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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 TOKYO 001233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/07/08 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Japanese, Chinese leaders in summit meeting agree to develop a 
strategic, mutually-beneficial relationship (Yomiuri) 
 
(2) Foundation of Japan-U.S. alliance rocking (Asahi) 
 
(3) Futenma relocation plan still up in the air two years after 
Japan, U.S. reach agreement (Asahi) 
 
(4) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Hill meets with members of 
Japanese delegation sent by organizations related to victims 
kidnapped by North Korea (Sankei) 
 
(5) WTO talks: Agreement within year at crucial juncture (Mainichi) 
 
 
(6) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gas tax (Asahi) 
 
(7) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gasoline tax (Tokyo 
Shimbun) 
 
(8) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, provisional gas tax, 
new health insurance system for elderly (Mainichi) 
 
(9) Simulation of next Lower House election: If 2 PERCENT of LDP 
votes go to DPJ, two parties would trade places (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Japanese, Chinese leaders in summit meeting agree to develop a 
strategic, mutually-beneficial relationship 
 
YOMIURI ONLINE (Full) 
May 7, 2008 
 
Prime Minister Fukuda this morning met at his official residence 
with China's President Hu Jintao, who is visiting Japan as a state 
guest. The two leaders agreed to strengthen even further a 
"strategic, mutual relationship" that is aimed at expanding the 
interests of both countries by cooperating with the international 
community. 
 
After the summit meeting, the two leaders signed a political 
document titled, "Joint statement between Japan and China on 
comprehensively promoting a strategic, mutually beneficial 
relationship." In the statement, "facing history directly, aiming at 
the future" was the expression used regarding the historical 
problem. On the other hand, on global warming countermeasures, the 
two issued a "joint statement between Japan and China on climate 
change," in which China took a positive stance. 
 
This is the first visit to Japan in ten years by a Chinese 
president, who is the head of state. The summit meeting lasted 
approximately an hour and a half, starting at 10:26 this morning. 
Attending from the Japanese government were five cabinet ministers 
including Foreign Minister Koumura and Finance Minister Nukaga. The 
Chinese side included Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. 
 
At the start of the meeting, the prime minister stated: "I would 
like to offer my hear-felt welcome to you on the occasion of the 
thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Japan China Treaty of 
 
TOKYO 00001233  002 OF 017 
 
 
Peace and Friendship." President Hu replied: "Relations between 
China and Japan are now blessed with a new chance to develop even 
more." 
 
The joint statement issued today is the fourth political document 
since the first one in 1972. That statement was followed by a treaty 
of peace and friendship in 1978 and by another joint statement in 
¶1998. 
 
The latest statement in referring to a new bilateral relationship 
went: "We will directly face history, facing the future, and build 
together a good future for the world." Compared to November 1998, 
when then President Jiang Zemin visited Japan during a time of 
bilateral friction and repeatedly stated, "with history as a 
mirror," this time, the Chinese side stressed a future-oriented 
relationship. 
 
Also included in the statement was an agreement for visits by the 
two leaders once a year, and the promotion of broad exchanges, such 
as mutual visits by senior officials in the national security area. 
As areas for mutual cooperation, the statement specified energy and 
the environment, as well as "food and product safety," which has 
become an issue due to the poisoned dumpling incidents. 
 
In addition, the two countries included in the document the words, 
"We will closely cooperate to understand even more and pursue common 
values." Having in mind the Tibet issue, on which the international 
community is now focused, the two countries took a stance of placing 
emphasis on human rights issues. 
 
On the pending issue of developing gas fields in the E. China Sea, 
there does not seem to be a specific agreement in the document. 
Regarding Japan's becoming a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council, which Japan is seeking, the expression used was 
the same as in last year's statement when Chinese Premier Wen 
visited Japan: "We hope to see Japan play an even greater 
constructive role in the international community."  On the other 
hand, in the joint statement on climate change, a positive stance 
regarding negotiations on a post-Kyoto Protocol regime that starts 
after 2013, China, which is a world-class emitter of greenhouse 
gases, took a stance of actively participating. 
 
(2) Foundation of Japan-U.S. alliance rocking 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
May 6, 2008 
 
By Yoichi Kato, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the 
Asahi Shimbun 
 
The foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance is being rocked. Priority 
gaps over the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and other matters 
are emerging. The mood in the United States to place a high priority 
on the alliance with Japan has run out of steam. In the post-Cold 
War era, Tokyo and Washington have overcome the alliance "adrift" 
relationship by redefining the alliance as capable of playing a role 
in the Asia-Pacific and in the world instead of being a set of 
security arrangements for the defense of Japan alone. The need to 
revamp the alliance is again being mentioned. 
 
Priority gaps over Futenma relocation and FX selection 
 
 
TOKYO 00001233  003 OF 017 
 
 
Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba was scheduled to visit the United 
States during the Golden Week holiday period from late April through 
early May. Coordination for that clearly exposed the growing 
priority gap. According to a connected source, the U.S. side reacted 
strongly to Japan's initial agenda for it did not include the issue 
of U.S. force realignment. 
 
