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O 080313Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/ANP, PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2018 
TAGS: PARM PREL KTIA MOPS NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND, CLUSTER MUNITIONS, AND 
INTEROPERABILITY 
 
REF: STATE 47101 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Margaret McKean; Reason 1.5 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  Summary.  New Zealand considers interoperability to 
be one of two key issues (the other issue being the 
definition of a cluster munition that causes unacceptable 
humanitarian harm) for resolution in Dublin at the upcoming 
cluster munitions convention meeting beginning May 19. 
However, MFAT indicates that New Zealand's approach will be 
to develop more specific language regarding interoperability 
as opposed to deleting clauses 1 (b) and (c) of the draft 
convention.  MFAT does not want the issue of interoperability 
to preclude New Zealand's participation in the types of 
peacekeeping and international security roles it is involved 
in now with the UN as well as the United States.  New 
Zealand, however, may be constrained from becoming a party to 
the convention, as the Oslo signing event will come after the 
New Zealand election.  MFAT has acknowledged that if the 
opposition National Party wins the election, it is unclear if 
National will support the convention.  End Summary. 
 
Definition/Interoperability Critical at Dublin 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (C)  Pol/Econ Counselor met with Jillian Dempster, head 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) 
Disarmament Division on May 5 to provide demarche points and 
discuss GNZ views on interoperability concerns.  Dempster 
will be joining New Zealand head of delegation Ambassador Don 
MacKay and some his Geneva-based staff in Dublin, along with 
members of MFAT's legal division and several Ministry of 
Defense representatives.  Dempster noted that 105 countries 
have now signed the Wellington Declaration, which would 
permit their participation in the Dublin negotiation process 
that will begin on May 19.  She acknowledged that the GNZ 
views interoperability as one of two key issues to be 
resolved at the two-week session.  The GNZ is aware of 
concerns among the like-minded states as well as the US on 
this issue, and for that reason hosted a special break-out 
session on interoperability at the February 2008 meeting in 
Wellington.  However, Dempster complained that many of the 
delegations were unprepared for detailed, substantive 
discussions and the session made little progress.  She 
 
offered that a similar session would be likely in Dublin, 
although it is not clear if Ireland (as host) will lead off 
with a plenary and then break out into smaller working 
groups, or if working groups will operate simultaneously with 
an ongoing plenary discussion. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The other major issue for resolution, according to 
Dempster, will be the definition of where to draw the line on 
cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. 
Although NGOs continue to call for no exceptions, Dempster 
predicted that there would not be a total ban, and a possible 
exemption on high-tech cluster munitions with better guidance 
systems and self-destruct mechanisms.  She acknowledged that 
an exemption would only account for less than 5 percent of 
cluster munitions in use, but it was important to realize 
that there would likely be some level of flexibility on the 
part of NGOs. 
 
Interoperability:  "Tricky but Manageable" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  Pol/Econ Counselor provided the USG points on 
interoperability and asked if New Zealand would consider 
deleting clauses 1 (b) and (c) of the draft convention. 
Dempster acknowledged that the two clauses had been lifted 
from the Ottawa Landmine Convention and had proven 
problematic in the past due to the ambiguity surrounding the 
language.  Instead of deleting the clauses, New Zealand 
favored adding greater clarity to the language.  Pol/Econ 
Counselor stressed that the likely envisioned workarounds to 
mixing treaty and non-treaty nations in coalition forces in 
the future would add to the cost, may discourage 
participation, and could result in operational delays putting 
lives at risk.  Dempster insisted that the interoperability 
hurdle remains a "tricky but manageable" issue, but one that 
she foresees will be resolved. 
 
What Happens After Dublin? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Dempster briefly discussed the dissatisfaction felt 
by many of the like-minded delegations during the Wellington 
meetings in February, but offered strong criticism of those 
states' behavior -- and in some cases -- their methods.  She 
acknowledged that having a convention acceptable to the 
 
like-minded states would enhance the credibility of any 
convention.  If only states that do not produce, use, 
stockpile, or transfer cluster munitions sign the convention, 
it will not have the weight of a convention that includes 
European countries and the likes of Canada and Australia. 
However, Dempster noted that the decision to sign the 
convention will be made at the political level, so even if 
some like-minded delegations are again dissatisfied with the 
results in Dublin, they may be overruled by their political 
leaders. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ironically for New Zealand, Dempster noted that New 
Zealand may not be in a position to attend the signing 
ceremony in Oslo in December 2008 depending on how the New 
Zealand election later this year plays out.  (Note:  There 
are no date set for the election but the Prime Minister must 
call for an election no later than mid-November.  End Note.) 
Dempster offered that in the pre-election period, the 
government may not enter into new agreements; if the 
opposition National Party were to win, any Labour caretaker 
government would also be constrained during the time it would 
take for the transfer of power.  National has not asked for a 
briefing on the draft convention, nor has anyone from MFAT 
engaged with any other political party on the issue. 
Pol/Econ Counselor asked about the Green Party and Dempster 
corrected herself, saying that the Greens have been kept in 
the loop regarding the ongoing Oslo Process.  (Comment:  We 
are not sure of the accuracy of Dempster's statements; our 
initial soundings on the question suggest that the government 
could indeed sign the agreement in the pre-election period as 
it would not be "new business;" if countries would be allowed 
to sign before the official signing ceremony in December is 
another question.  We also understand that even if National 
won the election; a caretaker Labour government could attend 
the signing ceremony in December and sign if National were 
consulted and agreed.  End Comment.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  MFAT had already forwarded its policy paper to 
Ministers before this demarche arrived.  However, New Zealand 
has long been aware of the significance of the 
interoperability issue and the concerns of like-minded 
states.  The Australian High Commission has told us that they 
 
have little confidence in the reassurances from MFAT and MOD 
interlocutors; they say the Australian Minister of Defense 
may call his New Zealand counterpart (Phil Goff) during the 
Dublin meetings.  However, Goff is dual-hatted as both 
Minister of Defense and Minister for Disarmament -- and 
although he has flagged interoperability as a concern -- his 
disarmament leanings may ultimately override practical 
military considerations.  End Comment. 
MCCORMICK