VZCZCXRO7286
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0689/01 1640823
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 120823Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5993
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2396
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7251
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3453
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0428

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000689 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS TO USTR PBURKHEAD AND BGRYNIEWICZ 
CAIRO PASS TO TREAS ASEVERENS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD PREL AG
SUBJECT: COMMERCE MINISTER NONCOMMITTAL ON WTO PROGRESS 
 
REF: ALGIERS 481 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  In a long-awaited meeting on June 8, 
Commerce Minister El Hachemi Djaboub and his lead WTO 
negotiators offered us little in terms of concrete actions 
that the Algerians would take to accelerate their bid to join 
WTO.  We received some indications of willingness to adjust 
Algerian negotiating stances, but the Minister and his team 
pledged no dramatic changes in economic policy that would 
facilitate joining the WTO.  The Algerians said they had 
contacted a Swiss firm to translate 1,500 pages of documents 
into English, but offered no date by which the task may be 
completed nor assurances that future offers would be in 
English.  Likewise, the Minister instructed his staff to 
create a legislative action plan similar to the Vietnam 
model, but his team leader suggested that the lists of 
Algerian laws already provided should be sufficient.  The 
Algerian negotiators admitted that the lack of convertibility 
of the Dinar remains a problem for Algeria's WTO bid, but 
gave no hint that Algeria would change that policy and they 
insisted that there is no discrimination against foreign 
companies in Algerian law today. In general, the Algerians 
feel there are only a dozen or so outstanding issues to 
negotiate, and are waiting for USTR to provide them a list of 
priority goods market access items on which to focus.  The 
Minister lamented the long, slow process that WTO 
negotiations have become for Algeria, and said that Algeria 
continues to make gradual progress toward economic and 
financial reform that should help its WTO bid.  The 
Ambassador underlined several times in the meeting that while 
we support Algeria joining the WTO, the Algerians - not the 
Americans - must decide to take steps forward.  Regarding 
MEPI/IESC programming, the Minister's team said they may 
still be interested, but that any such programming must be in 
French if it is to be effective.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On June 8, the Ambassador delivered a demarche to 
Commerce Minister El Hachemi Djaboub regarding Algeria's bid 
to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). (NOTE: The 
appointment to meet the Minister was granted more than four 
months after the Embassy officially requested it by 
Diplomatic Note and informally through follow-on calls.  The 
meeting had been canceled twice by the Algerians.  END NOTE). 
The Ambassador spoke from talking points provided from 
Washington that suggested specific steps that Algeria could 
take to accelerate the negotiations leading toward its WTO 
accession. 
 
ALMOST THERE? 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Minister Djaboub and his lead WTO negotiators were 
at first upbeat, claiming that out of approximately 170 
original questions to negotiate for WTO accession, only a 
dozen or so remained outstanding.  The Ambassador expressed 
surprise, saying there were a variety of issues still 
outstanding.  Chief WTO negotiator and Director General of 
Foreign Trade Cherif Zaaf admitted that the limited 
convertibility of the Algerian dinar remained a stumbling 
block between the United States and Algeria, as the lack of 
convertibility makes it impossible for companies doing 
business in Algeria but registered outside of Algeria to 
repatriate profits.  Zaaf and his Minister insisted that 
Algerian law does not discriminate against foreign firms, 
however. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The Ambassador suggested Algeria formulate 
comprehensive offers for goods and services to generate 
momentum among its bilateral negotiating tracks, rather than 
extending bilateral negotiations over a long period.  Zaaf 
indicated that Algeria was waiting for a list of priority 
goods sectors from USTR because his last offers in services 
and agriculture were not considered priorities by U.S. 
negotiators.  The Ambassador reminded the Algerians that, if 
USTR were to create such a list of priority discussion items 
for Algeria, the Algerians would need to negotiate them with 
genuine flexibility.  He also told the Minister that the 
Algerian negotiators needed sufficient authority and 
flexibility to make commitments and negotiate new topics that 
might arise during a fruitful round of talks.  The Minister 
lamented the slow, arduous pace of WTO negotiations, and 
noted that Algeria has been gradually reforming its economy 
 
ALGIERS 00000689  002 OF 002 
 
 
and financial system, but that residual fears from the 2004 
Khalifa banking scandal still curb the enthusiasm in some 
parts of government for greater reform and privatization. 
Ambassador noted that there are steps the Algerian 
negotiators can take now that are simple enough, such as 
listing in detail its existing sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
regime.  (The Minister looked at his negotiator Zaaf who 
nodded and said this could be done.) 
 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION PLAN - GOT ONE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The Ambassador told the Minister that, so far, the 
Algerian legislative action plans had not had enough detail 
to explain when and how new legislation would go into force 
and how that new legislation would resolve issues raised in 
WTO negotiations.  We gave the Minister the sample 
legislative action plan for Vietnam provided by USTR, and 
encouraged the Algerians to create a similar tracking device. 
 Zaaf defended Algeria's previous efforts, saying they have 
already produced lists of laws related to WTO that were 
passed during the period 2001-2005.  Minister Djaboub, 
nonetheless, directed Zaaf to create a new legislative action 
plan along the lines of the Vietnam model. 
 
IN ENGLISH, PLEASE 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The Ambassador stressed that Algeria should 
translate its offers and documents into English to make it 
easier to conclude negotiations with a number of parties, not 
just the United States.  Chief negotiator Zaaf said that 
Algeria has contacted a Swiss firm with experience in WTO 
terminology to translate Algeria's documents into English, 
but noted that it would take some time and be expensive 
because there are over 1,500 pages to translate.  Zaaf said 
they would prioritize the translation of documents generated 
from the last Working Party meeting that were most important, 
but we were given no timelines nor assurances that future 
offers would be in English.  The Minister, meanwhile, 
expressed unhappiness over the cost but said the Algerian 
government would go forward. 
 
BUT TRAINING IN FRENCH 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  We also reiterated a proposal for a MEPI funded 
program to be implemented by the International Executives 
Service Corps (IESC) that would bring private experts to 
Algeria to offer workshops and counseling sessions specific 
to WTO accession (reftel).  Zaaf and the Minister stressed 
that for such a program to be effective, it should be 
conducted in French to reach the target audience at the 
Ministry. 
 
COMMENT: HERE WE ARE AGAIN 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  While cordial and friendly, Minister Djaboub did 
not offer any particular assurances that Algeria will 
accelerate trade and investment regime changes to speed along 
WTO access negotiations.  The Algerians seemed a bit more 
serious about providing documentation in English, but Zaaf's 
indication that he is waiting for USTR to create a priority 
list for goods access negotiations, and his reluctance to 
create a new legislative action plan like the Vietnam model, 
hint that he'll argue that the Algerians are doing all that 
they need to do if only Algeria's partners would make 
political decisions.  When the Ambassador suggested that it 
would be more effective for the Algerians to submit 
comprehensive offers that would be acceptable to multiple WTO 
parties rather than trying to conclude a series of bilateral 
negotiations, Djaboub laughed and said, "In reality, if we 
conclude negotiations with you, everyone else will agree to 
let us accede."   The government is a bit embarrassed that it 
cannot conclude the WTO accession talks, but not enough to 
accelerate economic reforms. 
FORD