VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1373/01 1410731
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200731Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4373

UNCLAS TOKYO 001373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM ENRG ETTC PREL KNNP MNUC JA
SUBJECT: THE FIFTH ASIAN SENIOR-TALKS ON NONPROLIFERATION 
(ASTOP V) MEETING, APRIL 25, 2008 
 
Sensitive but unclassified; protect accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  ISN Deputy Assistant Secretary Mary 
Alice Hayward and ISN Counterproliferation Director Tony 
Foley represented the U.S. at the fifth Asian Senior-Level 
Talks on Nonproliferation (ASTOP V) in Tokyo April 25, 2008. 
Recent news on North Korea's proliferation activities 
conducted with Syria, and reports of difficulty implementing 
the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and United Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCRs) concerning North Korea and Iran garnered 
the most interest.  The agenda also included the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), strengthening export 
controls, and regional concerns.  Japan introduced its 
"Nuclear Power Infrastructure Initiative," for enhancing 
nuclear nonproliferation safeguards, safety, and security in 
the midst of the nuclear renaissance.  Senior-level 
government officials in charge of nonproliferation policies 
from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries 
(Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), plus 
Australia, China, Republic of Korea, the U.S., Canada, New 
Zealand, and host country Japan participated in the meeting. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------- 
OPENING SESSION 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Hitoshi 
Kimura expressed hope states could act in concert and take 
swift and firm measures to tackle the issues related to 
strengthening nonproliferation in the Asian region, namely 
the North Korean and Iranian proliferation threats.  In his 
opening remarks, Kimura also highlighted nonproliferation as 
a main agenda item at the upcoming G8 Summit chaired by the 
Government of Japan (GOJ).  Therefore, the results of the 
ASTOP Talks will not go unnoticed, Kimura stated, but will be 
reflected in the G8 process.  Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Science 
Director-General Takeshi Nakane echoed Kimura's sentiment and 
emphasized the need for all countries to implement UNSCRs 
concerning North Korea and Iran.  Nakane strongly believed 
the recent discovery of North Korea's secret work on a 
nuclear reactor in cooperation with Syria, and Iran's failure 
to declare its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards not 
only put peace and stability in jeopardy in Asia, but 
threatens the entire world.  In Nakane's final remarks, he 
urged all states to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
NEW INITIATIVE PROMOTING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  After the opening remarks, the conference took up 
the first agenda item on promotion of the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy in a manner ensuring the 3Ss (nuclear 
nonproliferation/safeguards, safety and security).  MOFA 
International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Director Yasuyoshi 
Komizo gave an extensive presentation on Japan's "Nuclear 
Power Infrastructure Initiative," which he said Japan would 
like to launch at this year's G8 Summit.  Komizo said a 
growing number of countries worldwide are considering 
embarking on nuclear power programs -- a trend known as the 
"Nuclear Renaissance" -- as a means of addressing climate 
change and energy security.  The Japanese side noted the IAEA 
designed 19 important milestones in an effort to deal with 
the trend.  Due to its dual nature, certain nuclear 
technology can be misused for non-peaceful purposes. 
Furthermore, should nuclear accidents occur, they would have 
serious consequences not only for the country where the 
nuclear power plant in question is located, but also 
neighboring countries and the international community as a 
whole.  Considering such concerns, Komizo said primary 
emphasis should be given to one IAEA milestone, the 3Ss, 
because it constitutes necessary infrastructure for the 
proper introduction of nuclear power.  Komizo noted the IAEA 
was consulted in developing the initiative and will continue 
to play a key role in the implementation phase if the 
initiative is adopted at the Summit. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  In response to the GOJ presentation, the Republic 
of Korea official commented the ROK is the sixth largest 
producer of nuclear power in the world and his government 
agrees with the GOJ on the effectiveness of ensuring the 3Ss. 
 The Korean representative pointed out two challenges -- safe 
disposal of spent fuel and rising uranium costs -- as 
impediments to the initiative and the nuclear renaissance. 
The New Zealand representative said her country opposes 
nuclear power.  However, it strongly supports the 3Ss 
initiative because of New Zealand's concern about the 
transshipment of nuclear waste materials in the Pacific. 
Singapore welcomed the initiative, also recognizing the 
 
growing interest in acquiring nuclear energy.  The official 
said his government looks forward to sharing information 
about the 3Ss initiative with the recently formed ASEAN 
Nuclear Energy Safety Sub-Sector Network Working Group.  That 
group held its first annual meeting late January in 
Singapore. 
 
