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O 020702Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3946
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2268
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2023 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PARM JA NATO
SUBJECT: CLUSTER MUNITIONS: JAPAN STILL WORKING CCW AND 
OSLO PROCESS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Joseph Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: An Oslo Process agreement that criminalizes 
the possession of cluster munitions (CM) and/or penalizes 
countries that support states that possess CM could block 
future peacekeeping operations (PKO) and embarrass Japan 
during the July G-8 Hokkaido Summit, PM Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Ganyard told Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department 
Deputy Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo during an April 23 
meeting in Tokyo.  DDG Shimbo said Japan's policy, approved 
by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, is unchanged.  Japan 
continues to favor addressing humanitarian and 
interoperability concerns within the framework of the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).  However, 
domestic political considerations and public pressure for 
faster action will keep Japan engaged in the Oslo Process. 
Shimbo admitted that the current Oslo Process draft text, 
which will be considered at the May Dublin conference, could 
be problematic for PKOs and that Japan is working hard to 
change the language.  Tinkering with words would not be 
sufficient, DAS Ganyard said, as he urged Japan to strengthen 
its focus on the CCW.  DAS Ganyard suggested Japan join the 
United States in upcoming diplomatic efforts to support the 
CCW.  DDG Shimbo demurred, saying the current situation in 
Tokyo is not yet that critical.  He warned that Japan may be 
forced to decide between adopting the CCW or Oslo Process 
text at the end of the year.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
US: Criminalizing CM Will Affect PKO, Embarrass G-8 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) An agreement in May at the Dublin meeting of the Oslo 
Process that bans CM could have an embarrassing effect on the 
July G-8 Summit at Hokkaido's Lake Toya, Bureau of Political 
Military Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, 
Programs and Operations Stephen T. Ganyard told MOFA 
Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department Deputy 
Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo on April 23.  G-8 nations 
are the main providers of monetary, human and logistical 
resources for PKO.  However, criminalizing possession of CM 
and/or penalizing countries that support nations that possess 
CM, as called for in Articles 1(b) and 1(c) of the current 
Oslo draft text, will hinder, delay or prevent State Parties 
and Non-State Parties to the agreement from jointly engaging 
in PKO.  The draft text will also reduce the United States, 
ability to protect Japan and respond to contingencies in the 
Pacific.  The Oslo Process, which does not include the main 
CM users such as China, Russia and Pakistan, would not be as 
effective in dealing with the international community's 
concerns about CM as the CCW, DAS Ganyard said. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Japan Position Unchanged - Prefer CCW, Settle for Oslo 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) DDG Shimbo said Japan's position, approved by Prime 
Minister Yasuo Fukuda, is unchanged.  Tokyo's first priority 
is to reach a binding international agreement on CM within 
the CCW to which all of the main producers and users of CM 
would be party.  However, domestic political realities are 
forcing Japan to participate in the Oslo Process.  The 
Japanese public, media and Diet are increasingly frustrated 
with the slow progress within the CCW, DDG Shimbo continued, 
which is raising the pressure on Japanese government 
officials to take action.  Fellow members of the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) recently grilled Foreign 
Minister Masahiko Koumura during Lower House debate about 
Tokyo's opposition to a CM ban.  Lower House Speaker Yohei 
Kono leads a new multi-party Diet committee inaugurated on 
April 19 that is pushing to ban CM.  Japan's Foreign and 
Defense Ministers understand the logic underlying the 
importance of CM but are also pragmatic when it comes to the 
domestic political realities behind calls for quick action to 
ban CM.  (Comment: PM Fukuda's ruling LDP controls the Diet's 
Lower House in coalition with the New Komeito Party, a group 
with ties to a traditionally pacifist Japanese Buddhist sect. 
 PM Fukuda's hold on the Japanese Government is being 
challenged by the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 
which controls the Diet's Upper House.) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
The Need for a Stronger Public Campaign 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Turning to the effect of a CM ban on PKO, DDG Shimbo 
admitted that the current Oslo draft text could be 
problematic and that Japan is pushing for changes in the 
wording of Articles 1(b) and 1(c) and will continue to press 
the matter with other ""Like-Minded"" nations at Dublin to the 
fullest extent possible.  DDG Shimbo expressed doubt that 
arguments focused on PKO would sway public opinion.  Instead, 
Fukuda Cabinet officials would need to stress how a CM ban 
would reduce the ability of Japan's Self Defense Forces and 
U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) to defend Japan in order to 
convince the Diet and Japanese public about the importance of 
CM.  MOFA and Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials in the 
meeting expressed a strong interest in receiving additional 
information from the United States that they can share with 
the Diet on the role of CM in defense of Japan.  DDG Shimbo 
suggested that it might be time for the United States and 
Japan to be more public on the issues, noting that opponents 
of CM are engaging in an active public relations campaign. 
Embassy Tokyo Political Officer suggested that the Embassy 
and USFJ might be willing to consider a Foreign Ministry 
request to coordinate on public relations and outreach 
efforts with the Diet and general public.   DDG Shimbo 
pledged to consider providing a list of possible activities 
for the U.S. Government,s consideration. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
United States Will Raise Prominence of Issue 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) DAS Ganyard told DDG Shimbo that simple tinkering with 
the language would not be sufficient, as any ban on CM 
envisioned by the Oslo Process would negatively affect 
interoperability and PKOs.  The United States is gearing up 
for a prominent diplomatic campaign to highlight the 
seriousness of the issue.  The Secretary planned to write 
letters to Foreign Ministers and to the UN Secretary General 
asking that the UN reinforce the importance of keeping 
discussion of CM within the CCW.  Ambassadors in Washington 
will be called in for meetings at the Under Secretary level. 
DAS Ganyard asked that Japan also consider writing a letter 
to the UN Secretary General, urging him to oppose any 
agreement that would hinder, prevent or delay PKOs. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Japan May Decide Between Two Documents 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) DDG Shimbo said he would consider and convey the 
proposal to his superiors, but was not optimistic considering 
the bipartisan domestic support for banning CM.  The current 
situation is not yet that critical.  Although the Oslo 
Process participants in Dublin may reach basic agreement on 
the text, and Japan will not be in a position to object, the 
text will not be formally adopted and would not be binding. 
In the meantime, negotiations in the CCW will continue.  The 
real turning point will be at the end of 2008, when Japan may 
be forced decide between the CCW and Oslo Process texts.  At 
that time Japan will need to balance its national interests 
and relations with important allies to decide one or the 
other.  For now, Japan is making every effort to strengthen 
the CCW and to modify the Oslo Process text to mitigate any 
potential harmful affects on interoperability, DDG Shimbo 
concluded. 
 
¶7. (U) Principal Deputy Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Mark Asquino, USFJ representatives J-5 COL 
Born, J-5 LTC Hague, and Embassy Tokyo officers accompanied 
DAS Ganyard.  MOFA and MOD Japan personnel joined DDG Shimbo. 
 
¶8. (U) This cable as been approved by DAS Ganyard. 
DONOVAN