VZCZCXRO2161
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0902/01 1701030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181030Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1080
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000902 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/C, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS SU
SUBJECT: SLM/MM FRUSTRATED AND WEAKENED TO THE BREAKING POINT 
 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  On June 17, Mohammed Suliman, a senior leader of 
SLM/Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM) and Secretary General of the TDRA, railed 
against the NCP, stating that the ruling party should openly admit 
its neglect of the DPA, rather than deceptively undermine the peace 
agreement.  Suliman's fiery speech at a Darfur Peace Conference 
elicited a strong NCP response, with one leader barging into the VIP 
room following the speech shouting, "That is just his perspective, 
wait till you hear ours!"  Earlier in the week, three other leaders 
of SLM/MM separately threatened that without immediate 
implementation of the DPA they "may have to resort to other 
desperate means."  These leaders also reported that: Minnawi 
narrowly averted a deadly attack on his convoy during a field visit 
east of Kutum on June 14; that SLM/MM has lost the loyalty of many 
important field commanders; and that some of SLM/MM's political 
leadership may defect to more "active and effective rebel movements 
such as JEM."  END SUMMARY 
 
SLM/MM RAILS OUT AT NCP AT DPA CONFERENCE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (U)  On June 17, the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority 
(TDRA) and Sudan Center for Research and Strategic Studies, a 
prominent Khartoum think-tank hosted a conference entitled "Darfur 
Peace: Between the Present and the Future."  Muhammad Suliman, 
Secretary General of the TDRA, began his opening remarks stating 
that the conference comes at a time of deteriorating security, 
increased frequency of human rights abuses, and continued violations 
of ceasefire agreements.  Suliman stated that the implementation of 
the DPA has come to a "complete standstill since June 2007," and 
that differences between DPA parties are widening.  He also stated 
"The NCP continues in its retreat from DPA implementation and even 
refuses to sit with the SLM in joint meetings to negotiate points of 
difference."  For example, stated Suliman, the DPA continues to 
stagnate in the first of six stages in the security protocols. 
Suliman added that this failure to implement the DPA has started to 
impact the well-being of the SLM army, as its soldiers have defected 
to other movements, and as it does not have enough "daily bread" to 
sustain itself.  In his strongest words, Suliman stated that "if the 
government wants to retreat from its commitments it should do it 
openly and blatantly.  There is no need for its sly attempts or its 
threats to join together other parties against us - such as the 
Declaration of Commitment (DOC) parties who defected from us." 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Following the speech in a short break, SLM/MM leaders 
praised the strong remarks, while NCP representatives criticized 
Suliman's words. Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation 
Commissioner Lieutenant General Mohammed Ahmed Al-Dabi burst into 
the room yelling, "This speech was nonsense.  All of you from the 
embassies and the U.N. better stay for my speech. That is just his 
perspective, wait till you hear ours!"  Other NCP representatives 
stated that it was inappropriate for Suliman to open the conference 
with a strong statement where the NCP was not allowed the 
opportunity to directly respond.  At the start of the next session, 
Khalid Hussein, the Director of the Sudan Center for Research and 
Strategic Studies, stated that Suliman's words are not reflective of 
his center and that other parties will have a chance to respond, 
while panel leader and Darfur activist Yousif Bakhit reminded the 
presenters to be respectful in their presentations. 
 
¶4.  (U) (Note: Suliman's remarks follow other strong statements from 
SLM/M.  On June 16 a spokesmen for SLM/M spokesman El-Tayeb Khamis 
told "Al-Ayyam" that his movement will soon specify a "final date to 
implement the DPA with the National Congress Party.  Khamis stated 
that "if we receive no response from the NCP, we will take other 
options." End Note.) 
 
MINNAWI AVERTS ATTACK ON HIS CONVOY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU)  On June 15, SLM/MM parliamentarian Ali Traio told poloff 
that Minni Minnawi learned of an impending attack on his convoy on 
June 14 and re-routed his travel at the last minute.  According to 
Traio, Minnawi informed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) western 
sector commander of his planned route between Kutum and El-Fasher 
and requested safe passage between the two cities. Traio stated that 
the sector commander granted permission and ensured Minnawi of the 
safety of the road.  Traio stated that despite this pledge, Minnawi 
learned of a government-supported militia attack on his convoy and 
he re-routed his travel plan at the last minute.  Traio reported 
that Minnawi's intelligence was accurate, as other SLM/MM field 
commanders confirmed a heavily armed Arab militia moving along 
Minnawi's original route.  "There are a lot of dirty tricks going on 
in this country.  Everything is possible and nothing is certain," 
commented Traio.  Another SLM/MM press spokesman, Sayf Al-Haroun, 
separately told poloff a similar version of the story above, but 
cautioned that the militia group planning to attack Minnawi may have 
not been controlled by the GoS. 
 
"SECURITY ACT REGULARIZES THE JANJAWEED" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
KHARTOUM 00000902  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Traio stated that despite his objections the National 
Security Act would likely pass.  Traio stated that as drafted, the 
National Security act included a clause about "additional reserve 
forces," something Traio interpreted as "the regularization of the 
janjaweed because the president has the power to institute a 
non-regular police force whenever he wants."  (Note:  On June 16 the 
National Security Act did pass in the National Assembly.  Section 
14.1 in the draft bill reads, "Constitution of the Additional 
Reserve Forces:  The President of the Republic may, by an order as 
he makes, pursuant to a recommendation from the minister, may 
constitute any additional reserve forces to perform general, special 
or temporary duties."  End Note.)  Traio stated that the SPLM has 
not been an ally on this issue, saying "it seems like they have some 
type of deal set up with the NCP." 
 