-------------------------------- 
SIX-PARTY TALKS NEW ACTION PLANS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Moving to regional nonproliferation issues, 
China's representative presented a paper on the current 
status of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea.  He stated with 
China's active mediation and the concerted efforts of all 
other parties, the Six Party Talks yielded significant fruits 
since the 2005 Joint Statement.  Two action plans to 
denuclearize were released on February 13 and October 3, 
¶2007.  China's official reported the Initial-Phase Actions 
for the implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement were 
complete but the Second-Phase is ongoing.  He said the 
Second-Phase Actions were delayed because of some differences 
between the U.S. and North Korea over the declaration issue. 
The representative asserted China has been actively working 
with both parties, placing emphasis on promoting useful 
consultations and coordination in resolving differences.  As 
a result, the disablement of nuclear facilities and the 
provision of energy assistance to North Korea are well 
underway.  China is optimistic the Second-Phase Actions will 
conclude at an early date. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In response, DAS Hayward said the Second-Phase 
Actions experienced delay because North Korea failed to 
submit its declaration due December 31, 2007.  Hayward 
emphasized the U.S. will continue to urge North Korea to 
provide a complete and correct declaration in order to 
proceed to the Third Phase.  She noted the United States is 
overseeing the disablement activities at the three core 
facilities at Yongbyon and providing initial funding for the 
work at the request of the other Parties.  Turning attention 
to a related issue, Hayward briefed the participants using 
points drawn from the White House press statement that 
announced recently released intelligence indicating North 
Korea's cooperation with Syria in developing a covert nuclear 
reactor.  The Chair greatly appreciated the U.S. updates on 
the North Korea-Syria nuclear cooperation and took the 
opportunity to underscore the importance of North Korea 
providing the declaration without further delay.  Australia's 
representative said such actions are "extremely disturbing" 
and completely undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT).  She further said, the Six Party Talks should continue 
vigorously in light of the recent discovery and Syria should 
promptly provide access to IAEA inspectors and swiftly ratify 
the Additional Protocol.  The ROK official added resolution 
of nuclear issues is important.  The official expressed hope 
North Korea would abandon its nuclear program, and during the 
negotiation period, Korea would remain flexible in its 
approach.  Canada, like other countries, attached great 
importance to a diplomatic approach, therefore called for 
full implementation of UNSCRs concerning North Korea.  The 
Canadian representative said GOC would continue to lend 
support to the Six Party Talks, which is a wise process 
because it offers the best process to seek an acceptable 
outcome for all parties.  The Six Party Talks can effectively 
demonstrate to North Korea it has little chance but to 
concede to the will of the international community.  Canada's 
representative, in his final remarks, expressed hope the Six 
Party Talks would move forward and not suffer a major 
set-back from the recent findings. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  DAS Hayward presented recent developments 
regarding Iran's nuclear program, emphasizing Iran has 
continued to develop its fissile material production 
capabilities despite the strong concerns registered by the 
international community, including through sanctions imposed 
by the UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803.  DAS Hayward, highlighting 
Iran's show of defiance, explained Iran had expanded its 
centrifuge capacity by installing 3,000 machines at the Fuel 
Enrichment Plant at Natanz and announced plans to double the 
quantity by the end of the year.  Furthermore, Iran is 
testing IR-2 centrifuges and continuing to construct the Arak 
Heavy Water Research Reactor.  In response to Iran's 
unconstructive posture, DAS Hayward noted the U.S. and 
broader P5 1 are pursuing a dual track strategy to encourage 
Iran to suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear 
activities and cooperate with the IAEA.  DAS Hayward called 
on all states to continue efforts to implement financial 
measures because of their effectiveness.  As a result of the 
UNSCR designations and U.S. designations actions under E.O. 
 