For the United States, the biggest problem is that the construction 
of a Futenma replacement facility and the relocation of U.S. Marines 
to Guam are lagging behind schedule. Washington fears that if this 
situation persists, the relocation plan will not be completed by 
2014, as originally scheduled, especially given Tokyo's noticeable 
lack of enthusiasm for the plan under the Fukuda administration. 
Ishiba's trip to the United States fell through in the end. 
 
Japan is discontent with the United States, as well. Washington 
declined Tokyo's request for the provision of information on the 
state-of-the-art stealth fighter F-22 as a possible candidate for 
Japan's next-generation mainstay combat jet aircraft (FX), citing 
U.S. law prohibiting exports of the aircraft and the need to hold 
strategic talks first. Last spring, even then-Prime Minister Abe 
asked for U.S. cooperation. Japan cannot easily back down on the 
matter that concerns the foundation of the bilateral alliance 
transcending the question of procuring a piece of equipment. 
 
A priority gap also exists in the United States. The difference is 
specifically between one group who attach importance to direct 
dialogues with China and North Korea in dealing with them and 
another placing priority on talks with such U.S. allies as Japan, 
South Korea, and Australia. 
 
Former National Security Council Asian Affairs Director Michael 
Green thinks the Bush administration belongs to the former. "The 
administration eyes achieving results in a short term. Its strategy 
regarding the North Korean nuclear issue is a prime example." That 
has resulted in Japan's mistrust of the United States for its lack 
of consideration, causing the bilateral alliance to become adrift. 
 
There is concern in Japan that such gaps will grow larger following 
the change of administration in the United States next January. 
 
The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, the legal basis for the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, 
will also expire next January. This will be followed by expiration 
in July of the Iraq Special Measures Law, the legal basis for the 
Air Self-Defense Force's airlift mission in Iraq. In view of the 
Japanese political situation, extending laws and enacting new 
legislation seems difficult. SDF pullout might prompt the next U.S. 
administration to conclude that Japan is not dependable. 
 
Move for new declaration 
 
To prevent such an eventuality, an idea has emerged to issue a new 
strategic document in 2010 that is similar to the 1996 Japan-U.S. 
Joint Declaration on Security. 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of 
the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The new U.S. 
president is also expected to visit Japan to attend the 2010 annual 
APEC Summit to be hosted by Japan. The idea is for the Japanese 
prime minister and the U.S. President to reaffirm a wide-ranging 
Japan-U.S. alliance not confined to the Asia-Pacific region and 
security. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001233  004 OF 017 
 
 
The U.S. government is reluctant to do so, saying that outstanding 
bilateral issues, such relocation of Futenma Air Station, should be 
settled first. This is another example of a priority gap. Experts 
are also split on the matter, with Pacific Forum CSIS President 
Ralph Cossa underscoring the need for revitalizing the alliance, 
while Green noting, "Another fancy document with no substance is 
ineffective. Given the Japanese political situation, determining 
when to produce such a document is a difficult question." 
 
Will Japan and the United States be able to keep pace with each 
other? The envisaged new declaration is likely to be a test to 
prevent the Japan-U.S. alliance from becoming further adrift. 
 
Interview with former US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard 
Lawless -- Realignment agreement must be implemented swiftly 
 
What is your view of the Japan-U.S. alliance today? 
 
The implementation of reform (realignment) of the bilateral alliance 
(as was confirmed in the 2006 U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment 
Implementation) has been adrift since the establishment of the 
Fukuda administration. The relocation of Futenma Air Station is one 
example. I hear that the project will be delayed by one year. Unless 
the replacement facility is completed, U.S. Marines cannot be 
relocated to Guam. This agreement is like a complex instrument. If 
one component freezes, the entire instrument freezes. 
 
Will the U.S. side comply with a request for making changes to the 
Futenma plan? 
 
No. The reason is because the current plan was presented by the 
Japanese government; it is not what the United States hoped for. The 
Japanese side guaranteed the plan's fruition, so the (U.S.) side 
made a compromise. Change would follow change endlessly, and that 
would delay the relocation further. Third, revision talks would drag 
the United States into the conflict between Tokyo and Okinawa. 
 
Why is the Japan-U.S. alliance adrift? 
 
That is because the leaders of the Japanese government are 
preoccupied with other matters. Procurement scandals and the Atago 
collision accident hit the Defense Ministry. Under the previous 
Koizumi and Abe administrations, Tokyo had a considerably strong 
interest in (U.S. force realignment). Funding the realignment 
agreement should be made Japan's national priority. If Japan handles 
this agreement as merely a nominal pact, the U.S. Congress would 
take an extremely negative view and alter its effort. Although I do 
not think the alliance is adrift, unless change is made swiftly, the 
alliance would lose its capability that an edge in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
 
What about the idea of issuing a new security declaration? 
 
I think it is an extremely good idea. But unless what is agreed upon 
between the two countries is implemented, (the new declaration) 
would be meaningless. It would then be known by all countries in the 
region. 
 
