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FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8310
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000600 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SEVERAL TRACK 2 AND 1.5 INITIATIVES 
UNDERWAY OR UNDER CONSIDERATION 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Prominent Sri Lankans and interested 
members of the international community are pursuing a number 
of Track 1.5 and 2 initiatives to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic 
conflict.  The One Text Initiative (OTI) appears to have 
progressed the most.  Other initiatives are either embryonic 
or stalled.  OTI brings together senior political leaders to 
tackle difficult issues, such as access to humanitarian goods 
and services, and language policy.  In the long term, OTI 
aims to build confidence and trust among stakeholders 
necessary for future peace talks.  Post's interlocutors on 
these initiatives consistently emphasize that their efforts 
should remain out of the media spotlight to keep Sinhalese 
nationalists from pressuring the government to disengage. 
Post will continue quietly to support these efforts and 
encourage political leaders to remain involved.  End Summary. 
 
One Text Initiative 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The aim of the One Text Initiative (OTI) is 
two-fold.  In the short term, OTI brings together senior 
leaders of Sri Lanka's major political parties to tackle 
difficult issues that are directly related to the conflict 
(such as access to humanitarian goods and services, and 
language policy).  In the long term, through these exercises, 
OTI aims to build confidence and trust among stakeholders. 
Thus, when peace talks resume, OTI might serve as a parallel 
process in which leaders can engage on difficult issues and 
feed into negotiations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) OTI began in 2004, but after a period of neglect, 
was redesigned and restarted in October 2007.  Director 
Mangala Moonesinghe and Lead Facilitator Nick Lewer work to 
keep all parties on board and facilitate discussions.  The 
main body, the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue (or "Long Table"), 
is composed of senior political party leaders, plus four 
civil society representatives who attend in an observer 
capacity.  The Long Table includes several cabinet ministers: 
 Minister of Science and Technology and Chair of the All 
Party Representative Committee Tissa Vitharana, Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs D.E.W. Gunasekera, acting Minister of 
Justice Dilan Perera, and Minister of Transport Dallas 
Allahuperuma.  Other members include: leader of the Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA) R. Sampanthan, United National Party 
(UNP) member and former Minister of Finance K.N. Choksy, 
representatives from the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the 
National Unity Alliance (the two largest Muslim political 
parties), and representatives from the government's 
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and 
the Peace Secretariat for Muslims (PSM).  Members meet 
monthly and are supported by party-nominated researchers. 
 
¶4. (SBU) J.S. Tissainayagam, a columnist for the Sunday 
Times, joined OTI as the TNA researcher and has since been 
appointed to the Board of Directors.  He is currently being 
detained by the Terrorist Investigation Division of the Sri 
Lankan police.  On June 6, the Defense Ministry issued a new 
detention order against Tissainayagam for an additional 90 
days.  The GSL maintains that he is under investigation for 
unspecified terrorist links, but no charges have been filed. 
OTI director Moonesinghe, this Embassy, and other foreign 
missions have intervened repeatedly to try to get 
Tissainayagam released - so far without success. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Long Table has chosen four themes within which 
to approach specific issues: 1) access to humanitarian goods 
and services, 2) official language policy, 3) human security 
and human rights, and 4) lessons to be learned from failed 
peace processes.  A sub-group, or "Small Table" (composed of 
the TNA, SCOPP, PSM, and Lewer), focuses on humanitarian 
goods and services; one on language policy will soon be 
convened.  Small Tables may invite outside experts to assist 
and produce by consensus a discussion document, which is sent 
 
COLOMBO 00000600  002 OF 003 
 
 
to the Long Table for comment.  Ultimately, the Long Table 
comes to a consensus agreement on the document -- hence, "One 
Text."  The process is intended to be fluid and flexible, 
with many different sizes and types of groups convening. 
Lewer reports that the GSL is sending senior ministers to 
Small Table discussions.  Eventually, OTI wants to have three 
facilitators in addition to Lewer: a Tamil, Sinhalese, and 
Muslim. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Norwegian, Swiss, British and Canadian Foreign 
Ministries fund OTI.  The U.S. is also providing $25,000 to 
OTI to cover lease costs for its office.  In a meeting on 
April 23, Lewer told Ambassador that it would be helpful for 
the U.S. to encourage support for OTI at high levels in the 
GSL, but that the U.S. should do so quietly so that OTI 
remains under the radar. 
 
