Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI760, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08AITTAIPEI760.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI760 2008-06-03 08:21 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0760 1550821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030821Z JUN 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9059
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8323
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9564
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000760 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused June 3 
news coverage on new   Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou's 
first meeting with the local media Monday, in which he elaborated on 
President Ma Ying-jeou's concept of a "cross-Strait diplomatic 
truce;" on DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen's questioning of the KMT's 
approach in handling cross-Strait relations; on Taiwan's 
preparations for opening the island to Chinese tourists; and on 
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's slumping approval rating and 
his government's decision to delay the planned resumption of U.S. 
beef imports.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial 
in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" criticized KMT Chairman Wu 
Poh-hsiung's recent remarks that China is unlikely to fire missiles 
at Taiwan.  The article said Wu's "indiscreet" statement will only 
create an illusion for the Taiwan people and will likely paralyze 
the Taiwan military's awareness of possible cross-Strait crises.  An 
editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
remained skeptical about the future development of cross-Strait 
relations and said "it is too early to tell where thawing relations 
between Taipei and Beijing will take us."  End summary. 
 
A) "Wu Poh-hsiung's Indiscreet Remark" 
 
The mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] 
editorialized (6/3): 
 
"[KMT Chairman] Wu Poh-hsiung's remark upon his return [from a trip 
to China] that Beijing would not launch missiles against Taiwan has 
caused a disturbance [in Taiwan].  One can say that Wu has made an 
indiscreet remark. 
 
"Negotiations between two countries on disarmament, arms control or 
removing missiles would be an issue of major significance.  Only 
after days of long talks between the delegations from both sides, 
taking time to discuss every detail, and employing all their guiles 
could some modest achievements possibly be reached.  China's missile 
deployments target the United States, Russia, Japan, India and 
Taiwan, and a slight move or change in any way will affect the whole 
situation. 
 
"Besides, missiles are the most effective strategic weapon for 
suppressing Taiwan independence - thus they cannot be removed 
easily.  Moreover, if China insists that Taiwan offer something in 
return [for its removal of missiles], could Taiwan give up 
purchasing the F-16C/D fighter jets?  [Taiwan] has given up its 
major bargaining chips by stating stupidly and voluntarily that it 
will not purchase submarines and PAC-3 missiles.   What price will 
we have to offer in exchange if [we] ask China to remove missiles in 
the future? ..." 
 
B) "Beijing's Grand Illusion of Peace" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (6/3): 
 
"Less than three weeks have passed since the Chinese Nationalist 
Party (KMT) administration was sworn in and already, if we are to 
believe world headlines, the Taiwan Strait has been transformed from 
one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints to the milieu for a 
neighborly spat.  Optimism is high, especially in the wake of KMT 
Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's recent visit to China and talks with 
Chinese President Hu Jintao, which prompted some, including US 
National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Dennis 
Wilder, to praise the rekindled dialogue across the Strait. ... 
 
"But it is wise to remain skeptical on just how solid the basis for 
all this optimism is. ...Wu's optimism about a possible reduction in 
missiles, meanwhile, is gullibility at its most extreme. For one, 
even if China were to dismantle or redirect some of its missiles, 
the fact remains that hundreds would still be aimed this way. One 
missile - and the threat to use it - is one too many. Furthermore, 
quantitative cuts mean very little when they could easily be offset 
by the increasing precision of those still active. In other words, 
as long as the intent to use missiles against Taiwan exists, talk of 
cuts is meaningless. ...  It is too early to tell where thawing 
relations between Taipei and Beijing will take us. While there are, 
indeed, signs that tension might be diminishing, it is in the long 
run, when Beijing's patience is tested - and it will be, if 
Taiwanese negotiators meant what they said when they vowed to 
protect Taiwan's interests and dignity - that we will see if the 
KMT's professed intentions will be answered in kind." 
 
WANG