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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM898, ABYEI ACCORD MAY BE AN NCP TRAP, SAYS FORMER SUDANESE FM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM898 2008-06-16 14:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0381
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0898/01 1681410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161410Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1070
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000898 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI ACCORD MAY BE AN NCP TRAP, SAYS FORMER SUDANESE FM 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 859 
 
B. KHARTOUM 772 
C. KHARTOUM 448 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Lam Akol told CDA Fernandez that the SPLM views 
the June 8 Abyei agreement as success, but the choice to refer the 
border demarcation to international arbitration could help the NCP 
delay a decision until after the 2011 referendum. A prolonged 
arbitration process serves the NCP well, trapping the SPLM into a 
legal morass as the interim border increases the ethnic 
heterogeneity of Abyei. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Former Sudanese Foreign Minister and Sudanese Peoples' 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) turncoat Lam Akol welcomed Charge 
d'Affaires Fernandez to his Khartoum home Monday, June 16 to discuss 
recent developments in Abyei. Despite numerous setbacks that have 
tarnished his stature, including a now-debunked alleged 
assassination attempt in March (ref. C), Akol still maintains an 
active voice in both North and South Sudanese politics. CDA 
complimented Akol on his positive role in maintaining unity at the 
May SPLM convention, convincing representatives from Upper Nile, 
Jonglei and Unity states to vote as a single bloc in urging keeping 
both GOSS VP Riek Machar and Akol's rival Pagan Amun in the party 
leadership. Asked if Sudan had pulled back from the brink of 
disaster, Akol commented that the May 10 attack on Khartoum/Omdurman 
by Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rendered the 
National Congress Party weaker, and, despite significant strategic 
mistakes, strengthened both JEM's standing and the arrogant 
Ibrahim's opinion of himself. "That the Sudanese Army would not or 
could not fight was significant, but the security and police did 
fight for the regime." He added that while SAF won't fight for 
Darfur "people will defend their homes." 
 
3. (SBU) Akol expressed limited optimism in this month's agreement 
between the NCP and the SPLM Abyei, saying, "the Abyei Accord is a 
solution in the sense that it will get things rolling." However, he 
said the demographic quirks of Abyei border demarcation temper his 
optimism. Greater homogeneity of Dinka in administrative units limit 
access to oil fields, but greater access to oil (through more 
expansive borders for Abyei) increases the ethnic heterogeneity by 
adding large numbers of Misseriya. "Do we want people or oil? Can we 
agree on an area that includes both? The interim border goes beyond 
administrative units, including many more Misseriya than Dinka." 
 
4. (SBU) Regarding the issue of border arbitration (ref. A), Akol 
acknowledged that the NCP has won the upper hand from the June 8 
Abyei agreement. "When you talk of arbitration, you talk of years. 
If the ruling comes after 2011, what do you do with the current 
border? Some (within the SPLM) think arbitration is a victory but 
they don't look at the intricacies." Akol added, "the arbitration 
court must have evidence," and listed historical trends that show 
Abyei is part of the North: 1905, when Abyei was moved to Kordofan; 
1939, when the Ngok Dinka chiefs chose to keep Abyei in "Dar 
Misseriya" in Kordofan; and 1952, when Abyei chose again to remain 
part of Kordofan. 
 
5. (SBU) Akol claimed there is scant historical evidence proving 
that Abyei was part of the south, and argued that advocates for 
secession could be hard-pressed to win their case before a court of 
arbitration.  He noted that the southern argument that Abyei was 
part of the South is based on an ethnic argument, not a historical 
one. "They should have had a lawyer look at it before they signed on 
June 8." He added that the new agreement "buries" the Abyei Boundary 
Commission (ABC) and its report which, while rejected by the NCP in 
August 2005, gave the SPLM the moral high ground in the dispute. 
 
6. (SBU) Akol disagrees with analysts who assume that the conflict 
over Abyei is a fight over untapped fossil fuel reserves. "The Abyei 
problem did not come because of oil. The possibility of secession - 
that Abyei won't want to go to the south - makes 2011 such high 
stakes. Not oil." Akol pointed out that contradictory forces 
determine Abyei's identity (and borders): one trying to restrict the 
border in order to ensure a pro-secession majority for 2011, and the 
other trying to enlarge borders to include enough oil wells for the 
Abyei area to be self-sufficient. Akol predicted that such forces 
will cause the South to become "more entrenched in their tribal 
shells."  "If you do not put forth policies that tend to unify 
people, that have their interests intertwined, you can never get rid 
of tribalism. The government must be conscious of this." 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: Lam Akol's reputation as a wily, dubious character 
in Sudanese politics is well warranted and underlines his political 
astuteness, and everything he says should be taken with a grain of 
salt since he often portrays SPLM decisions in a negative light. 
Despite this, he remains in the party leadership and was in the 
front row next to FM Alor at the May 2008 SPLM convention during 
Salva Kiir's speech. He believes the June 8 Abyei agreement will 
 
KHARTOUM 00000898  002 OF 002 
 
 
prove advantageous to the NCP, tangling up the conflict in process 
and trapping the SPLM - with its history of hasty decision-making - 
into making a questionable legal case that Abyei has historically 
been part of the South, despite evidence to the contrary. Akol may 
be right, as Abyei's interim borders are likely to become the de 
facto borders while the arbitration court decides Abyei's fate at an 
undetermined date, possibly after the 2011 referendum, despite the 
accord's best efforts to get a definitive solution within a year. 
 
FERNANDEZ