VZCZCXRO7697
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0806/01 1641443
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121443Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1868
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8132
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6254
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2210
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000806 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC, L, PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018 
TAGS: BR MOPS PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: 2008 RENEWAL OF PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION (PD) 
REGARDING BRAZIL'S SHOOTDOWN (ABD) PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. A) SECSTATE 54183 
     ¶B. B) 07 BRASILIA 1868 
     ¶C. C) STATE 57700 
     ¶D. 07 STATE 17940 
 
Classified By: DCM Phillip Chicola, Reason 1.5 (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  SUMMARY.  Per ref a, Post is engaged with the 
Brazilian government to assess Brazil's safety procedures 
concerning its Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program, in order to 
make the annual Presidential  Determination (PD).  Based on 
regular contacts with the Brazilian Defense Ministry and air 
traffic control facilities, post believes that Brazil's 
safety procedures remain strong, and we will have as good a 
basis for certification as we have had in previous years. 
Despite the difficulties presented by the Department's need 
for over two months to compile the information collected, 
Post is actively engaged in fulfilling the steps requested 
reftel a.  However, Brazilian authorities considers any 
effort by an outside government to exercise "oversight" of a 
Brazilian government program to be a violation of national 
sovereignty, and are particularly sensitive with regard to 
aviation matters.  Post is concerned that the new and 
increased demands we are requested to make of the GOB, which 
now go well beyond what was agreed in the 2004 exchange of 
notes, present insurmountable and unnecessary obstacles to 
recertification.  The steps outlined in ref a effectively 
require us to second-guess GOB assurances regarding the 
safety of their ABD procedures, which we do not believe is 
warranted on the basis of what we already know about Brazil's 
intentions and efforts with regard to its ABD program. 
Mission and Bureau plans place a priority on improving 
cooperation with Brazil, especially in the area of 
counternarcotics and political-military affairs.  In the 
absence of strong evidence that Brazilian safety procedures 
have deteriorated refusal to certify will have a significant 
negative impact on our ability to achieve this objective. 
Post proposes several measures (see paragraph 5 below) that 
would serve to improve USG oversight as required by last 
year,s interagency document and increase the Department's 
confidence in Brazil's ABD program.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (S)  Post has been active in working the issues raised 
in ref a with the Brazilian government, including through 
contacts with Brazilian air traffic control and the Defense 
Ministry.  In the four years since the exchange of notes, 
there has been no  basis to believe that the ABD program has 
increased risks to civilian aircraft and considerable 
evidence of ABD's efficacy in allowing Brazilian authorities 
to enhance their ability to stop shipments of narcotics 
through Brazilian airspace.  There is nothing to suggest 
that, once we complete this year's consultations with the 
GOB, Brazil's safety procedures will be found weaker than in 
previous years when we have been able to certify.  Indeed, 
following the appointment of Nelson Jobim as Defense Minister 
last year, Brazil has focused on improving its air traffic 
control system and its cooperation with the U.S.  As a 
result, we expect to provide a recommendation that the PD 
should be renewed for 2008-2009. 
 
¶3. (S) With no evidence that Brazil's safety procedures  have 
worsened, we believe this is the wrong time to increase USG 
requirements for certification.  Our bottom line should be 
that if Brazil can provide the same level of  assurance about 
its ABD program as in the past, we should  be able to make 
the same determination we have in the past.  Managing the 
political and public diplomacy fallout of non-certification 
would be a significant challenge, as Brazilians would 
consider us to be punishing Brazil for maintaining the same 
level of control that we were able to certify in the past. 
Failing to certify under present conditions would be seen as 
a rebuke to DefMin Jobim, one of the strongest supporters of 
an improved relationship with the U.S., and would jeopardize 
information sharing that is becoming increasingly important 
to counternarcotics activities, damaging our own interests in 
restricting the traffic of illegal drugs.  Our interest in 
increasing sharing of information under a GSOMIA (agreed as a 
priority by Minister Jobim and Secretaries Rice and Gates) 
would likely be affected, as well as our interest in signing 
a Defense Cooperation Agreement, undermining key elements of 
our plan to advance pol-mil enagement with Brazil, as tasked 
in ref c.  Moreover, failure to certify Brazil's ABD program 
would belie in a tangible way the message the President, 
Secretary and Ambassador have repeatedly conveyed to GOB 
officials: that the USG views Brazil as a valued and trusted 
partner on military, security, and law enforcement matters. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000806  002 OF 002 
 
