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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM913, ABYEI UPDATE JUNE 19

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM913 2008-06-19 13:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3204
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0913 1711310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191310Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1098
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000913 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND 
CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI UPDATE JUNE 19 
 
1. (U) SPLA and SAF contingents that will form the basis of the new 
JIU battalion in Abyei began to arrive in Abyei June 19, according 
to UNMIS.  310 SPLA troops arrived overland from Wau June 19, while 
the 200 SAF arrived overland from Muglad with an additional 100 due 
to arrive later the same day.  UNMIS reported that its movements are 
still restricted, but that it will press for greater movement now 
that the new JIU is beginning to deploy.  The SAF 31st brigade is 
supposed to leave Abyei once the new JIU is fully deployed, but has 
not yet made any moves toward redeployment according to UNMIS. 
Replacement police contingents have not yet been deployed in Abyei, 
according to both UNMIS and SPLM contacts. 
 
2. (SBU) Vice President Ali Osman Taha will travel to Juba June 20 
to discuss the interim administration and the arbitration mechanism 
(as well as the draft electoral law) according to NCP negotiator and 
parliamentarian Dirdiery Mohammed Ahmed.  Dirdiery said the NCP will 
not accept Edward Lino, the SPLM's current representative in Abyei 
who has been viewed by many as a provocateur in the current crisis, 
as the interim administrator for Abyei under the agreement.  For 
their part, the SPLM will not accept a Misseriya as the deputy 
administrator, according to SPLM northern sector representative 
Yasir Arman.  SPLM contacts told CG Juba that possible alternatives 
to Edward Lino include the SPLA's JDB representative Major General 
Kuol Diem Kuol.  However, Minister of the Presidency Luka Biong Deng 
told CG Juba that he did not believe Edward Lino would be replaced. 
(Comment: If the NCP is willing to concede that a Misseriya will not 
have the deputy slot, the SPLM may be willing to remove Lino, though 
this will be a tough compromise for both sides to accept. End 
comment.) 
 
3. (SBU) In a meeting with CDA Fernandez June 18, SPLM northern 
sector Deputy SG Yasir Arman was optimistic about the Abyei 
agreement and thought it likely the NCP would implement it.  "The 
biggest test will be the interim administration," said Arman.  Arman 
suggested that a Dinka NCP member such as Zakaria Atem would be 
acceptable for the deputy slot.  He pointed out that there are many 
other positions in the interim administration, such as the 
thirty-person "administrative council" to which local Misseriya 
could be appointed. 
 
4. (SBU) Arman laughingly noted that Atem's entire family is SPLM, 
with Atem's eldest son serving as one of Foreign Minister Deng 
Alor's SPLM bodyguards. Atem, with whom CDA Fernandez met in April 
in Abyei at the NCP's fortress-like headquarters, is an elderly and 
faithful minion of the NCP with a long and sordid history as 
informer and agent of Khartoum. But he is also an Ngok Dinka and son 
of Abyei. 
 
5. (SBU) Arman believes that the NCP reached an agreement on Abyei 
because they were afraid that "something big would happen" if they 
did not.  The aftermath of the Omdurman JEM attack, combination of 
the UNSC visit and SE Williamson's abrupt departure scared them, he 
said, and they wanted to demonstrate progress.  Arman views wealth 
sharing as the biggest obstacle in the Abyei agreement.  He pointed 
out that although the amount of oil produced will decrease over time 
(this is a common point made by foreign diplomats hoping to 
encourage the NCP and SPLM not to view Abyei as a major source of 
future oil revenue) the price of oil is constantly increasing and 
the amounts of revenue involved are still very large in Sudanese 
terms, in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  Arman said the SPLM 
surprisingly did not push to address oil arrears in the agreement 
because it would have blocked progress at a critical time during 
negotiations.  He said the SPLM hopes to address arrears during 
arbitration discussions.  (Note: During the first three years of the 
CPA, no oil revenues from Abyei have been reallocated because an 
interim administration was never put in place.  End note.) 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: Sending fresh troops to Abyei is the easy part; 
negotiating the interim administration and the arbitration mechanism 
is the true test of good will on both sides.  With an agenda for 
Juba that includes both Abyei and the elections law, Taha and Kiir 
have an enormous, short-fused challenge before them and it is 
unrealistic to expect full resolution on either issue this weekend. 
What we could see, and would be both telling and worrisome, would be 
deadlock over the two top officials for the region.  Progress on the 
composition of the interim administration alone would be a good 
outcome for the discussions in Juba. 
 
FERNANDEZ