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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, DRL 
NSC FOR FISK, ALVARADO 
STATE PASS USAID FOR CARDENAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2018 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S TWO CAUDILLOS MOVE FURTHER TOWARDS 
TWO-PARTY RULE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, Reasons, 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) 
has initiated proceedings to revoke the legal registration of 
two minority national democratic parties, the leftist 
Movement for Sandinista Renovation (MRS) and the center-right 
Conservative Party (PC).  These two parties, representing 
between 10 and 20 percent of the electorate, would be the 
only two significant alternatives to the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) and Constitutional Liberal Party 
(PLC) on the November municipal elections ballot; the loss of 
registration will prevent their participation.  The MRS, in 
particular, has experienced growing organizational strength 
and rising poll numbers in the recent months and has the 
potential to make inroads at the FSLN's expense.  The CSE's 
move lacks sound legal footing and appears orchestrated by 
President Daniel Ortega and PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman (who 
control the magistrates on the CSE) to eliminate potential 
electoral alternatives to their two parties, further narrow 
democratic space, and set the stage for their power-sharing 
arrangement, the Pacto, to continue unchecked in the 
post-election period.  END SUMMARY. 
 
REVOKING REGISTRATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) PLC Deputy and First Deputy President of the National 
Assembly, Wilfredo Navarro (Aleman's most obsequiously loyal 
congressional henchman) sent a letter in mid-May to the CSE 
requesting an investigation into the PC's compliance with the 
Electoral Law, as well as that of two smaller Atlantic Coast 
parties -- PAMUC and PIM.  Navarro has subsequently denied 
responsibility for the letter, unconvincingly claiming it was 
inspired by disgruntled PC Deputies in the National Assembly 
who have been engaged in a public fight with PC President 
Azalia Aviles over the decision by the PC to run 
independently in the local elections.  PC Deputies have told 
us Navarro's assertions are nonsense and represent part of a 
continued effort by Aleman's cronies to create problems in 
the alliance between the PLC and the "Vamos con Eduardo" 
movement of former Presidential candidate and current Managua 
mayoral candidate Eduardo Montealegre.  In a suspicious 
display of bi-partisanship, the FSLN made a similar appeal to 
the CSE to investigate the MRS. 
 
¶3. (C) The Electoral Law, modified several years ago as part 
of the Pacto arrangement by Aleman and Ortega, requires a 
party to register candidates in 80 percent of the country's 
153 municipalities as well as for 80 percent of the seats 
open for election, including mayor, vice-mayor and 18 council 
seats in each municipality.  The law also establishes 
stringent conditions for parties to establish legal 
representation at the municipal, departmental and national 
levels, including legal proof establishing these 
representations filed with and certified by the CSE.  The 
CSE, a fourth branch of the government independent of the 
National Assembly or the Courts, is split between the FSLN 
and PLC, with all the magistrates beholden personally to 
Ortega and Aleman respectively for their positions.  If a 
party fails to comply with these requirements, the CSE has 
the authority to revoke the party's "personeria juridica" 
(legal personhood/registration), thereby prohibiting the 
party from participating in elections or even using the party 
name and insignia. 
 
PC AND MRS PUSH BACK, BUT DOUBTFUL OF SUCCESS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Former PC Deputy and current national campaign manager 
Alejandro Bolanos told us that the party has submitted a 
series of documents to the CSE, including an analysis 
prepared by a leading Sandinista-affiliated NGO, that 
demonstrate that the PC has more than complied with the 
requirements of the electoral law.  Bolanos reported they 
have fielded candidates in 89 percent of all municipalities, 
if you include those in the Atlantic North where elections 
have been suspended.  If those municipalities are discounted, 
they enjoy representation in 93 percent.  Similarly, they 
have well over 85 percent representation of the seats up for 
election, though not all of the candidates are seriously 
competing.  Bolanos lamented that the CSE-ordered, hastily 
 
MANAGUA 00000706  002 OF 003 
 
 
advanced electoral calendar completely disrupted the PC's 
efforts to build a more comprehensive national slate, and 
forced the party to scramble for candidates to fill the slots 
needed and to comply with the requirements. 
 
¶5. (C) Bolanos estimates that the PC can realistically 
compete in about 30 municipalities with a serious shot at 
winning at least 10 mayorships as well as many more council 
seats.  However, the campaign is hindered by the lack of 
funds (many of the PC's financial backers have sided with the 
PC deputies who opposed running as an independent party) and 
a lack of certainty and enthusiasm among activists caused by 
the registration issue.  He expects that the CSE will drag 
out the final decision on registration in order to further 
dampen activism, before eventually issuing an edict to revoke 
the party's registration in mid-summer.  "They will drag this 
out to defeat us psychologically." 
 