13382, more than 40 banks have reduced or cut off dealings 
with Iran as of mid-2007. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  In response, Malaysia's representative noted his 
government's most recent efforts in applying UN resolutions 
concerning Iran.  He said the GOM banned Iran from the April 
22 Defense Services Asia show for exhibiting missile 
equipment, which violates UN resolutions prohibiting Iranian 
arms exports.  Japan 's representative circulated the GOJ's 
recent press release announcing its implementation of UNSCR 
1803 and vowed to take necessary steps to continue to 
encourage Iran to suspend its nuclear weapons program. 
Canada's representative noted Iran's proliferation activities 
are gaining more focused attention as the IAEA submitted 19 
reports concerning Iran's nuclear actions.  The 
representative expressed hope Iran would adopt the Additional 
Protocol and conduct a peaceful nuclear program. 
 
------------------------------------ 
G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP CURRENT STATUS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Opening the next agenda item, the status of the G8 
Global Partnership (GP), MOFA Arms Control and Disarmament 
Director Yasunari Morino called for continued commitment and 
close coordination to help close the gaps in the security of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  There are 23 countries 
involved in the GP, including the European Commission (EU) 
with Ukraine joining as a recipient country in 2005.  For its 
part, Japan has been assisting Russia in dismantling 
decommissioned nuclear submarines.  Two submarines have been 
dismantled and four more are slated to be dismantled.  Japan 
is also talking with Russia about a new effort to construct a 
long-term storage facility for compartments of the dismantled 
submarines. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Morino said the partners at the G8 Summit will 
discuss further steps to strengthen the GP.  One focus will 
be on which projects to prioritize for the destruction of 
chemical weapons and the dismantlement of nuclear submarines. 
 Japan underscored the importance of partners strengthening 
coordination and overcoming challenges, such as site access, 
involved in project implementation.  Another key issue will 
be possible expansion of the GP to deal with global threats 
of proliferation and terrorists acquiring WMD capability 
without undercutting ongoing financial and technical 
assistance in Russia and Ukraine. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  New Zealand's representative highlighted her 
country's contribution to the GP through using the piggyback 
method.  Because New Zealand is a small economy with limited 
resources, the representative expressed great appreciation at 
being able to partner with larger countries and help fund 
four projects in Russia and Ukraine since 2003.  The New 
Zealand representative further noted it would be difficult to 
justify to its taxpayers the need to strengthen the borders 
of another country, therefore channeling money through the 
piggybacking process allows it to cut back on its efforts for 
public buy-in.  The ROK representative noted his country's 
involvement in the GP since 2004 and said the Global 
Partnership Program may eventually have a role in North 
Korea. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN ASIA 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Turning to the topic of the universalization of a 
nonproliferation regime, MOFA Nonproliferation, Science, and 
Nuclear Energy Director Tomiko Ichikawa noted the previous 
ASTOP meeting had occurred soon after the adoption of UNSCRs 
1718 and 1737 and prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1747 and 
1803, highlighting the changing situation and anticipating 
that many countries were likely experiencing difficulties in 
AP and UNSCR implementation.  As examples of developments 
since the previous ASTOP meetings, Ichikawa noted, Vietnam 
signed the AP, Malaysia had ratified the CTBT, and Indonesia 
had passed legislation to implement the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  The Singapore representative pointed out that her 
government signed the AP in 2005.  The GOS, she continued, 
has taken steps to see the proper administrative and legal 
measure are in place and is working with the IAEA to study 
control of nuclear materials.  In particular, the Health 
Authority and the National Environmental Agency have been 
consolidated to form the Center for Radiological Protection 
and Nuclear Science.  Furthermore, the Radiological 
Protection Act has been repealed and then re-enacted, in 
preparation for Singapore's ratification of the AP. 
Singapore's AP was ratified and came into effect March 31, 
¶2008.  Thailand's representative stressed that the RTG 
considered the AP an effective confidence-building measure 
 
