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Viewing cable 08BRUSSELS903, REFUGEE NUMBERS PROVE DIFFICULT MEASURE OF EUFOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRUSSELS903 2008-06-13 15:00 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USEU Brussels
VZCZCXRO8870
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #0903/01 1651500
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131500Z JUN 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000903 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR PRM/AFR MMCKELVEY, AF/C TASHAWNA BETHEA, AF/RSA MICHAEL 
BITTRICK 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL EUN
SUBJECT: REFUGEE NUMBERS PROVE DIFFICULT MEASURE OF EUFOR 
CHAD SUCCESS 
 
ΒΆ1. (U) Summary: Three months into the European Union's 
military mission to Chad and Central African Republic 
(EUFOR), officials at the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) told 
USEU officers the mission has been more logistically 
challenging than expected, but is fulfilling its goal of 
protecting refugees and IDPs and facilitating the work of 
humanitarian organizations.  Although planners in Brussels 
had hoped to measure success by the number of displaced 
people returning home during the mission, that idea may be 
revised in the face of increasing numbers of refugees moving 
into EUFOR's area of operations.  Assessment teams are 
preparing to conduct a field mission which will result in an 
EU progress report to the UN at EUFOR's six-month midpoint on 
Sept. 15.  End summary. 
 
EUFOR facts and timelines 
------------------------- 
2.(U) During a June 10 tour of EUFOR's OHQ in Mont Valerien, 
France, USEU pol-mil and refugee officers received a two-hour 
briefing from Deputy Operations Commander Major General 
Boguslaw Pacek, Col. Carol Paranaiak, and several officers 
handling specialties such as logistics and intelligence. 
They described the mission as a "military mission for 
humanitarian purposes acting under a UN mandate."  Among the 
information provided was the following: 
-- There are currently 2,924 soldiers deployed, with full 
deployment of all 3,820 expected by late summer. 
-- The three countries contributing the bulk of the troops 
are France, Poland and Ireland.  The next tier includes 
Sweden, Finland, and Belgium.  In total, 17 EU countries have 
contributed personnel. 
-- Initial operating capacity was reached on March 15, 2008, 
which means the EUFOR mandate will expire 12 months later on 
March 14, 2009.  Full operating capacity was declared in May. 
-- The area of operations is 850 km by 250 km in eastern Chad 
and northern CAR.  EUFOR soldiers are located at a number of 
sites, including Iriba (mostly Polish troops), Abeche, Goz 
Beida (the largest, with two battalions of mostly Irish 
soldiers), and Birao, CAR (the smallest, a company of French 
troops). 
-- EUFOR is co-located with the 2,500-person UN Mission for 
Chad and CAR (MINURCAT), which includes 300 UN police, 1,300 
nurses and other civilians, 50 military liaison officers, and 
850 members of an integrated security detachment. 
 
Measuring mission success 
------------------------- 
3.(U) Operational Commanders say 100,000 new refugees have 
moved into EUFOR's area of operations in eastern Chad and 
northern CAR in the past nine months, since September 2007 
(note: figures significantly higher than those used by PRM). 
In late 2007, prior to EUFOR deployment, EU officials said a 
key measure of the mission's success would be the number of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who returned 
home during the 12-month mission.  Several months into the 
mission, refugee numbers instead have risen.  The increase 
may be due to the security provided by EUFOR, or it may be 
unrelated to EUFOR and stem from factors such as continued 
attacks against civilians, banditry and general instability 
in Darfur.  Operational Commanders said there are a total of 
255,000 refugees in EUFOR's area of operations (49 percent in 
the north near Iriba, 33 percent in the center near Abeche, 
17 percent in the south near Goz Beida, and 1 percent in CAR) 
and 185,000 IDPs (2 percent in the north, 23 percent in the 
center, and 75 percent in the south).  The increase in 
refugees may present a challenge for the EU in terms of 
measuring mission success, since it had planned to use 
refugee returns as a benchmark. Officials in Brussels say the 
measurement criteria will be revised, but it is not yet clear 
what the new benchmarks will be.  Pacek and others at OHQ 
termed the mission a success so far in that it is providing 
security for the refugees and IDPs, and is serving as good 
experience for EU soldiers working together in a difficult 
environment.  Teams from the UN, EU, and OHQ are heading this 
month to the field, and each will prepare an assessment 
report by early July.  The EU will review the findings and 
present a final report to the UN SYG by September 15, the 
mid-point of EUFOR's mission. 
 
