VZCZCXRO2880
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1493/01 1710646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190646Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4429
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001493 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, PRM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREF PGOV PREL PK IR AF
SUBJECT:  Afghanistan's Refugee Absorption Reaches Saturation 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Since January 1 of this year, 143,737 Afghan 
refugees - the vast majority from Pakistan - have repatriated to 
Afghanistan with assistance from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  While the numbers are relatively 
low compared to recent years, Afghanistan's ability to absorb more 
refugees is already strained.  Meanwhile, visiting Pakistani 
ministers are stressing Afghanistan's "obligation" to take back its 
refugees by December 31, 2009.  As that date approaches, we expect 
UNHCR Kabul to try to push back in indirect ways, including through 
the November 2008 Return and Reintegration Conference in Kabul.  End 
summary. 
 
Pakistan Increasing "Refugees Out By 2009" Drumbeat 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Visiting Pakistani Advisor to the Prime Minister on 
Interior Affairs and Narcotics Control Rehman Malik told President 
Karzai June 8 that Afghanistan is obliged to accept the return of 
all Afghan refugees by December 31, 2009.  According to UNHCR, Malik 
was overstating his case - Pakistan's timetable is still not 
formally accepted by UNHCR Kabul or the Afghan Ministry of Refugees 
and Repatriation (MORR) - but President Karzai did not push back. 
Afghan Foreign Minister Spanta, when meeting with visiting Pakistani 
Foreign Minister Qureshi two days earlier, only reminded Qureshi 
that Pakistan's repatriation of refugees should be gradual, 
voluntary, and conscious of Afghanistan's capacity to resettle 
returnees. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Any appearance of tacit consent or acquiescence to the 
2009 deadline by IRoA senior-level officials undermines UNHCR and 
MORR's attempts to keep the issue alive in the Afghan/Pak/UNHCR 
Tripartite Commission context.  Although the Tripartite Memorandum 
of Agreement establishes the 2009 expiration of Pakistan's Proof of 
Registration (POR) cards, the POR card expiration deadline is 
referred to as "renewable," and UNHCR Kabul and MORR Minister Sheer 
Mohammad Etibari continue to insist that the card expiration date 
and the repatriation deadline are not linked.  According to UNHCR, 
Pakistani refugee officials have admitted privately that Afghans are 
likely to remain in Pakistan after 2009.  UNHCR and Minister Etibari 
will maintain their position that the 2009 repatriation deadline is 
not agreed to and press Pakistan in the Tripartite Commission 
meetings to extend the POR card deadline and accept a more realistic 
repatriation timeline.  Their current goal is to extend the POR 
expiration date until 2012, when Afghanistan's Afghan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) will be implemented, and agree to a more 
realistic figure of one million Afghans returning over five years. 
 
 
UNHCR Pursuing "Predictability of Staying" Along 
With Repatriation Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) While visiting Pakistani ministers beat the repatriation 
drum in Afghanistan, UNHCR is quietly seeking compromises with both 
Pakistan and Iran that would give refugees "predictability of 
staying."  Since UNHCR Kabul claims that legal integration, i.e., 
citizenship or permanent residency, has been a political non-starter 
with both countries, predictability must be achieved through 
indirect, incremental measures.  These measures would boost funding 
and access to existing education and health programs for both 
refugees and hosting communities, and temporary residence status 
would be extended for longer periods, such as the three-year POR 
validity in Pakistan.  Predictability of residency is particularly 
critical in Iran, where the recently extended Amayesh III refugee 
registration process only provides residency status for six months. 
Refugees there are constantly in limbo and unable to plan their 
lives for more than a few months at a time, obviously preventing 
full integration into the labor market and educational networks. 
 