What is the challenge facing the Japan-U.S. alliance? 
 
It is a new tempo that has emerged in Asia regarding security 
policy. Until now, Japan has enjoyed the luxury of taking seven, 
 
TOKYO 00001233  005 OF 017 
 
 
nine years to decide on one policy. In that time period, other 
counties make three decisions and finish implementing them. Japan 
must change its tempo in one way or another; otherwise, Japan and 
the Japan-U.S. alliance would be marginalized. 
 
(3) Futenma relocation plan still up in the air two years after 
Japan, U.S. reach agreement 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
May 3, 2008 
 
Two years have passed since the governments of Japan and the United 
States reached a final agreement on realignment plans for U.S. 
forces in Japan. The municipalities housing U.S. military bases had 
initially taken a stiff attitude in reaction to the agreement 
reached in disregard of their wishes. But they have since softened 
their attitude in response to the policy of dialogue being taken by 
the Fukuda administration. A thaw in the atmosphere between the 
central and the local governments is now expected. Even so, the plan 
of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station remains up 
in the air. 
 
Three-way standoff over Okinawa call for moving construction site 
further offshore 
 
To break the impasse in negotiations on the Futenma relocation 
issue, government officials concerned kept in mind the following 
blueprint this spring: 1) The central government and the affected 
municipalities would agree on revising the construction site that 
involves building a pair of runways; 2) Defense Minister Ishiba 
would visit the U.S. during the Golden Week holidays to begin 
full-scale negotiations with the U.S; and 3)  Around the G-8 Summit 
in Hokkaido in July, Japan would reach an agreement with the U.S. 
and include necessary expenses in the budget for next fiscal year. 
 
On April 9, representatives from the central and the affected 
municipalities held a meeting of the council on the Futenma 
relocation issue at the Prime Minister's Official Residence. 
Representatives from Okinawa insisted that a working-level 
consultative body be established. But the central government's reply 
was that the issue should be discussed at the council level. After 
the meeting, Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Machimura, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Futahashi 
stayed behind. Twenty minutes later, the three emerged from the room 
with hard looks on their faces. An informed official complained: 
"The possibility of settlement this year has become remote." 
 
The Koizumi and Abe administrations took a tough stance toward the 
government of Nago city, the site of the Futenma relocation, because 
of its opposition to the government's plan. They took such tough 
measures as freezing subsidies to Nago. But then, Vice Defense 
Minister Takemasa Moriya, who was taking the initiative in dealing 
with Nago, was arrested for corruption. The affected municipalities 
placed hopes on the Fukuda administration for its policy of 
prioritizing dialogue, and they agreed to resume negotiations last 
November for the first time in 10 months. 
 
In a drive to reach an early settlement, Machimura also expressed a 
flexible view in a meeting of the said council in February about 
Okinawa's request for moving the construction site for the runways 
further offshore. He said: "We would like to reach a settlement at 
an early date, while keeping Okinawa's request in mind." 
 
TOKYO 00001233  006 OF 017 
 
 
 
U.S. Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, however, told Machimura: 
"Modifications will be impossible. We have finally gotten control 
over the Marines, so (if we make modifications,) it would result in 
opening a Pandora's Box. The Marines would demand that the runways 
be made longer." 
 
Okinawa Governor Nakaima has basically approved the plan of 
transferring the Futenma Air Station to waters off Henoko district. 
The prefecture also tacitly permitted the Defense Ministry's start 
this March of a full-scale examination in preparation for the 
planned environmental impact assessment. Nakaima is also calling on 
the central government to turn Okinawa's requests into action. Many 
residents of Okinawa do not want the air station to be moved to 
another part of the prefecture. Nakaima remains unable to make a 
decision ahead of the prefectural assembly election in June. He 
fears that he might come under fire unless he shows a willingness to 
reflect the wishes of the local people. 
 
Meanwhile, the central government is worried that if it swallows all 
requests from Okinawa without securing a guarantee for its 
cooperation in promoting the relocation plan, "the negotiations on 
the Futenma relocation issue may not move forward," a senior Defense 
Ministry official said. The central government and the Okinawa 
government remain at odds despite their desire to find a point of 
compromise. They plan to submit a preliminary report on results of 
the environmental impact assessment this summer, but the submission 
is now likely to be deferred to December or later. It is uncertain 
whether the relocation plan is completed by 2014 as agreed on 
between Japan and the U.S. 
 
A government source involved in negotiations with Okinawa vented: 
"The Fukuda administration is losing its grip on power due to 
declining public support. Nakaima remains unable to make a decision 
out of fear of criticism from the people of Okinawa. The U.S. does 
not want to take any risk that could upset the U.S.-Japan agreement. 
The three parties concerned are now in a three-way standoff." 
 
On the other hand, the Japanese government has agreed to finance a 
plan to move U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam starting next fiscal 
year. Japan plans to pay about 600 billion yen of the total 
construction cost of approximately 1 trillion yen. 
 
