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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/08/08 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Japan, China need to produce visible results through strategic, 
mutually beneficial cooperation (Nikkei) 
 
(2) Japan-China Joint Statement on Climate Change (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan) 
 
(3) Aso, Yosano, Koike, Koizumi, Tanigaki keep casting covetous eyes 
on prime minister's post after Fukuda (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(4) Kakushin (nitty-gritty) column: Debate on Constitution - 
international contributions likely to flare up again in the fall, 
with expanding scope of SDF activities reaching limit (Tokyo 
Shimbun) 
 
(5) Interview with Surugadai University Professor Emeritus Hiroshi 
Honma -- Government must not be satisfied with improved SOFA 
administration (Akahata) 
 
(6) Agreement reached on full lifting of embargo on Japanese rice 
exports to China: Farm products to become touchstone for export 
expansion; Still mountain of issues, including eliminating price 
gaps, increasing productivity (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Japan, China need to produce visible results through strategic, 
mutually beneficial cooperation 
 
NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
May 8, 2008 
 
The leaders of Japan and China signed a joint statement that pledges 
promoting a mutually beneficial relationship based on common 
strategic interests, as new guidelines for future bilateral 
relations. The statement advocates building a future-oriented 
relationship and blueprints a bilateral relationship that can 
contribute to the world in the new era. Even so, such outstanding 
issues such as gas exploration rights in the East China Sea and the 
poisoning of frozen dumplings imported from China to Japan have been 
left unattended. To ensure improvement in Japan-China relations, 
both countries need to produce visible results through strategic, 
mutually beneficial cooperation. 
 
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda: "I hope this year will be recorded in 
history as the year of development in Japan-China relations." 
 
Chinese President Hu Jintao: "China-Japan relations are now at the 
starting point of a new chapter of history." 
 
In a conference press conference held after their meeting, Fukuda 
and Hu emphasized that Japan-China relations have entered a new 
phase. 
 
Fukuda aims to score high marks on the diplomatic front, given 
declining public support for his administration. Meanwhile, Hu, 
faced with international criticism for his response to the riots in 
Tibet, wants to make relations with Japan a breakthrough in the 
impasse in promoting foreign policy in the run-up to the Beijing 
Olympics in August. They had no big grins on their faces during the 
press conference, reflecting the difficult circumstances surrounding 
 
TOKYO 00001252  002 OF 011 
 
 
them. 
 
Ten years have passed since former Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
visited Japan. During the past decade, Japan-China relations were 
seriously strained over historical issues. But what affected the 
bilateral relations most significantly was a structural change, that 
is, China's growing economic strength. The two countries have become 
even more interdependent in the economic area, but discord also 
occurred in various areas. 
 
Although China has enjoyed high-speed, two-digit economic growth, 
distortions have also been exposed, like the widening gap between 
rich and poor and environmental pollution. China has come up with a 
national goal to create a harmonious society. But in order for China 
to continue sustainable economic growth and stabilize society, 
cooperation from the industrialized countries that have a similar 
experience is indispensable. 
 
For Japan, reconstructing relations with China is also essential. 
China's market is becoming more attractive to it, but as seen from 
its response to the torch relay, China is also a unique economic 
power. How should Japan deal with such a neighbor that is growing 
rapidly while being saddled with various risks? How should Japan 
lead that nation to making a soft landing? This question has become 
a major theme that will directly affect Japan's national interests. 
In drawing up diplomatic strategies toward the United States, 
Russia, and other countries, as well, it is important for the two 
countries to stabilize their bilateral relations. 
 
"We have unavoidably contradictions or problems in 
country-to-country relations. What is important is to maintain 
comprehensive friendship." Using almost the same expression, Fukuda 
and Hu emphasized the significance of Hu's visit to Japan, though 
some pointed out the bad timing of the visit. 
 
Despite a myriad of problems pending between Japan and China, it has 
become possible for the leaders of Japan and China to make 
reciprocal visits as promised. This is a sort of progress. The key 
point is how to construct a mechanism to bear fruit through 
cooperation on such occasions. 
 
