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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000433 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE PART III:  ANALYSIS  OF THE 
FINAL REPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 17328 
 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 349 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 420 
     ¶D. THE HAGUE 425 
 
This is CWC-22-08. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) This cable is part of a series on the Second 
Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference 
(RevCon) April 7-18, 2008.  It follows the initial 
report at the end of the Conference (ref b), and 
reports on the opening plenary sessions of the 
Conference and the general debate (ref c) and events 
on the margins of the Conference (ref d).  One more 
cable will follow focusing on the process during the 
Conference and lessons learned. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Negotiations at the OPCW Second Review 
Conference (RevCon) were characterized by a number of 
long-standing debates on issues of importance to 
States Parties, but there were also several 
contentious issues that received far less attention 
than expected.  Iran, frequently assisted by India, 
South Africa and Pakistan, played its customary role, 
holding various sections of the text hostage until 
the eleventh hour and showing a particularly 
troubling desire to walk back agreed language from 
the First Review Conference.  Despite Iranian 
objections, the de facto solution that developed for 
breaking through impasses was to fall back to either 
language from the First Review Conference or the 
Convention itself. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Overall, the final report of the RevCon met 
key U.S. objectives (ref a) in a number of areas and 
the U.S. Del successfully defended our red lines. 
The report reinforces commitment to all of the 
Convention's provisions, lays some groundwork for 
future evolution of the verification regime and 
solidly underlines the importance of national 
implementation of the convention.  The report 
acknowledges the impact of developments in science 
and technology on the work of the Organization   and 
encourages States Parties to cooperate in mitigating 
the threat of terrorist use of toxic chemicals as 
chemical weapons, although both of these issues were 
watered down in the report by NAM and, especially, 
Iranian opposition. 
 
¶4. (SBU) As was clear in the months leading up to the 
RevCon, the conference proved less an opportunity to 
propose new initiatives than a setting in which the 
U.S. and other like-minded delegations spent much of 
their time defending past achievements and fending 
off problematic NAM advances.   What did not/not find 
its way into the report is as important as what did 
in many cases.  References, oblique or direct, to 
"incapacitants"; non-compliance in 2012; and 
portrayal of the Australia Group as inconsistent with 
the CWC were either minimal or avoided altogether. 
The U.S. and allies also succeeded in denying new 
initiatives with respect to victims of chemical 
warfare (particularly, Iranian lobbying for 
compensation of their victims of Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons); an Article XI Action Plan; and 
unrestrained budget increases for International 
Cooperation and Assistance. Although not discernable 
as accomplishments in the final report, these were 
hard-won successes in the negotiations. 
 
¶5. (U) The sections below follow the order of the 
RevCon agenda and final report. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
THE ROLE OF THE CWC IN ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES AS SET 
FORTH IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE CONVENTION 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the absence of a political declaration, 
the opening paragraphs of the substantive report 
(Agenda Item 9) serve as an overview of progress 
made, challenges confronting, and future work to be 
done on the topics covered by the articles of the 
CWC.  The debate on this section by the Committee of 
the Whole reflected the parallel debate in the 
smaller negotiating group, with a few noteworthy 
exceptions.  Iran introduced language on riot control 
agents (RCAs) and incapacitating agents up front, 
clearly unacceptable to the U.S.  This was eventually 
replaced by compromise language that quoted verbatim 
the CWC's Article I undertaking not to use RCAs as a 
method of warfare.  Iran also sought a declaration 
that the use of chemical weapons was "illegal under 
any circumstances," a characterization the U.S. 
considered inappropriate as it assigns the CWC the 
status of customary international law.  Compromise 
language was adopted based on language in the 
Director General's statement to the conference that 
"an overwhelming majority of states consider chemical 
weapons...to be illegal and prohibited."  India 
substituted "prohibited" for the DG's stronger term 
"immoral", creating the redundancy in the final 
version of the sentence. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Despite numerous NAM attempts to delete all 
references to non-proliferation, a reference to the 
non-proliferation aims of the Convention was retained 
in the opening section.  A paragraph noting the 
impact of scientific and technological progress and 
highlighting the role of the Scientific Advisory 
Board was also retained, despite a slightly 
surprising NAM reluctance to acknowledge any such 
impact. 
 
