Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BRASILIA847, U.S. AIRCRAFT IN CONTENTION TO BE BRAZIL'S NEXT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BRASILIA847.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA847 2008-06-20 18:02 2011-07-11 00:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO4621
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0847/01 1721802
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 201802Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1918
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8158
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6285
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2255
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000847 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM AND WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 
TAGS: MARR ETTC BR PREL ETRD EAIR EIND
SUBJECT: U.S. AIRCRAFT IN CONTENTION TO BE BRAZIL'S NEXT 
PRIMARY MULTI ROLE FIGHTER 
 
REF: A. A) BRASILIA 175 
     B. B) BRASILIA 643 
     C. C) EMBASSY BRASILIA-STATE-DTSA E-MAILS 
     D. MAY 2008 
     E. D) BRASILIA 638 
     F. E) BRASILIA 429 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Frank Manganiello, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S/NF)  SUMMARY.  On June 10, MLO Brasilia obtained an 
unofficial copy of a Request for Information (RFI - passed 
electronically to Washington agencies) from the Brazilian Air 
Force (BRAF) concerning the upcoming competition for 
Brazil,s next fighter aircraft.  One U.S. origin fighter, 
the F-18 Super Hornet, is under consideration, along with the 
Eurofighter Typhoon, the SU-35, the Gripen and the Rafale. 
As noted in reftels, there are a number of political factors 
working against a decision to purchase the F-18, but post 
believes that there is also a strong case to be made for the 
Hornets and that there are several steps the USG should take 
immediately to maximize the chance of Boeing winning the 
contract.  In addition to the economic benefit to a U.S. 
business, being chosen to supply Brazil,s main combat 
aircraft for the next generation would carry important 
political benefits and provide a foundation for improved 
defense cooperation. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  Brazil is seeking replacements for the majority 
of its obsolete combat aircraft, which have been plagued by 
readiness problems.  During the recent visit of the George 
Washington Carrier Strike Group, the Brazilian Navy was 
unable to muster a single working fighter for a joint flight 
with Navy F-18s.  Key points of the RFI have been leaked to 
the British journal "Flight," but the details remain 
close-hold.  While the RFI contains considerable detail on 
performance requirements for the new fighter, post believes 
that the key criterion for the decision will be the economic 
benefit to Brazil, i.e. the offset packages to be offered by 
bidders.  With no immediate airborne threats to Brazil, 
combat lethality will be a lesser consideration, although the 
GOB will also consider what they perceive to be the prestige 
of owning a modern fighter.  We believe that the lesser 
prestige of an older design led to the F-16 being left out, 
even though it could fulfill most Brazilian defense 
requirements at a lower cost than other options. 
 
PROS AND CONS 
----------------------- 
3.  (C/NF)  There are several factors that favor the success 
of the F-18 sale and several that could thwart it. 
 
Pro: 
 
--  The F-18 has a proven combat record with unmatched 
reliability and durability. 
--  The likely beneficiary of any offsets, Embraer, would 
find the opportunity to enter into a business partnership 
with Boeing desirable, especially if Boeing intends to offer 
additional cooperation in commercial aviation. 
--  Many members of the BRAF would be eager for closer 
cooperation with the U.S. 
--  The F-18 has been selected for use by Canada, India and 
Australia, large countries with similar operational 
requirements. 
 
Con: 
 
--  Key members of the Brazilian political leadership believe 
it would be to Brazil,s advantage not to be dependent on the 
U.S. for military technology.  France and Russia are seen as 
more desirable partners. 
--  Government owned competitors could be able to offer a 
broader range of offsets. 
--  There is a perception in Brazil, encouraged by the 
Ministry of External Relations, that the U.S. refuses to 
transfer technology. 
 
4.  (C/NF)  The negative factors cited above will make a 
successful outcome difficult, but post recommends that the 
USG make the greatest possible effort to achieve a sale. 
Although the RFI states that the BRAF will make its decision 
 
BRASILIA 00000847  002 OF 003 
 
 
on the factors cited, it is likely that political 
considerations, some driven by anti-U.S. sentiments, will 
also come into play.  The political benefits to be gained by 
a clear affirmation of U.S.-Brazilian defense partnership 
would be enormous.  Even an unsuccessful effort could help 
undermine the assumption that the U.S. is unwilling to 
transfer technology. 
 