This year marks the 30th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's visit to 
Japan and the start of China's reform and open-door policy. During 
this period, providing yen loans was a major tool for Japan's 
cooperation to China, but Japan has decided to end providing fresh 
yen loans to China starting this year. In the environment area, some 
have suggested creating a fund to be financed jointly by Japan and 
China, but the two countries have yet to crafted means for policy 
coordination and cooperation in response to the structural change in 
bilateral relations. 
 
The statement proposes promoting a future-oriented relationship, but 
Japan and China have separated in popular sentiment. In preliminary 
negotiations, a Chinese representative said: "We are no longer in 
the era in which only leaders make diplomatic decisions." In order 
to obtain public understanding, the two countries have to continue 
to show the results of cooperation both at home and abroad. 
 
It is also imperative to improve the political foundation to carry 
out new challenges. Given that the opposition camp has control in 
the House of Representatives, the Fukuda administration remains 
unable to draw up a medium- and long-term diplomatic strategy and 
 
TOKYO 00001252  003 OF 011 
 
 
even a roadmap needed for resolving immediate issues. A Japanese 
government source said: "The Japanese government now finds it 
difficult to make a bold diplomatic decision. This affected China's 
posture in drafting the joint statement." 
 
The Lake Toya Summit will be held in early July, and the Beijing 
Olympic Games will take place in August. A Japan-China-South Korea 
summit is scheduled for this fall. Japan and China will proactively 
grope for chances for their leaders to make reciprocal visits, so 
there are still chances for the two countries to achieve results. 
But if they are slow to make an arrangement to that end, a hazy may 
hang over the blueprint mapped out during the "trip in the warm 
spring" as said by President Hu. 
 
(2) Japan-China Joint Statement on Climate Change 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs home page, posted May 5, 2008 
 
¶1. The governments of Japan and China (hereinafter called "both 
sides") recognized the need to make efforts together hand-in-hand 
and to cooperate on climate change, a common threat facing human 
beings. 
 
¶2. Both sides confirmed the goals and the principles promised in the 
"United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)" and 
the "Kyoto Protocol" and again stated the "Japan-China Joint 
Statement on Further Strengthening Cooperation on Environmental 
Conservation" signed by both sides in April 2007. Based on this 
joint statement, the two countries have decided to further boost 
cooperation on measures to deal with climate change, deepen 
dialogues and exchanges, promote practical cooperation, and build a 
partnership to deal with climate change so that the two countries 
will put the strategic, mutually beneficial relationship into 
action. 
 
¶3. Both sides confirmed that the "UNFCC" and the "Kyoto Protocol" 
are appropriate and effective frameworks for countries on the globe 
to deal with climate change. Both sides again stated that based on 
common but differentiated responsibilities and based on each 
country's capability, the industrialized countries take the 
initiative in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and that by 
providing developing countries with funds or transferring technology 
to them, they can implement the promises in the conventions and 
would endorse them. 
 
¶4. Both sides highly value the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change's (IPCC) assessment reports and reaffirmed the ultimate 
objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. 
 
¶5. The Japanese side expressed a view that in order to achieve the 
above objective, greenhouse gas emissions in the world must be at 
least halved by 2050. The Chinese side expressed a view that it 
would pay attention to the Japanese side's view and that it would 
discuss methods and measures with other countries to achieve the 
ultimate objective in the UNFCCC. 
 
¶6. The Japanese side again stated that it would achieve the goal for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 6 PERCENT  during a period from 
2008 through 2012 proposed by the "Kyoto Protocol" and in line with 
the plan to achieve the goal, and that it would continue a 
 
TOKYO 00001252  004 OF 011 
 
 
country-specific goal for constraining greenhouse gas emissions in 
2013 and beyond. The Chinese side will proactively deal with climate 
change under a framework that will enable sustainable growth, strive 
to implement a Chinese national program on climate change, and 
freshly contribute to protecting world climate. Both sides mutually 
appreciated their respective approaches. 
 