 
------------------- 
Specific Challenges 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (S)  The main challenge post faced in 2007 was the 
difficulty of arranging visits to air traffic control 
facilities.  Sensitivities remain high with regard to access 
by non-Brazilian and Brazilian non-military personnel to 
military air bases.  Raising the profile of our oversight 
efforts would be counter-productive and would likely lead to 
greater restrictions on our ability to  meet certification 
criteria.  Nonetheless, with the cooperation of our DAO and 
MLO, we are developing a plan for conducting such visits as 
prioritized in ref a during the June-July timeframe in the 
context of other contacts with the air traffic control 
facilities.  The key aspect of post's plan is to make such 
visits in the context of other contacts, as recommended in 
reftels.  Because gaining access to these facilities in this 
manner is difficult, meeting the ref a target of all four 
CINDACTAs by July 31 may prove impossible.  It should be 
noted that Brazilian air traffic controllers are all employed 
by the military; there are no civilian air traffic 
controllers.  Controllers of civilian traffic have no 
authority to influence potential shoot downs.  As a result, 
military controllers responsible for monitoring civilian 
aircraft will be the subject of post's visits.  Post agrees 
that it would be ideal to observe a real time interception 
but notes that doing so in 2007 was a matter of serendipity 
not likely to be repeated.  Post will inquire as to the 
possibility of seeing a simulation. 
 
¶5.  (S)  At this time, we do not believe there would be any 
advantage to trying to negotiate an addendum to the 2004 
exchange of notes.  As stated above, raising the profile of 
our oversight effort would be counter-productive.  While we 
may be able to begin a negotiation process this year, it is 
unclear if such a process could be ever concluded 
successfully, certainly not in time for this year's 
certification deadline.  Additionally, Brazil would consider 
any effort by an outside government to exercise "oversight" 
of any Brazilian government function or program to be a 
violation of national sovereignty and would be considered 
illegal.  Any contact with the Brazilians ostensibly aimed at 
"oversight" will be summarily denied. 
 
¶6. (S) That said, we believe there is some scope to enhance 
our confidence in Brazil's implementation in light of the 
2007 interagency document requesting greater oversight 
without crossing Brazilian redlines.  We propose several 
possible steps: 
 
--  At the heart of the case for requiring annual 
certification is uncertainty over Brazil's precise 
procedures.  Ref a clearly states the problem is that "the 
USG has no direct knowledge of Brazilian procedures."  We 
believe it may be possible to approach Brazil to provide such 
procedures in writing, provided it is done in the context of 
an information exchange, i.e. sharing best practices on Air 
Traffic Control, and not as a unilateral demand for U.S. 
oversight.  As we have been able to certify in the past 
without being provided with this, it need not be an absolute 
condition for certification in the future, but could help 
considerably in making such determinations. 
 
--  In order to encourage sharing of precise policy and 
procedures, we should be prepared to offer Brazil some 
incentive to provide its procedures.  For example, as long as 
adequate procedures are in place, and confirmed by an annual 
visit to Comdabra, we should take any steps possible to make 
the annual certification process a routine one. 
 
--  The Department should consider supplementing the 
information we develop from visiting Comdabra and other 
facilities by tasking U.S. intel agencies to focus collection 
efforts on Brazil's ABD program, particularly signs that 
shootdown controls are being relaxed.  This is consistent 
with USG views that national technical means often provide 
effective verification. 
 
--  The Department should consider funding travel of 
Brazilian air traffic controllers to the U.S. for exchange 
visits to U.S. facilities.  This would help us argue that the 
GOB should be more open to us visiting their facilities.  It 
would also provide the opportunity to question the Brazilian 
controllers on their safety procedures while away from their 
government's sovereignty concerns. 
SOBEL