VZCZCXRO1163
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0931/01 1751438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231438Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1132
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000931 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU
SUBJECT: CHIEF MEDIATOR DESPERATELY NEEDED AS UN/AU MEDIATION TEAM 
BECOMES NONEXISTENT 
 
¶1. This is an action cable, see para 13. 
 
¶2. (U) SUMMARY:  On June 22, the political director of the UN/AU's 
Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST), Muin Shrim, told poloffs that 
they are "back to square one" in the search for a joint mediator, 
and that by August only a couple of its current staff (of 
approximately 10 individuals) will still be with the JMST.  Shrim 
also gave a detailed analysis of the power dynamic of Darfur's major 
rebel groups following the JMST's failure to secure their 
participation in their May security consultations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NO CHIEF MEDIATOR 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU)  Shrim stated that the last candidate for the position, 
Mr. Ablasse Ouedraogo of the African Development Bank, was vetoed by 
the African Union.  According to JMST political officer, Amy Scott, 
although Ouedraogo participated in the negotiations for the Darfur 
Peace Agreement, he was not an effective force in Abuja.  "I don't 
think anyone will be shedding any tears that he was not selected for 
the position," stated Scott.  Shrim added that given the length of 
the search and the state of the peace process, "we need someone who 
is not just mediocre, but is excellent."  Shrim stated that he 
personally believes that although the term of UN's special envoy Jan 
Eliasson is coming to an end on June 30, that Eliasson will want to 
extend for another year.  "If there is a chief mediator, you might 
be able to push Eliasson out, but until someone fills that vacuum 
UNAMID may be compelled to re-hire him," stated Shrim.  Shrim stated 
that one reason the process has slowed to a standstill is because 
multiple offices in the UN and AU have a hand in the selection 
process including the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, the 
Department of Political Affairs, and the Office of the Secretary 
General and "names are constantly being added and deleted." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Polcouns inquired why this hiring process has taken so 
long - whether it was due to bureaucracy or because no one actually 
wants the job.  Shrim and Scott stated that some ideal candidates 
have viewed the position as a "poisoned chalice" as there is "no 
opening for progress right now in Darfur."  Shrim also stated that 
the criteria used for hiring appear to be faulty, as most of the 
candidates proposed for the position appear to be at the end of 
their careers.  "They look for a totally accomplished person who, 
after he or she is selected, realizes that they do not want to end 
their careers on a bad note," stated Shrim.  Shrim suggested that 
the selection committees should focus their efforts on mid-career 
individuals, "who have accomplished something, but still have 
something to gain." 
 
JMST GUTTED 
- - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU)  Shrim stated that as of July 1, he will take over as 
UNMIS's head of Political Affairs.  He said that the JMST has lost 
several officers already and at least four other members of the JMST 
will rotate out of their positions by the end of August, leaving 
only one or two existing staff members in place at the JMST.  Muin 
said that they have been reluctant to focus on new hiring, as they 
have assumed that the new chief mediator would bring some of his own 
staff with him, and would want to build his own team. 
 
FAILURE TO BRING JEM AND SLA/AW TO NEGOTIATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  Shrim stated that although the mercurial rebel leader 
previously agreed to attend security consultations, Abdul Wahid Nur 
changed his mind and refused to participate just a few days before 
the start of the JMST-led security consultations.  According to 
Shrim, Nur stated that "a minimum level of security in Darfur" is a 
precondition for his participation in negotiations.  This minimum 
level of security, according to Nur, now includes: 1) full 
deployment of UNAMID, 2) disarming the janjaweed and Arab militia 3) 
removal of settlers from lands belonging to IDPs and refugees  4) 
the safe return of IDPs.  (Comment: That this level of progress 
would mean that the Darfur is at peace - obviating the need for an 
agreement - shows how entirely unrealistic Abbul Wahid's demands 
are. End comment.) 
 
 
SLA/AW FIELD OFFICERS FORM COMMMITTEE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  Shrim stated that following Nur's reversal, SLA/AW field 
commanders felt angry, as they also agreed to participate and were 
not consulted prior to Abdul Wahid's change of mind.  Shrim stated 
that these field commanders have since organized themselves, forming 
a joint leadership committee.  Shrim stated this council may "soften 
Abdul Wahid and make him more rational- no one can challenge him 
individually, but collectively it might be possible to get some 
other voices at the table."  Shrim stated that this new SLA/AW 
leadership council was one of the few promising things that came out 
of the failed Geneva meeting. According to Shrim, the GoS is not 
 
KHARTOUM 00000931  002 OF 003 
 
 
concerned about Abdul Wahid's movement.  "The Sudanese Government 
has isolated SLA/AW.  They may have the support of the IDPs and Fur, 
but they are not a threat to the GoS from Jebel Marra," stated 
Shrim. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Shrim relayed that he told Abdul Wahid that his refusal to 
participate is unrealistic, as he cannot wait two years for UNAMID 
to completely deploy to meet his "minimum security requirements." 
Shrim stated that he told SLA/AW that the Zaghawa are taking over 
Darfur and that the tendency will be to negotiate with whichever 
group is ready.  "We told SLA/AW, 'we did a u-turn for you and 
changed our entire course to focus on security as that is a top 
priority for you, and then you failed to show up.  The Zaghawa are 
ready to negotiate and you will be left out," said Shrim. 
 
