Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KIGALI422, TRANSFER OF GENOCIDE SUSPECTS TO RWANDA - UK

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KIGALI422.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KIGALI422 2008-06-18 14:03 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kigali
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0422/01 1701403
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181403Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5390
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0244
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0332
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1147
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1915
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0467
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0250
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1243
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0511
UNCLAS KIGALI 000422 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM RW
SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF GENOCIDE SUSPECTS TO RWANDA - UK 
"YES," ICTR "NOT YET" 
 
REF: A. KIGALI 369 
 
     B. KIGALI 380 
     C. KIGALI 415 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Rwanda has received three different 
judicial evaluations recently of its capacity to try 1994 
genocide suspects returned from abroad.  A British district 
judge most recently ruled in favor of the extradition of four 
individuals to Rwanda for trial, citing sufficient judicial 
independence and legal protections.  Two ICTR rulings 
differed in their treatment of Rwandan judicial failings, but 
welcomed futher progress by Rwanda that might justify a later 
transfer of suspects.  While pleased with the British 
decision, the ICTR rulings dented Rwanda's claims to being 
fully prepared for case transfers of genocide suspects.  Each 
decision will likely be appealed.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU)  Local reaction to the British decision was quite 
enthusiastic.  The judge decided that the charges brought 
against the four were not ethnically motivated, and that the 
2007 Rwandan Organic Law on the transfer of cases from the 
ICTR provided enough legal support and protection for 
potential witnesses and the suspects for their extradition. 
Noting the lack of a extradition treaty, the judge found a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the two governments 
sufficient for transfer.  The British judge did not spare 
criticism of the Government of Rwanda (GOR) in his ruling, 
noting there was "fundamental agreement" that the GOR is "not 
a democracy, but an authoritarian state," where freedom of 
the press is lacking.  However, he rejected arguments that a 
"culture of interference attempts" by government officials in 
the past, and recent "intemperate language" by GOR officials 
on the Spanish indictments constituted a lack of judicial 
independence which would prevent extradition. 
 
3. (SBU) In his ruling (note: unofficial copy obtained 
locally by the embassy), the British judge also brusquely 
dismissed testimony from "expert" defense witnesses and vocal 
GOR critics including "Hotel Rwanda" subject Paul 
Rusesabagina and Dutch academic Filip Reyntjens, questioning 
their expertise and knowledge of Rwanda and its judicial 
system as they exist today.  The judge called some of 
Rusesabagina's claims, including placing the blame for the 
genocide on members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and 
of RPA participation in killings at genocide roadblocks, 
"worthless, wild, and exaggerated."  The pro-government New 
Times seized on this portion of the decision, printing it in 
its entirety under the headline, "How a UK judge exposed and 
shamed Paul Rusesabagina." 
 
 4.  (SBU) Reaction to the ICTR decisions was more muted.  In 
the first ICTR panel decision, judges cited GOR condemnation 
of the Spanish indictment of 40 senior Rwandan military 
officials (ref A) as evidence of its antipathy to judicial 
independence (ref B).  The panel also cited witness 
protection problems and technical sentencing issues regarding 
possible life sentences with solitary confinement as reasons 
for denial of transfer.  A second ICTR panel days later ruled 
against the transfer of another genocide suspect for similar 
witness protection concerns and technical sentencing issues 
regarding solitary confinement.  However, the second ICTR 
panel examined but rejected the notion of a lack of judicial 
independence in Rwanda, and in fact commended GOR progress in 
Qindependence in Rwanda, and in fact commended GOR progress in 
the judicial sector.  The two ICTR decisions explicitly 
invited further progress and reforms by the GOR. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment:  The jury is still out on whether the 
international community will ultimately accept the transfer 
of genocide cases to Rwanda.   While the GOR is certainly 
pleased with the UK decision supporting extradition (and also 
rubbishing two principal opposition critics), the ICTR 
decisions have dented its claims to be fully prepared for the 
return of principal genocide suspects.  As noted in ref C, 
the recent GOR indictment and arrest of four RPA officers for 
revenge killings in the 1994 tragedy may not be a 
coincidence, as Rwanda seeks to convince the world that 
Rwanda will seek justice and render it fairly.   End comment. 
WELLER