VZCZCXRO2635
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0550/01 1770918
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250918Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9337
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000550 
 
STATE FOR AF/E, PRM/AFR, S/CRS AND USAID 
ADDIS ABABA FOR REFCOORD 
NAIROBI FOR RDRAPCHO AND REFCOORD 
GENEVA FOR KPERKINS 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF EAID EAGR SMIG SO ET DJ XA
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI - SOMALI REFUGEE INFLUX EXACERBATES FOOD 
INSECURITY 
 
REF: A) DJIBOUTI 535 
      B) DJIBOUTI 439 
C) DJIBOUTI 437 
 D) DJIBOUTI 425 (NOTAL) 
      E) DJIBOUTI 223 
      F) 07 DJIBOUTI 1004 
 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: The unforeseen influx of refugees since November 2007 
from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea has strained the capacity of the 
Government of Djibouti (GoDJ) and the two primary international 
organizations supporting refugees in Djibouti.  World Food Program 
(WFP) struggles to meet the demand of Djibouti's Food shortage.  The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
National Office of Assistance to Refugees and Disaster Stricken 
People (ONARS) lack sufficient registration arrangements, including 
a structured plan to provide new arrivals with complete 15-day food 
rations, and enough water.  The UNHCR has recognized this problem 
and expressed its needs to improve the situation.  They also 
continue to keep a strong stand on returning repatriated refugees. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------- 
FOOD INSECURITY 
--------------- 
 
¶2. On February 13, the Regional Refugee Coordinator (REFCOORD) and 
post's Refugee Officer met with World Food Program (WFP) 
Representative Benoit Thiry and UNHCR to discuss WFP's food pipeline 
in Djibouti.  Mr. Thiry explained that the WFP supply was sufficient 
to feed the current unforeseen refugee influx; however, if problems 
arise, he plans to borrow food from Ethiopia and/or Yemen.  He 
underscored the need for advance coordination between ONARS and 
UNHCR with WFP, when food is needed and used at the refugee camp. 
 
¶3. During the April 1 visit of Washington-based Refugee Officer for 
the Horn of Africa (HOA Refoff), Mr. Thiry changed his assessment of 
the food supply.  He reported that WFP currently awaits a major cash 
donation from Brussels promised since October, but does not know 
when to expect the donation to arrive.  He blamed himself for not 
pressuring Brussels for funds.  Since it is difficult to store food 
in Djibouti due to the heat, he decided to give Brussels some time 
to deliver the money to purchase the food.  Mr. Thiry is afraid the 
funds will not arrive in sufficient time to purchase from regional 
sources, and unfortunately, WFP does not purchase food from the 
local market. 
 
¶4.  Since November 2007, Djibouti has experienced an influx in 
refugees and migrants from southern and central Somalia (refs C, 
E-F), as well as from Ethiopia and Eritrea.  This unforeseen influx 
has strained the GoDJ and UNHCR.  Djibouti is a small country that 
receives aid and assistance from several international donors.  Its 
food security, always fragile because of the dry climate and 
terrain, has been further jeopardized due to a poor rainy season, 
and a 35 percent increase in staple food prices (ref E).  The 
combined forces have had substantial negative consequences on 
pastoral livelihood. 
 
