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Viewing cable 08KABUL1508, GHAZNI PROVINCE: SECURITY REMAINS A CHALLENGE, BUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL1508 2008-06-22 05:49 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO0330
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1508/01 1740549
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220549Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4447
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001508 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ECON AF
SUBJECT: GHAZNI PROVINCE: SECURITY REMAINS A CHALLENGE, BUT 
SLOWLY IMPROVING GOVERNANCE BRINGS HOPE 
 
REF: KABUL 752 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Security in Ghazni's Pashtun belt remains 
a challenge, but the Afghan National Police (ANP) are slowly 
improving.  The province is beginning to attract more donor 
attention, which will hopefully revive Ghazni's stagnant 
economic development.  Ghazni has had four governors in the 
last nine months, but security chiefs have remained in place 
and the Provincial Council's performance has improved 
substantially. 
 
Security: Number of Incidents Increases, but Police Begin to 
Improve 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The number of security incidents in Ghazni during 
the first six months of 2008 was 16 percent higher than the 
corresponding period in 2007.  Insurgent tactics consist 
primarily of small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire on 
military convoys and commercial trucks, and of IED 
emplacement.  The latter has become more effective as 
insurgents develop larger and more sophisticated 
pressure-plate devices and implant them in greater numbers. 
In May 2008, a section of the Ring Road was damaged when a 
large IED exploded in a culvert * the first instance of a 
paved road being mined in Ghazni.  Most of Ghazni's secondary 
dirt roads are heavily mined, preventing rural Pashtuns from 
easily accessing the Ring Road and its markets and inhibiting 
reconstruction activities.  Still, insurgents faced a robust 
response by Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces. 
The U.S. Army maneuver battalion in Ghazni has expanded its 
presence to Giro district, while the PRT plans to build 
additional paved roads in several turbulent districts. 
 
3. (SBU) Ghazni's ANP are also doing a better job of 
responding to insurgent attacks.  In at least three instances 
this year, police held their ground, returned fire, and drove 
off attackers.  A Guam National Guard company partners with 
police in Qarabagh district, helping the ANP to man several 
outposts and ensure Ring Road security.  Focused District 
Development (FDD) has begun in Deh Yak District and will 
expand to three more districts by year's end.  Afghan 
National Civil Order Police are well regarded in Deh Yak, 
though some residents complain that they do not patrol 
sufficiently.  Governor Usman will reach out to elders and 
mullahs to ensure that FDD recruitment shuras net qualified 
candidates. 
 
Development: New Activities on the Horizon 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Development in Ghazni is stagnant, though increased 
donor attention may help to change that.  UNAMA plans to open 
a field office in the province.  The PRT has oriented its 
reconstruction activities toward road building and support to 
the education and health sectors in the Hazara belt.  A new 
Texas National Guard Agribusiness Development Team and a 
Polish addition to PRT Ghazni arrive this month, expanding 
the PRT's reach and resources.  GIRoA's own development 
activities are still hampered by staff vacancies, 
particularly in critical sectors such as health and 
agriculture.  The Provincial Development Council is 
ineffective, though the addition of two technical advisors 
funded by USAID's Local Governance and Community Development 
(LGCD) program and continued PRT mentoring should improve its 
performance. 
 
Governance: Turmoil in the Governor's Office, but the 
Provincial Council Gains Stature 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (SBU) There has been considerable turmoil at the top of 
the provincial administration, with four governors since 
August.  Ghazni's latest Governor, Dr. Mohammad Usman, took 
office on May 31, following the short terms of Sher Khosti 
(March - May 2008) and Faisanullah Faisan (September 2007 - 
March 2008).  Usman's priorities include outreach to 
religious and tribal leaders and to local insurgent fighters 
who might be reconciled to the government.  He proposes to 
 
KABUL 00001508  002 OF 002 
 
 
link the government to the people through the creation of 
elders, and mullahs, shuras at the district and village 
level.  This approach has worked well in Deh Yak, Ghazni's 
most successful Pashtun-belt district (reftel).  Usman has 
been well-received by local leaders who were alienated by his 
predecessor's western ways.  LGCD has placed technical 
advisors in the Governor's office. 
 
6. (SBU) After a two-month delay, Ghazni's Provincial Council 
(PC) held leadership elections in March.  Under new leaders, 
it is showing unprecedented dynamism.  It no longer treats 
the PRT as the solution of first resort.  Instead, the PC 
summons line directors and NGO representatives, questions 
them on their work, and demands results. 
 
7. (SBU) Ghazni's police force is understaffed, with roughly 
1,800 officers out of a Tashkil (staffing plan) allotment of 
2,777.  Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) &sustainment 
training8 reaches 80 to 90 men each month.  Before the ANAP 
program ends on October 1st, most ANAP will receive 
sustainment training, enabling them to transition to regular 
police service.  Deh Yak became Ghazni's first FDD district 
in March, and its police will return from FDD training in 
late June.  Provincial Police Chief Khan Mohammad, in office 
since November 2007, is starting to lose momentum.  In the 
beginning, he weeded ghost police from the roles, implemented 
electronic salary payment for 300 men, and got MOI ID cards 
to 1,740 ANP, but he has recently been accused of corruption. 
 At a minimum, he has become less proactive, though several 
of his staff officers are promising and carry out reforms. 
 
8. (SBU) Most of Ghazni's 19 District Administrators (DAs) 
are ineffectual, but the situation is improving.  Former 
Governor Khosti relieved three weak performers, but he had 
difficulty finding qualified persons for DA slots.  Governor 
Usman plans to ask local elders and mullahs to caucus and 
propose candidates to him, ensuring popular support for new 
DAs.  District centers remain inadequate in terms of 
security, facilities and staffing; many are little more than 
police stations.  In April, LGCD trained DAs and district 
department heads.  Among the line ministries, the Health and 
Finance line ministries are still strong performers, while 
Education, under a new director, has lost momentum and focus. 
 Justice sector departments benefit from INL's Justice Sector 
Support Program and new CJTF-101 Rule of Law initiatives. 
However, pay, infrastructure and popular skepticism limit 
modern legal institutions, reach and effectiveness. 
DELL