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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 002021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DURRANI DISCUSSES FATA 
STRATEGY 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY.  On May 29, Mahmud Ali Durrani, Pakistan's 
new National Security Advisor (NSA), addressed counties with 
troops in Afghanistan on Pakistan's strategies for combating 
terrorism and enforcing peace agreements within the tribal 
areas.  He stressed that it was important not only to 
himself, but also the Government of Pakistan (GOP), to make 
clear that Pakistan viewed the ongoing conflict as their war. 
 Stressing the difficulties of operating in the rugged and 
inhospitable terrain of the tribal areas, Durrani explained 
existing constraints on military operations in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): 1) sensitivity to 
collateral damage, 2) constitutional protection of tribal 
traditions and governance, 3) limited counter-terrorism 
capabilities, and 4) political acceptability of military 
actions. 
 
¶2. (U) He also "spelled out" Pakistan's strategy in the war 
on terror - to vigorously pursue the ultimate objective of 
the extermination of terrorist elements and to deny the use 
of its territory as a safehaven for militancy within and 
outside of Pakistan.  This strategy would be implemented 
through a three-pronged approach, using complementary 
political, military, and developmental engagement.  Regarding 
future peace agreements in troubled areas, Durrani remarked 
they would be structured to reestablish the writ of 
government and to deny space for terrorist action thereby 
creating space for democratic initiatives.  Specifically, 
future agreements must contain clauses requiring elimination 
of cross-border terrorist movement, expulsion of foreign 
fighters, closure of extremist training camps, and acceptance 
of the government's right to take action should tribes fail 
to enforce the agreements.  Durrani closed the meeting by 
reiterating Pakistan's commitment and resolve.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (U) On May 29, in a meeting with countries with troops in 
Afghanistan at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National 
Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and recent Pakistani 
Ambassador to the U.S., Mahmud Ali Durrani, outlined 
Pakistan's strategies for combating terrorism and enforcing 
peace agreements within tribal areas of the border region. 
After a brief introduction by Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood 
Qureshi, designed to demonstrate cohesion within the new 
administration, Durrani briefed the Chiefs of Mission on the 
Pakistan's military and political strategies in the FATA, as 
well the substance of current and future peace agreements. 
 
¶4. (U) He began by noting that popular support for liberal 
political parties in the recent elections was a boost for 
Pakistan's efforts in the war on terror, citing the 
significance of religious parties' low showings in the border 
regions.  Durrani said he wanted to make clear that the GOP 
believes the war on terror is Pakistan's war. 
 
¶5. (U) Referencing a series of maps of the FATA and the 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Durrani argued that 
terrain in the region posed major difficulties in policing 
not only the region as a whole, but border crossing points in 
particular.  In his words, the rugged, inhospitable terrain 
and poor infrastructure made it nearly "impossible" to police 
the border, despite Pakistan's nearly 900 border posts.  He 
added that the historical granting of border-crossing 
"easement" rights to tribals made policing even more 
difficult, especially at night.  Durrani said that while 
there were only two officially established routes between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, there existed some 20 dirt tracks 
that could be traversed by wheeled vehicles and approximately 
340 routes traveled primarily by foot and pack animal. 
Describing the challenging terrain as restrictive to the 
movement of ground troops and logistical supply lines, 
Durrani claimed that Pakistan's lack of air mobility 
exacerbated its policing problems.  Finally, he noted that 
refugee camps along the border were an additional concern 
because they are, in his opinion, breeding grounds and safe 
havens for militants and narco-traffickers. 
 
¶6. (U) Durrani discussed the current constraints on military 
operations within the FATA.  First, government sensitivity to 
collateral damage is growing; "sifting the bad guys from the 
good" is becoming increasingly difficult.  Second, the 
existing status of the tribal areas in Pakistan's 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002021  002 OF 004 
 
 
constitution requires acceptance of their right to traditions 
and self-governance.  Third, Durrani cited Pakistan's limited 
counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities, 
claiming that despite the support already received from 
allies, deficiencies existed and additional training and 
equipment were needed.  He asserted that political reaction 
to military action, not only within Pakistan but from the 
outside as well, so imposed a hindrance on Pakistan's ability 
to curb extremism along the border.  He commented that the 
emergence of liberal parties helped to moderate views and 
improve Pakistan's ability to engage the tribals through 
means other than military, but there was still a long way to 
go. 
 
¶7. (U) Referencing comments made by Prime Minister Gilani, 
Durrani proclaimed that Pakistan was "virtually fighting for 
its soul" so as not to "go the way of the Taliban."  As such, 
he spelled out Pakistan's strategy in the war on terror - to 
vigorously pursue the ultimate objective of the extermination 
of terrorist elements and to deny the use of its territory as 
a safe haven for militancy within and outside of Pakistan. 
This strategy would be implemented through a three-pronged 
approach, using complementary political, military, and 
developmental engagement.  Showing clear cohesion with 
Gilani's previous statements, Durrani confirmed that the 
federal government would grant a greater role to the NWFP 
government and increased political and economic engagement in 
the FATA.  He made it clear that there would be no compromise 
or talks with terrorists unless they "lay down their arms," 
and that current discussions were only being held with tribal 
leaders and jirga representatives.  Durrani reiterated that 
the army would remain in the FATA but their leadership had 
been given more discretion to relocate as necessary to 
facilitate better logistics and control of the region. 
 
Potential Peace Agreements 
 
¶8. (U) He followed his briefing on the government's FATA 
strategy with a discussion regarding future elements of any 
potential peace agreements in the FATA.  He remarked that the 
concept was to separate "irreconcilables" and reestablish the 
writ of government, denying space for terrorist action and 
creating space for democratic initiatives.  He also commented 
that agreements would only be signed with tribal leaders to 
ensure they understand their responsibilities to shoulder 
enforcement of the agreements.  Specific clauses will be 
required in future peace agreements - including that being 
implemented in South Waziristan - to effectively combat 
terrorism while providing opportunities to tribal leaders to 
regain control and legitimacy within their tribal areas. 
 
