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Viewing cable 08KABUL1495, AFGHAN POLICE: ANAP/ABP TRAINING SURGE UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL1495 2008-06-19 08:54 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2971
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1495/01 1710854
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190854Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4433
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001495 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO A/DAS CAMP, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, 
INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE:  ANAP/ABP TRAINING SURGE UPDATE 
 
REF: A. KABUL 1030 
     B. 07 KABUL 3848 
     C. 07 KABUL 3054 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. In the onward press of the Focused District Development 
(FDD) program to train and equip the Afghan National Police 
(reftels), the network of police-training facilities has been 
running at full capacity.  Most of the network capacity of 
about about 3,500 spaces is now dedicated to FDD-related 
training; however, other training imperatives remain, 
particularly 1) transitioning Afghan National Auxiliary 
Police (ANAP) into the regular police force before the ANAP 
program expires on October 1, 2008; and 2) training up units 
for the undermanned Afghan Border Police (ABP).  To reach 
those goals, the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition 
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has initiated a training surge, 
accommodated at a range of temporary sites.  The surge 
represents a short-term solution until the National Police 
Training Center is opened in Wardak Province later this year. 
 The intent of this effort is to facilitate FDD while 
transitioning as many of the 5,000 ANAP as possible over to 
the regular police force by October 1.  It is also to improve 
the quality and quantity of the ABP, currently manned at 65 
percent, in particular on the Pakistani border.  In early 
May, Emboffs visited Nangarhar Province to assess the 
training surge's progress. 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
2. Defeating the Afghan insurgency requires both a strong 
Afghan National Army and capable Afghan National Police (ANP) 
corps.  In December 2007, CSTC-A embarked on the Focused 
District Development (FDD) program, a country-wide police 
training program to train and equip the ANP, district by 
district, within five years.  Along with FDD, CSTC-A is 
executing the 2007-08 ANP training surge, which focuses on 
the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the Afghan National 
Auxiliary Police (ANAP).  The ANAP were established in 2006 
as a temporary program to field additional police units 
rapidly to high-threat 
districts, mainly in the south and east.  Although many ANAP 
slots were never filled, and while these lightly-trained 
police are of unreliable quality, local commanders and 
governors rely upon them in the absence of other forces. 
 
3. Within the broader effort to reform and professionalize 
Afghan police, transitioning as many of the 9,318 serving 
ANAP as possible into regular police service is imperative. 
Although efforts are under way to fill all of the 82,000 
authorized ANP positions with new recruits, the ANAP 
represent an existing pool of recruits that already has some 
policing experience.  ANAP troops receive a scant two weeks 
of basic training, whereas AUP basic training consists of an 
eight-week course followed by sustainment training.  (For 
comparison, the basic course for what is considered the best 
of ANP, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), is 16 
weeks.)  Since the ANAP program is scheduled to end on 
October 1, 2008, individual ANAP patrolmen must either 
complete a three-week sustainment training course to qualify 
for transition to the AUP or ABP or they will be removed from 
the police payroll.  CSTC-A will ensure that ANAP in 
FDD-targeted districts receive the necessary training and 
equipment to make the transition, but ANAP in other districts 
must complete their training elsewhere if they wish to remain 
in the force.  The training surge is also targeted at the 
ABP, who remain under authorized strength.  For the moment, 
ANAP and ABP training takes place principally at selected, 
existing 
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and other facilities on a 
space-available basis.  DynCorp mentors under contract to INL 
oversee instruction, which is administered by certified 
 
KABUL 00001495  002 OF 002 
 
 
Afghan trainers. 
 
4. By the end of the ANAP program on October 1, 2,480 ANAP 
are targeted to receive the eight-week basic course along 
with the rest of the AUP units in their district, thus 
bypassing surge training altogether.  These ANAP may 
transition straight into AUP without completing the 
sustainment course, as long as they meet all other program 
requirements.  ANAP in districts targeted by FDD after 
October 1, if they receive the three-week sustainment course 
and fulfill other program requirements, may remain on the job 
until the FDD program reaches their districts.  As of May 18, 
1,790 ANAP had completed the three-week sustainment training 
and another 628 additional ANAP are currently in sustainment 
training.  That leaves an estimated 5,048 additional ANAP 
still to be trained.  (NOTE:  Confirming accurate numbers for 
ANAP remains difficult and is being addressed in the context 
of overall payroll reform efforts.  In any event, many ANAP 
patrolmen will choose not to join the AUP, and a number will 
likely be unqualified to transition to the ANP.  END NOTE.) 
 
5. The ABP is approximately 70 percent manned, with 12,761 of 
18,003 positions filled.  648 ABP are scheduled to graduate 
from basic training by July 26, and 124 will complete 
advanced training by June 2. FOB Hughie in Nangarhar Province 
is one of the 16 FOBs nationwide that was selected to host 
surge training.  It is located near Highway 1, which runs 
from the Torkham Gate in the east, past FOB Hughie and 
through the provincial capital of Jalalabad.  About 290 ABP 
personnel are currently receiving basic training at this FOB, 
and Emboff spoke with several who expressed satisfaction with 
their instructors and the quality of the course.  CSTC-A is 
responsible for providing life support and for ensuring that 
the facilities are properly equipped and supplied, while 
DynCorp mentors under contract to INL oversee instruction by 
Afghan instructors. 
 
6. As with other programs, implementation under conditions 
experienced in Afghanistan poses severe challenges and 
requires creative teamwork.  Local Afghan contractors provide 
uneven quality in food delivery and construction; latrine, 
sink and shower units have not held up well under the troops' 
daily use.  ABP unit commanders, based a few miles away in 
the provincial capital of Jalalabad, have provided limited 
support; however, on the day we visited, an ABP two-star 
general was on hand to address pay issues for the troops. 
Although DynCorp mentors visit the FOB each training day, the 
ANA unit that secures the FOB is unable to provide secure 
overnight billeting for these mentors.  While the ANA troops 
remain on hand to provide security, the lack of overnight 
supervision for trainees has left them vulnerable to 
disciplinary issues.  Mentors have expelled two trainees for 
violations of the drug policy but cannot block after-hours 
access for those individuals.  The Ministry of Interior 
dispatched a partial complement of trainers on time, but the 
U.S. team has struggled to keep the course on track pending 
the uncertain arrival of remaining instructors. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. Despite these challenges, the training surge is 
contributing toward the transitioning of ANAP to regular 
police service while providing much-needed training to the 
ABP.  Lessons learned will probably lead to a reduction in 
the overall number of training sites.  Ultimately, planners 
aim to complete ANAP training by September 1 in order to 
allow a thirty-day cushion to pick up stragglers and complete 
administrative processing before the ANAP program expires. 
This training surge will preserve the joint U.S. and Afghan 
investment in these troops -- and reduce the numbers who 
transition to local militias or other unwelcome outcomes. 
DELL