Fall 2008 Conference on Refugee Return and 
Reintegration 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) UNHCR hopes the fall 2008 Conference will bring a dose of 
reality to the refugee arena and move the debate away from 
Pakistan's unilateral plan of "engineered return," i.e., 800,000 
refugees returning each year between 2007 and 2009.  The conference 
was proposed by the IROA and endorsed by the Joint Coordinating and 
Monitoring Board VI last year and will be co-hosted by Foreign 
 
KABUL 00001493  002 OF 003 
 
 
Minister Spanta and UN High Commissioner Guterres this November in 
Kabul.  The main objectives will be to develop a rational policy 
among Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and donors on how to successfully 
return and reintegrate a more realistic number of refugees in light 
of Afghanistan's limited absorption capacity.  The Afghan government 
will also present the five-year reintegration strategy that is being 
developed and costed out now through the ANDS. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) UNHCR will also have to guard against MORR's attempts to 
grab donor resources.  MORR has neither the will nor capacity to use 
resources in an effective or transparent manner, and the ongoing 
UNHCR-led ministry reform process has still not weeded out corrupt 
elements inside the ministry.  UNHCR will instead channel donor 
funds to subject-matter experts, such as the Ministries of 
Education, Rural Development, or Water, to create schools, clinics, 
or water points in areas of high return.  It is unclear if donors 
will ante up, however.  Pakistan pledged $20 million at the June 12 
Paris Conference for refugee repatriation, and Iran said it would 
provide a $300 million loan to Afghanistan over three years, 
presumably for refugee assistance. Other donors may be tapped out as 
well after the large contributions made in Paris. 
 
Meanwhile, Squatter Camps Develop in Nangarhar 
And Laghman 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  (SBU) As the political posturing continues and the conference 
planning begins, refugee squatter communities are starting to stack 
up.  At least 69 percent of all 2008  returns so far have been from 
Jalozai camp, and most families are returning to Nangarhar, Kunar, 
and Laghman provinces, with substantial return to Kabul province and 
the north.  Six informal refugee settlements have mushroomed in 
Nangarhar and Laghman, with refugees claiming they cannot return to 
their places of origin (many in Kunar) due to landlessness, tribal 
conflicts, insecurity from anti-government elements, personal 
enmity, land disputes, and limited socio-economic opportunities. 
Some refugees have been moved to marginal areas, such as the 
Mehterlam Desert in Laghman or Chamtala Desert in Nangarhar, where 
they eke out a precarious existence, even with substantial 
humanitarian support. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The draw for Nangarhar is most likely the job 
opportunities in Jalalabad city, the biggest commercial center in 
the east.  A group of 16 Nuristani families have reportedly opted to 
stay in Nangarhar and make a fresh start rather than scratching out 
a living in Nuristan in subsistence agriculture.  But many 2005 
returnees from Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) 
still have not integrated; they live in temporary settlements, such 
as Hersashahi in Nangarhar, where the government wants the land for 
industrial purposes but the people claim they have nowhere to go. 
These returnees have been unable to reintegrate into the social and 
economic networks in either their province of origin or their 
adopted provinces.  New returnees are following the same pattern by 
congregating in squalid temporary settlements, often in direct 
conflict with landowners, local government, and PRT-funded project 
implementers.  Even though land was set aside in Kunar province for 
Jalozai returnees, they refuse to go.  Conditions in the temporary 
settlements are often grim. Some Jalozai families in the north have 
no assistance and are living in a "buzkashi" (traditional Afghan 
horse polo-like game) field without even tent shelters or water. 
Others are surviving only through fragile and temporary assistance. 
With summer's extreme heat, the ongoing drought, and food price 
increases, this situation is unlikely to improve soon. 
 
Who is Helping, and How? 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The international community, including PRM, is providing 
assistance through new or existing water, health, and education 
projects.  The World Food Program is providing food for vulnerable 
families in the Mehterlam Desert, UNICEF is tankering in water to 
many settlements, UNICEF and a Danish aid organization are digging 
wells, and IOM, UNICEF, and UNHCR are distributing non-food items. 
A PRM-funded IMC clinic is serving 450 Kunari families in a new 
settlement near Tangi, Nangarhar.  The Afghan government is also 
stepping up its efforts, with the Department of Public Health 
staffing some mobile clinics (with the support of WHO and UNHCR), 
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development providing water 
and creating water points, and the relevant Departments of Refugees 
 
KABUL 00001493  003 OF 003 
 
 
and Repatriation interceding with communities and trying to match 
resources with their needs.  While these efforts are helpful, they 
cannot address the long-term reintegration needs of livelihoods, 
education, and security that will dictate whether these recent 
returnees stay in Afghanistan or go back to Pakistan or Iran in 
search, again, of a better life. 
 
DELL