VZCZCXRO4602
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0859/01 1611454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091454Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0995
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000859 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS, DRL 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM EAID KPKO SOCI UNSC SU
 
SUBJECT: NCP AND SPLM SIGN ABYEI ACCORD 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  On the evening of June 8, with great fanfare 
before an assembled audience of media and diplomatic community 
representatives, President of the Government of National Unity 
(GoNU) Omar Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir announced the 
completion of a new road map agreement to settle the North-South 
dispute over the division of the oil rich territory of Abyei.  While 
the accord shows progress and gives reason to hope that this 
flash-point in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement might finally be 
headed for a resolution, Sudan is the land of paper agreements that 
never quite get implemented.  There is a long way to go before we 
see the end of this source of NCP-SPLM conflict.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) Following the outbreak of heated fighting between Sudanese 
Armed Forces (SAF) and Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA) 
units in Abyei in late May that ended with the burning and looting 
of the town and the displacement of more than 50,000 area residents, 
tensions have run high between the NCP and the SPLM over the issue 
of the demarcation of the border in this region.  The CPA 
established the Abyei Border Commission (ABC) to finalize the 
North-South border, but its report was issued two years ago and the 
NCP has consistently refused to accept its findings, claiming that 
the ABC exceeded its mandate in awarding much of the territory to 
the SPLM.  Meanwhile, the SPLM has maintained that the findings of 
the ABC are final, which has resulted the placement of SAF and SPLA 
forces perilously close to one another in the area. 
 
¶3. (SBU) For the last two weeks NCP and SPLM negotiators have 
attempted to bridge the differences between the two sides, finally 
resulting in the agreement signed on the evening of June 8.  The 
accord calls for, first, new security arrangements to establish 
within 10 days a new Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) of combined SAF and 
SPLM troops to maintain order in Abyei (allowing for the safe 
separation of SAF and SPLA units), the deployment of police within 
two weeks, free movement and access to the north and south of Abyei 
for UNMIS patrols, and an investigation into the causes of the 
conflict. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Following the creation of a secure environment, targeted to 
take place by the end of June, the accord next calls for the safe 
return of all IDPs to their homes with the financial assistance of 
the GoNU and the international community. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Step 3 calls for the establishment of an interim Abyei 
administration, with an Area Administrator nominated by the SPLM and 
to be approved by President Bashir.  The Administrator's deputy is 
to be from the NCP, although both are to be chosen from among the 
residents of the area as originally called for in the CPA.  The 
Chief Administrator and Deputy will, with the approval of President 
Bashir, appoint the heads of departments and members of the Abyei 
Area Council.  Finally, without prejudice to the final demarcation 
of the Abyei border to be determined by arbitration, the oil revenue 
from the oilfields in the areas under arbitration are to be 
allocated in accordance with the wealth sharing arrangements noted 
in the Abyei Protocol, and that 50% of GoNU and 25% of the GOSS 
revenues from the arbitration area will to be used to finance 
projects of benefit to the region. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Finally, Step 4 of the accord calls for the establishment 
of an arbitration process to make a final and binding decision on 
the border demarcation, a decision to be rendered within six months 
from the date of the establishment of the arbitration process. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Following a public reading of the agreement in both English 
and Arabic, First Vice President Kiir spoke, congratulating the NCP 
and SPLM on developing a roadmap for the full implementation of the 
Abyei Protocol.  He lamented that it had taken 2 years and the 
tragedy of the recent fighting in Abyei town to reach this point, 
creating much needless suffering, but at least now a mechanism had 
finally been created to overcome the stalemate.  Kiir outlined the 
potential benefits of the agreement, and reaffirmed the SPLM's 
commitment to the establishment of peace and democracy.  "We will 
not go back to war," he stated firmly, "but we will be vigilant 
against the enemies of peace."  A new spirit of trust had been 
established with this agreement, and although the conflict over 
Abyei had wasted much precious time, the way was now clear to move 
on demarking the whole of the North-South border and to start the 
process of preparing for elections in 2009.  Finally, he condemned 
the recent attacks on Omdurman by the JEM, but he also called on the 
GoNU to protect the rights of all citizens and not to violate those 
rights based on ethnic origins, a clear reference to accusations 
that the GoNU has been arbitrarily arresting and abusing natives of 
Darfur in Khartoum. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Last, President Bashir spoke, proclaiming that the toughest 
part of the implementation of the CPA had now been addressed.  The 
 
KHARTOUM 00000859  002 OF 002 
 
 
Abyei Protocol was the key to the CPA, and this important agreement 
would again give hope to the people of Sudan.  He briefly outlined 
the conditions of the new agreement, and affirmed the need for 
reconciliation, which would be greatly enhanced by the commitment of 
oil revenues by both sides to help rebuild the region.  Abyei, he 
said, would change from a national problem to a national model of 
conflict resolution. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: We are a long way from an end to the Abyei 
conflict.  On the good news side, this new agreement establishes oil 
revenue sharing for the eastern sector of Abyei that did not exist 
before but which was claimed by the SPLA, and we are seeing some 
flexibility on the part of the SPLM on the possibility of 
alternatives to the ABC report's border demarcation.  On the 
possibly good side, the accord also creates the mechanism for 
establishing an administration in Abyei, for providing security for 
the IDPs, for UNMIS to have access to the entire region, and for the 
movement of IDPs back to their homes.  All this, however, depends on 
both parties putting into operation what they have signed without 
attempting to stall or undermine the process by using loopholes to 
delay or subvert its implementation, as we have seen so often in the 
past with similar agreements.  Finally, on the possible down side, 
we have the continued insistence by both parties on an arbitrated 
final settlement of the border.  This has been tried before without 
success when the NCP did not find the ruling of the Abyei Border 
Commission to its liking and refused to accept the result.  It would 
probably be better if the SPLM and NCP would just sit down and 
finally hammer out a political agreement that they both could live 
with.  At the very least, the arbitration time lines established by 
the new accord means a settlement to Abyei will not be announced 
until January of 2009 at the very earliest, and UNMIS has 
highlighted to us that in order to have elections before 2010, voter 
registration must begin by January 2009.  If the borders of Abyei 
are not settled or agreed upon by January 2009, it will be difficult 
to register voters in solidly-constructed constituencies.  This 
arbitration scheme could well once again lead the NCP and SPLM in 
circles and only serve to delay the two sides doing the hard work of 
directly negotiating a final border demarcation that both can 
implement. 
 
 
DATTA