and since signing the AP in September 2005, is finalizing the 
domestic processes necessary to ratify the AP.  Vietnam's 
representative noted that his government is exploring the 
possibility of ratifying the AP in "due time" and looks 
forward to its legislators considering approval of the 
Nuclear Energy Law in the coming year.  Vietnam hoping to 
develop nuclear energy in the future, welcomes cooperation 
from Japan and other countries. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Burma's representative, noted Burma signed the 
NPT in 1992, concluded a Safeguards Agreement in 1995, signed 
the CTBT in 1996, and stated Rangoon attaches paramount 
importance to the NPT and to nuclear disarmament, believing 
the two processes to be inter-related and mutually 
reinforcing.  Thus both areas deserve equal attention.  The 
representative said Burma recognizes the importance of the AP 
and noted his government started a nuclear research program 
in May 2007.  (Note: The Burmese representative did not 
mention Russian involvement or cooperation in its recently 
initiated nuclear research.)  He said Burma's Ministry of 
Science and Technology is responsible for the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy and is preparing to take appropriate measures 
to align itself with the "safeguards program of the IAEA." 
Burma's representative said technical training and assistance 
would be most helpful in order to sign and implement the AP. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
CANADA'S EFFORTS ON PROLIFERATION FINANCE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Turning to member's experiences with 
proliferation finance (PF), Canada's representative presented 
on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recent efforts. 
FATF is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the 
development and promotion of policies to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing.  Since 2007, the 
organization held its first substantive discussion on 
proliferation finance at the plenary in Strasbourg.  To 
advance initial PF discussions, the development of 
non-binding guidance on effective UNSCR prohibitions on 
proliferation financing began at an intercessional meeting in 
Ottawa. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  The Canadian representative summarized FATF 
guidance on PF in three areas.  One area of focus is 
assisting jurisdictions in implementing targeted financial 
sanctions contained in UNSCRs relating to WMD proliferation. 
FATF has also issued guidance on implementing activty-based 
prohibitions, such as OP6 of UNSCR 1737.  This approach is 
risk-based and intelligence led to identify and enhance 
scrutiny of high risk customers and their transactions.   The 
last guidance touched upon addressing broad-based measures to 
combat WMD proliferation finance.  The official noted such 
guidance is a long-term undertaking, and in that regard, 
Canada and Denmark will co-host brainstorming exercises. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
KOREA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPORT CONTROLS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  The Korean representative said the Republic of 
Korea is committed to tightening export controls and is party 
to four major international export control regimes, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement (1996), Nuclear Suppliers Group (1995), 
Australia Group (1996), and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (2001).  Besides enhancing expertise on export control 
through international cooperative efforts, the government is 
also engaging in robust efforts on the domestic front. 
Government efforts include streamlining systems and 
organizations, raising public awareness with educational 
seminars and media advertisements, and lastly, constructing 
infrastructure to improve convenience for companies via an 
online strategic trade information system.   However, the 
representative noted the implementation process is not 
without hurdles.  He pointed out transshipment is a 
challenge.  Since 2006-2007, the Republic of Korea noticed a 
sharp increase in transshipment, especially at Busan Port, 
which is the world's third largest transshipment port. 
Currently, the government is looking for new ways to control 
proliferation activities and perhaps a second line of defense 
will be required.  As a starting point, in April 2007, Korea 
revised its Foreign Trade Act, legislation used to control 
transshipment activities.  The representative commented the 
government would continue to develop ways to improve its 
legal framework for domestic implementation. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
UPDATE ON SINGAPORE'S CONTROL MEASURES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  The Singapore representative said her 
government's rationale for establishing an export control 
system stemmed from security and economic interests.  On the 
 
