VZCZCXRO3929
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0851/01 1600907
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080907Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0983
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000851 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EAID KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON MEETING WITH SENIOR SPLM IN 
KHARTOUM 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Special Envoy Richard Williamson met with the 
senior leadership of the SPLM in Khartoum on May 31 to discuss 
progress on the implementation of the CPA, the crisis in Abyei, and 
the need for better coordination between the SPLM and the United 
States in dealing with the National Congress Party (NCP).  SPLM 
attendees included Vice President of the Government of Southern 
Sudan Riek Machar, the Deputy Secretary General of the Northern 
Sector of the SPLM Yasir Arman, GoNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor, 
Governor of Blue Nile State Malik Agar, Minister of Presidential 
Affairs Luka Biong Deng, and GOSS Minister for Legal Affairs and 
Constitutional Development Michael Makuei. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Special Envoy Williamson opened the meeting by describing 
the devastation he had witnessed in the town of Abyei, the scene of 
recent fighting between SPLA and SAF units.  Ambassador Williamson 
expressed his view that no party is entirely at fault and no party 
is entirely innocent - but that one part is probably more guilty 
than the other. The leadership of GOSS President Salva Kiir during 
the crisis, on the other hand, had been outstanding and his 
restraint had prevented the situation from spiraling out of control 
into war.  The status of the CPA, however, was fragile, and 
immediate steps needed be taken to lower the risks to peace.  First 
and foremost, a way had to be found to provide security in Abyei so 
as to reduce tensions and the potential for another incident that 
could spark a war. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Williamson offered the services of the United 
States in helping to defuse the crisis, but he emphasized that the 
U.S. would not impose a solution on the parties.  Success in 
negotiations would require both sides to embrace the decisions 
reached.  However, he recognized the problems the SPLM faced in 
dealing with the NCP, and offered to help focus the attention of the 
NCP on the consequences of a failure to follow through on 
commitments.  This could be done by using the tragedy of Abyei to 
rally the support of the international community and the United 
Nations to deal with the issue.  With the presidency of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), beginning on June 1, the U.S. would 
be well placed to focus attention on Sudan.  Ambassador Williamson 
reiterated support for GOSS President Salva Kiir, and said the 
United States backs his decision to not let the CPA collapse. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Williamson next expressed his disappointment 
with the SPLM decision to withdraw from the talks he was about to 
hold with the Khartoum government.  Describing the GOSS as a friend 
and ally, Ambassador Williamson said that if the U.S. was to work 
with the SPLM on securing the CPA and supporting the GOSS, the SPLM, 
he said, had to be prepared to work closely with us.  Withdrawing 
from the U.S. - GOS dialog without informing him not only treated 
the U.S. with disrespect, but being blindsided by the announcement 
had undermined trust that the SPLM is a reliable negotiating 
partner.  Williamson said he was disappointed they pulled out of the 
dialog, and he was disappointed he had learned of this decision from 
the media. It had the appearance to trying to dictate to the U.S. 
who it could talk to and who it could not, and the U.S. would not be 
dictated to by anyone.  Williamson emphasized that this breach of 
trust must not happen again. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Finally, Ambassador Williamson once again praised the 
actions of President Kiir in Abyei in avoiding a war, quoting Kiir 
as telling him, "We do not want to be responsible for the collapse 
of the CPA."  The Ambassador pointedly asked the assembled SPLM 
leaders if they supported Kiir in this regard and in his handling of 
Abyei. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Vice President Riek Machar responded that the SPLM was 
committed to the CPA, that the GOSS was committed to the CPA, and 
that he and the others present all backed President Kiir in his 
handling of the Abyei crisis.  The theme of the recently completed 
SPLM convention had been, he said, "No to war and yes to New Sudan." 
 "Our people suffered in Abyei," he continued, "and we could have 
used force to settle it, but we did not."  However, the Abyei border 
was to have been settled by the Abyei Border Commission (ABC) 
report, which the NCP had rejected two years ago in violation of the 
terms of the CPA.  Since then, the SPLM had tried to negotiate a 
settlement, offering many interim solutions, but all had been 
rejected.  The NCP, he said, had created the crisis.  Machar implied 
that the timing of the Abyei fighting was, in fact, no accident, but 
a deliberate attempt by the NCP to provoke the SPLM into war before 
the Special Envoy was due to arrive in Khartoum.  The NCP feared the 
pressure that Williamson could bring to bear on the regime, and 
hoped the SPLM would start a war to remove that pressure.  However, 
the SPLM had refused to be provoked. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The decision to withdraw from the talks had not been 
intended to undercut the Special Envoy or President Bush, but had 
been taken because of the events in Abyei.  Peace in Darfur and the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000851  002 OF 003 
 