---------------------------- 
INCOMPLETE FOOD DISTRIBUTION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. During a March 31 visit to the refugee camp, HOA Refoff witnessed 
new arrivals receiving incomplete food packages and expressed 
concerns to the WFP.  Although the WFP Country Director was not 
surprised at this report, he was unaware even that the food 
distribution was taking place. As he has on previous occasions, Mr. 
Thiry requested advance notice and proper communication from UNHCR 
and ONARS to WFP, regarding food distribution for new arrivals.  He 
explained that if UNHCR and ONARS provide WFP with the number of new 
arrivals expected at the camp, food can be delivered to the camp 
within 12 hours, prior to their arrival.  HOA Refoff also inquired 
about the possibility of WFP pre-positioning a supply of food at the 
refugee camp for new arrivals.  Mr. Thiry stated that a small buffer 
of food remains at the camp that could feed up to 200 people.  WFP 
concurred that this food could be used for new arrivals, but that 
ONARS needs to inform WFP prior to distribution and properly log the 
use of the food stored in the camp warehouse.  WFP is adamantly 
opposed to a larger buffer stock, since food distribution is 
controlled by the GoDJ, which lacks proper inventory control to 
prevent diversion of food assistance.  Prompted by the HOA Refoff, 
UNHCR agreed to take the lead in establishing a working group to 
improve communication among UNHCR, WFP, and ONARS to ensure that 
proper levels of food are available and distributed in Ali Addeh 
camp. 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000550  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
UNHCR RESPONSE AND NEEDS 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. UNHCR has developed a favorable working relationship with ONARS. 
Together, they successfully repatriated many Somaliland refugees in 
December 2007.  UNHCR reports an estimated 1,000 refugees from 
Somaliland remain at Ali Addeh camp, including over 600 from the ex 
Hol-Holl camp.  These refugees signed up for voluntary repatriation 
after the end of the aforementioned repatriation; however, UNHCR now 
lacks the resources to undertake a new repatriation while also 
handling the current influx. 
 
¶7. During a meeting with UNHCR, REFCOORD highlighted UNHCR's 
shortfall on protection--the lack of daily presence at Ali Addeh 
camp.  The UNHCR Representative and Senior Protection Officer agreed 
to come up with a solution.  Three weeks later, HOA Refoff witnessed 
the corrective action taken, as two UNHCR-newly hired master's 
degree-holders stationed 45 minutes from the camp at Ali Sabieh, 
have started commuting daily to the camp to work on refugee 
protection and assistance, with the supervision of the protection 
unit.  (COMMENT: While this is commendable, UNHCR requires support 
from its regional office to hire at least two more persons for the 
understaffed protection unit.  Furthermore, there is no office 
available in the camp where protection cases can meet with 
protection officers in a private setting. END COMMENT.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PROBLEMS WITH REGISTRATION OF REFUGEES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  Registration of new arrivals poses a challenge to UNHCR 
Djibouti.  In addition to a staffing shortage, they have technical 
constraints with the registration software.  There are not enough 
ProGres-loaded laptops to operate the registration, and no technical 
tools to consolidate the two databases on which this software 
operates: one based in the City of Djibouti (for registration at the 
ONARS office), and one at Ali Addeh.  With sufficient funding, UNHCR 
also intends to set up registration facilities at the border point 
of Loyada, where southern Somali refugees arrive, although no 
concrete plans have been developed. 
 
¶9. Transportation of refugees from Loyada to Djibouti city and then 
to Ali Addeh is an added problem.  ONARS currently uses two old 
trucks given by WFP to cover the 130-kilometer distance.  As these 
same trucks are also used to transport food and non-food items from 
the WFP warehouse to the Ali Addeh camp, extensive use has caused 
substantial wear and tear on the vehicles, making them increasingly 
unsafe for human transport.  All the refugee agencies and partner 
organizations would welcome two replacement trucks. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
FORMERLY REPATRIATED REFUGEES RETURNING TO DJIBOUTI 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10. During the February food distribution, the refugee camp's 
refugee leaders reported the presence of Somalilander refugees who 
had previously been repatriated attempting to collect food.  When 
the Somalilanders were denied access to the distribution, they 
responded by throwing stones at the protection team.  The 
individuals were removed from the camp by Djiboutian police.  UNHCR 
filed formal charges against the repatriated refugees and the 
Djiboutian courts prosecuted the main agitators and warned the 
remainder. 
 
¶11. COMMENTS:  Given the influx of refugees in Djibouti, it is 
critical for the USG to send an assessment team from the USAID and 
the Population, Refugee, and Migration to develop a strategy for 
feeding and supporting the international organizations and the GoDJ 
in relieving the situation. Meanwhile, UNHCR Djibouti needs to 
ensure that the recently started daily camp presence of protection 
staff at Ali Addeh continues through regular visits by staff from 
the capital.  It needs to arrange with the regional office in 
Nairobi or headquarters in Geneva to receive qualified additional 
personnel to resolve its staffing issues in the protection and other 
sections.  Additional manpower would also enable UNHCR to screen and 
register new arrivals faster and allow it to catch up with existing 
registration backlogs at Ali Addeh camp.  END COMMENT. 
 
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