(4) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Hill meets with members of 
Japanese delegation sent by organizations related to victims 
kidnapped by North Korea 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
May 4, 2008 
 
Takashi Arimoto, Washington 
 
A joint delegation sent by the Association of the Families of 
Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) and the National 
Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea 
(NAEKN) at noon of May 2 (before dawn of May 3, Japan time) met with 
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill (for East Asia and the 
Pacific), the U.S. chief delegate to the six-party talks on the 
North Korean nuclear issue. Japanese delegates asked Hill not to 
remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. 
Hill is seen as an "advocate" in the U.S. administration of 
delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, but he 
 
TOKYO 00001233  007 OF 017 
 
 
refrained from answering directly to the question posed by the 
Japanese delegate. Hill also admitted that in negotiations with 
North Korea on a declaration of its nuclear activities, he has not 
received any account of where a nuclear bomb-manufacturing facility 
is located. 
 
The fact that the U.S. has not grasped the location of the facility 
means that North Korea's attitude is far from the stage of making a 
complete and correct declaration, as demanded by the U.S. 
government. Hill, in fact, noted: "That is a problem." 
 
Hill estimated that North Korea may possess 30-50 kilograms of 
plutonium, noting, "The problem is that plutonium is stored in a way 
to be easily passed on to terrorist groups." Referring to uranium 
enrichment programs and cooperation on development of nuclear 
weapons, Hill said: "Those activities have now been suspended." 
 
Teruaki Masumoto (52), secretary general of the AFVKN and the 
younger brother of Rumiko Masumoto who had been kidnapped by North 
Korea at the age of 24, asked Hill not to remove North Korea from 
the list of state sponsors of terrorism by putting aside the 
abduction issue. In response, Hill went no further than to say: "I 
am not in a position to define abductions as an act of terrorism." 
 
Dennis Wilder, senior director for East Asian Affairs at the 
National Security Council (NSC), who met with Masumoto and other 
delegation members on May 2, gave this account of the question of 
whether to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism: 
"President Bush has not decided anything yet. He will make a 
decision, taking into consideration not only U.S.-North Korea talks 
but also how Japan-North Korea relations are progressing." 
 
Emerging from the meeting, Masumoto said: "Among the reasons why 
countries are listed as state sponsors of terrorism is abductions. 
If the U.S. removes North Korea from the list, it would mean that 
the U.S. makes light of abductions. The probability of Washington 
delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism is said to be 
30 PERCENT . In order to further lower the probability, the Japanese 
government's response is an important element." 
 
In the meantime, the U.S. Department of State's North Korean Desk 
head Sung Kim is to travel to North Korea shortly and again hold 
talks with the North Korean side on the details of a declaration of 
its nuclear programs. Depending on the result of their talks, Hill 
will travel to Singapore and meet with North Korean Vice Foreign 
Minister Kim Kye Gwan for final coordination. 
 
Major exchanges of views between Hill and the Japanese delegation 
 
The following are major exchanges of views between Hill and the 
joint Japanese delegation composed of (the AFVKN and the other 
group). 
 
Takashi Arimoto, Washington 
 
Nuclear issue 
 
Jin Matsubara, deputy secretary general of the Council of 
Parliamentarians to Quickly Rescue Japanese Kidnapped by North 
Korea: Has the U.S. lowered the hurdle of removing North Korea from 
the list of state sponsor of terrorism? Where is the facility 
producing nuclear bombs located? This is an important part of a 
 
TOKYO 00001233  008 OF 017 
 
 
declaration of nuclear programs. 
 
Hill: The nuclear issue consists of three elements: nuclear 
proliferation, uranium enrichment, and plutonium. When it comes to 
nuclear proliferation, we have had in-depth discussions with the 
North Korean side. They said there was no ongoing nuclear program 
with Syria. American intelligence agencies also take the same view. 
It's no mistake, however, that they jointly developed nuclear 
weapons in the past. 
 
As for uranium enrichment, there is no doubt that North Korea 
obtained 140 tons of aluminum tubes, which can be used only for 
nuclear development. We've confirmed that they are not used for a 
centrifugal machine, but the bad news is that they are used as 
missile parts. 
 
As for how much North Korea possesses plutonium, I presume it 
possesses 30 to 50 kilograms of plutonium. The problem is that 
plutonium is stored in a way to be easily passed on to terrorist 
groups. We need to verify how much plutonium was extracted and where 
it is stored. It's not fair to criticize us as lowering the hurdle. 
We sent a U.S. diplomat to that country and examined aluminum 
tubes. 
 
Matsubara: Reaching a lukewarm agreement would mean that the U.S. 
has placed more emphasis on North Korea than Japan. 
 
Hill: Relations with North Korea can't be compared to those with 
Japan. 
 
Matsubara: Did you get any information from the North Korean side 
about the place of a facility to produce nuclear weapons? 
 
Hill: No. That is a problem. 
 
Abduction issue 
 
Teruaki Masumoto, secretary general of the AFVKN: Delisting North 
Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism before resolving the abduction 
issue would be tantamount to nullifying Japan's efforts to resolve 
the issue by pressuring that country. Mr. Hill appears to have 
believed the North Korean side's assertion that the victims died. 
 