¶7. Both sides again expressed their political resolve to strive to 
resolve the climate change issue through international cooperation, 
based on the principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities" under the "UNFCCC" and the "Kyoto Protocol" 
frameworks. Both sides have come to share the perception that active 
participation in negotiations to strengthen effective processes and 
frameworks to be applied up to 2012 and in 2013 and beyond agreed on 
in the Bali road map will lead to results at a conference of parties 
to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen slated for the 
end of 2009. 
 
¶8. The Japanese side stated that a sector-specific approach is very 
significant in terms of setting a country-specific goal for reducing 
a total amount of greenhouse gas emissions. The Chinese side stated 
that the sector-specific approach is an important method to 
implement the emission reduction indicator and take action. Both 
sides stated that they would further discuss the role of the 
sector-specific approach. 
 
¶9. Both sides shared the perception that measures to prevent 
pollution and deal with climate change would benefit each other, 
compensate each other, promote sustainable growth, and have a 
significant meaning in building an eco-civilization. Both sides have 
decided to strengthen studies and cooperation in this area. 
 
¶10. Both sides have come to share the perception that because 
science and technology are important to deal with climate change, 
the two countries will strengthen scientific studies to deal with 
climate change as well as working-level cooperation concerning 
development and transfer of technology for relaxation and 
adaptation. Both sides have decided to carry out technical 
cooperation in the following priority realms: 
 
(1) Energy saving, improvement in energy efficiency, new energy, and 
renewable energy 
(2) Clean coal technology (improvement in facilities in coal thermal 
power plants and improvement in efficiency of such plants) 
(3) Capture and use of methane 
(4) Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
(5) Adaptation to climate change 
 
¶10. Both sides will continue to strengthen mutually beneficial 
cooperation in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and 
encourage both sides' firms to actively participate in the projects. 
Both sides will discuss how to improve and maintain the CDM. 
 
¶11. Both sides will bolster cooperation to adapt to climate change 
through the following measures: 
 
(1) Studies and analyses of negative effects and fragility of 
climate change 
(2) Studies and analyses of socioeconomic effects of climate change 
and costs 
(3) Strengthen anticipation competence in science, technology, and 
institutions on climate change and its impact 
 
TOKYO 00001252  005 OF 011 
 
 
(4) Research and development of technology and measures for climate 
change 
(5) Improve awareness of the need to reduce fragility and adapt to 
needs when establishing and implementing a sustainable development 
strategy 
 
¶12. Both sides will work together in such areas as strengthening 
capacity-building, improving the national awareness, human exchanges 
and training 
 
¶13. Both sides will discuss the question of how to invest as much 
money as possible to deal with climate change, including encouraging 
the private-sector and banking institutions to play their roles. The 
Chinese side positively appreciated the Japanese side's 
implementation of international cooperation under its "Cool Earth 
Partnership" in order to deal with climate change in developing 
countries to which Japan has provided financial support. The 
Japanese side positively appreciated the policies and measures the 
Chinese side has taken to deal with climate change and stated that 
Japan was ready to help the Chinese side to engage in activities 
related to climate change, particularly, promoting the 
implementation of the Chinese national program on climate change. 
 
¶14. Both sides have decided that the National Development and Reform 
Commission of China and related government offices of Japan will 
take the responsibility to implement this Joint Statement. 
 
Both sides will implement this Joint Statement in concrete terms by 
further holding talks between their related sectors. 
 
¶15. This Joint Statement was signed by the Japanese government's 
representative and the Chinese government's representative on May 7, 
2008, in Tokyo. 
 
(3) Aso, Yosano, Koike, Koizumi, Tanigaki keep casting covetous eyes 
on prime minister's post after Fukuda 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
May 8, 2008 
 
Those Liberal Democratic Party members regarded as possible 
candidates to succeed Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda are now actively 
on the move. Fukuda's sway over the LDP has drastically declined due 
to the defeat of the LDP candidate in the Lower House by-election 
for Yamaguchi No. 2 constituency, and because of the confusion 
created by the reinstatement of the provisional tax rates, including 
the gasoline tax. Speculation is rife in the LDP that calls for 
replacing Fukuda will arise after the Group of Eight (G8) summit in 
Hokkaido in July -- the assumption being that the party could not 
win the next Lower House election under his leadership. 
 