¶8. (SBU) One very contentious topic was the role of 
the OPCW in the fight against terrorism.  The debate 
was foreshadowed by a bitter fight on the agenda of 
the RevCon, months before the conference itself. 
France and Algeria were particularly insistent that 
terrorism be given a separate sub-item; Iran and 
others were equally insistent that it not be 
mentioned.  In the end, the Executive Council agreed 
to take terrorism off the agenda with a commitment by 
delegations that absence of any one topic (and citing 
terrorism as the prime example) from the agenda in no 
way precluded discussion or report language at the 
RevCon.  In the pre-RevCon Open-ended Working Group, 
the Chair's drafts consistently referred to terrorism 
in the opening section.  Despite bitter protests by 
Iran, a paragraph on terrorism was retained in the 
opening section throughout RevCon negotiations in the 
Committee of the Whole along with the understanding 
that it would also appear later in the report.  A 
number of delegations had a strong interest in not 
only ensuring language on terrorism, but including a 
specific reference to UNSCR 1540. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Iranians were surprisingly flexible on a 
number of issues expected to generate far more debate 
in the RevCon.  Instead, the Iranian "must-have" (or, 
in this case, must not have) that emerged was the 
deletion of any reference to UNSCR 1540 specifically, 
and the more general goal of minimizing references to 
the OPCW's role in the fight against terrorism.  In 
the final hours of negotiation, Iran managed to 
eliminate all references to UNSCR 1540, leaving a 
paragraph on terrorism in the opening section that 
instead repeated language from the first Review 
Conference.  This noted the increased danger of the 
 
use of chemical weapons by terrorists, but referred 
to an EC decision from 2001 rather than any more 
recent action in the UN or the OPCW.  The Iranians 
fought for and achieved that the only other paragraph 
on terrorism would appear in the final section of the 
report on the functioning of the Organization, that 
emphasized the OPCW's autonomy and merely "took 
cognizance of the resolutions of the United Nations 
on combating terrorism." 
 
¶10. (SBU) From a U.S. perspective, the report's 
acknowledgement of the increased threat of terrorism 
coupled with the urging of cooperation to prevent 
terrorist acquisition of CW can be considered to have 
met our RevCon objectives on terrorism.  However, the 
loss of the reference to UNSCR 1540 and a general 
weakening of the topic by burying it in last section 
was a significant disappointment to many delegations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ENSURING THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE CWC 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Universality section was one of the 
most non-controversial and extensively discussed 
sections of the Chair's text.  Issues included 
whether to address by name the twelve states not 
party to the CWC, and how to encourage those that 
were already in the process of preparing to accede 
(para 9.16).   The now common Iranian mantra of 
"States not Party whose non-adherence is a matter of 
serious concern," a transparent jab at Israel that 
they tried to insert in five places, was whittled 
down to two references in the final report.  Another 
important accomplishment was ensuring that 
universality alone was not considered a panacea; and 
that full implementation of, and compliance with the 
Convention was also necessary.  The NAM proposed 
dropping references to both compliance and 
implementation, for which the most vocal proponents 
were Iran, India and Pakistan.  The U.S. delegation 
argued that it doesn't matter how many join "the 
club" if all members do not play by the rules.  The 
final text of this section stresses that universality 
must be matched by full implementation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND DECLARATIONS RELATED THERETO 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Negotiations on this section covered 
several issues of significance for the U.S., and the 
final text may be more noteworthy for what it does 
not/not address.  Switzerland, supported by Austria, 
Sweden, Norway, and to some extent Germany and the 
UK, proposed that the EC address new developments in 
the field of incapacitating agents.  Iran 
additionally proposed that such new developments were 
a cause for concern which could be detrimental to the 
object and purpose of the Convention.  The U.S. 
Delegation proposed compromise language, to which the 
Swiss attempted to add language regarding follow-on 
discussions.  When this language, including the 
follow on,  was addressed in the small negotiating 
group, the entire reference was dropped in response 
to U.S. and Russian objections. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Pursuant to instructions, the U.S. 
Delegation proposed including language in this 
section confirming that the CWC prohibits any 
preparations by a States Party for the possible 
production or use of chemical weapons, including the 
development of plans for the mobilization of 
industrial or research facilities for such purposes. 
This proposal met with enthusiastic support from 
other WEOG delegations and strong resistance from NAM 
delegations and Russia.  It was eventually dropped. 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Chair's draft text also built in 
repetition of the comprehensive nature of the CWC's 
prohibitions throughout, which the U.S. and others 
strongly supported.  Predictably, the NAM proposed 
deletion of most of these references.  The final text 
retained one strong reaffirmation of the contentious 
definitions and their comprehensive nature and the 
General Purpose Criterion. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND DESTRUCTION OR 
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The NAM sought early on to characterize 
destruction as "core", "critical", "crucial", 
"fundamental", or any of a number of other adjectives 
to convey a sense of graduated levels of importance 
between the different treaty obligations.  Balanced 
language was eventually found to underscore the 
importance of several obligations, instead of placing 
the disarmament objectives of the CWC above all 
others.  The NAM, with the exception of India, also 
attempted to downplay the significant progress made 
so far by possessor states in destruction of their 
chemical weapons.  Never one to settle for a single 
reference when a dozen will do, Iran also managed to 
work in an excessive number of references to the 
"final extended deadlines," awkward from a drafting 
perspective but adding no substantive difference. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Having remained silent throughout the 
majority of the Open Ended Working Group meetings, 
Russia emerged as a surprisingly constructive ally on 
destruction.  This was clearly the issue of 
importance for Moscow, and the Russian delegation was 
vocal and effective in pushing back on NAM attempts 
to inappropriately elevate the importance of Article 
IV and V obligations. 
 