Hill: I have no idea about whether the victims are alive or not. I 
don't want to raise expectations. Japan has enforced the sanction of 
banning North Korean vessels from entering Japanese ports. The U.S. 
has previously enforced this sort of sanction. 
 
Matsubara: We view abductions as an ongoing act of terrorism. It's 
strange to remove that country from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism. 
 
Hill: I am not in a position to define abductions as an act of 
terrorism. The North Korean people are quite different from those 
whom I have ever met. An Iranian Air office is located near the U.S. 
Embassy in Tokyo. In Iran, U.S. diplomats were detained in the past. 
Among them was one of my friends. He still suffers the pain he had 
at the time. What do you think about this? 
 
Matsubara: I can understand that feeling. 
 
(5) WTO talks: Agreement within year at crucial juncture 
 
TOKYO 00001233  009 OF 017 
 
 
 
MAINICHI (Page 7) (Full) 
May 4, 2008 
 
It has been more than six years since the multilateral trade talks 
(Doha Round) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) started in 
November 2001. The talks now face their real test of meeting the 
goal of reaching an agreement before year's end. The primary concern 
for the time being is whether an agreement in principle, a premise 
for a final agreement, can be reached or not. A mood for pushing 
forward the talks is heightening as a senior official of the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) noted. However, the 
future course of the talks is unclear, as there are still many 
challenges and areas of contention in the agricultural, and mining 
and manufacturing areas. 
 
Ministerial meeting to be held possibly in late May 
 
The Doha Round has encountered difficulties right from the 
beginning. It has been repeatedly suspended or broken down. A 
timetable for reaching a settlement has been postponed each time the 
talks get bogged down. Chances are that if talks collapse, it will 
last a long period of time because the U.S. president will be 
replaced early next year. A final agreement must be reached this 
year. 
 
Negotiators of concerned countries need to take what was agreed on 
in principle to their home countries to work out details before a 
final agreement is reached. This process takes about six months. As 
such, a ministerial meeting must be held before the end of June at 
the latest. The work of revising the chairman's proposal regarding 
the agricultural, and mining and manufacturing sectors are now in 
progress. The process will likely be completed by mid-May. Then 
whether a ministerial meeting can be held based on the chairman's 
proposal, following talks at the vice-ministerial and ambassador 
levels, will come into focus. 
 
Conflicts of various countries' interests 
 
Compared with the Uruguay Round, which reached an agreement in 1994, 
the coverage of the talks at the Doha Round has expanded from trade 
in goods to services and rules. The talks have become extremely 
difficult due to an increase in the number of member nations and 
with 151 nations and territories at odds over various areas of 
interests. 
 
Regarding the agricultural area, the top agenda item, exporting 
countries, such as the U.S. and Australia are calling on Japan, the 
European Union (EU) and India to cut tariffs. On the other hand, 
Japan is seeking a cut in agricultural subsidies from the U.S. 
Industrialized countries, such as Japan, the EU and the U.S. are 
calling on developing countries like Brazil and Argentina, to cut 
tariffs. Thus, various countries' stances are intertwined in a 
complex manner. 
 
High hopes for comprehensive agreement 
 
Hopes are now high that the talks will make progress, as one 
negotiator said, "The atmosphere has changed." The U.S. appears 
eager to settle the talks while President Bush is in office. Some 
developing countries that had thus far taken a hard-line stance have 
reportedly begun showing flexibility. 
 
TOKYO 00001233  010 OF 017 
 
 
 
While the future of the global economy increasingly becoming unclear 
due to the subprime mortgage crisis and a sharp rise in food prices, 
some take the view that a mood for establishing a free trade system 
is growing, as one official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI) opined. Even so, in view of the fact that the talks 
have involved years of twists and turns, a cautious view that there 
is no way of telling the outcome of the talks until the very last 
minute remains deep-rooted. 
 
Japan's major challenge is agricultural sector 
 
Japan's major challenge at the Doha Round is the agricultural area. 
In particular, how to deal with key trade items, such as rice, will 
be in the spotlight. Since special treatment of constraining the 
margin of tariff cuts to a modest degree is allowed for key trade 
items, Japan is nervous about how many such items it can secure for 
protection of its domestic agriculture. 
 
The chairman's proposal presented in February sets the number of key 
items at 4 PERCENT -6 PERCENT  of taxable items. The number of 
Japan's dutiable items stands at approximately 100, which is 40 
PERCENT -60 PERCENT  of the total number. Japan's proposal for such 
a number is over 10 PERCENT , showing a big gap with the chairman's 
proposal. 
 
In the meantime, even a partial liberalization of key items will be 
imposed in the form of an expanded import framework for low-tariff 
imports. Japan accepted the minimum-access quota system for rice at 
the Uruguay Round. It now annually imports approximately 770,000 
tons of low-tariff rice. It wants to constrain the margin of the 
expansion of the import quota to the minimum for protection of 
domestic rice farmers. 
 