International Study Group 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In 2007, Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, head of the 
Center for Policy Alternatives in Colombo, and Norbert Roper, 
then-country director of the Berghof Foundation, quietly put 
forward a proposal for an "International Study Group." 
Saravanamuttu is one of the most respected NGO leaders in Sri 
Lanka.  Roper, a German national, is a highly experienced 
INGO executive who had to depart Sri Lanka in January 2008 
when the GSL revoked his work visa. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Saravanamuttu and Roper visited Washington in 
February 2008 to speak with former Deputy Secretary Richard 
Armitage about serving as head of an International Study 
Group of eminent persons.  Its objectives would be: 1) to 
generate ideas on how international actors can support new 
indigenous peace initiatives more creatively and effectively 
than they did during the 2002 - 2005 Ceasefire Agreement and 
2) to engage with the stakeholders in Sri Lanka in a discreet 
and effective way to explore which options for new peace 
initiatives are most realistic and promising. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Saravanamuttu told PolOff on June 6 that he and 
Roper intend to hold meetings in Tokyo and New Delhi in July, 
at which they hope to decide who the Japanese and Indian 
eminent persons will be.  Norway supports the initiative, and 
Saravanmuttu is hoping for funding from the U.S. Institute of 
Peace, as well as Japanese foundations.  Roper may also 
arrange a meeting with EU representatives about the 
initiative. 
 
A Norwegian Effort 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem briefed PolChief 
on quiet efforts by former Norwegian Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (2001-2005) and Secretary-General of 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) Vidar Helgesen to implement a Track 1.5 
initiative.  Helgesen aims to bring together constitutional 
experts from India and the LTTE Diaspora, and gradually 
involve experts from southern Sri Lanka and eventually the 
GSL.  Helgesen's approach to the Indians met with a cool 
reception, however.  Minister of Tourism Milinda Moragoda 
supports the idea and has said he plans to encourage India to 
engage.  Another obstacle to progress at this time is the 
difficulty of access to Kilinochchi.  For the last several 
months, the GSL has not been permitting foreign diplomats to 
go there. 
 
A South African Effort 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) A group of South Africans, Roelf Meyer, Ebrahim 
Ebrahim, and Ivor Jenkins, have been visiting Sri Lanka 
 
COLOMBO 00000600  003 OF 003 
 
 
occasionally since 2002.  In the period after conclusion of 
the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, they had regular contact with 
the LTTE through Anton Balasingham and Tamilchelvan.  After 
the CFA collapsed, the group's focus has been engaging 
political parties in the south.  Working with the 
organization Inpact, they plan to select a group of Sri 
Lankans from the south to visit South Africa, with the goal 
of building a better relationship between the President's 
UPFA and the principal opposition UNP. 
 
¶12. (SBU) COMMENT:  Post's interlocutors on the above 
initiatives consistently emphasize that their efforts could 
get derailed if they become politicized through media 
coverage.  If widely publicized, the Sinhalese supremacist 
parties like the JVP and JHU would seek to derail these Track 
1.5 and 2 initiatives, putting pressure on President 
Rajapaksa and other government officials and political 
leaders to back away from involvement.  Ambassador and 
Emboffs will continue to quietly support these efforts and 
encourage political leaders to engage in them as much as 
possible.  Post sees attempts to engage Sinhalese 
nationalists in the south as well as the Tamil diaspora 
community as particularly important in laying the groundwork 
for future productive negotiations. 
MOORE