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FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3367
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0020
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0076
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0535
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000460 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF ETRD CU BR
SUBJECT: VISIT TO CUBA OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMORIM 
 
REF: HAVANA 77 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Greg Adams for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Poloff met with Brazilian DCM Vilmar Coutinho (please 
protect) to discuss the May 30-31 visit to Cuba of Brazilian 
foreign minister Celso Amorim.  Amorim's visit was a 
follow-up to Brazilian President Lula da Silva's January 2008 
visit to Cuba (Reftel).  In addition to meeting with his 
counterpart, Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, 
Amorim also met with Cuban President Raul Castro.  Coutinho 
himself did not attend this meeting, although Brazilian 
Ambassador Bernardo Pericas Neto did, as the lone GOB 
representative.  VP Carlos Lage, FM Perez Roque, and Minister 
of Basic Industries Marta Lomas Morales also attended the 
meeting between Amorim and Raul Castro.  The encounter was 
described as largely a social one, with the substantive 
meeting having occurred earlier between Amorim and Perez 
Roque, which Coutinho had attended.  Pericas informed 
Coutinho that Raul Castro appeared confident and comfortable 
in his role as Cuba's leader, and described Castro as being 
well-informed on a range of issues pertaining to the 
Brazil-Cuba bilateral relationship. 
 
¶2.  (C) Coutinho noted that the GOB had not requested an 
audience with Raul Castro, though they were hoping the GOC 
would announce that Castro wished to meet with Amorim. 
Venezuelan FM Nicolas Maduro had received an audience with 
Castro a week earlier, and the Brazilians felt that it would 
be a significant gesture if the GOC made Castro available. 
Coutinho added that Cuban FM Perez Roque received an audience 
with Brazilian President Lula during an earlier visit to 
Brazil, and consequently the GOB felt they were owed 
reciprocal treatment.  Amorim also pressed for a commitment 
by Raul Castro to visit Brazil, but the latter would only say 
that Brazil would be "one of the first countries he would 
consider" for his first trip as head of state. 
 
¶3.  (C)  According to Coutinho, during Amorim's conversation 
with Raul Castro, the Cuban leader stated that he had no 
intention of lifting the "tarjeta blanca" restriction on 
foreign travel by Cuban citizens at anytime in the near 
future.  In response to a query from Amorim, Castro stated 
firmly that lifting this restriction would result in Cubans 
departing the island en masse, the bulk of them heading for 
Mexico.  Castro believed this exodus would negatively 
influence the bilateral relationship between Mexico and Cuba. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Castro also denied that any significant change to 
Cuba's dual-currency system was in the works.  While he 
conceded that the Convertible Peso/Ordinary Peso system 
created deep divisions in Cuban society, he stated that any 
change in the exchange rate to favor the ordinary peso would 
spike inflation in Cuba and lead to devastating food 
shortages. 
 
¶5.  (C) Coutinho described Amorim's proclamation to the press 
that Brazil wanted to become Cuba's primary trade partner as 
"unrealistic."  He noted that Brazil was not in a position to 
usurp Venezuela given the hefty subsidies offered to Cuba 
annually by Chavez.  Instead, Coutinho noted that Amorim's 
words were more a symbol to the GOC of the seriousness with 
which Brazil viewed its relationship with Cuba. 
 
¶6.  (C) Coutinho noted that Brazil saw two concrete benefits 
from expanding ties with Cuba: 1) Brazil perceives Cuba to be 
influential within international organizations such as the 
NAM, and views Cuba's support as key in securing a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council, and 2) Brazil is seeking to 
assert itself as a world power beyond South America, and sees 
Cuba as a stepping stone into the Caribbean and beyond. 
 
¶7.  (C) Brazil remains firmly committed to not broach the 
subject of human rights with Cuba.  Coutinho said that doing 
so would "poison" the environment.  He asserted that Raul 
Castro only expressed an interest in meeting with Amorim 
because he knew the GOB would not discuss human rights. 
 
¶8.  (C) The topic of Fidel Castro was not raised during 
Amorim's meeting with Raul Castro. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT:  Brazil sees the establishment of good 
relations with Cuba as the cornerstone of its Caribbean 
policy and very much desires a reciprocal visit from Raul 
 
Castro.  As Coutinho notes, the trade aspects of the 
relationship get lip service, but the Brazilians seem 
realistic about business opportunities in Cuba.  Raul Castro 
may wish very much to make Brazil one of his first foreign 
visits in order to cement further an economic relationship 
that can balance the inordinate influence of Venezuela. 
However, to do so he will either have to visit Venezuela 
first or have the internal political strength to overcome the 
perceived snub to Cuba's number one ally that would accrue 
from going first to Brazil.  At the moment neither option may 
be acceptable. 
 
PARMLY