An increasing number of countries are now restricting exports of 
food due to a sharp rise in grain prices.  Japan has proposed 
introducing a system of mandating prior talks between exporting and 
importing countries in order to keep the move from escalating. It 
aims at having its proposal included in the agreement in principle 
with Agriculture Minister Wakabayashi saying, "Rules for invoking 
the export restriction should be clarified." 
 
(6) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gas tax 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
May 2, 2008 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. Bracketed figures denote 
proportions to all respondents. Figures in parentheses denote the 
results of the last survey conducted Apr. 19-20.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
Yes 20 (25) 
No 59 (60) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support now? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 24 (26) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 28 (22) 
New Komeito (NK) 4 (2) 
 
TOKYO 00001233  011 OF 017 
 
 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2 (2) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 0 (1) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (0) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 
Other political parties 0 (0) 
None 34 (41) 
No answer (N/A) + don't know (D/K) 8 (6) 
 
Q: A law adding a gasoline surcharge of 25 yen per liter to the 
gasoline tax expired at the end of March. The government and the 
ruling coalition have now restored the surcharge in order to secure 
tax revenues. Do you support its reinstatement? 
 
Yes 22 
No 66 
 
Q: A bill adding a surcharge to the gasoline tax did not pass the 
House of Councillors. The ruling coalition then took a second vote 
in the House of Representatives and passed the bill with a 
concurring vote of more than two thirds. Do you think it was 
appropriate for the ruling coalition to take a second vote in the 
House of Representatives? 
 
Yes 29 
No 54 
 
Q: Following the reinstatement of a gasoline surcharge with a second 
vote this time, the ruling coalition will take another second vote 
in the House of Representatives in mid-May on a bill to use gasoline 
tax revenues for road construction and other road-related 
infrastructure projects. Do you think it is appropriate to do so? 
 
Yes 28 
No 59 
 
Q: Do you support the idea of incorporating gasoline taxes and other 
road-related tax revenues into the state's general account budget to 
use the tax revenues for other purposes? 
 
Yes 67 
No 22 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes") What would you like to be 
done about the gasoline surcharge? Do you think it's all right to 
add the gasoline surcharge if gasoline taxes and other road-related 
tax revenues will be incorporated into the state's general account 
budget, or do you otherwise think it would be better to repeal the 
gasoline surcharge? 
 
It's all right to add the gasoline surcharge if gasoline taxes and 
other road-related tax revenues will be incorporated into the 
state's general account budget 44(29) 
It would be better to repeal the gasoline surcharge 44(29) 
(TN: Figures on a par) 
 
Q: The DPJ is considering submitting a motion in the House of 
Councillors to censure Prime Minister Fukuda over the gasoline 
surcharge's reinstatement and other issues. Do you support the DPJ's 
standpoint on these issues? 
 
Yes 42 
No 40 
 
TOKYO 00001233  012 OF 017 
 
 
 
Q: Even if a censure motion is passed in the House of Councillors, 
the prime minister does not have to respond. What do you think Prime 
Minister Fukuda should do? (One choice only) 
 
Resign 9 
Dissolve the House of Representatives for a general election 60 
No need to resign or dissolve the House of Representatives 25 
 
Q: If you were to vote now in a general election, which political 
party would you like to vote for in your proportional representation 
bloc? (Figures in parentheses denote the results of a survey 
conducted Feb. 2-3.) 
 
LDP 22 (30) 
DPJ 39 (32) 
NK 4 (3) 
JCP 2 (2) 
SDP 1 (1) 
PNP 0 (0) 
NPN 0 (0) 
Other political parties 1 (1) 
N/A+D/K 31 (31) 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted from the evening of 
Apr. 30 through May 1 over the telephone on a computer-aided random 
digit dialing (RDD) basis. Respondents were chosen from among the 
nation's voting population on a three-stage random-sampling basis. 
Valid answers were obtained from 998 persons (58 PERCENT ). 
 
(7) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gasoline tax 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
May 3, 2008 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote the results of the 
last survey conducted Apr. 4-5.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
Yes 19.8 (26.6) 
No 66.6 (59.6) 
Don't know (D/K) + no answer (N/A) 13.6 (13.8) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the previous question) 
What's the primary reason for your approval of the Fukuda cabinet? 
Pick only one from among those listed below. 
 
The prime minister is trustworthy 16.1 (20.7) 
Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Liberal Democratic Party and 
New Komeito 16.4 (11.7) 
The prime minister has leadership ability 0.8 (1.7) 
Something can be expected of its economic policies 4.6 (2.9) 
Something can be expected of its foreign policies 4.1 (1.3) 
Something can be expected of its political reforms 3.5 (1.7) 
Something can be expected of its tax reforms 0.8 (2.1) 
Something can be expected of its administrative reforms 3.6 (2.5) 
There's no other appropriate person (for prime minister) 48.1 
(52.0) 
Other answers (O/A) 0.7 (0.9) 
D/K+N/A 1.3 (2.5) 
 
TOKYO 00001233  013 OF 017 
 
 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the first question) What's 
the primary reason for your disapproval of the Fukuda cabinet? Pick 
only one from among those listed below. 
 
