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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM938, ABYEI ROADMAP IMPLENTATION: DUTCH LEGAL ADVISOR BRIEFS AEC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM938 2008-06-25 07:25 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2542
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0938 1770725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250725Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1147
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000938 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
L/AN FOR CHRISTINA SANFORD 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI ROADMAP IMPLENTATION: DUTCH LEGAL ADVISOR BRIEFS AEC 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 928 
 
1.  (SBU) On June 23, Dutch arbitration advisor J.G. Lammers briefed 
international partners of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission 
(AEC) on the Terms of Reference (TOR) on arbitration of the Abyei 
boundaries dispute, agreed to by the NCP and the SPLM.  Prof. 
Lammers said that the two sides have agreed on all of the main 
issues involved in the arbitration. 
 
2.  (SBU) Under the TOR, the two parties to the arbitration will be 
the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), the two parties to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA).  The venue will be the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the 
Hague.  The arbitration panel will be made up of five members, two 
selected by the GoS, two selected by the SPLM, the fifth member to 
be chosen by the first four. The GoS and the SPLM will make their 
choices from the members of the Court of Arbitration.  Lammers 
commented that he believed that the two parties had limited their 
choices in this way to avoid politicizing the membership of the 
panel.  Dutch Ambassador Wolfe remarked that the Court of 
Arbitration has over 100 years of experience in resolving boundary 
disputes, including the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Thus 
the Permanent Court has a long list of precedents on which to draw, 
covering any legal eventuality that might come up in the current 
dispute.  (Comment: Of course, this doesn't mean that the parties 
will have the political will to implement the court's ruling, it 
just means the court has a long history ruling on such cases. End 
comment.) 
 
3.  (SBU) The issue for the panel to decide will be whether the 
Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) exceeded its mandate under the 
Abyei Protocol of the CPA when it issued its report on the borders 
of the Abyei region.  If the panel determines that the ABC acted 
within its mandate, then its report will stand as the final borders 
of Abyei.  If the panel determines that the Commission exceeded its 
mandate, then the arbitration panel will determine those boundaries 
based on "the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to 
Kordofan in 1905," per the CPA.  Lammers said that the TOR dos not 
include an enforcement provision, but that such a provision would be 
unusual in a case such as this. 
 
4. (SBU) Separately, Norwegian Oil envoy Anders Hannevik told CDA 
that he believes it is a mistake for the parties to resort to 
arbitration on the Abyei border.  Hannevik believes this "removes 
chips from the table" in the negotiation on future oil revenue 
sharing arrangements assuming that the South secedes.  He also 
feared the parties would view the ruling as producing a "winner" and 
a "loser."  However, Hannevik was pleased that the June 8 Abyei 
agreement set a precedent for separating land from oil in future 
discussions, since although Heglig is not part of the interim 
border, its oil revenues will be shared.  Hannevik believes the 
international community should begin advising the CPA parties now on 
possible scenarios for oil revenue sharing - and other issues that 
must be negotiated such as debt, border security, taxes and customs, 
etc - to prevent conflict as 2011 approaches.  Even if the South 
does not secede, Hannevik believes the parties need advice on the 
security of the oil fields.  Hannevik reported that when he last 
traveled to the oil fields in Unity State, he noticed that many of 
the "soldiers" in the area actually appeared to be militia or other 
armed groups very loosely tied to the SPLA.  CDA and poloffs 
observed that the presence of armed ethnic militias in oil areas is 
a recipe for instability in the long run. CDA noted that one could 
eventually see a "Nigerian" scenario, where these ethnic militias 
disrupt supplies in order to get more attention or acquire more 
funds for local needs. 
 
5.  (SBU) Comment: While we agree with Hannevik that an early 
discussion of oil revenue sharing scenarios is much needed, we 
disagree that it was a mistake to remove the discussion of Abyei's 
borders from political negotiations.  The parties have been unable 
to reach a compromise on Abyei's borders for almost three years and 
have often pointed to arbitration as a solution.  Hannevik's 
observations on ethnic militias in the oil areas are sobering, and 
point to the desperate need to encourage real development in 
marginalized areas including those where oil is produced. 
 
FERNANDEZ