VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDR #0393/01 1771353
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADX0AAA9B7 MSI9757 611)
R 251353Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7640

UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 000393 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (TEXT) 
 
DEPT FOR H 
AF/RSA FOR KMOODY, AF/E FOR JLIDDLE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ECON MOPS TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA:  SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CODEL NELSON 
 
REF: STATE 062146 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) Over the past two years, the U.S.-Tanzanian 
bilateral relationship has witnessed a sea change.  With the 
election of a charismatic, pro-Western President, and 
increasing levels of U.S. assistance, cooperation has expanded in 
areas ranging from health and education to counterterrorism and 
military affairs.  As a nascent 
democracy with an impressive record of peaceful political 
transition, Tanzania is a stabilizing influence in a turbulent 
region.  Despite daunting challenges--HIV/AIDS, poor infrastructure, 
corruption, and political stalemate in 
Zanzibar--the Government of Tanzania (GOT) remains committed to 
furthering both economic development and 
democracy.  Providing more than USD 400 million in direct 
bilateral assistance to the GOT in FY 2008, the Mission aims to 
advance several strategic priorities such as enhancing Tanzania's 
counterterrorism capability and strengthening the checks and 
balances of Tanzania's democracy.  A USD 698 million MCC Compact, 
the largest Compact to date, was signed during the February 2008 
POTUS visit to Tanzania.  The level of cooperation between our 
military and the Tanzania People's Defence Forces is deeper than 
ever before with active USG peacekeeping training programs and USG 
assistance to support Tanzania's role in African Union operations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On anti-corruption and transparency, President 
Kikwete, well aware of the importance of government accountability 
to 82 percent of the electorate (Source: National Electoral 
Commission of Tanzania) who voted him into office and to the donors, 
allowed press freedoms to strengthen, particularly investigative 
reporting.  During the second year of his administration, one 
corruption case after another was aired in the press.  Some major 
donors even threatened to reduce "medium term" assistance levels 
without greater transparency and accountability.  Over the last 
year, with our assistance, the Tanzanian press was further energized 
resulting in a huge increase in corruption reporting.  Partly as a 
result, in less than four months, the Governor of the Bank of 
Tanzania was fired by President Kikwete, the Prime Minister and four 
other key ministers resigned, and the entire cabinet was 
reshuffled. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Mission as a whole has dramatically increased our 
public diplomacy and messaging.  We now produce and distribute fact 
sheets and "back packet" card in both English and Swahili that 
summarize all the facts of our work, so every Mission employee can 
be an "ambassador" in telling America's story.  Mission members 
travel all over Tanzania, appearing in the press each week with 
stories of America's generosity.  We have designed a "From the 
American People" logo in both languages as informal letterhead and 
event banners to shine a light on the projects we are supporting. 
End summary. 
 
Political and Economic Background 
--------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) In 1992, Tanzania opened the door to multi-party 
democracy, transitioning from a single party, socialist 
state.  Under the stewardship of former President Mkapa, 
fundamental macro-reforms were introduced and Tanzania began its 
transition toward free-market capitalism.  With the landslide 
election of President Kikwete in 2005, Tanzania underwent its third 
peaceful transition to a new President.  Taken together, political 
and economic reforms introduced since 1992 have made Tanzania an 
example of peace and stability in the region. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Formidable challenges remain.  Located in a 
turbulent neighborhood, Tanzania is neighbor to eight countries, all 
with porous borders and a 1,500 kilometer coastline.  Tanzania is a 
member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), an 
association of its southern neighbors.  Tanzania is also a member of 
the East African Community (EAC), an association of its East African 
and Great Lakes neighbors.  Infrastructure remains rudimentary; red 
tape and corruption impede private sector 
development; and HIV/AIDs prevalence hovers around seven 
percent.  While elections on the Mainland have been free and fair, 
Tanzania is still a state dominated by the executive branch and the 
ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party.  In Zanzibar, serious 
irregularities and sporadic violence marred elections in 1995, 2000, 
and 2005. 
 
¶6. (SBU) While Tanzania has achieved major macroeconomic 
reform over the past decade, macro-stability has yet to 
translate into significant gains at the micro level.  More 
than one third of Tanzanians live in abject poverty and per 
capita GDP is USD 340.  In a 2007-08 UN Development Program (UNDP) 
report, Tanzania ranked 159 out of 177 in the Human Development 
Index.  In 2006, the Tanzanian government had to revise its growth 
forecasts downward (from 7.2 to 5.8 
percent) due to a food shortage and an ongoing power crisis.  The 
lack of electricity, coupled with rising oil and food  prices, 
caused inflation to increase from approximately 4 to 7 percent. 
Tanzania's oil import bill quadrupled and its business climate 
suffered set backs.  While in 2007, the economic forecast rebounded 
to a growth rate of nearly 7.2 percent, sharp increases in food 
prices during the first quarter of 2008 once again threatened 
growth. 
 
