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R 201928Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1923
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4124
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3836
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8163
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6290
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2260

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000849 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2016 
TAGS: PREL BR EU
SUBJECT: BRAZIL AND EUROPE: PRIORITIES AND PARADOX 
 
BRASILIA 00000849  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Frank Manganiello, Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Although relations with Europe do not 
figure highly in Brazilian public statements of foreign 
policy priorities, Brazil,s relations with the EU and with 
major European governments are gaining in importance and 
complexity.  As with the United States, Brazilian leaders 
sometimes seek political advantage from reflexive opposition 
to Europeans, but, as Brazil seeks a global role, its 
political approach to Europe will continue to develop. 
Several recent high-level visits to Brazil by European 
leaders and Brazil-EU discussions on the margins of the 
EU-Latin America Summit in Lima illustrate that, while closer 
European relations may not rank high on Brazil,s foreign 
policy wish list, its importance remains high.  The challenge 
will be to include Brazil as an Atlantic partner, rather than 
allow it to be a catalyst for U.S.-EU competition.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  In public statements of Brazil,s foreign policy 
priorities, South America, Africa and the BRIC countries tend 
to figure prominently, with the United States and Europe far 
down the list.  In fact, for the May 2008 EU-Latin America 
Summit in Lima, the Ministry for External Relations (MRE) had 
to bring Brazil,s consul from San Francisco back TDY as 
MRE,s understaffed Europe division had no one to work Summit 
issues.  Nonetheless, with a growing economy and aspirations 
to a more prominent global role, Brazil,s relations with 
Europe are developing more rapidly than with many other 
regions.  Economic potential and Brazil,s historic ties to 
Europe drive the relationship, despite MRE,s preference for 
a greater focus on the developing world. Brazil has recently 
completed &action8 plans with the EU and with Germany that 
highlight areas for future cooperation, including energy, 
research and development and UN reform.  While for political 
purposes, the GOB continues to emphasize South America and 
Africa, in 2007 President Lula visited more countries in 
Europe (ten) than any other continent. 
 
KEY ISSUES 
---------- 
¶3.  (C)  Biofuels are at the top of Brazil,s list of policy 
priorities when dealing with Europe.  President Lula has 
condemned EU governments for their reluctance to import more 
Brazilian ethanol, blaming protectionism and misplaced 
concerns about the effects of ethanol production.  While high 
oil prices have generated interest in Brazilian ethanol, 
environmental concerns and technical barriers hold back 
European purchases.  Ironically, although it was Volkswagen 
that helped produce the first mixed fuel vehicles in Brazil, 
the government of Germany has opposed increase domestic use 
of ethanol because the majority of German cars cannot use 
more than a small percentage of ethanol in their fuel. 
During the Lima Summit and in bilateral Brazil-EU 
consultations, there was general agreement that the 
environment was an important area of mutual interest, but the 
EU proposal for a passage on climate change in the Summit 
declaration met with Brazilian opposition.  Officially, 
Brazil objected to the text being introduced late in the 
negotiation process, but MRE was also uncomfortable with what 
it believed could be interpreted as criticism of Brazil,s 
management of deforestation in the Amazon region. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Brazil has pursued a strong relationship with the EU 
on security issues.  With the increasing understanding that 
Brazil,s military need modernization, MRE has sought to 
promote the idea that European defense exporters would be 
more reliable when it comes to technology transfer than those 
from the United States.  Brazilian leaders, including Defense 
Minister Jobim, have announced their intention to purchase 
French submarine technology to develop nuclear propulsion 
capability, although the French Embassy claims there is no 
agreement yet on such a purchase.  At the same time, the 
German Embassy reports continued interest in German-made 
submarines.  At Lima, Brazil sought and received praise for 
its leadership role in the UN Mission in Haiti.  Brazil has 
cooperated with Germany to build support for a permanent UN 
Security Council seat.  While Brazil and the EU agreed on the 
importance of UNSC reform in Lima, the endorsement lacked 
specifics.  Jobim also recently invited NATO SecGen de Hoop 
Scheffer to visit Brazil to discuss Atlantic security. 
 
¶5.  (C)  While Brazil has been the main proponent of greater 
South American integration through UNASUL, in its relations 
with the EU, Brazil has preferred a bilateral approach.  The 
 
BRASILIA 00000849  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Lima Summit declaration focused on sustainable development, 
eliminating inequality, energy and other topics well within 
the center-left mainstream but stayed away from specific 
programs.  The MRE described the Summit outcome as &a 
maturing relationship.8  One EU diplomat differed, 
describing the Brazilian delegation as &difficult8 and 
&finicky,8 preferring its bilateral relationship with the 
EU to working toward greater regional integration.  Within 
Brazil the visits of German Chancellor Merkel and Spanish 
Prime Minister Zapatero were well-received.  Even though they 
yielded little of substance, Brazilians like to know they are 
being treated as an important country and look to Europe, 
like the United States and their BRIC partners (Russia, 
India, and China), for validation of this importance. 
 
¶6.  (C)  COMMENT.  Brazil has many of the same challenges in 
its relations with Europe as it does with the United States, 
including trade barriers, immigration, and differences on 
environmental issues.  Similarly, the United States and 
Europe share an interest in seeing Brazil become more a part 
of the international mainstream and a partner in trade, 
global security, and democracy promotion.  Many Brazilians, 
particularly in the MRE, prefer to see Europe, and especially 
the EU, as a useful counterweight to the United States, as 
Brazil pursues its "rightful place" in a &multipolar8 world 
order, a vision that often provides a convenient mask for 
anti-Americanism.  The interests of the United States, 
Brazil, and EU members are best served by a relationship 
built on cooperation, not competition.  The challenge for 
U.S. policy is to promote an alternative vision of a growing 
trans-Atlantic partnership of democracies that includes 
Brazil and its neighbors working with Europe and the U.S. to 
promote greater prosperity and security. 
SOBEL