 
full implementation of the CPA all depended upon actions that had to 
be taken by the NCP, not the SPLM.  The people of the South did not 
understand why the SPLM would do anything to aid the NCP in 
improving its relations with the U.S. after what had happened in 
Abyei. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Last, Machar pointed out that President Bashir had just 
announced that it would take at least two years to establish a 
lasting peace in Darfur, which was his underhanded way of announcing 
that Darfur would not participate in the national elections in 2009. 
 Blocking Darfurians from voting, of course, helped the NCP in 
national elections, since it removed a base of support for the 
SPLM. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Foreign Minister Deng Alor next told the Special Envoy, "We 
almost went to war over Abyei.  Salva kept it from happening, but we 
can be forced to war in self defense."  He agreed with the Vice 
President that it had, in fact, been the intention of the NCP to 
provoke the SPLM into a war, but their plan had not worked.  He 
regretted that the Ambassador had not been informed of the decision 
by the SPLM to withdraw from the normalization talks, but said that 
he had informed the State Department of the action in advance. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The NCP was uncomfortable without the SPLM in the talks, 
he continued, which he thought was having a positive impact on their 
willingness to resolve the Abyei crisis.  "They want us back because 
we give them credibility in the talks with you."  The purpose of 
withdrawing was not to embarrass the U.S., or to try to dictate who 
Williamson could talk to, but to leverage the NCP's need for the 
SPLM's help in improving relations with the U.S. to force them to 
end the Abyei crisis. 
 
¶11. (SBU) What the NCP wanted on Abyei, he continued, was to submit 
the question to arbitration.  The problem was that the ABC report on 
the Abyei border was already the result of binding arbitration, as 
specified in the CPA, and all the NCP really wanted was to keep 
arguing the case until it got a decision it liked.  When he had 
begun his term as the Foreign Minister for the GoNU, Bashir had told 
him that he would implement the ABC report.  He had not.  This was 
typical of how the NCP operated -- say one thing, do another.  "We 
need your intervention," Alor said.  "If you don't, war is the 
likely outcome.  We don't want it, but tensions will overwhelm us." 
 
¶12. (SBU) The rest of the SPLM delegation echoed the sentiments of 
the Vice President and Foreign Minister, except that Yasir Arman 
pointed out that following the JEM attacks on Khartoum, the NCP had 
been victimizing all Darfurians in the city.  Captured JEM leaders 
were also being tortured, and this harassment and abuse of prisoners 
had to stop. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Ambassador Williamson responded by reiterating that the US 
interest in Sudan was security and stability for all.  There were 
many issues related to the CPA that needed attention, but the most 
pressing were the need to hold elections in 2009 and to hold the 
Southern referendum on self determination in 2011. We had supported 
the people of Southern Sudan in the past, he said, and would do so 
again.  We were contributing to the professionalization of the SPLA, 
as well as to humanitarian and development assistance. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Ambassador repeated that the crisis in Abyei might 
well present an opportunity to galvanize the international community 
and the UN into action, and the U.S. was ready to help make that 
happen, but the hard work of resolving the situation was up to the 
parties involved.  "We will not try to impose solutions."  Further, 
we must be asked to help so that it was clear that the SPLM wanted 
the U.S. involved.  If we were asked, then the SPLM must be prepared 
to work closely and collaboratively with us.  It was not enough for 
the Foreign Minister to say that he had informed the State 
Department of a decision on a matter that directly involved the 
Special Envoy.  They all had his telephone number and they needed to 
call him directly.  He had called all of them on many occasions to 
coordinate his actions with them.  They needed to reciprocate that 
level of coordination.  Even if they decided to take a path 
different from the Americans on an issue (and friends could disagree 
from time to time), they must reach out and talk to him before 
acting or his efforts on their behalf would fail.  On the subject of 
Abyei, the Ambassador said if the SPLM wanted U.S. help, they should 
make a public request for assistance or he would take no further 
action in this regard. He stressed that unless both the NCP and SPLM 
both felt ownership of the issue, effort as resolution will not 
succeed.  The SPLM delegation agreed to make such a request 
immediately. 
 
¶15.  (U) S/E Willamson's delegation reviewed this message before 
transmission. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000851  003 OF 003 
 
 
DATTA