SLM-MM INTERNALLY DIVIDED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  On June 17, SLM-MM spokesman Sayf Al-Haroun emphasized 
that his movement is fracturing along ethnic and political lines. 
He stated that Mustafa Mohamed Ahmed Tirab, the Secretary-General of 
SLM/MM and State Minister at the Ministry of Federal Government, 
leads one faction of SLM rivaling that led by Minnawi.  Haroun also 
stated that as a non-Zaghawa he feels excluded from the movement. 
Once a head of SLM/MM's Liberation Council, the sole spokesman of 
SLM/MM, and SLM/MM's liaison to the U.S., Al-Haroun said that he now 
has been pushed to the "outer circle" of Minnawi's movement along 
with other non-Zaghawa.  He stated that he was frustrated that 
senior SLM/MM leaders did not invite him to a meeting with Special 
Envoy Williamson and that he no longer has any influence in the 
movement.  "Which SLM/MM will you work with?" asked Al-Haroun. 
 
"MINNI IS LOSING CONTROL POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU)  Al-Haroun also stated that Minnawi has been in Darfur 
because he is slowly losing the loyalty of his commanders and the 
support of the people in SLM/MM controlled areas.  (Note:  As of 
June 17, Minnawi has been in the field in Darfur for over three 
weeks. End Note.)  According to Al-Haroun, Minnawi visited some 
areas paying compensation to families who were abused by SLM/MM 
forces.  Al-Haroun also stated that Minnawi has lost the loyalty and 
control of several influential field commanders in SLM/MM 
controlled-areas.  Haroun said that many of these commanders "are 
not interested in aligning with another rebel group," but just 
controlling what they have.  Haroun reported that some of these 
independent commanders even turned Minnawi away when he tried to 
visit him.  Haroun said that where SLM field commanders remain loyal 
to Minnawi, there is so much banditry and crime that the movement is 
losing the support of the local population.  "For the last two years 
SLM/MM has been dying very slowly, so what is left for us," 
questioned Haroun. 
 
"I, TOO, AM ALMOST READY TO DEFECT TO JEM." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶9.  (SBU)  Also on June 17, a SLM/MM contact told poloff that he is 
ready to defect to JEM or another rebel movement.  According to this 
contact, JEM may now be militarily stronger than SLM/MM for the 
first time since the start of the Darfur conflict.  "Some soldiers 
that made SLM/MM strong have defected to JEM and they are building 
up that organization," stated this contact.  Even though JEM has an 
Islamic ideology and Khalil Ibrahim thinks more of Khartoum than 
Darfur, "he is a hero to us for making it to Omdurman," stated this 
contact.  This contact added that he is in close communication with 
JEM leaders and that he is strongly considering returning to the 
field and joining JEM.  He stated, "The only option is hard because 
we signed a ceasefire agreement - but it seems like there is no 
option except pulling back to Darfur and joining other rebel 
movements." (Note:  This individual's name and contact information 
is available from Post through siprnet communications. End Note). 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶10.  (SBU) SLM/MM's frustration is growing, and it will not be 
surprising if Minnawi withdraws from the Government of National 
Unity in protest before the end of 2008.  More troubling than the 
political ramifications of such a move are other possibilities such 
as: 1) Minnawi continuing to lose his command and control structure 
in SLM/MM controlled areas - leading to further fragmentation, the 
birth of a new rebel movements, and an even more divided Darfur 
landscape; 2) More individual political and military SLM/MM leaders 
defecting to JEM or other rebel movements, feeding the rebellion 
with skilled warriors and political strategists 3) Minnawi returning 
to what he knows best, re-organizing his fighters and returning to 
his pre-DPA activities.  All of these are real possibilities in 2008 
as SLM/MM approaches the breaking point. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In the absence of any other agreement and no progress by 
the UN/AU peace process, serious consideration should still be given 
by the international community to pushing for the implementation of 
 
KHARTOUM 00000902  003 OF 003 
 
 
the DPA, including disarmament of the janjaweed. Unfortunately, the 
international community has intellectually and politically "moved 
on" from the DPA.  It remains a perfectly good agreement which had a 
massive investment of time and energy at the time from the USG, and 
if implemented even part-way could have provided some incentive to 
other rebel groups to join in further peace talks.  The NCP remains 
interested only in the portions of the DPA relating to the 
disarmament of SLA forces, but should be pressed more aggressively 
by the international community for further concessions on broader 
security arrangements, as well as guarantees for IDPs.  Such a move 
could breathe new life into what is now an almost moribund peace 
process in Darfur. The problem is that the DPA in and of itself will 
not bring peace to Darfur, but its implementation could prevent 
further fragmentation and anarchy from spreading in the troubled 
region.  That is probably just not good enough for a distracted 
international community deeply concerned about Darfur but daunted by 
the complexity of the issues involved. 
 
FERNANDEZ