The prime minister is untrustworthy 11.1 (8.9) 
Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Liberal Democratic Party and 
the New Komeito 4.5 (5.2) 
The prime minister lacks leadership ability 25.7 (32.5) 
Nothing can be expected of its economic policies 26.6 (24.0) 
Nothing can be expected of its foreign policies 1.3 (2.0) 
Nothing can be expected of its political reforms 8.0 (7.9) 
Nothing can be expected of its tax reforms 11.6 (6.5) 
Nothing can be expected of its administrative reforms 6.9 (6.8) 
Don't like the prime minister's personal character 3.3 (4.2) 
O/A 0.3 (0.7) 
D/K+N/A 0.7 (1.3) 
 
Q: The ruling coalition of the LDP and New Komeito took a second 
vote in the House of Representatives on a bill reinstating a 
gasoline surcharge to ensure tax revenues for road construction and 
other road-related infrastructure projects. A gasoline surcharge of 
about 25 yen will be added to the gasoline tax again. What do you 
think about this? 
 
Appropriate 21.4 
Inappropriate 72.0 
D/K+N/A 6.6 
 
Q: The ruling coalition of the LDP and New Komeito agreed to prepare 
legislation within the year in order to incorporate gasoline taxes 
and other road-related tax revenues into the state's general account 
budget from fiscal 2009. Do you support this? 
 
Yes 37.7 
No 53.6 
D/K+N/A 8.7 
 
Q: The DPJ is considering submitting a motion in the House of 
Councillors to censure Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda over the gasoline 
surcharge's reinstatement and other issues. Do you support the 
move? 
 
Yes 54.7 
No 31.9 
D/K+N/A 13.4 
 
Q: What do you think Prime Minister Fukuda should do if and when a 
censure motion is passed in the House of Councillors? 
 
He does not have to resign because the motion is not legally binding 
18.5 
His cabinet should resign en masse 8.4 
He should dissolve the House of Representatives for a general 
election 68.1 
D/K+N/A 5.0 
 
Q: In April, the government started a new health insurance system 
for the elderly to deduct premiums from their pensions. Prime 
Minister Fukuda has ordered his administration to improve its 
implementation. Meanwhile, the DPJ and other opposition parties are 
calling for the new system to be abolished. Which do you think is 
 
TOKYO 00001233  014 OF 017 
 
 
better? 
 
Improve implementation 44.0 
Abolish the new system 46.5 
D/K+N/A 9.5 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 24.3 (27.6) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 30.3 (25.7) 
New Komeito (NK) 3.6 (2.5) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3.7 (4.1) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.6 (1.4) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.7 (0.3) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) --- --- 
Other political parties, groups --- --- 
None 34.4 (36.8) 
D/K+N/A 1.4 (1.6) 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted across the nation on 
May 1-2 by Kyodo News Service on a computer-aided random digit 
dialing (RDD) basis. Among randomly generated telephone numbers, 
those actually for household use with one or more eligible voters 
totaled 1,478. Answers were obtained from 1,027 persons. 
 
(8) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, provisional gas tax, 
new health insurance system for elderly 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
May 3, 2008 
 
Questions & Answers 
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 18 (24) 16 19 
No 61 (57) 70 56 
Not interested 19 (18) 14 23 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 37 
(38) 40 35 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
8 (10) 8 7 
Because there's something stable about the prime minister 28 (23) 21 
31 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
measures 18 (24) 24 15 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 8 
(5) 9 8 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
37 (45) 29 42 
Because there's no fresh image about the prime minister 5 (5) 7 4 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
 
TOKYO 00001233  015 OF 017 
 
 
measures 49 (44) 54 45 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
 T P M F 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 20 (24) 18 21 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 28 (22) 36 24 
New Komeito (NK) 3 (5) 3 4 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (3) 2 4 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 3 (1) 3 3 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (1) 1 0 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 1 (0) 1 0 
Other political parties 1 (1) 0 1 
None 39 (41) 36 41 
 
Q: The ruling coalition of the LDP and New Komeito took a second 
vote in the House of Representatives on a bill reinstating a 
gasoline surcharge and other provisional tax rates and passed the 
legislation with a concurring vote of more than two thirds. Do you 
appreciate this? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 19  21 18 
No 74  75 73 
 
Q: The DPJ faced off with the ruling coalition over the gasoline 
surcharge and the Bank of Japan's governor post. Do you appreciate 
this? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 41  47 47 
No 51  49 53 
 
Q: In April, the government started a new health insurance system 
for those aged 75 and over. Do you appreciate this system? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 17  16 17 
No 77  80 75 
 
(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that 
the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "No answer" omitted. Figures in 
parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Apr. 
5-6. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted May 1-2 over the 
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit 
sampling (RDS) basis. Answers were obtained from 1,042 persons. 
 