Biggest mission threat: the mosquito 
------------------------------------ 
 
BRUSSELS 00000903  002 OF 002 
 
 
4.(U) Pacek stressed that the key verbs in EUFOR's mission 
statement are "protect" and "facilitate": protecting 
civilians in danger, and facilitating delivery of 
humanitarian aid and free movement of humanitarian personnel 
through improved security.  Most EUFOR sites are located 
15-20 km from refugee camps and IDP settlements, and EUFOR 
operates simply by being an armed presence that patrols in 
the area to deter attackers.  Pacek said the mission has 
encountered no problems from either Sudanese or Chadian 
rebels, though general banditry is common.  "So far, we 
haven't had to use our guns," he said.  One EUFOR soldier and 
one civilian were killed when they strayed into Sudan, an 
incident that Pacek said resulted from "a mistake."  In 
assessing threats to the force on the ground, EUFOR officials 
ranked malaria-bearing mosquitoes number one.  "We are not 
concerned about the Janjaweed or Toro Boro (rebels), but we 
do worry about mosquitoes," Pacek said.  Despite the 
mosquitoes and a host of infectious diseases endemic to the 
region, officials say that soldiers have stayed mostly 
healthy so far.  Logistical challenges are daunting since 
most mission supplies have to be imported, and transportation 
infrastructure is poor at best.  EUFOR has so far received 
eight cargo ships worth of supplies, each of which takes 14 
days to sail from Rotterdam, the Netherlands, to Douala, 
Cameroon, and then days to weeks to get the approximately 
2000 kms from Douala to eastern Chad by road.  The southern 
part of the mission has been drenched in tropical rains, 
while the northern part has been baking in the desert sun. 
"Only for France is this operation a piece of cake," said 
Pacek, referring to France's long experience in the region. 
EUFOR's first tasks were to be visible and to conduct 
information operations, primarily to show local residents 
that EUFOR was different from the pre-existing French 
Epervier mission, OHQ officials said. 
 
Relationship with NGOs 
---------------------- 
5.(U) Pacek said EUFOR coordinates with approximately 100 
humaniarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
international organizations on the ground.  EUFOR's mission 
allows it to assist in securing humanitarian convoys, but so 
far they have received requests only from international 
organizations, none from NGOs, officials said.  EUFOR troops 
on the ground interact regularly with NGOs to share threat 
assessments and security information, primarily trading 
information about the safety of movement and operations in 
various areas, according to Lt. Col. Philippe Morin, an 
intelligence officer at the OHQ. 
 
Comment 
------- 
6.(SBU) Officials at the OHQ are broadly pleased with the 
mission so far, an assessment that seems to stem from the 
fact that neither the troops nor the refugee/IDP settlements 
in their area have been attacked by rebels; not too many 
troops have succumbed to heat and illness; IOs and NGOs are 
able to operate under the EUFOR security umbrella; and EU 
troops are gaining experience in operating in a difficult 
logistical environment.  Pacek said the last one may be the 
most important of all, predicting that Africa will become a 
future site for more and more European peacekeeping and 
humanitarian action.  EUFOR will not be able to measure its 
success based on the number of refugees and IDPs that go home 
during the mission, since those numbers have actually 
increased, perhaps a logical side effect of the increased 
security in the area.  There is no clear answer yet to what 
will happen on March 15, 2009, if UN troops are not in place 
to take over when EUFOR's mandate expires.  OHQ officials 
deflected that question, saying it was for the politicians to 
decide. 
MURRAY 
.