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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD1963, ALAQ HIGHLIGHTS PRIMACY OF INSPECTORS GENERAL IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD1963 2008-06-27 04:27 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO4586
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1963 1790427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270427Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8002
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001963 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
STATE FOR INL/C/CP, INL/I, NEA/I and S/I 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: IZ KCOR KCRM PGOV EAID PREL
SUBJECT:  ALAQ HIGHLIGHTS PRIMACY OF INSPECTORS GENERAL IN 
ANTI-CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY:  In a June 25 meeting with visiting INL consultants 
and ACCO staff, Joint Anti-Corruption Commission (JACC) chairman and 
Council of Ministers Secretary General Ali Alaq stressed his 
interpretation of the ministries' Inspectors General (IG's) as the 
vanguard of Iraq's anti-corruption enforcement in Iraq.  Alaq noted 
that coordination between the IG's and the Commission on Integrity 
(COI) had improved.  He also promised the team, as well as ACC 
Ambassador Benedict in a separate meeting June 26, that his staff 
would provide the Embassy with an updated assessment by next week of 
the GOI's implementation of its 18-point anti-corruption action 
plan, as initially outlined by DPM Salih at the first Iraqi 
anti-corruption conference in January.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PERCEIVED PRIMACY OF INSPECTORS GENERAL 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) In a 25 June meeting with visiting INL consultants and ACCO 
staff, Joint Anti-Corruption Commission (JACC) chairman and Council 
of Ministers Secretary General Ali Alaq stressed his interpretation 
of the ministries' Inspectors General as the vanguard of 
anti-corruption enforcement in Iraq.  A former Ministry of Oil IG 
himself from 2004-2006, Alaq described the IG's as not only the 
front line but the driving force behind Iraq's anti-corruption 
regime. He said that by his interpretation of the law, the IG's are 
responsible for initiating anti-corruption investigations.  Even if 
the COI possesses incriminating information, Alaq said, it is the 
COI's responsibility to pass this information to the IG's for 
follow-up. 
 
3. (U) Reiterating from previous meetings a request for USG 
assistance, Alaq stressed the need for a comprehensive assessment of 
Iraq's anti-corruption needs as well as the challenges in 
maintaining staffing within the IG's. He said that he had 
recommended each IG to provide an assessment of what types of 
corruption was most prevalent in each respective ministry, but that 
his request was currently hung up in the Council of Ministers.  Alaq 
added that staffing of the IG's had been difficult, with many 
positions left vacant, but that he had received Prime Minister 
Maliki's support to bolster IG staffing. 
 
CLAIMS BETTER COORDINATION WITH COI 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) In response to a question of reported clashes between IG's 
and the COI, Alaq highlighted improved coordination between these 
two agencies.  Alaq attributed the improved cooperation to the new 
leadership of COI under Rahim al-Ugaili, whom he repeatedly praised 
as "very good" and having a strong vision for the future of the COI. 
 Nonetheless, he conceded that a large backlog of cases remained at 
the commission. 
 
STILL WAITING FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5. (U) Alaq told the team, and reiterated to ACC Ambassador Benedict 
in a separate meeting June 26, that his office was continuing to 
finalize an updated assessment of the 18-point anti-corruption 
program, as initially outlined by DPM Salih at Iraq's 
anti-corruption conference in January.  Post will follow up with 
Alaq's office next week for the updated assessment.  Alaq had no 
further information regarding the passage of the three laws (55, 57, 
and 77) that would formalize the relationship between Iraq's primary 
anti-corruption agencies (the COI, IG's, and Board of Supreme Audit) 
but said he understood that the law had had its first reading before 
the COR. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) Alaq's interpretation that IG's must direct all 
anti-corruption investigations and that the COI has no authority to 
lead investigations on its own is not consistent with Iraqi law or 
COI practices.  The COI, under both current law and the laws 
currently pending before the COR, does in fact have the authority to 
initiate and conduct anti-corruption investigations.  Alaq's 
effusive praise of COI Commissioner Rahim throughout the meeting 
therefore comes as something of a surprise following Rahim's 
reported rejection of a similar order by Alaq's deputy last year 
that said the COI had no power to drive investigations.  Such an 
interpretation has troubling implications for executive interference 
with anti-corruption investigations, since IG's can be fired at will 
by their respective ministers according to current Iraqi law.  The 
new laws pending before the COR are expected to remove this 
ministerial prerogative, elevating this firing authority to the 
Prime Minister's office. 
 
CROCKER