Aso gives priority to harmony and strengthens own ability 
 
On April 28, the day after the LDP candidate was defeated in the 
Lower House by-election, Taro Aso, 67, a former LDP secretary 
general who has already thrown his hat in the ring for the next 
party presidential race, stressed in a meeting of his faction: "It 
is absolutely necessary to prevent the party from running about in 
confusion." 
 
If Aso takes a clear anti-Fukuda stand at a time when the government 
and ruling parties are having a hard time coping with the DPJ's 
 
TOKYO 00001252  006 OF 011 
 
 
political offensive, the result would not only benefit the DPJ but 
also create resentment of the largest faction, the Machimura 
faction, which has supported Fukuda. Aso seems to have judged that 
it would be advisable to refrain from taking actions for the time 
being that would make him stand out. 
 
In fact, the Aso faction, which was formed with a membership of 15 
in December 2006, now has 20 members. Aso has been energetically 
delivering speeches in rural areas in order to increase his 
supporters. 
 
Yosano suddenly emerging as candidate by criticizing Prime Minister 
Fukuda 
 
Kaoru Yosano, 69, a former chief cabinet secretary, has suddenly 
emerged as a presidential candidate. Although Yosano was once 
regarded as Fukuda's personal advisor, he has recently often leveled 
criticism at Fukuda instead. Appearing on a commercial TV program on 
May 1, he made a candid statement about Fukuda, saying: "The prime 
minister needs to make a public appeal about such major challenges 
as fiscal reconstruction." He has just come out with his first book, 
which includes such pet views as the need to hike the consumption 
tax to 10 PERCENT . Speculation abounds that his book might be a 
preparatory step to run for the presidential election. 
 
Yosano plans to focus his activities within a new study group that 
includes fellow lawmakers. There is a possibility that calls for him 
to run in the party leadership race will become stronger. 
 
Koike active to form parliamentary leagues 
 
Former Defense Minister Yuriko Koike, 55, visited China in late 
March along with Hidenao Nakagawa, a former secretary general. Koike 
and Nakagawa formed on April 1 a parliamentary league to achieve 
Kyoto Protocol goals. In his meeting on April 9 with Koike and Seiji 
Maehara, a vice president of the DPJ, former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, 66, reportedly said: "There are two candidates 
for the prime minister's post here." Chances are that if she became 
Japan's first female prime minister, she would be popular among the 
public. 
 
However, a senior member of the Machimura faction, to which Koike 
belongs, took an icy view: "Should the faction field a candidate for 
the presidency, we would back Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka 
Machimura. Nobody will support her." So, it is unclear whether 
support for Koike will expand or not. 
 
Any possibility of Junichiro Koizumi running in presidential race 
 
Although Koizumi has clearly rejected the possibility of his running 
again for the party presidential election, there are strong calls 
from LDP members for him to do just that. His positive remarks in 
meetings and speeches have encouraged speculation that Koizumi might 
run again for the presidential post. However, a veteran lawmaker 
said: 
 
"He has no intention to run again for the presidency. Seeing the 
maneuvering between the ruling and opposition camps due to the 
lopsided Diet (in which the opposition camp controls the Upper House 
and the ruling camp holds the majority of the Lower House), he just 
cannot help expressing himself. He has no desire to run again." 
 
 
TOKYO 00001252  007 OF 011 
 
 
Many LDP members say Sadakazu Tanigaki lacks demonstration 
 
Many in the LDP have said that Policy Research Council Chairman 
Tanigaki, 63, who ran in the presidential race before last, lacks 
eagerness to run again, despite his having served in a key post. He 
first needs to strengthen his political footing in order to be a 
presidential candidate, since he will be in a new faction to be 
formed on May 13 when his faction and the Koga faction merge. 
 