 
U.S.-Tanzanian Bilateral Relationship 
------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Since the election of President Kikwete in December 2005, 
U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations have significantly deepened. 
President Kikwete's pro-Western stance, coupled with an increasing 
level of U.S. assistance, has been the catalyst for this change, 
enhancing cooperation in sectors from health and education, to 
counterterrorism and military affairs.  President Kikwete has 
visited the U.S. five times since taking office, meeting President 
Bush in Washington D.C. (May 2006, September 2006) and attending the 
UN Assembly in September 2007 at which time he met the Secretary of 
State in Washington.  During President Bush's historic trip to 
Tanzania in February 2008, the relationship was further cemented 
through the public singing of the MCC compact and, equally 
importantly, the favorable reaction of Tanzanian citizenry to the 
POTUS' visit to hospitals, factories and schools in Dar es Salaam 
and Arusha. 
 
¶8. (SBU) As a member of the UN Security Council (January 
2005-December 2006), Tanzania supported key resolutions 
sanctioning North Korea and Iran.  Tanzania did not fully 
support the USG's effort to address Burma's human rights 
situation in the Security Council, insisting the issue be 
dealt with in the Human Rights Council instead.  With respect to 
country specific human rights resolutions in the Third Committee, 
Tanzania was also not completely cooperative and abstained from 
votes or voted to close the discussion on some key human rights 
resolutions which the GOT believed should be handled by the Human 
Rights Council. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Tanzania has started to play an increasingly 
prominent role in the region on issues ranging from Sudan to 
Somalia.  Standing up to Sudan, the Kikwete administration was 
outspoken in its support of a UN peacekeeping mission to take over 
the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur and against Sudan assuming 
the AU Chairmanship in January 2007. During the January 2008 AU 
Summit in Addis Ababa, President Kikwete was elected AU Chairman for 
the next 12 months.  While still in Addis, he worked to garner 
Africa's support 
for a strong Security Council statement against the 
deteriorating situation in Chad.   Over the next year, Kikwete will 
be playing a pivotal role to resolve conflicts on the continent from 
Kenya, to Darfur and Chad, to Zimbabwe. 
 
¶10. (SBU) President Kikwete pledged to the Secretary of State in 
September 2007 to send three peacekeeping battalions to Darfur; 
these troops are presently being trained under the Department of 
State's ACOTA program.  Tanzania has also been supportive of our 
policy in Somalia and joined the Somalia Contact Group.  At the 
United States' behest, President Kikwete swiftly voiced his support 
for Ethiopia, the need for an African peacekeeping mission to be put 
in place, and offered to train 1,000 Somali troops to help stabilize 
the situation.  Tanzania has long played a constructive role in the 
Burundi peace process and a lead role within SADC on Zimbabwe. 
 
Strategic Priorities 
-------------------- 
¶11. (SBU) The Mission's strategic priorities in Tanzania are: 
 (i) building the GOT's counterterrorism (CT) capacity as guided by 
the Mission's Interagency Counterterrorism Working Group. 
(ii) strengthening Tanzania's democratic institutions and 
accountability focused on parliamentary capacity building and 
anti-corruption efforts. 
(iii)improving education by combating HIV/AIDS and malaria, and 
increasing access to school for underserved children such as Muslim 
girls; 
(iv) improving health by combating HIV/AIDS and malaria. 
 (v) spurring economic growth through policy reform and improved 
natural resource management; and 
(vi) influencing public opinion especially among Tanzania's Muslims 
who tend to view U.S. policy as anti-Islam. 
 
¶12. (SBU) We support these strategic priorities with active 
diplomatic engagement and a generous foreign assistance program. 
Although Tanzania enjoys the support of numerous 
donor countries, the U.S. is one of the top donors in Tanzania in 
dollar amounts.  In FY08, the total USG bilateral assistance will 
amount to nearly USD 400 million including presidential initiatives 
such as PEPFAR and PMI.  Taking into account the U.S. share of 
contributions from multilateral donors such as the World Bank and 
African Development Bank, U.S. assistance will total USD 662 million 
in 2008.  This does not include major private U.S. benefactors such 
as the Gates Foundation.  Other major bilateral donors include the 
U.K., Norway, Sweden, and the European Union. 
 
