VZCZCXRO0435
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0899/01 1681453
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161453Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1072
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000899 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND 
CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI SU
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF ABYEI ROADMAP; SRSG EXPRESSES CONCERNS 
ABOUT JOINT INTEGRATED UNITS AND LANDMINES 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 889 
¶B. KHARTOUM 859 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: President Bashir issued a decree June 15 
implementing the legal framework for the Abyei agreement, but an 
administration has yet to be named or confirmed.  Observers continue 
to disagree over which side got the better deal in the agreement, 
however everyone agrees that the process could be lengthy, leaving 
wide open the possibility of further conflict.  UN/SRSG Qazi 
expressed concern that UNMIS does not have access to Joint Defense 
Board meetings that discuss deployment of the Joint Integrated 
Units, and also that the SPLA and possibly the SAF may have laid 
landmines outside of Abyei, which could endanger IDPs returning to 
Abyei town.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) In the first step toward implementing the June 8 NCP-SPLM 
Abyei Roadmap agreement (ref. a), on June 15 Sudan's Presidency 
codified the agreement's provisions on establishing an interim 
administration for the region.  Paragraph 3 of the Roadmap provides 
that the Presidency would take such action within two weeks (i.e., 
by June 22).  In accordance with the Roadmap, Presidential Decree 
146 provides for an interim Chief Administrator, to be nominated by 
the SPLM, a Deputy, to be nominated by the NCP, and five department 
heads.  All are to be drawn from residents of the Abyei region.  The 
Decree also defines the region as that agreed to by the NCP and SPLM 
in the Roadmap and depicted by a map appended to the agreement. 
These boundaries are provisional, until a final determination of 
Abyei's boundaries is reached through arbitration. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a meeting with CDA Fernandez June 16, NCP insider and 
Director of the Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Sayed al Khateeb 
said he believes that the current Abyei agreement "is the best that 
can be hoped for" given the breakdown in political dialogue between 
the two parties on the issue and expressed appreciation to SE 
Williamson for his assistance in the discussions that led to the 
agreement.  Khateeb believes that arbitration was the only avenue 
left for the parties and seemed confident that the NCP will fare 
well in arbitration.  By contrast, Khateeb said the 2004 Abyei 
protocol was a "huge mistake" and was agreed to at a time when both 
the NCP and the SPLM were "giddy" with the possibility of finalizing 
the CPA and were eager to trust the other side and international 
mediators like ABC chair Don Peterson "but we should have been more 
cynical." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Khateeb blamed SPLM Abyei representative Edward Lino for 
precipitating the recent problems in Abyei after his arrival in 
February 2008, but acknowledged that the Dinka and Misseriya had now 
taken matters into their own hands and that the NCP and the SPLM 
were no longer in full control of the situation.  Khateeb expressed 
distrust of the Misseriya Arabs "who are only out for themselves" 
and want to retain power in both the South and the North to protect 
their interests - and have largely achieved it through the dual 
guarantees of freedom of movement and dual citizenship in the 
agreement. He expected that the Misseriya will push for even more 
favors in Kordofan in return for their acceptance of the latest 
agreement. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a separate meeting June 16, UNMIS SRSG Ambassador Ashraf 
Qazi told CDA that "the SPLM might fare well in arbitration" but 
noted that the process could be lengthy and expressed concern about 
delays in other items in the CPA - such as elections.  Qazi 
predicted that, as with other issues in Sudan, the parties will 
allow the situation to continue to fester and put off final 
settlement of Abyei as well as other CPA requirements such as border 
demarcation and elections, allowing the situation on the ground to 
reach another breaking point.  "Conflict doesn't happen because it's 
rational," he noted, but rather because of frustration on the ground 
that gets out of control.  Qazi observed that the rest of the border 
beyond Abyei still has not been demarcated and seems to have been 
dictated by power of force on the ground. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite his concerns about the accord, Qazi noted that many 
in the SPLM "seemed giddy" about the agreement even though it seemed 
like something that could have been arrived at long ago. "The SPLM 
got a bloody nose in Abyei, their people had to flee, and so they 
had to play it up." He noted that, despite the rhetoric, Salva Kiir 
seemed diminished by the Abyei events as he had been by the supposed 
re-shuffling of the SPLM in May which in the end only confirmed the 
status quo. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Qazi expressed particular frustration with UNMIS' lack of 
access to Joint Defense Board meetings when the Joint Integrated 
Units are discussed, and asked for US intervention with the GOS on 
this issue.  (Note: Per the CPA, UNMIS does not have access to any 
JDB meetings; Qazi asked that UNMIS at least be allowed access when 
 
KHARTOUM 00000899  002 OF 002 
 
 
the JIUs are under discussion since UNMIS is supposed to assist with 
support to these units. End note.)  Qazi also said that UNMIS still 
doesn't have free access to areas outside of Abyei town, and per the 
agreement UNMIS will not have access until the JIUs are in place, 
"SAF tells us they are still waiting for orders from Khartoum on 
what to do".  He expressed concern that the parties will drag their 
feet putting the new JIUs into place, and urged that the US and 
other countries push for this to happen quickly. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Qazi raised a final issue of considerable concern, that the 
SPLA - and perhaps also the SAF - had laid mines to protect their 
positions outside of Abyei town.  Qazi was particularly concerned by 
information that that SPLA has laid mines south of town, since the 
IDPs in Agok and Turalei could potentially cross ill-defined mined 
areas on their way back to Abyei town. He noted that the SPLA has 
traditionally done a poor job in keeping track of its mines through 
other parts of the South.  Qazi asked for US intervention with the 
SPLA on this issue. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Finally, Qazi warned that the conflict over Abyei 
underscored the importance of the CPA and how its potential 
unraveling would affect all of Sudan, including Darfur. Given the 
tactics of brinksmanship employed by both sides, the possibility of 
miscalculation remains high and the first period of the CPA 
(2005-2008) "when they could ignore problems and kick them away for 
later" is almost over. The stakes are now higher and the margin for 
error grows ever narrower. "We need to constantly warn New York and 
Washington about the high possibility of further tension and 
violence as we get closer to these deadlines," he exclaimed. CDA 
heartily agreed. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: Post will raise the issue of the landmines with 
the SPLA/SPLM.  If UNMIS' information is correct and mines have 
recently been laid, the damage has already been done and the SPLA 
must be urged to map the areas where mines were laid as soon as 
possible, and ensure that these areas are cordoned off.  Post will 
also raise the issue of the JIUs with the GOS.  The GOS has 
previously promised to include UNMIS in JDB meetings concerning the 
JIUs, and may simply need an additional push to follow up on these 
promises. 
 
FERNANDEZ