(9) Simulation of next Lower House election: If 2 PERCENT  of LDP 
votes go to DPJ, two parties would trade places 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
May 5, 2008 
 
Rei Shiratori, a professor at Akita International University, 
conducted a simulation on how many votes the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will garner in the 
next House of Representatives election. According to the simulation, 
if two percent of the LDP's supporting votes go to the DPJ in the 
next House of Representatives election, the DPJ will become the 
largest opposition party in the Lower House. This newspaper analyzed 
 
TOKYO 00001233  016 OF 017 
 
 
based on the simulation how the next Lower House election would turn 
out to be if the LDP was buffeted by a headwind and how the Japanese 
Communist Party's (JCP) votes in the single-seat districts where the 
party will not file its candidates would move. 
 
Sharp decrease in LDP seats 
 
According to the Shiratori's simulation, the number of Lower House 
seats to be obtained by the LDP would be 230, a large drop from the 
296 that the party won in the previous election, while the DPJ would 
garner 194, making great strides from the 113 current seats. 
 
The LDP would win 12 district seats (23 in the previous race) of the 
25 single-seat constituencies in Tokyo and 11 seats (21 in the 
previous race) of the 33 single-seat constituencies of the Tokai 
bloc. The party would drastically decrease its Lower House seats in 
urban areas. 
 
The New Komeito, the LDP's junior coalition partner, would garner 32 
seats (31 in the previous election), the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) - eight seats (seven in the previous election) and the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) - nine seats (nine in the previous 
election). The seats to be obtained by the three parties would be 
nearly unchanged from those they garnered in the previous election. 
 
The simulation shows that although the DPJ would make great stride, 
the ruling parties -- the LDP and New Komeito -- would keep the 
majority of the Lower House seats. 
 
If LDP buffeted by unfavorable wind 
 
If the unpopularity rating for the Fukuda cabinet continues, the 
simulation concludes the number of seats the LDP will capture would 
further drop. 
 
If one percent of the LDP supporting votes go to the DPJ, the LDP 
would garner 216 seats and the DPJ - 207. Should two percent of the 
LDP's supporting votes go to the DPJ, the LDP would get 205 and the 
DPJ - 217. The number of seats to be obtained by the LDP and New 
Komeito would reach a majority. If three percent of the LDP's 
supporting votes go to the DPJ, the DPJ would have an advantage. 
 
According to Shiratori, if the election is conducted under the 
unpopular Fukuda cabinet, one percent of the LDP's supporting votes 
would go to the DPJ; and if the LDP suffers from an issue similar to 
the pension-record mess, a major campaign issue for the Upper House 
election last August, about three percent of the LDP's supporting 
votes would move to the DPJ. 
 
If JCP narrows down candidates 
 
The JCP, which had initially planned to field its own candidates in 
all the 300 single-seat constituencies, intends to decrease the 
number of its candidates for the next general election to about 140. 
Therefore, the JCP's supporting votes in the 160 single-seat 
districts will likely greatly sway the outcome of the Lower House 
race. 
 
For this reason, both the LDP and DPJ aim to score with the JCP's 
supporters in 160 single-seat constituencies. According to various 
exit polls in the April 27 Lower House by-election for the Yamaguchi 
No. 2 district, more than 80 PERCENT  of the JCP's supporters voted 
 
TOKYO 00001233  017 OF 017 
 
 
for the DPJ candidate; so, the JCP's supporting votes seems to be 
going to the DPJ. 
 
Should 30 PERCENT  of the JCP's supporting votes in single-seat 
districts in which the JCP will not file its candidates, the LDP 
would win 221 and the DPJ would increase to 204. 
 
Should 50 PERCENT  of the JCP's supporting votes go to the DPJ, the 
LDP would secure 217 seats and the DPJ - 204. 
 
Should votes supporting the LDP be added to the 204 seats, the LDP 
would be placed at a disadvantage. 
 
If 30 PERCENT  of the JCP's supporting votes and one percent of the 
LDP's votes go to the DPJ, the DPJ would become the largest party. 
If 50 PERCENT  of the JCP's votes and three percent of the LDP's 
votes go to the DPJ, the LDP would win 238 seats, exceeding the 184 
seats the LDP would secure. 
 
Regarding the above predictions, Shiratori said: 
 
"The LDP won overwhelmingly the 2005 Lower House election. Seeing 
the analysis that the two parties would trade places if a just few 
percentages of votes go to the DPJ, the LDP did not win big. This is 
the result of a mixed electoral system of small and proportional 
constituencies." 
 
Shiratori conducted the simulation, assuming that the next Lower 
House election would be held on Sept. 6, 2009. 
 
  If JCP's supporting votes go to DPJ 
   0 PERCENT  30 PERCENT  50 PERCENT 
If LDP's supporting votes go to DPJ 0 PERCENT  LDP 
DPJ 230 (seats) 
194 221 
204 217 
208 
 1 PERCENT  LDP 
DPJ 216 
207 209 
215 203 
221 
 2 PERCENT  LDP 
DPJ 205 
217 198 
225 192 
231 
 3 PERCENT  LDP 
DPJ 197 
225 190 
232 184 
238 
 
DONOVAN