VZCZCXRO3065
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0911/01 1711108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191108Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1094
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0241
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000911 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT GETS A LIFT 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 883 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Just when it seemed like those in charge of UNAMID 
deployment were all out for summer break and all meaningful work 
would accordingly have to wait until fall, the contingent-owned 
equipment for the Chinese engineers in Nyala reached its destination 
at long last, allowing for arrival of the main Chinese party by July 
¶1.  This is no small feat and comes at a time when things seem more 
bleak than ever for the peacekeeping operation: PAE's demobilization 
from Darfur, fickle troop contributors, and spiking incidents of 
banditry and other crime ahead of the rainy season and in 
conjunction with unrest in eastern Chad.  The June 18-21 visit of 
incoming Assistant-Secretary-General for the Department of Field 
Support Susanna Malcorra could also contribute to the slight 
"momentum," and a reinvigorated push instigated by UNAMID police to 
get convoys moving from El Obeid are other positive steps for the 
still quite overwhelmed Mission.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CHINESE ENGINEERS EXPECTED JULY 1 
--------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) New Chief of Planning for the United Nations-African Union 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) COL Noddy Stafford (who replaced COL 
Murdo Urquhart) told FieldOff June 17 that the advance party of 
Chinese engineers in Nyala finally received their contingent-owned 
equipment (CoE) after close to an eight-month delay.  Because the 
shipment included fasteners necessary for the engineers' work on 
accommodations, they are able to begin construction of two 
additional buildings, allowing for the arrival of the main party of 
the Chinese by July 1, ahead of UNAMID's original deployment 
schedule [NOTE: The Planning Chief remarked that it would be a long 
haul for the advance elements of the Chinese contingent despite the 
"early" arrival of the main party.  The advance party's deployment 
clock does not begin until the party is complete, leaving them with 
another 18 months in Darfur.  END NOTE]. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In other CoE updates, the Planning Chief noted that UNAMID 
would begin moving 11 containers from Zam Zam to Kulbus in violent 
West Darfur on June 18 in preparation for the deployment of the 
advance elements of the second Ethiopian battalion, an element that 
would consist of some engineers.  The CoE in these containers would 
be transported by 14 runs of an Mi-26 heavy transport helicopter and 
would include 14 vehicles.  The Planning Chief, who had accompanied 
UNAMID Force Commander Agwai on a June 13 visit to Addis Ababa, said 
the Ethiopian MoD was still paranoid about security for its troops 
deploying in Sector West and for its assets, and was requesting an 
airlift of its four APCs.  According to the Force Commander, the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) had agreed in principle to allow Ethiopia 
to fly its troops directly from Addis Ababa to El Geneina for onward 
Sector West deployment. 
 
OTHER ENCOURAGING SIGNALS 
------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) According to the Force Commander, further baby steps were 
taken in a June 16 monthly meeting in Khartoum between UNAMID 
leadership (including FC Agwai, D/JSR for Operations and Management 
Medili, Director of Administration Yonis and Police Commissioner 
Fryer) and the GoS (MFA U/S Siddiq and his military/intelligence 
team).  During this meeting the GoS officially accepted 0700-1900 
operating hours at Darfur airports; agreed to accelerate the 
issuance of land; committed to working to release CoE; agreed to 
assist in convoy movement from Kordofan.  GEN Agwai also affirmed 
GoS acceptance of the Thai and Nepalese contributions to UNAMID once 
the Ethiopian and Egyptian battalions had deployed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On convoy movement, the other half of the CoE coin, UNAMID 
is encouraged by the successful five-day movement of 20 trucks from 
El Obeid to Nyala, a convoy headed by UNAMID Police Commissioner 
Fryer.  Despite only 101 km of tarmac roads, the water and fuel 
escort convoy made it to Nyala without incident and informed 
UNAMID's planning for future such convoys, which the Police 
Commissioner plans to push on a 72-hour basis.  Fryer told FieldOff 
the experience convinced him of the indispensability of local 
drivers and authorities (GoS police escorted the convoy from El 
Obeid to Babanusa, then from Babanusa to El Daein).  He said it also 
impressed upon him the vulnerability of such convoys, which stretch 
almost two kilometers long on vast, deserted "roads" where 
hijackings would be very easy to execute.  Nonetheless, UNAMID 
leadership is determined to make another run, again led by the 
enterprising Police Commissioner, this time on the El Obeid-Um 
Kadada-El Fasher route during the week of June 22. 
 
REALITY CHECK 
------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Not all CoE and deployment news is so encouraging, however. 
 The Planning Chief described difficulties with moving the CoE for 
the first Ethiopian battalion, noting that this CoE (which had 
 
KHARTOUM 00000911  002 OF 002 
 
 
arrived in country on April 21) was "lost on a conveyor belt 
somewhere between Port Sudan and El Obeid" and was not accordingly 
expected until at least October.  He mentioned that there was 
ongoing discussion with the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense with 
regard to the deployment of the first Ethiopian infantry battalion: 
whether it would go to Muhajeria/Shaeiria or to Tulus/Edd Al Fursan 
in South Darfur. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Planning Chief pointed out that new battalions were 
arriving without the requisite training to operate APCs, noting that 
the much used Canadian APCs were particularly unfamiliar to troops 
and that they required a two-week training period for both drivers 
and gunners.  To remedy this, the Chief suggested deploying drivers 
early for such training and instructing engineers in theatre to 
construct training areas for such instruction to take place so that 
troops could get on the ground and trained up from here. 
 
¶9. (SBU) On the possibility of transferring Chinese and Pakistani 
platoons from the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to UNAMID, the 
Planning Chief reported that there would be a Chinese recce in the 
coming days.  He confirmed the Pakistani refusal to transfer a 
platoon from UNMIS but noted its offer to provide its own platoon 
directly from Pakistan later this year.  The Planning Chief noted 
that this contribution would end up being too little far too late. 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶10. (SBU) Despite persistent obstacles and shortcomings to its 
deployment, UNAMID is not without some measured progress, and it is 
indeed encouraging to see movement on CoE issues in particular, 
since this issue is fundamental to the arrival of increased numbers 
of troops.  Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that some 
of these "accomplishments," especially the arrival of the Chinese 
CoE, were months in the making, largely due to factors that should 
never have been allowed to become the obstacles that they did (the 
Chinese CoE was delayed as a result of haggling by the UN over 
transport costs of $1000 with local contractors).  Until UNAMID 
learns to better pick its logistical battles, we may have to get 
used to such "successes" every eight months or so.  Hopefully the 
visit of A/SYG Malcorra will continue this forward momentum and keep 
the spotlight on the unexciting but essential logistical issues that 
threaten to grind UNAMID deployment to a halt. 
FERNANDEZ