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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI912, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI912 2008-06-26 09:40 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0912/01 1780940
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260940Z JUN 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9290
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8396
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9625
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused June 26 
news coverage on the Ma Ying-jeou Administration's new measures to 
liberalize financial regulations vis-a-vis Mainland China; on 
China's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi's remarks Monday 
regarding Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization; 
and on President Ma's meeting with U.S. investment specialist Jim 
Rogers Wednesday.  The pro-independence "Liberty Times" carried a 
banner headline on page two reading "U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
Defense: China's Military Intimidation against Taiwan is 
Deteriorating." 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" said that Taiwan should stop 
fantasizing that it could enjoy greater international space simply 
by resuming negotiations with Beijing.  An op-ed in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" said that Ma has 
failed to come up with a concrete plan that can both consolidate 
Taiwan's sovereignty and improve cross-Strait relations.  An 
editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" 
urged Ma to adjust its "China first" policy for fear that Taiwan's 
security relations with the United States and Japan would be 
compromised.  End summary. 
 
A) "Zero-Sum Sovereignty Struggle across the Taiwan Strait" 
 
The mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] 
editorialized (6/26): 
 
"... China's ossified concept of its absolute sovereignty has 
impaired Taiwan's rights and interests in exchanging information 
with other countries in the world about epidemic prevention, which 
could harm Taiwan severely and which has aroused resentment among 
the Taiwan people.  [President] Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy 
has, for a while, created illusions for many people who believe 
[that Ma's policy] could more or less change China's tough attitude 
[toward Taiwan].  The remarks by [China's Taiwan Affairs Office 
Director] Wang Yi [Monday that China does not accept Taiwan's formal 
participation in the World Health Organization], however, have once 
again crushed [the Taiwan people's] wishful thinking.  For both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, there is still a long and difficult way 
to go regarding [their negotiations over] the sovereignty issue. 
 
"Taiwan must keep its head clear.  First, if [Taiwan] decides to 
separate politics from economics, it should just talk about economic 
issues with the other side of the Strait.  Issues that involve 
sovereignty, such as [Taiwan's] international space, are about 
politics, so [Taiwan] can put it aside for the time being, or else 
it will be a mix, rather than separation, of politics and economics. 
 Second, it is fine to talk about political issues regarding 
sovereignty, but then it really depends on what Taiwan is capable of 
offering [in the negotiation].  It could be 'one China with 
respective interpretations,' arms procurement [from the United 
States], or [Taiwan's] relations with the United States and Japan, 
etc.  China regards sovereignty as something supremely sublime, and 
what can Taiwan give in exchange for something so sublime?  Being 
overly naive would not be endearing, but rather a grievous error." 
 
 
B) "Ma's One-Track Cross-Strait Policy" 
 
Yao Jen-to, Assistant Professor at Taiwan's National Tsing Hua 
University's Graduate Institute of Sociology, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (6/26): 
 
"... The [Ma] government has yet to tell the public how it intends 
to handle these challenges [in terms of cross-Strait relations]. 
What is clear is that the KMT has a fixed track in mind for 
cross-strait relations.  Following this, Taiwan and China would 
inevitably get closer.  This is not a big problem; the problem is 
what will happen once this has happened.  Putting aside contentious 
issues such as whether Ma should be addressed as "President Ma" or 
"Mr. Ma," the question remains: Where will this track lead us? 
 
 
"If what Ma really wants is unification with China, the KMT's plan 
should remain unchanged.  However, if Ma intends to keep the 
promises he made in his inaugural speech and work to safeguard the 
dignity and sovereignty of Taiwan, or the Republic of China, he 
should propose a concrete plan to consolidate public consensus on 
Taiwan's independence and sovereignty while pushing it toward China. 
 Over the past month, we have seen the latter, but not the former. 
..." 
 
C) "Ma Must Adjust 'China First' Line" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (6/26): 
 
"... Perhaps the most worrisome indication of the direction of the 
new KMT government's 'adjustment' of Taiwan's external policy 
direction concerns numerous news media reports that the Ma 
government had asked the United States to 'delay' public 
announcement of a new package of advanced defensive weaponry to 
Taiwan until after this month's talks between the quasi-official 
Strait Exchange Foundation and Beijing's Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Strait.  In the wake of Taiwan's democratization, 
both the former KMT government under ex-president Lee Teng-hui and 
the former president Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party 
administration had believed that close relations with both the US 
and Japan were the bedrock of Taiwan's national security strategy, 
and that Taiwan could enhance its strategic position in the 
Asia-Pacific and gain greater flexibility to engage the PRC through 
deepening robust security ties with Washington and Tokyo. 
 
"The reports of this request by Ma's national security team sent a 
ringing message to Washington that his government will decide its US 
policy based on the state of relations with the authoritarian PRC 
regime in a dramatic reversal of the strategic priorities of the 
Taiwan government since 1988. ...  Moreover, we sincerely urge 
President Ma to reconsider his decision to prioritize cross-strait 
relations over foreign affairs, a policy that has already 
effectively become tantamount to the abandonment of Taiwan's 
independent diplomacy. 
 
"Even if supporters of Ma's policy maintain that Taiwan will be 
unable to upgrade its international status or expand its 
international participation without friendly cross-strait ties with 
the PRC, the KMT government's current stance has handed Beijing 
effective control over Taipei's diplomacy and national defense 
policies and has spawned grave doubts about Taiwan's new strategic 
direction in Washington and Tokyo and in the capitals of our 23 
official diplomatic partners. ...  Since its strategy does not enjoy 
public consensus and has triggered growing doubts among our 
traditional allies and has already begun to harm the fabric of 
Taiwan's democracy, we believe that the Ma government should 
reconsider its policy of putting relations with the PRC 'above 
everything' and return to its promise to 'put Taiwan first.'" 
 
YOUNG