Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD2020, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DURRANI ADDRESSES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ISLAMABAD2020.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ISLAMABAD2020 2008-06-03 10:29 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO9764
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2020/01 1551029
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031029Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7210
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8667
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8028
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3340
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9823
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5566
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4307
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 4008
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 002020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DURRANI ADDRESSES 
DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON FATA STRATEGY 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002020  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////// /////////////// 
////PLEASE ZFR IMI ZFR ABOVE MESSAGE. A NEW MSG WILL BE///// 
///SENT WITH A NEW MRN/MCN. SORRY FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE//// 
///////////////////////////////////////////// ////////////// 
 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002020  002 OF 004 
 
 
constitution requires acceptance of their right to traditions 
and self-governance.  Third, Durrani cited Pakistan's limited 
counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities, 
claiming that despite the support already received from 
allies, deficiencies existed and additional training and 
equipment were needed.  He asserted that political reaction 
to military action, not only within Pakistan but from the 
outside as well, so imposed a hindrance on Pakistan's ability 
to curb extremism along the border.  He commented that the 
emergence of liberal parties helped to moderate views and 
improve Pakistan's ability to engage the tribals through 
means other than military, but there was still a long way to 
go. 
 
7. (C) Referencing comments made by Prime Minister Gilani, 
Durrani proclaimed that Pakistan was "virtually fighting for 
its soul" so as not to "go the way of the Taliban."  As such, 
he spelled out Pakistan's strategy in the war on terror - to 
vigorously pursue the ultimate objective of the extermination 
of terrorist elements and to deny the use of its territory as 
a safe haven for militancy within and outside of Pakistan. 
This strategy would be implemented through a three-pronged 
approach, using complementary political, military, and 
developmental engagement.  Showing clear cohesion with 
Gilani's previous statements, Durrani confirmed that the 
federal government would grant a greater role to the NWFP 
government and increased political and economic engagement in 
the FATA.  He made it clear that there would be no compromise 
or talks with terrorists unless they "lay down their arms," 
and that current discussions were only being held with tribal 
leaders and jirga representatives.  Durrani reiterated that 
the army would remain in the FATA but their leadership had 
been given more discretion to relocate as necessary to 
facilitate better logistics and control of the region. 
 
Potential Peace Agreements 
 
8. (C) He followed his briefing on the government's FATA 
strategy with a discussion regarding future elements of any 
potential peace agreements in the FATA.  He remarked that the 
concept was to separate "irreconcilables" and reestablish the 
writ of government, denying space for terrorist action and 
creating space for democratic initiatives.  He also commented 
that agreements would only be signed with tribal leaders to 
ensure they understand their responsibilities to shoulder 
enforcement of the agreements.  Specific clauses will be 
required in future peace agreements - including that being 
implemented in South Waziristan - to effectively combat 
terrorism while providing opportunities to tribal leaders to 
regain control and legitimacy within their tribal areas. 
 
9. (C) First, all cross-border terrorist movement must cease. 
 Durrani acknowledged that enforcement would be difficult, 
given the terrain, acceptable trade movements, and the 
easement rights of tribes, but claimed that this clause was 
essential to establishing the framework on control.  Second, 
tribes would be responsible for the expulsion of foreign 
fighters, choosing his words wisely to not cast blame on all 
foreigners present in the FATA.  Third, Durrani stated 
agreements must require the closure of all extremist training 
camps.  Referencing the failure of 2006 agreements, he 
admitted that while the agreements themselves were not 
inferior, implementation and enforcement was.  As such, 
Durrani claimed that a more "sturdy mechanism" would be in 
place to enforce and monitor these agreements.  Finally, any 
signed agreements must recognize the government's right to 
take action should tribes fail to enforce the agreements.  He 
confessed that he fully expected violations to occur but said 
that the central issue was how quickly the government would 
be able to respond. 
 
10. (C) Expecting questions would arise regarding Baitullah 
Mehsud, Durrani noted that peace agreements with the Mehsud 
tribes had two distinct features.  The first was that the 
agreements were pursued by the Mehsud tribes themselves as a 
result of the inconveniences and suffering caused by 
Baitullah Mehsud's militancy.  Second, Durrani argued that 
the government was signing these agreements from a position 
of strength, which they hoped to exploit in sparking similar 
developments elsewhere.  Durrani accepted that disagreements 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002020  003 OF 004 
 
 
may exist regarding Pakistan's tactics and methods in 
prosecuting the war on terror, but reiterated Pakistan's 
commitment and resolve. 
 