security front, Singapore desires to play an important role 
in preventing WMD proliferation and constraining illicit 
transfer of WMD.  Regarding its economic interests, Singapore 
would like to ensure its ports and sea lanes remain secure 
from WMD because Singapore is heavily dependent on trade and 
shipping.  To tackle growing WMD threats, Singapore is 
continuously reviewing its control system. 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  The representative provided updates on 
Singapore's control measures.  In 2006, Singapore announced 
the decision to expand the Control List in the Strategic 
Goods Act and the expanded list took effect this year.  It 
has also updated legislation on the Chemical Weapons 
Prohibition Act, finalized ratification procedures for the 
AP, and implemented measures for complying with UNSCRs 1540, 
1737, 1747, and 1803.  The Singapore representative said 
although the country is involved in ongoing training and 
capacity building programs, challenges remain.  Singapore is 
small, has limited expertise in controlled items, and lacks 
adequate resources.  The GOS must sort out how to implement a 
robust system without affecting trade and address industry 
concerns, such as diversion to less stringent ports. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
AUSTRALIA GROUP EFFORTS ON BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  The Australian Embassy representative highlighted 
export control efforts made by the Australia Group (AG).  The 
AG is an informal arrangement among 40 countries and the EU, 
which aims at preventing chemical and biological weapon 
proliferation through coordinated efforts to strengthen 
national export controls systems.   All states participating 
in the AG are party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
Biological Weapons Convention and strongly support efforts 
under those Conventions to rid the world of chemical and 
biological weapons.  The Group meets annually to discuss ways 
members' national level export licensing measures can 
collectively be made more effective.  The Embassy 
representative noted at the 2008 AG plenary in Paris 14-18 
April 2008, the Group recognized rapid international 
developments in the field of synthetic biology.  The AG 
members agreed to form a synthetic biology advisory body as a 
means of ensuring the Group is kept abreast of, and can 
respond quickly and appropriately to technological 
developments in this area. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE ON EXPORT CONTROLS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU)  A representative from the Center for Information 
on Security Trade Control (CISTEC), discussed its experience 
in helping Japanese companies comply with export control 
regulations.  CISTEC, founded in 1989 is the only non-profit, 
non-governmental organization in Japan dealing with security 
export controls.  The CISTEC representative noted a number of 
export control challenges companies face.  Therefore, CISTEC 
offers a myriad of resources to assist companies so 
regulations are not unintentionally violated.  These steps 
include outreach seminars and consultations,  educational 
videos and books, downloadable information on current topics 
of interest, and administering certification exams.  The 
representative noted, in the context of UNSCR 1540, Japan 
imposed new regulations in June 2007 to strengthen the 
control of transshipment and brokering of WMD related goods. 
Other international cooperative activities include conducting 
the Asian Export Control Seminar since 1993, offering 
training courses for Asian government officials that began in 
1999, and organizing industry outreach seminars throughout 
all of Asia from 2004. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCRs, EXPORT CONTROL 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶22.  (SBU)  Japan opened the next agenda item by asking 
countries to discuss candidly difficulties faced regarding 
their efforts at implementing the AP and the domestic 
implementation of the UNSCRs based on a questionnaire 
circulated beforehand.  The purpose of the questionnaire was 
to address possible ways of cooperation to effectively tackle 
implementation challenges. 
 