¶13. (SBU) To ensure that corruption does not undermine development 
efforts, the Mission is sharply focused on supporting President 
Kikwete's anti-corruption campaign.  The Kikwete administration has 
taken steps to combat corruption, appointing a new Director General 
of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and 
passing two new pieces of legislation: the Anti-Money Laundering 
Bill and the Anti-Corruption Bill.  While pleased with passage of 
these bills, we are disappointed that the Anti-Corruption Bill does 
not adequately safeguard the independence of the PCCB.  A steady 
drum beat of corruption allegations featured in the press over the 
past year have involved many of Tanzania's senior leaders; until 
now, no one had been brought to justice for their alleged actions. 
However, with respect to the Bank of Tanzania, President Kikwete 
fired the Governor in January 2008, and announced an investigation 
of the Central Bank's activities with the report due in six months. 
President Kikwete's willingness to take actions, including criminal, 
against alleged corrupt officials will go a long way in determining 
how serious he is. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In the wake of the 1998 Embassy bombing, the Mission is 
actively engaged in furthering counterterrorism 
(CT) cooperation with the Tanzanian government.  The  Mission has an 
integrated strategy involving modernization of Tanzania's law 
enforcement as well as winning the hearts and minds of the Tanzanian 
people.  Our work in Pemba--a majority Muslim island--exemplifies 
this strategy.  We have knit together cultural preservation projects 
to repair mosques, self-help projects to improve rural livelihoods, 
and small USAID projects including the donation of generators to 
provide electricity to two hospitals.  In addition, CDC is providing 
HIV prevention and treatment services at the central hospital in 
Pemba.  USAID and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) have partnered to build and furnish a primary school and 
the Mission has plans to inaugurate an American Corner in Pemba to 
advance Islamic outreach efforts.  Another key component of the 
Mission's strategy is helping the government establish its own 
national, interagency CT Center to collect, share and analyze CT 
data. 
 
Zanzibar's Political Impasse 
---------------------------- 
¶15. (SBU) In his December 2005 inaugural address, President 
Kikwete pledged to address Zanzibar's "political problem," 
which involves the bitter divide between two political 
parties - CCM and the Civic United Front (CUF)- and between 
Zanzibar's two islands--Unguja and Pemba.  In 1995, 2000 and again 
in 2005, the Zanzibar elections were marred by 
irregularities.  A National Democratic Institute observer 
team reported "serious problems in Zanzibar's urban region 
where 40 percent of the registered voters reside."  While 2005 did 
register some administrative improvements and 
violence was contained, the elections still concluded in an impasse. 
 CUF contested the elections and refused to recognize President 
Karume's government. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Throughout 2006, neither party made any formal 
reconciliation attempt.  Among CUF members, there appeared to be 
disagreement between older members urging patience and time for 
President Kikwete to address the problem, and the CUF youth wing 
which was increasingly frustrated and 
impatient.  Within CCM there also appeared to be a divide 
between moderates recognizing that there was a problem in 
Zanzibar and more hard-line members, including President 
Karume, denying that any real problem existed.  In January 2007, 
official reconciliation talks finally began between the CCM 
Secretary-General Makamba and CUF's Secretary-General Malim Seif 
Hamad. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Nearly eighteen months later, the talks appear to be at a 
stalemate.  CUF leaders remain adamant their bottom line is the 
formation of a power-sharing government in advance of the 2010 
elections.  CUF leaders have repeatedly emphasized that without a 
government of national unity, the 2010 elections will be neither 
free nor fair and have warned that their membership is becoming 
increasingly restless and disillusioned with the democratic 
process. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The CCM party, particularly President Karume and his inner 
circle, appears unwilling to implement a power-sharing agreement 
prior to the 2010 elections and have called for a referendum on the 
issues.  However, a referendum election without proper oversight in 
place risks raising tensions in Zanzibar even higher.  While 
President Kikwete has personally monitored progress of the talks, he 
has not yet wielded his position as CCM party chairman or his 
offices as Head of State to successfully broker an agreement that 
would be fair and equitable to both sides. 
 
Military-to-Military Relations 
------------------------------ 
¶19. (SBU) Under the Kikwete administration, the GOT has 
expressed its intent to begin participating in international 
peacekeeping operations.  In 2006, Tanzania became our newest 
partner in the African Contingency Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 
program.  With Kikwete's offer to deploy a peacekeeping brigade to 
Darfur under UN auspices, the Mission's goal is to train three 
Tanzanian battalions by 2009.  These battalions will not only 
contribute to UN deployments but constitute part of an AU regional 
standby brigade.  (Note: Demonstrating its intent to become more 
active in peacekeeping, Tanzania deployed 75 military police to 
Lebanon in January 2007 to help secure the UNAFIL mission.) 
 