(4) Kakushin (nitty-gritty) column: Debate on Constitution - 
international contributions likely to flare up again in the fall, 
with expanding scope of SDF activities reaching limit 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
May 3, 2008 
 
Tetsuya Furuta 
 
Debate on the relationship between the Constitution and Japan's 
international contributions is likely to flare up again in the fall 
or after. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was forced under 
the divided Diet to temporarily suspend the Self-Defense Forces' 
(SDF) refueling mission in the Indian Ocean last year. Learning a 
lesson from that case, the LDP has now embarked on discussion of 
permanent legislation that would make it possible for Japan to 
dispatch the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad as needed. Meanwhile, 
the government's approach of broadening the SDF's purview of 
activities bit by bit has reached its limit. The relationship 
between Article 9 of the Constitution and international 
contributions need to be reconsidered. 
 
Debate on international contributions is likely to resurface as the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) refueling mission now going on 
in the Indian Ocean under the New Antiterrorism Special Measures Law 
is to end next January and the Air Self-Defense Force's (ASDF) 
airlifting activities conducted under the Iraq Special Measures Law 
will expire in July 2009. 
 
In the Upper House, which is dominated by the opposition bloc, the 
major opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is opposed to 
extending those activities. If no action is taken, there is a strong 
possibility that the suspension of the refueling mission in the 
Indian Ocean will occur once more. Should the SDF troops who are 
deployed there again be forced to pull out, the government would 
lose a key component of its international contributions. 
 
The best policy for the government and the ruling bloc to avoid such 
a case would be to involve the DPJ in the process and enact 
permanent legislation for overseas SDF dispatch in the extraordinary 
session of the Diet this fall. But the LDP's junior coalition 
partner New Komeito remains cautious about enacting such 
legislation. Instead, the party has cited as priority policy agendas 
preventive measures against a recurrence of a collision between an 
Aegis ship and a private vessel. Debate on permanent legislation in 
the ruling camp has yet to get started. 
 
After the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Law was enacted in 
1992, overseas dispatch of SDF personnel began in full swing. At 
first, five principles for overseas dispatches, for instance, 
obtaining a cease-fire agreement between the parties in conflict, 
were strictly observed in order to put restrictions on overseas 
dispatches. Destinations for dispatches and the use of weapons were 
 
TOKYO 00001252  008 OF 011 
 
 
both limited. 
 
Unconstitutional judgment handed down 
 
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the 
government has established a series of laws, such as the 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Special Measures 
Law, in a way to respond to America's call for Japan to provide 
logistical support. As a result, the SDF's purview of activities has 
been broadened to cover even de facto "combat zones", for instance, 
the Indian Ocean and Iraq. In order to avoid cases of exercising the 
right to collective self-defense, an act prohibited in the 
government's interpretation of the Constitution, the government 
created this logic: activities  in non-combat zones would not 
involve linking to the use of force by other countries. 
 
But last month, the Nagoya High Court handed down a ruling about the 
deployed ASDF personnel in Iraq that said the ASDF's airlifting (of 
armed soldiers in the multinational force to the Baghdad combat 
zone) were acts that could be identified as being linked to the use 
of force by other countries. 
 
The government has assumed a wait and see attitude toward the 
ruling, with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda noting, "There is no 
problem about the airlifting." But in the course of debate on 
permanent legislation, the government will be forced to discuss the 
relationship between the overseas dispatch of the SDF and the 
Constitution. 
 
LDP, DPJ wide apart 
 
The government and the ruling bloc are pinning high hopes on the 
DPJ's cooperation to enact permanent legislation for overseas SDF 
dispatches. Former DPJ President Seiji Maehara has noted: "The 
government has repeatedly added changes to its previous views to 
meet the reality, but now it is no longer possible to continue to do 
so." However, the DPJ as a party is not in a mood to directly take 
up the constitutional issue. 
 
Furthermore, the LDP and the DPJ are wide apart in their views over 
UN resolutions, which Japan has made the ground for overseas 
dispatches of the SDF. 
 
Some LDP lawmakers assert that the Diet should allow the SDF to 
operate broadly without being bound by UN resolutions in order to 
deal with the growing number of peacekeeping operations that are 
being more frequently carried out by a multinational force other 
than the UN or the "coalition of the willing." Some also insist that 
the types of activities the SDF would take part in should be 
broadened to cover guard, maintenance of security, and ship 
inspections. 
 
However, DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa will not endorse any overseas 
dispatch of the SDF without a UN resolution authorizing such. In 
addition, regarding active participation in UN operations, Ozawa 
noted: "It would not violate the Constitution even if such 
participation involves the use of armed force." His stance is 
opposed to the government's interpretation that even in the case of 
participation in UN-led operations, the use of force would not be 
allowed. 
 
(5) Interview with Surugadai University Professor Emeritus Hiroshi 
 
TOKYO 00001252  009 OF 011 
 
 
Honma -- Government must not be satisfied with improved SOFA 
administration 
 
AKAHATA (Page 3) (Full) 
May 8, 2008 
 
In the wake of a string of brutal crimes by U.S. military personnel, 
calls are growing for revising the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA). But the government is dismissive of revising the 
pact. This newspaper asked Hiroshi Honma, a professor emeritus (of 
international law) at Surugadai University, about the issue. 
 
Embracing U.S. discretion 
 
-- The government intends to deal with brutal crimes committed by 
U.S. military personnel by improving SOFA application, based on a 
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement. 
 
Ending the matter by improving SOFA implementation only means not 
changing the pact and leaving the matter to U.S. discretion. 
 
In November 2002, a U.S. Marine major attempted to sexually assault 
a foreign woman in Okinawa. The U.S. side subsequently refused to 
hand over the major to police custody before indictment, saying it 
was an attempted rape. Attempting to rape a woman is a serious crime 
in Japan. 
 
The U.S. side probably feared that since the crime was by an 
officer, handing him over would lower military morale. In contrast, 
the U.S. military is willing to hand over into police custody rank 
and file service members before indictment by giving "sympathetic 
consideration." 
 
Why is government negative about revising the SOFA? 
 
-- Why is the government reluctant to revise the SOFA? 
 
There has been no convincing explanation from the government. It 
explained, for example, that revising the SOFA with Japan would 
affect SOFAs with other countries. But the SOFA with Germany (the 
so-called Bonn Agreement) was revised (in 1993), the one with Italy 
(in 1995), and the pact with South Korea (in 2001). 
 
The revised Bonn Agreement includes a set of rules for the use of 
bases and environmental conservation -- contents that go far beyond 
that in the SOFA with Japan. 
 
The criminal trial jurisdiction clause was not revised, however. 
That is because the U.S. Congress takes the view that the U.S. 
Constitution is the best in the world when it comes to guaranteeing 
the rights of the accused and that the rights of U.S. military 
personnel overseas must be guaranteed, transcending the sovereignty 
of other countries. 
 
In 1957, an American soldier named William S. Girard shot to death a 
woman collecting spent cartridges in Gunma Prefecture. In this case, 
the accused argued that it was unconstitutional for the United 
States to abandon primary jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court 
dismissed the argument, saying that abandoning jurisdiction was not 
unconstitutional, while acknowledging that primary jurisdiction 
rested with the United States. There is no guarantee that a similar 
case will not occur. Japan needs a legal system to vie with the 
 
TOKYO 00001252  010 OF 011 
 
 
United States instead of being satisfied by saying that the 
Japan-U.S. SOFA is most advanced regarding the criminal jurisdiction 
procedures. 
 
Violation of police powers 
 
On March 19, a taxi driver was killed in Yokosuka, Kanagawa 
Prefecture. In connection with this case, a U.S. sailor has been 
arrested on two charges: desertion and murder accompanied by 
robbery. 
 
The SOFA specifies which side -- Japan or the United States -- has 
primary jurisdiction over the one being criminally charged. But the 
pact does not envisage a case in which the jurisdiction of Japan and 
the United States vie with each other over two different criminal 
charges. 
 
A certain set of rules is included in what was agreed upon by the 
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. Still, in the event the U.S. side 
independently finds a suspect who is believed to have committed an 
extremely brutal crime, like the Yokosuka taxi driver murder case, 
the most fundamental and conceivable system is for the United States 
to ask Japanese police to arrest him. 
 
The U.S. military seized the suspect matter-of-factly and brought 
him back to a U.S. base without taking him to Japanese police in 
advance. Such an act is a violation of Japanese police powers. 
 