"SLA/UNITY IS WELL PLACED" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶9.  (SBU)  Shrim suggested that many prominent Zaghawa groups are 
ready to negotiate, including SLA/Unity and the United Resistance 
Front.  Shrim stated that SLM/Unity is "well positioned" and has a 
good relationship with JEM, many Arab movements, and external actors 
such as Libya and Eritrea.)  Shrim stated that SLM Unity's Abdalla 
Yaya, Suliman Jamous, and Sharif Harir are all "really ready" to 
talk more.  Shrim stated that he would be traveling to London on 
June 26 to meet with JEM leaders residing there to "discuss in 
detail what they would like to see in a peace deal." 
 
"WHERE IS THIS GOING?" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶10.  (SBU)  In response to this bleak outlook, Polcouns questioned 
where the peace process is going and whether it would be better for 
the UN/AU to "bless a deal brokered by another party."  Shrim stated 
that "side deals will not work."  He said that UNAMID deployment, 
increased security, and an empowered group of field commanders may 
give SLA/AW more credibility.  He said that the GoS is only worried 
about JEM and is sincerely interested in a cessation of hostilities 
with the Zaghawas.  Shrim stated that one approach would be to focus 
on bringing the Zaghawas to the table, focusing first on JEM and 
SLA/Unity, and later the URF.  He said that if these Zaghawa groups 
were convinced to come to the table, then SLA/AW would be forced to 
participate as well. 
 
INFLUENCE OF LIBYA AND CHAD 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU)  Shrim stated that while Eritrea has less influence in 
Darfur, Chad and Libya continue to influence the region.  He said 
that Chad and Libya support "Unity, JEM, URF - pretty much everyone" 
with money, cars, and weapons and allow access to their territory 
for supply, training, and planning.  Shrim stated that it was 
"anyone's guess" what Libya's goal is in Darfur, except that it 
wants a hand in events along its border, and also wants a weak 
neighbor along its border.  Shrim opined that Qaddafi is not 
personally involved in supporting the rebels, but that the head of 
military intelligence, Abdallah Senussi, is the major player. 
 
ROAD AHEAD 
- - - - - - 
¶12.  (SBU)  Shrim stated that the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue 
(cHD) has secured the participation of all major rebel groups for a 
July 11 meeting in Geneva.  The meeting will focus on humanitarian 
issues and, although JMST will not lead the session, JMST will 
attend.  Shrim stated that there was internal debate within the JMST 
as to whether to give (cHD) permission to hold the session "as it 
looks bad when they are able to pull the rebels together and we are 
not."  Shrim also expressed concern that it is jumping ahead to 
discuss humanitarian activities without a cessation of hostilities. 
Shrim stated that he has also come to doubt the usefulness of large 
meetings such as this.  Shrim stated that the JMST has used too much 
time trying to secure rebel participation in meetings outside of 
Sudan, and that it now realizes that it should have focused on 
shuttle diplomacy dealing with substantive issues.  Shrim emphasized 
that this shuttle diplomacy is almost impossible with the current 
configuration of the JMST (with the joint special envoys) "as you 
need someone who can get up and go very quickly with a smaller staff 
and make decisions quickly."  Shrim emphasized that this single 
mediator will also be able to build relationships with the parties 
more effectively and see through many of the movements' lies and 
disinformation. 
 
COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION 
-------------------------- 
¶13.  (SBU) The JMST has become practically nonexistent and long 
before that it became inert.  The UN/AU needs a single chief 
mediator now and the U.S. should assert pressure at all levels and 
departments of the USUN and AU to appoint a mediator with a support 
team by August 1.  Shrim is right - the JMST needs an energetic, 
innovative, and accomplished (though not necessarily an elder) 
 
KHARTOUM 00000931  003 OF 003 
 
 
diplomat and the UN and AU should widen their search immediately. 
Given the delay and inaction at this point by JMST, we believe a 
younger, aggressive, Arabic-speaking diplomat (preferably NOT from 
the Arab world) who could shake up both JMST and the UN/AU from 
their stupor would be appropriate. That will be a tall order and 
then whoever is identified will have to run the gauntlet of 
interested parties. Just as the Friends of UNAMID put a full court 
press on UNAMID deployment, so too should the U.S. lead the effort 
in finding an appropriate candidate for the crucial position of the 
chief mediator.  The Embassy welcomes recommendations to pass to 
JMST for appropriate candidates for the position of the US/AU chief 
negotiator but the main obstacles seem to be in New York and Addis. 
USUN and the U.S. Mission to the AU should also receive these 
suggestions, and subsequently underscore the dire and immediate need 
for filling this crucial position to their appropriate counterparts. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