¶6. (C) MRS Deputy Victor Hugo Tinoco echoed the assessment of 
Bolanos, noting that while the MRS also had registered in 
over 90 percent of the municipalities, the advanced electoral 
calendar created significant problems for organizing the 
party in every municipality.  Tinoco suggested that while the 
party is still "young," it is much stronger today than two 
years ago, which is precisely why the FSLN wants to "take 
them out of the game."  Even though their list of candidates 
had already been certified, the CSE is now going over every 
document to find an "excuse" to de-register the party. 
Tinoco called the process "arbitrary" and believes the MRS 
has to fight back forcefully if it wants to avoid permanent 
elimination. 
 
ELIMINATING ALTERNATIVES 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Bolanos commented that the damage of the loss of party 
registration for the PC would be severe and lasting.  In key 
municipalities, such as Granada and the surrounding area, 
de-certification would hand the FSLN mayorships they would 
have otherwise been unable to win.  Moreover, Bolanos 
suggested that it will be impossible for the PC (or the MRS) 
to register a new party in less than four years, ensuring 
that there will be no democratic alternative party to 
challenge the PLC and the FSLN in the national elections in 
¶2011. Tinoco was less pessimistic about the MRS's ability to 
obtain a new registration, probably in part because the MRS 
is a coalition of several groups, some of which could 
conceivably serve as the basis for a new party.  Nonetheless, 
Tinoco agreed that the re-registration and re-organization 
effort would drain vital resources and time away from efforts 
to challenge the FSLN in 2011. 
 
¶8. (C) PC and MRS leaders with whom we spoke expressed the 
same view -- that the effort to revoke party registrations is 
designed to eliminate all potential non-Pacto alternatives 
for the voters in the municipal elections and beyond.  Recent 
polling indicates that 40 percent of likely voters are 
independents, and at least 20 percent of FSLN voters are 
unhappy with Ortega's anti-democratic tendencies.  Similarly, 
Aleman's power base rests with his control over the CSE, the 
Supreme Court and other structures and not with the party 
base.  Both Ortega and Aleman would benefit from elimination 
of electoral alternatives to their parties - driving the 
growing number of independent voters back to their respective 
parties -- or the abstention column.  Tinoco believes the end 
result will be a "two caudillo system" in which Aleman gets 
his full freedom restored and Ortega ensures the perpetuation 
of his power and hold on the presidency.  NGO Etica y 
Transparencia leader Roberto Courtney suggested to us that 
Aleman and the PLC would probably benefit the most from this 
arrangement, picking up many more votes and possibly altering 
the balance of power within the Pacto. 
 
¶9. (C) Aviles and former MRS presidential candidate Edmundo 
Jarquin commented to us that, with the PC and the MRS 
potentially out of the picture, the Pacto will then devote 
all its attention to the "destruction" of Managua mayor 
candidate Eduardo Montealegre.  As the last remaining 
alternative to the Pacto, Montealegre's political fortunes 
"would be a matter of life or death for Aleman."  Aviles and 
Jarquin expect Montealegre to be forced out of the campaign 
 
MANAGUA 00000706  003 OF 003 
 
 
by August and to be replaced by an Aleman crony, possibly his 
wife or daughter.  Similarly, with Aleman and Ortega 
controlling the entire vote counting mechanism, via their 
grip on the CSE, Jarquin and Aviles noted that they will be 
able to ensure that none of Montealegre's candidates within 
the PLC-VCE alliance are elected.  Reinforcing this view, the 
Prosecutor General's office announced on June 2 that a 
decision on a criminal case involving Montealegre's 
involvement in the CENIS issue would be ready in late July. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) It is still not clear at this point whether the CSE 
will proceed with the elimination of the PC and MRS.  Bolanos 
is probably correct in his view that simply prolonging the 
decision has much the same effect -- by dampening enthusiasm 
and participation among activists, donors and candidates.  A 
long count may also serve to drive away more of the 
independent voters from politics, increasing Aleman and 
Ortega's share of the voting population.  Regardless, the 
threat of the elimination of the PC and MRS represents yet 
another step by the Ortega government, with Aleman's active 
support, to narrow democratic space, eliminate potential 
challenges, and strengthen the absolute political control of 
their rather unique parasitic symbiosis. 
 
 
TRIVELLI