VZCZCXRO6407
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0871/01 1631033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111033Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1009
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000871 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SPQL ENVOY 
ELIASSON 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a June 1 meeting Special Envoys Williamson and 
Eliasson compared notes on current circumstances complicating the 
path to peace in Darfur.  Eliasson highlighted regional aspects of 
the Darfur crisis, namely the need for the P5 to facilitate 
normalization of Chad-Sudan relations.  Williamson stressed the 
vulnerability of the Government of Sudan (GoS) as a result of the 
recent turmoil in Abyei and because of JEM's May 10 advance on 
Omdurman.  Both Envoys were cautiously optimistic that the aftermath 
of the Abyei crisis could yield positive results for Darfur and 
agreed to remain in contact ahead of Eliasson's planned briefing to 
the Security Council during the third week of June under the U.S. 
Presidency.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants: 
     ------------ 
U.S. 
---- 
Special Envoy Richard Williamson 
CDA Roberto Powers 
Jana Chapman-Gates, SE Senior Advsor 
Genevieve McKeel, SE Assistant 
Saira Mohamed, SE Assistant 
Lt Col Glenn Sadowski, USUN Military Staff Committee 
Eric Barbee, Embassy Khartoum Poloff 
Emily Bruno, El Fasher FieldOff (notetaker). 
 
UN-AU 
----- 
Special Envoy Jan Eliasson 
Shirin Pakfar, SE Eliasson's Assistant 
Yasser Sabra, Joint Mediation Support Team Member 
Muin Shrim, Joint Mediation Support Team Member 
 
 
GOS AND DARFUR MOVMENTS ARE "PLAYING WITH FIRE" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶3. (SBU) In a June 1 meeting in Khartoum with Special Envoy 
Williamson's visiting delegation, United Nations-African Union 
Special Envoy Jan Eliasson said a combined, "no-nonsense" analysis 
of the Darfur situation is necessary at this stage.  Eliasson 
commended Williamson's holistic approach toward addressing Darfur 
and stressed that the crisis' regional and national aspects have to 
be considered in the search for a solution at a time when extensive 
banditry, movement of Chadian rebels across the western border, an 
overconfident Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Sudan Armed 
Forces military might threaten to turn Darfur into "total disaster 
within ten days." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Eliasson expressed "deep disappointment" with the JMST's 
failure to get a security meeting in Geneva off the ground earlier 
in May.  He said that several rebel movements - including Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA)-Unity, United Redemption Front and 
SLA-Abdulshafie - had agreed to attend but in the end it had been 
SLA/Abdulwahid and JEM political leadership, ironically for the same 
reasons, which led to the ultimate cancellation of the meeting 
(Eliasson noted that SLA/Abdulwahid Field Commanders had been 
amenable to the meeting).  According to Eliasson, both Abdulwahid 
and JEM chief negotiator Ahmed Tougod had objected to sitting at the 
same table with "traitors" from other rebel groups, whom they did 
not consider legitimate.  Eliasson added that the GoS had indicated 
it was ready to talk with JEM on security issues but questioned the 
GoS' overall commitment to the peace process at this stage.  He said 
that the JMST would continue to consult bilaterally with both JEM 
and SLA/Abdulwahid in the hopes of achieving some sort of framework 
peace agreement. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Eliasson on several occasions stressed the need to 
normalize Chad-Sudan relations in the search for a Darfur solution. 
He inquired about the role of the Permanent Five members of the UN 
Security Council to get this issue on the Council's agenda. 
Eliasson noted that he had been invited by the U.S. Presidency to 
brief the Council o/a June 24, following a June 12 stop in Addis 
Ababa to brief the AU Peace and Security Council.  Eliasson remarked 
that France "could be doing more on Chad and JEM," and he flagged 
Libya's continued and transparent involvement in stoking the 
insecurity between the sides. 
 
ABYEI WILL TIP DARFUR BALANCE 
----------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Special Envoy Williamson explained the GoS' vulnerability 
in the wake of JEM's May 10 attack on Omdurman, which had revealed 
the extent of JEM's "inside information" about the GoS military and 
had emboldened JEM as a result of its minimal losses in the 
incident.  According to Williamson, however, the GoS would not be 
able to focus on Darfur until the Abyei issue was resolved. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000871  002 OF 002 
 
 
Williamson noted that both the GoS and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) had asked him to mediate on the Abyei issue, and 
Eliasson encouraged him to do so, calling the chance a "golden 
opportunity" and agreeing with Williamson that to serve in this 
capacity would put the USG in a good position to leverage the GoS on 
the Darfur issue in return. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On the border issue, Special Envoy Williamson indicated the 
need for the GoS to confront the issue of Chadian involvement with 
JEM as soon as possible, and he mentioned the possibility of 
changing UNAMID's mandate to respond to the Chad-Sudan border 
situation.  Williamson noted that France would have to engage more 
constructively on this issue within the next month, and Special 
Envoy Eliasson remarked that China, as a veto-wielding UNSC member, 
would have to be brought on board for any UNSCR 1769 mandate change 
[NOTE: UNAMID's mandate comes up for renewal on July 31.  One of the 
most contentious issues during negotiations of 1769 in 2007 was that 
of monitoring the Chad-Sudan border.  China was one of the 
staunchest opponents of such a provision.  END NOTE]. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Special Envoy Eliasson noted he would see Foreign Minister 
Deng, National Intelligence and Security Services Chief Ghosh, and 
Presidential Advisor Mustafa on June 2, as well as regional partners 
(Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and Libya) in Geneva on June 4.  Williamson 
and Eliasson agreed to remain in close contact in the coming weeks 
ahead of Eliasson's UNSC appearance. 
 
¶9. (U) This message has been cleared by the Special Envoy's staff. 
 
DATTA