¶17. (SBU) The expected debate over what to do when 
one or more of the possessor states fail to meet the 
2012 deadline was all but absent.  This may be 
attributable, at least in part, to the Director- 
General's early and clear statements that it would be 
premature to discuss possible non-compliance at this 
RevCon.  His suggestion that a special session of the 
Conference of States Parties could be convened closer 
to 2012 may also have vented some of the steam that 
would otherwise have built on this issue. 
 
¶18. (SBU) One paragraph that took a somewhat 
disproportionate role in the negotiations on this 
section was the reference to the EC visit to 
Anniston.  The debate took shape much as it did 
during EC-52, with WEOG delegations attempting to 
characterize the visit(s) as valuable, the NAM 
insisting upon "expressing concern" in an attempt to 
call into question the utility of a process already 
set in motion by a CSP-11 decision, and the U.S. 
probably taking a fairly passive role.  The final 
language did little more than acknowledge that the 
visit had occurred. 
 
----------------------------------- 
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES OF THE OPCW 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) From an organizational perspective, the 
placement of Verification after Destruction was 
illogical and made for a less cohesive text.  This 
was an unfortunate carryover from the agenda debate, 
and a transparent play by the NAM to give destruction 
optical as well as substantive preeminence. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Several of the U.S. objectives for 
 
verification fell under the broader category of 
adapting the verification regime to address changes 
in technology, chemical industry, and the threat 
posed by terrorist use of toxic chemicals. Debate on 
this section of the report centered on a desire by 
WEOG, Japan and others to point to the need for a 
continuing evolution of the verification regime.  In 
almost direct opposition was a NAM effort to portray 
the verification regime as having met the 
requirements of the Convention, thus implying further 
work or adaptation to an ever-changing environment 
would be unnecessary.  The final report language 
struck a balanced tone, acknowledging the progress 
made thus far and the need for further evolution. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THE CWC 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Discussion in this area was noteworthy 
because of the U.S. objectives that were maintained 
in the report, despite significant disagreement by 
the NAM and associated States Parties.  Also, several 
subjects of significant NAM input were condensed to 
manageable report elements.  Some examples follow. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The NAM's insistence on using the term 
"hierarchy of risk" in relation to Scheduled 
chemicals and the verification activities that result 
from such declarations was successfully fought back. 
The "hierarchy" term is not used in the report at 
all.  Although paragraph 9.54 of the report speaks to 
the risk posed by the Scheduled chemicals (as laid 
out in the language of the Annex on Chemicals), it 
clearly points out that the risk from the various 
chemicals is only one factor considered in the 
selection of a plant site or facility for inspection. 
Also, early NAM drafts stated that there is no risk 
associated with discrete organic chemicals, an idea 
which was successfully removed from the report. 
 