11. (C) The French Ambassador asked how, in light of past 
agreement failures, Pakistan intends to ensure new agreements 
are fully respected, as well as whether the agreements 
included any stipulations regarding military presence and/or 
specific stationing locations.  Durrani responded that 
Pakistan had learned from past experience and thus 
established more conditions for the enforcement of new 
agreements.  In addition, improved intelligence and forward 
positioning of troops would enable the government to react 
more quickly to violations.  He acknowledged that success 
will hinge on proper implementation of the agreements, but 
that increased political engagement will be the key to 
"capturing space from terrorists."  Likewise, Durrani 
declared that now was not the right time to decide on 
long-term positioning of the army and, while locations may be 
adjusted as situations improve, the military would not be 
completely removed from the FATA "under any circumstances." 
 
12. (C) The Ambassador from Poland followed up by asking 
whether expulsion of foreign fighters would include Afghans 
and whether diminished power of the maliks would make their 
signing of the agreements less potent.  Durrani first 
admitted that distinguishing Afghan Taliban from Pakistani 
Taliban would be difficult, but contended that efforts would 
be focused more on foreign fighters, such as Chechens. 
Regarding the diminished power of the maliks, Durrani 
acknowledged the concern was valid, claiming that past 
military operations may have also disrupted the existing 
political system.  He stated the government hoped to bring 
back the malik system had power and suggested that an 
increase in government funding would help them improve their 
position. 
 
13. (C) The Norwegian Ambassador raised the lack of security 
in Afghanistan as a major reason for postponement of refugee 
camps closures in Pakistan and asked Durrani how the GOP 
planned to deal with the situation.  He answered that while 
refugees were a problem, the threat posed from a 
counter-terrorism perspective was real and had to be handled 
through increased security and intelligence.  Durrani urged 
the group to help improve stability in Afghanistan so that 
many of the refugees could return home.  He did, however, 
agree that there was no simple solution to the refugee 
problem but resolved to hold discussions with the Afghan 
government on the matter. 
 
14. (C) The Danish Ambassador asked how the government would 
effectively monitor compliance with peace accords, pointing 
to Pakistan's claims that it would not hold talks with 
terrorists.  The Ambassador also questioned whether the 
Taliban would be included in future jirgas and if Baitullah 
Mehsud would be party to the South Waziristan peace 
agreement.  Durrani replied that a number of interrelated 
elements exist to help monitor compliance: 1) improvements in 
intelligence sharing and cooperation, 2) consistent military 
presence, 3) alliances with strengthened maliks, and 4) 
increased control of ingress routes by the military.  With 
respect to Taliban presence at future jirgas, Durrani 
explained the need to define not simply whether the 
individuals were Taliban, but whether they were militant, in 
which case they would not be welcomed.  Put simply, he said, 
the government must accept that fact that the tribal system 
in place had not changed over the years and if non-militant 
Taliban leaders held influence with the tribes, it would be 
difficult to exclude them from the jirgas.  On the other 
hand, Durrani assured the group that Baitullah Mehsud would 
in no way participate in the jirgas, acknowledging Mehsud's 
potential influence over tribal leaders who did participate. 
 
15. (C) Finally, the Ambassador from Australia inquired on 
the possibility that Mehsud was transferring fighters across 
the border to Afghanistan.  Although Durrani admitted that he 
had no evidence of these transfers, he contended that it was 
likely these moves had occurred.  Referring to previous 
"hard-hitting" operations, Durrani claimed that such 
operations were responsible for tribal relocations, which he 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002020  004 OF 004 
 
 
believed led to tribal pressure on Mehsud and requests for 
the peace agreements.  Even so, he acknowledged that dramatic 
progress would not occur overnight and asked the group of 
diplomats for their countries' patience and trust, granting 
their uncertainties regarding Pakistan's capabilities, but 
not its resolve in this long war. 
PATTERSON