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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8161
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6288
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2258
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016 
TAGS: BR MARR MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: ENHANCING POL-MIL ENGAGEMENT WITH BRAZIL 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 57700 
     ¶B. B) BRASILIA429 
     ¶C. C) BRASILIA 175 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Per instructions in ref a, post has remained in 
discussions with the Brazilian MRE and MOD on how best to 
proceed with building a fuller, more cooperative political 
military relationship. When Poloffs asked MRE pol-mil advisor 
Marcos Pinta Gama for his views on prospects for enhancing 
our relations, he responded that there was great potential 
for progress and that the situation today is vastly impproved 
from when he returned to Brasilia six years ago.  While Pinta 
Gama's glass is half full, there is also an empty half 
consisting of stalled initiatives and slowdown tactics that 
have limited our engagement.  Paragraph 2 lists several of 
the key areas for developing our pol-mil relationship with 
Brazil with comments on possible ways forward. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Areas for Pol-Mil engagement: 
 
--  Defense Cooperation Agreement. The DoD-MOD agreed text 
was sent to the MRE in March where it remains.  To move the 
DCA even as far as the back burner will take high-level 
intervention.  Post recommends raising the importance of 
completing the DCA at all opportunities, but the current MRE 
leadership will likely remain opposed.  Brazil's recent 
signing of similar agreements with other countries provides a 
precedent, but MRE opposition will likely continue. 
 
--  Information Sharing Agreement.  DoD has provided a draft 
text for a General Security of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA) to the Office for Institutional Security (GSI) of 
Brazil.  There has been a holdup thus far over confusion 
about the word "military" in the title.  As Brazil does not 
differentiate between military and non-military controlled 
information, the proposal could be turned down on the grounds 
that it is not compatible with Brazilian practice.  Post has 
been working with the Brazilian government to look past the 
title and focus on defining how to share information in a 
mutually beneficial manner.  Pinta Gama confirmed that the 
MRE will play a large role in any decision to move ahead with 
an information sharing agreement (post recommends avoiding 
the term "GSOMIA"). Although to date he has concurred 
personally that such an agreement would be in Brazil's 
intrest, his direct boss, Secretary General (vice minister) 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, is likely to throw up road blocks. 
 Post recommends continuing to look for opportunities to 
underline to the Brazilians the importance of improving 
information sharing while pressing GSI for a constructive 
response.  The July visit of GSI head Gen. Felix to the U.S. 
will be the first such opportunity. 
 
--  Jobim Visit to SOUTHCOM.  The July visit of Defense 
Minister Jobim to Miami will provide an additional 
opportunity to press the points above and highlight the 
benefits to Brazil of a strong mil-mil relationship.  In 
particular, SOUTHCOM should highlight how completing a DCA 
will open the door for broadening DoD-MOD cooperation through 
implementing arrangements that would not require MRE 
clearance.  Other key issues for this trip will be reported 
septel. 
 
--  POL-MIL Bilats.  Brazil has postponed the next round of 
Pol-Mil bilats several times.  The latest excuse for delay, 
according to Pinta Gama, was to allow "time to reflect" on 
Jobim's March visit to Washington.  It seems unlikely that 
Pinta Gama's boss, MRE SG Guimaraes, will approve a bilat 
this year.  As an intterim measure, post recommends looking 
for an opportunity for PM AA/S Mull to visit Brasilia for 
discussions with Pinta Gama and other officials.  Doing so 
will afford an opportunity to press for completion of the DCA 
and information sharing agreement, while allowing for 
discussion of technology transfer and other issues.  Late 
July (either just before or after the Jobim trip) or October 
would be the best times for such a visit. 
 
--  Defense Bilateral Working Group (BWG).  In a familiar 
refrain, the Brazilians have also postponed the BWG--in this 
case, probably because of the workload generated by the 
Minister's regional travel.  The current plan is to hold the 
 
BRASILIA 00000848  002 OF 002 
 
 
BWG in October.  Post will continue to press the MOD to 
settle on this timetable.  The BWG will provide the 
opportunity to explore beginning a Defense Technology 
Security Dialogue that will promote Brazilian understanding 
of the security concerns that are behind our export controls. 
 
--  Export Controls.  We often hear the mantra from 
Brazilians that "the U.S. doesn't transfer technology" used 
as a reason for not having a better pol-mil relationship. 
While the Brazilians' own experiences (over 90% of USML cases 
approved) should argue against this, several high profile 
difficulties raise the perception that our export controls 
are overly strict when applied to Brazil.  Post has made 
efforts to clarify these problems, generally the result of an 
exporter not following USG regulations and trying to blame 
USG policy, but such efforts have not prevented these 
problems being repeatedly raised with the Ambassador and 
other Mission personnel.  Post recommends that part of a PM 
Assistant Secretary visit be a team from PM/DDTC, PM/RSAT, 
DTSA and Commerce to brief the Brazilians on U.S. policies 
and seek to clarify that the U.S. routinely transfers 
military technology to partner states, but in accordance with 
set procedures.  We should also use Brazilian interest in 
acquiring F-18 fighter aircraft (reported septel) as a means 
to demonstrate that we have no difficilties transferring some 
of the best U.S. military technology to Brazil. 
 
--  Defense Industry Dialogue.  As suggested in reftels, such 
a dialogue would offer opportunities for partnership outside 
of government lanes and should be encouraged where possible. 
 
--  Professional Civilian Training.  Post supports the idea 
contained in reftel to seek means to provide professional 
training to Brazil's nascent Defense Ministry Civil Service. 
As the MOD is a comparatively new ministry, its civilian 
employees lack the experience and professional skills needed 
to make the Ministry effective.  Post suggests seeking 
appropriate USG resources and opportunities to increase MOD 
professional expertise, perhaps through reciprocal visits and 
exchanges of information.  This could be an appropriate 
subject for discussion at the next BWG. 
SOBEL