¶20. (SBU) The Tanzanian government has also signaled its desire to 
deepen military-to-military ties with the U.S.  more broadly. In 
December 2006, the GOT gave approval to CJTF-HOA to establish a 
Civil Affairs presence on the Swahili Coast.  The Civil Affairs team 
is carrying out humanitarian projects and helping build civil 
military operations capacity within the Tanzania People's Defence 
Forces (TPDF).  In early  2008, the Department of State authorized 
up to USD 1 million of peacekeeping operation (PKO) assistance in 
support of any African Union-led mission to the Comoros Islands. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The Tanzanian government has repeatedly requested 
military equipment from the U.S. but its failure to sign 
Article 98 is an impediment.  To respond to the GOT's requests for 
increased training opportunities, the Mission 
will use IMET funds to send promising officers from Tanzania's army 
and navy to the U.S. for educational exchange programs.  We also 
used funds from a State Department source (NADR-EXBS) to provide 
equipment to Tanzanian coastal security forces to strengthen the 
country's maritime security capacity.  Finally, using DoD Section 
1206 funding, we provided nearly USD 1 million in FY07 to train 
Tanzania's military in Special Forces Operations with an emphasis on 
patrolling the country's borders. 
 
Health Challenges: HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
--------------------------------------- 
¶22. (SBU) Tanzania faces a mature generalized HIV epidemic, 
with a prevalence rate of approximately 7 percent and 1.4 
million people living with HIV/AIDS.  In FY 2008, PEPFAR will 
provide Tanzania with over USD 300 million to support 
treatment, care, and prevention programs.  The PEPFAR program is on 
track to exceed its original targets: 150,000 
individuals on anti-retroviral drugs; care for 750,000 
individuals, including orphans and vulnerable children; and 
prevention of 490,000 new HIV infections.  Although the U.S. has 
fostered positive relationships with the Tanzanian 
government in the health sector, significant challenges remain 
including: poor health infrastructure; a shortage of 
health care workers; a weak procurement system; and occasional 
allegations of corruption. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Malaria is the number one killer of children in 
Tanzania and continues to be a major cause of maternal mortality. 
As a focus country under the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), 
Tanzania will receive up to USD 34 million in FY08 to support the 
delivery of long-lasting, insecticide treated bed-nets, the care and 
treatment of malaria, the malaria in pregnancy program, and indoor 
residual insecticide spraying.  Since 2006, USAID has focused its 
efforts on the isles of Zanzibar, successfully controlling malaria 
on both islands; the program on the Mainland is on track to attain 
the PMI goal of reducing malaria deaths by at least 50 percent by 
¶2010. 
 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
-------------------------------------- 
¶24. (SBU) In September 2007, the MCC Board approved Tanzania for the 
largest MCC Compact to date, USD 698 million.  The Compact will 
strengthen Tanzania's infrastructure network in three key areas: 
roads, water, and energy.  Tanzania's MCC Compact was signed by 
President Bush and President Kikwete in Dar es Salaam in February 
¶2008.  Even after this Compact signing, our message continues to be 
that a Compact is an agreement of reciprocal responsibilities, and, 
to sustain it over five years, Tanzania must pay heed to its 
corruption index and be vigilant at all levels to ensure 
transparency and accountability in governance. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Tanzania also received MCC Threshold funds--USD 
11.2 million--from FY2005 to 2007.  The Threshold program, which 
focuses on good governance and anti-corruption projects, consists of 
four components: (i) public procurement reform; (ii) a rule of law 
initiative with focus on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Bureau; (iii) civil society strengthening; and (iv) technical 
assistance to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶26. (SBU) In sum, our bilateral relationship is extremely robust. 
In addition, President Kikwete's current position as the African 
Union Chairman (January 2008 to January 2009) is key to our regional 
and Africa-wide objectives.  As a democracy in transition, we 
believe Tanzania is poised to continue to mature as a model of 
stability, enjoying peaceful transitions of power, and steady 
economic growth.  During the same time period that Tanzania's 
democracy and regional influence have strengthened, the Mission has 
been working toward and met the goals of consolidation and 
right-sizing well ahead of schedule.  During these past two years, 
we have made some extremely difficult choices, overturned many 
long-held practices and, in some cases, learned to do with less. 
Yet, within the context of the historic changes taking place in 
Tanzania, our entire Mission Community has consistently kept the 
Mission Strategic Plan as our vision and objective, and has worked 
confidently to realize substantial achievements to advance the 
United States, goals in Tanzania and East Africa. 
 
GREEN