COFFEE IS FOR CLOSERS 
----------------------------------- 
5.  (C/NF)  If we want to close the deal with the traditional 
cup of Brazilian coffee, there are several ways in which U.S. 
policy can help Boeing,s case pending a formal request for 
advocacy. As stated above, the most important determinant of 
which aircraft Brazil ultimately chooses will be the offsets, 
and Boeing will be responsible for making its own sales pitch 
in this regard.  The most important step the USG can take is 
to eliminate the idea that the U.S. does not transfer 
technology.  When Brazilians tell us this, it is apparent 
that there is no clear understanding of what technology 
transfer means or why they believe the U.S. doesn,t do it. 
Boeing,s proposal should state specifically that sale of the 
planes would include full technology transfer.  In the 
meantime, we can help improve Brazilian understanding by 
providing a briefing to the BRAF and Defense Ministry of U.S. 
tech transfer policies with examples of how we have managed 
arrangements with other friendly countries.  In doing so, we 
should be prepared to answer suggestions that other nations, 
tech transfer policies are more liberal than ours.  As the 
Defense Minister has personally raised the case as an example 
(inaccurately) of U.S. restrictiveness, we should consider 
waiving the proviso on the Honeywell inertial navigation 
systems (ref c) so that the export licenses matches those 
already approved for both Brazil and Colombia. 
 
6. (C/NF)  In addition to the key issues of offsets and tech 
transfer, we can help make the case for the sale of U.S. 
aircraft by ensuring the Brazilian are familiar with the 
performance advantages of the Super Hornet.  We can begin 
doing so during the July visits by Minister of Defense Jobim 
and Air Force Chief Saito to the U.S.  There are already 
plans for Jobim to have a demonstration flight in a Super 
Hornet during his visit.  A group of Brazilian F-5s will 
participate in this year,s Red Flag exercise in Nevada.  We 
should ensure that the Brazilian pilots and crews get as much 
exposure as possible to the F-18 while there, including to 
any F-18s being operated by allied air forces.  Should the 
F-18 make the Brazilian short list (to be announced in late 
August), we should ensure that Brazil has an opportunity to 
work with Super Hornets again at next year,s UNITAS.  The 
Brazilian navy was impressed with the F-18,s performance at 
this year,s UNITAS, and the participation once again of a 
carrier with its air wing will provide another opportunity 
for the Brazilian command to see the capabilities the Super 
Hornet provides in action. 
 
COMPETITORS: BEWARE THE GRIPEN 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
7.  (C/NF)  While the BRAF has its reasons for including each 
of the potential bidders in the RFI, there are several key 
considerations with the non-U.S. aircraft that could prove 
important for Brazil,s final decision.  While most of 
Brazil,s pilots would prefer not to have to fly Russian-made 
planes, they would check the prestige box by giving Brazil 
the same fighters as neighboring Venezuela.  The possible 
attractions of French planes are discussed in ref b.  With 
successful sales campaigns in South Africa, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, the Saab Gripen has emerged as a 
popular alternative to U.S. aircraft.  As stated above, the 
most important consideration for the Brazilians will be the 
offset package, and Saab has built its success on its ability 
to provide the sort Brazil is seeking.  Although no 
manufacturer is likely to propose transferring aircraft 
production facilities to Brazil (at least not for the 120 
fighter fleet Brazil is considering), Saab, and the Swedish 
government may be able to come up with offsets to create jobs 
in Brazil,s manufacturing sector that would prove 
attractive.  It should also be noted that the Gripen contains 
U.S. origin components, including a GE engine, that could 
potentially become a factor in advocacy efforts. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000847  003 OF 003 
 
 
WHY NOT THE JSF? 
--------------------------- 
8.  (C/NF)  The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is 
conspicuous in its absence from the Brazilian list for 
fighter purchases.  In the past, Brazilian Air Force 
personnel, including Chief of Staff Saito, have indicated 
that the F-35 would be preferred in the long term.  In 
discussions with post, the BRAF has expressed the view that 
the J35 would be too expensive to allow purchase of an 
adequate number of aircraft.  Brazil is also concerned that 
the structure of the JSF consortium would make it difficult 
for new members to join and would prevent delivery of the 
aircraft in the timeframe required by the RFI. 
 
COMMENT 
--------------- 
9.  (S/NF)  With resources being made available for defense 
modernization for the first time in a generation (see ref a), 
the purchase of Brazil,s next fighter aircraft will have 
effects far beyond a fat contract for the manufacturer. 
Brazil,s Defense Minister and Air Force leadership would 
prefer a closer relationship with the U.S. as a partner in 
guaranteeing hemispheric stability.  Purchase of U.S.-origin 
fighter aircraft would represent a major investment of 
resources in such a partnership and would be a decisive move 
away from recent Brazilian leaders, portrayal of the U.S. as 
more a potential adversary than a partner.  While the U.S. 
Air Force manages cooperation with partners flying the other 
aircraft under consideration, interoperability is obviously 
much stronger when both forces fly the same aircraft.  With 
progress on pol/mil engagement stalled, a BRAF decision to 
purchase fighters from a U.S. manufacturer will give Brazil a 
monetary stake in improving cooperation in the area of 
security. 
SOBEL