¶9. (U) First, all cross-border terrorist movement must cease. 
 Durrani acknowledged that enforcement would be difficult, 
given the terrain, acceptable trade movements, and the 
easement rights of tribes, but claimed that this clause was 
essential to establishing the framework on control.  Second, 
tribes would be responsible for the expulsion of foreign 
fighters, choosing his words wisely to not cast blame on all 
foreigners present in the FATA.  Third, Durrani stated 
agreements must require the closure of all extremist training 
camps.  Referencing the failure of 2006 agreements, he 
admitted that while the agreements themselves were not 
inferior, implementation and enforcement was.  As such, 
Durrani claimed that a more "sturdy mechanism" would be in 
place to enforce and monitor these agreements.  Finally, any 
signed agreements must recognize the government's right to 
take action should tribes fail to enforce the agreements.  He 
confessed that he fully expected violations to occur but said 
that the central issue was how quickly the government would 
be able to respond. 
 
¶10. (U) Expecting questions would arise regarding Baitullah 
Mehsud, Durrani noted that peace agreements with the Mehsud 
tribes had two distinct features.  The first was that the 
agreements were pursued by the Mehsud tribes themselves as a 
result of the inconveniences and suffering caused by 
Baitullah Mehsud's militancy.  Second, Durrani argued that 
the government was signing these agreements from a position 
of strength, which they hoped to exploit in sparking similar 
developments elsewhere.  Durrani accepted that disagreements 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002021  003 OF 004 
 
 
may exist regarding Pakistan's tactics and methods in 
prosecuting the war on terror, but reiterated Pakistan's 
commitment and resolve. 
 
¶11. (U) The French Ambassador asked how, in light of past 
agreement failures, Pakistan intends to ensure new agreements 
are fully respected, as well as whether the agreements 
included any stipulations regarding military presence and/or 
specific stationing locations.  Durrani responded that 
Pakistan had learned from past experience and thus 
established more conditions for the enforcement of new 
agreements.  In addition, improved intelligence and forward 
positioning of troops would enable the government to react 
more quickly to violations.  He acknowledged that success 
will hinge on proper implementation of the agreements, but 
that increased political engagement will be the key to 
"capturing space from terrorists."  Likewise, Durrani 
declared that now was not the right time to decide on 
long-term positioning of the army and, while locations may be 
adjusted as situations improve, the military would not be 
completely removed from the FATA "under any circumstances." 
 
¶12. (U) The Ambassador from Poland followed up by asking 
whether expulsion of foreign fighters would include Afghans 
and whether diminished power of the maliks would make their 
signing of the agreements less potent.  Durrani first 
admitted that distinguishing Afghan Taliban from Pakistani 
Taliban would be difficult, but contended that efforts would 
be focused more on foreign fighters, such as Chechens. 
Regarding the diminished power of the maliks, Durrani 
acknowledged the concern was valid, claiming that past 
military operations may have also disrupted the existing 
political system.  He stated the government hoped to bring 
back the malik system had power and suggested that an 
increase in government funding would help them improve their 
position. 
 
¶13. (U) The Norwegian Ambassador raised the lack of security 
in Afghanistan as a major reason for postponement of refugee 
camps closures in Pakistan and asked Durrani how the GOP 
planned to deal with the situation.  He answered that while 
refugees were a problem, the threat posed from a 
counter-terrorism perspective was real and had to be handled 
through increased security and intelligence.  Durrani urged 
the group to help improve stability in Afghanistan so that 
many of the refugees could return home.  He did, however, 
agree that there was no simple solution to the refugee 
problem but resolved to hold discussions with the Afghan 
government on the matter. 
 
¶14. (U) The Danish Ambassador asked how the government would 
effectively monitor compliance with peace accords, pointing 
to Pakistan's claims that it would not hold talks with 
terrorists.  The Ambassador also questioned whether the 
Taliban would be included in future jirgas and if Baitullah 
Mehsud would be party to the South Waziristan peace 
agreement.  Durrani replied that a number of interrelated 
elements exist to help monitor compliance: 1) improvements in 
intelligence sharing and cooperation, 2) consistent military 
presence, 3) alliances with strengthened maliks, and 4) 
increased control of ingress routes by the military.  With 
respect to Taliban presence at future jirgas, Durrani 
explained the need to define not simply whether the 
individuals were Taliban, but whether they were militant, in 
which case they would not be welcomed.  Put simply, he said, 
the government must accept that fact that the tribal system 
in place had not changed over the years and if non-militant 
Taliban leaders held influence with the tribes, it would be 
difficult to exclude them from the jirgas.  On the other 
hand, Durrani assured the group that Baitullah Mehsud would 
in no way participate in the jirgas, acknowledging Mehsud's 
potential influence over tribal leaders who did participate. 
 
¶15. (U) Finally, the Ambassador from Australia inquired on 
the possibility that Mehsud was transferring fighters across 
the border to Afghanistan.  Although Durrani admitted that he 
had no evidence of these transfers, he contended that it was 
likely these moves had occurred.  Referring to previous 
"hard-hitting" operations, Durrani claimed that such 
operations were responsible for tribal relocations, which he 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002021  004 OF 004 
 
 
believed led to tribal pressure on Mehsud and requests for 
the peace agreements.  Even so, he acknowledged that dramatic 
progress would not occur overnight and asked the group of 
diplomats for their countries' patience and trust, granting 
their uncertainties regarding Pakistan's capabilities, but 
not its resolve in this long war. 
PATTERSON