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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA843, BRAZIL: SATELLITE PIRACY MONITORING HAS BEGUN--SLOWLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA843 2008-06-19 20:37 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3613
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0843/01 1712037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 192037Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1914
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6282
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2252
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8156
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000843 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EEB/CIP/TS: SLETT, DHAY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ECPS MARR PINR TSPA BR
 
SUBJECT:  BRAZIL: SATELLITE PIRACY MONITORING HAS BEGUN--SLOWLY 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
REF: (A) GSarrano/DMay/SLett e-mails 16 June, 28 May 2008 
     (B) Letter to ANATEL 13 May 2008 
     (C) STATE 29253 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Following up on Ref. C demarche regarding U.S. 
military satellite interference by Brazilian radio operators, 
Brazilian telecommunications regulatory agency, ANATEL POC indicated 
during a telcon on 9 June that monitoring will take place over the 
next at least two months and then a plan to arrest and prosecute the 
perpetrators will be worked out with Federal Police in order to 
attack the problem comprehensively.  Post believes this timeframe is 
not ideal from USG perspective.  Post recommends interagency 
provide, if possible, information requested by GOB to assist its 
investigation efforts (see para 8).  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Econoff spoke with Nei Jobson da Costa Carneiro 
("Jobson"), a Regulation Technician with the ANATEL division which 
controls radio frequency spectrum, on 28 May and telephoned Jobson 
again on 9 June.  Until further notice, Jobson is our ANATEL POC on 
this issue, tel. # is 55-61-2312-1751, cell 55-61-9117-7200. 
 
3.  (SBU) Jobson indicated ANATEL is taking this situation very 
seriously and has developed a "synchronized, comprehensive plan of 
action" jointly with ABIN, the GOB's intelligence agency, and the 
Federal Police, up to and including possible arrest/judicial 
processing of the perpetrators. 
 
4.  (SBU) During both telcons with Econoff, Jobson stressed that the 
USG needs to have patience in order for the GOB to execute the plan 
systemically and nationwide and truly resolve the problem long-term, 
rather than provide a temporary solution.  Previous experience has 
shown ANATEL that approaching this type of interference on a 
case-by-case basis does not resolve the issue for more than a few 
months.  Econoff indicated both times we understand that concern, 
but also highlighted the importance to our military that this 
problem be resolved ASAP. 
 
5. (SBU) Econoff in both conversations with Jobson reiterated USG 
offer of assistance (in the form of a team with specialized 
equipment available to travel to Brazil at Brazil's invitation), 
indicating that we have equipment and processes/methodologies which 
perhaps could be of assistance.  Both times, Jobson indicated that 
the GOB would conduct its own monitoring, but conceded that it would 
not be feasible as a 24/7 operation due to lack of resources and in 
order to not draw excessive attention to the monitoring. 
Nonetheless, offers of sending a USG team and equipment to assist 
were not accepted at this point; nor were offers from Post to meet 
with ANATEL and ABIN. 
 
6.  (SBU) Jobson indicated the GOB plan is to monitor the 
transmissions "over the next two months or so" and try to track 
patterns, thus making actual engagement with the perpetrators more 
effective.  He said they would be monitoring activity a couple of 
days each week during this time period to see what kind of patterns 
of frequency interference, if any, emerge.  They will also be 
investigating sales of equipment, including internet sales, to try 
to cut off the suppliers that are contributing to the problem.  The 
"dossier" will then be shared with the Federal Police and Ministry 
of Foreign Relations (MRE).  The GOB's concern is that if they send 
a team out into the field for a large-scale operation too quickly, 
and they have not yet identified all the perpetrators, it would be 
easy for the perpetrators to alert other satellite pirates about the 
raid.  This would lead them to temporarily suspend operations and/or 
hide or destroy their equipment-only to have the problem re-emerge 
at a later date. 
 
7. (SBU) When asked if the GOB could share its monitoring plan with 
the USG so that the USG might be able to supplement GOB efforts, 
Jobson demurred, saying he would have to get permission from ABIN to 
share the plan and was not confident the intelligence agency would 
agree.  That said, he encouraged USG monitoring above and beyond 
what the GOB can do, saying the USG should feel free to do so and 
share the information with GOB in order to assist them in 
apprehending the perpetrators.  Econoff committed to pass this 
proposal to Washington. 
 
8.  (SBU) Action items for Washington:  As mentioned in Ref.  A, 
Jobson said during both telcons that the USG could be very helpful 
if we could assist the GOB as follows:  a)  Supply satellite photos 
of the interference (pinpointing times, locations, etc.  b) Provide 
recordings of the perpetrators' voices and what was said to assist 
in judicial processes down the road--processes that could help serve 
as a deterrent in future.  In addition, in more recent 
 
BRASILIA 00000843  002 OF 002 
 
 
conversations, Econoff was told that an update to the written 
tracking information on interference to supplement the report 
provided by the U.S. military which went up to Jan. 2008 might help 
the GOB to determine any new or increased usage, if this information 
can be provided.  The GOB's intent, Jobson reiterated, is to arrest 
and prosecute as many of the responsible persons as possible, both 
to avoid a recurrence of interference by current perpetrators and to 
serve as a more severe deterrent to future perpetrators. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT:  Post takeaway is that GOB is receptive to 
receiving any further information on the interference that 
Washington may have, but probably will not take direct enforcement 
action for at least a couple of months pending its own monitoring. 
To date, ANATEL has not/not been enthusiastic regarding the offer to 
send a USG team to Brazil to assist.  END COMMENT 
 
SOBEL