¶23.  (SBU)  In response, Cambodia's representative said his 
government actively supports measures preventing WMD by 
adhering to UNSCR 1540.  The Cambodian representative asked 
for assistance in applying financial measures and requested 
specific details of Iran's banking system and financial 
tactics.  Brunei noted intentions to become a transshipment 
hub, so it is increasing training on port enforcement while 
at the same time remaining committed to implementing the 
UNSCRs.  Burma's representative noted the Burmese government 
 
had submitted a 1540 report and is preparing an update for 
the 1540 matrix.  Burma seeks assistance in training capacity 
for enforcement activities at ports and capacity for 
monitoring the movements of designated individuals.  Laos' 
representative stressed total elimination of WMD is the only 
guarantee to global peace and stability.  He noted lack of 
technical expertise, financial resources, and proper 
equipment for cargo inspections greatly impedes its ability 
to fully implement nonproliferation obligations.  Vietnam's 
representative said the FATF recommendations are not 
applicable to its unique law system.  Therefore, it may take 
months to achieve interagency agreement and requested 
immediate technical assistance.  Noting difficulties in 
translating requests and reports between Vietnamese and 
English, the 
representative requested that the UN Security Council ask 
more simple questions for reporting requirements or provide 
model answers.  Thailand's representative emphasized his 
government's commitment to strengthening the nonproliferation 
regime.  In doing so, the RTG requests countries provide the 
date of birth when attempting to identify targeted 
individuals.  The Thai senior official asserted it is 
unrealistic to inspect cargoes by Iran Air.  Finally, Japan, 
as G8 President, said it would approach the 1540 Committee to 
address reporting problems and expressed hope to find ways to 
simplify the process. 
 
--- 
PSI 
--- 
 
¶24.  (SBU)  The ASTOP V representative from New Zealand gave 
a brief overview of plans for this year,s PSI exercise, to 
be held in mid-September near Auckland.  New Zealand is 
planning a five-day event and will focus on legal issues 
surrounding interdiction.  The scenarios for the event will 
center on dual-use proliferation items transshipped through 
New Zealand. 
 
¶25.  (SBU)  The Australian official discussed a March 2008 
PSI exercise conducted with the Philippines and indicated a 
strong desire for similar training with other countries in 
the region.  The Philippine representative praised the 
opportunity to participate in the exercise, but noted 
concerns over interdiction legality as related to Philippine 
law.  The representative added the Philippines expects to ask 
for more assistance from Australia and Japan to achieve a 
more complete understanding of the capabilities of PSI. 
 
¶26.  (SBU)  ISN Director Foley closed the PSI portion of 
ASTOP with the U.S. views on the recent history of PSI 
successes, highlighting increasing global understanding of 
the necessity of the initiative.  Foley noted PSI is 
successfully adapting to changing proliferation practices and 
added that exercises are an excellent way for countries to 
gain increased knowledge and build capacity.  In response to 
the Korean representative's questions about actual 
interdiction successes of PSI, Foley said that while most are 
not made public due to their sensitive nature, the seizure of 
the ship, BBC China, led to discovery of the A.Q. Khan 
network was a very visible example of what PSI can do. 
Noting the Chinese representative's concern over the legality 
of PSI, the Canadian representative rebutted the assertion 
emphasizing that PSI activities are conducted in accordance 
with international and national laws.  Foley seconded the 
Canadian representative's intervention and stressed that one 
of the key tenets of PSI was that interdictions are done 
where the legal basis is strongest. 
 
----------------- 
2005 SUA PROTOCOL 
----------------- 
 
¶27.  (SBU)  The Canadian representative highlighted the 
counterproliferation significance of the UN Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA).  The SUA Protocol provides the first 
international treaty framework for combating and prosecuting 
anyone who uses a ship as a weapon or as a means to carry out 
a terrorist attack, or who transports terrorists or cargo 
destined to support WMD programs by ship.  Japanese 
representative Ichikawa, said Japan realizes the Protocol's 
importance and is working to promptly conclude it, including 
review of the national legal framework for domestic 
implementation of SUA's criminal and boarding provisions. 
 
¶28.  (SBU)  Please contact TOKYO ESToff Ayanna Hobbs at 
hobbsa@state.gov for full text versions of the presentations 
made available. 
 
¶29.  This cable was cleared by DAS Hayward subsequent to her 
return to Washington. 
 
SCHIEFFER