(6) Agreement reached on full lifting of embargo on Japanese rice 
exports to China: Farm products to become touchstone for export 
expansion; Still mountain of issues, including eliminating price 
gaps, increasing productivity 
 
NIKKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
May 8, 2008 
 
With President Hu Jintao's visit to Japan as the occasion, the 
governments of Japan and China yesterday reached a final agreement 
on the complete lifting of the embargo on Japanese rice exports to 
China, one of the pending issues between the two countries. Rice 
consumption in Japan is dwindling. The lifting of the ban on the 
exports of rice to the Chinese market, where annual consumption of 
rice is said to be 20 times more than the amount consumed in Japan, 
will become a touchstone for Japan's strategy to expand exports of 
farm products. However, a gap in rice prices between the two 
countries is huge. There are also other issues to clear, including 
improving productivity and making Japanese rice a brand-name 
product. Japan and China have also agreed to cooperate with each 
other regarding promotion of investment and measures for small- and 
medium-size businesses. The first visit to Japan by a Chinese 
president in a decade is boosting a mood for strengthening ties on 
the economic front. 
 
Agreement reached on promotion of investment, measures for small- 
and medium-sized businesses 
 
Both the Japanese and Chinese leaders during a joint press 
conference announced that they had agreed to completely lift the 
embargo on Japanese rice exports to China. Since it had been viewed 
that an agreement on export conditions would be reached by the end 
of March, an Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) official 
explained, "Coordination has taken an unexpectedly long time." 
 
TOKYO 00001252  011 OF 011 
 
 
 
Japan's rice exports to China have been suspended since 2003 due to 
the review of the quarantine system on the Chinese side. Exports 
were partially resumed last year as a provisional measure. According 
to MAFF, it would be possible to fully resume rice exports as early 
as June, if a rice milling plant and a warehouse in Kanagawa 
Prefecture, which have already undergone a certain extent of 
inspection, are used. 
 
However, starting exports using other milling plants requires 
another checking process to confirm that there are no harmful 
insects in China-destined rice, which takes one year to complete. 
Though the checking period has been cut short from three years as 
the Chinese side had originally requested, many take the view that 
even if the embargo is lifted, export volume would not increase 
anytime soon. 
 
Japan exported 940 tons of commercial-use rice in 2007. The annual 
domestic demand for rice is approximately 8 million tons, of which 
only about 1 PERCENT  is for export. Some export items, such as 
apples, have produced some results, in China or Taiwan, where 
people' income level has risen. 
 
However, the price of Japanese rice was about 20 times higher than 
Chinese rice in general as of a time when exports were resumed last 
year on a provisional basis. The same MAFF official also said that 
124 tons were exported in provisional shipments, of which 24 tons in 
the first shipment were sold out soon due to their rarity, but the 
remaining amount remains unsold. Rice exports will hold the key to 
predicting how to sell agricultural products that have great price 
gaps with overseas products and whether they can earn money abroad. 
 
Japanese rice is sold in China as a high-class gift item. Though 
there is a growing concern about a rice shortage in Asia and Africa, 
there are surpluses in Japan. In addition, it is difficult to expect 
rice demand to expand over the long term due to the declining 
birthrate and the aging of the population. 
 
Food imports from China in 2007 rose to approximately 920 billion 
yen, which is 20 times more than Japanese exports to that nation. In 
order to create brand-name farm products, improving productivity in 
the agricultural area will be crucial. 
 
Japan and China have also signed a memorandum for cooperation on the 
trade and investment area and between small and mid-size businesses 
of the two countries. Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Minister 
Akira Amari on the 7th met with National Development and Reform 
Commission Chairman Zhang Ping and Commerce Minister Chen Deming. 
They agreed to promote sustainable development of the economies of 
both countries and push forward efforts to accelerate investment. 
They have also confirmed that they promote close exchanges of 
opinions aimed at promoting investment. 
 
Regarding small- and medium-sized businesses, they have agreed to 
reinforce assistance for mutual market access. Other agreements 
reached between them include holding a regular meeting to discuss 
product safety and establishing a system to share accident 
information possibly later in the month. 
 
DONOVAN