capacity to provide gas for the proposed Trans-Afghanistan 
Pipeline and expressed irritation at pipelines intended to 
avoid Russian territory at "any cost."  End summary. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
2. (SBU) In a May 31 meeting with Congressman Rohrabacher and 
the Charge, DFM Borodavkin stated that Russia was willing to 
share with the U.S. and NATO its considerable experience in 
Afghanistan, presenting an opportunity for Russia-U.S. 
cooperation.  Borodavkin said, however, that the GOR was not 
always "satisfied" with the response given to its offers of 
assistance, particularly its proposal for the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to cooperate with NATO. 
He also cited NATO allies supplying Afghanistan with 
unlicensed, Russian-designed weapons as an irritant for 
Moscow.  Borodavkin stressed, however, that the GOR placed 
such importance upon stabilizing Afghanistan that it hoped to 
continue assistance efforts already undertaken.  He cited the 
GOR's willingness to forgive Afghanistan's $10 billion Soviet 
era debt, the provision of Russian military assistance worth 
$200 million in 2002-5, $30 million provided for humanitarian 
aid, and an upcoming $4 million donation to the World Bank 
trust fund for Afghan healthcare and education. 
 
3. (SBU) Rohrabacher explained that he supported increased 
U.S.-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan, and explained that he 
and other Members of Congress were examining the prospect of 
obtaining U.S. funding for rehabilitating Soviet-constructed 
aqueducts in Afghanistan, which were necessary to expand 
non-poppy agricultural production.  Rohrabacher suggested 
that the GOR lend its technical experience to help restore 
this crucial irrigation system.  This project could help draw 
Afghans away from the poppy trade and demonstrate to the 
world that Russians and Americans were involved in 
"reconstruction, not destruction."  Borodavkin said that the 
GOR would study the idea of a joint project to restore the 
aqueduct system, while noting that Russian firms were already 
involved in a handful of Afghan infrastructure projects. 
Concern for security was, however, the greatest hindrance to 
further Russian activity. 
 
4. (SBU) Borodavkin said that the GOR did not share 
Rohrabacher's favorable assessment of developments in 
Afghanistan, and reiterated Russian concern over local 
governments "merging" with the Taliban in an attempt to 
co-opt Talib supporters.  Borodavkin argued that this simply 
"concealed" the Taliban's return to power and more closely 
connected local governments with the narcotics traffickers 
financing Afghan insurgents.  Rohrabacher told Borodavkin of 
the plan he advocated to have the Afghan government and NATO 
combat poppy growing by "making deals" with local Afghan 
leaders who would agree to oversee a halt in poppy production 
in exchange for rebuilding local infrastructure.  If, after 
several years, the local leaders had failed, or were not 
willing, to halt poppy production, all poppy fields would be 
eradicated.  Borodavkin said the pressure felt by Afghan 
farmers to grow cost-efficient poppies over less lucrative 
crops required applying "law enforcement measures" as well as 
offering economic incentives.  The GOR hoped the June 12 
Paris Donors Conference would present an opportunity to 
convince the Afghan authorities to be "more resolute" in 
their anti-Taliban activities. 
 
Pakistan 
-------- 
 
MOSCOW 00001587  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Borodavkin cautioned Rohrabacher against being too 
optimistic about the change in government in Pakistan, 
explaining that the GOR saw the new Pakistani government's 
efforts to appease extremists in the tribal areas as an 
"unfavorable development" that could hinder anti-Taliban 
efforts in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Borodavkin 
stressed Russia's concern that the Pakistani government 
retain control of the country's nuclear weapons.  He said 
that while Russia was not a "great supporter" of Musharraf's 
government, when a totalitarian regime is removed a period of 
instability often follows. 
 
China 
----- 
 
6. (SBU) Rohrabacher explained that international stability 
required closer U.S.-Russia cooperation, particularly given 
Chinese ambitions.  Borodavkin responded that Russia did not 
seek closer ties with the U.S. as an antidote to China, but 
benefited from closer ties with both countries.  He assured 
Rohrabacher that Russia continued to develop economically and 
would not fall behind the emergent China depicted by the 
Congressman. 
 
Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) In response to Rohrabacher's question about the 
proposed Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline that would carry gas from 
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, 
Borodavkin said in principle the GOR supported such efforts 
if the economic need existed and the countries involved had 
the means to provide the required resources.  He doubted, 
however, that Turkmenistan had the capacity to send gas 
through the proposed pipeline while also meeting existing 
obligations to provide gas to Russian companies.  Borodavkin 
also expressed Russia's pique over pipelines devised to avoid 
Russian territory at "any cost." 
 
8. (U) Congressman Rohrabacher did not have an opportunity to 
clear this cable. 
RUSSELL