¶23. (SBU) In addition, it was possible to 
successfully maintain the inspections statistics laid 
out in paragraph 9.55.  The NAM's efforts to remove 
the percentages that demonstrate the significant 
under-inspection of OCPF plant sites were overcome, 
and these statistics were maintained. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Despite a significant effort by the NAM and 
others to reduce the importance of discussions on 
developments in science and technology, several 
references were preserved throughout the report, 
including in paragraph 9.58 of this section. 
 
¶25. (U) In paragraph 9.60, the importance of timely 
submission of declarations was captured, and the EC- 
51 decision on this matter was cited. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Discussions in the late run-up to the 
Review Conference saw Iran starting to express some 
interest in adding language to the report on the 
topic of low concentration thresholds for Schedule 
2A/2A* chemicals.  This may have just been done in an 
effort to try to muddy the waters for the WEOG 
delegations and Japan, those most interested in the 
matter and still in disagreement on a solution.  In 
the end, Iran made no more mischief on the matter. 
Canada's call for report language that would put in 
place an interim declaration requirement (based on 
the last facilitator's draft from the fall of 2006), 
although supported from the floor by a large number 
of WEOG delegations, was quickly cut down by the 
German delegation.  In the end, an expression of 
concern and an urging to resume work promptly were 
all that ended up in the report. 
 
¶27. (SBU) On the various topics under consideration 
 
regarding OCPF declarations, nothing in the report 
caused any damage to U.S. objectives.  The report 
calls for early resumption of consultations on the 
selection methodology, citing the relevant paragraphs 
of Part IX of the Verification Annex.  However, 
language specifically focusing on proposals by States 
Parties (element c of paragraph 11) was not achieved. 
There was significant concern by India about any 
mention of efforts to improve OCPF declarations to 
enable focusing verification activities on the most 
relevant plant sites, but eventual language making it 
clear that this would be done without imposition of 
any additional declaration obligations allowed this 
concept to be captured in the final report. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Despite the usual blustering from Iran, 
report language on transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals 
to States not Party made no movement toward the ban 
Iran wants.  In the end, the report does nothing more 
than reaffirm and reference the EC-47 decision.  In 
early sidebar conversations, an Iranian delegate 
confided to Delrep that some of the biggest concerns 
in this area (meaning transfers to Israel) come from 
some of their NAM colleagues -- China and India. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) The discussions in the area of national 
implementation (Article VII) fell along historical 
lines, with WEOG delegations and many others calling 
for continued work toward all States Parties meeting 
their obligations and the NAM calling simply for 
further encouragement.  Many of the comments by Iran 
and India in the final run-up to the Review 
Conference gave the impression that they would try to 
truncate the Article VII Action Plan by focusing 
future work solely on the TS reporting elements 
(i.e., States Parties notifying the TS of their 
efforts, however minimal).  There was also an 
expectation that, as had been attempted previously, 
the NAM would try to barter continued work on Article 
VII for an Action Plan for Article XI.  None of these 
concerns became reality. 
 
¶30. (SBU) In the end, the report captured U.S. 
objectives by highlighting the need for a 
comprehensive approach to the enactment of 
implementing legislation, filling gaps in 
legislation, and ensuring that legislation fully 
reflects CWC prohibitions.  The report also retained 
statistics regarding progress to date, something the 
NAM had fought to remove in hopes of minimizing the 
importance of these issues.  In national statements 
and within the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 
a number of normally quiet delegations (particularly 
within the GRULAC) spoke about the importance of 
Article VII efforts. 
 
¶31. (U) This section of the report, interestingly, 
also captures language on a number of other important 
elements as they relate to Article VII, i.e., changes 
in the security environment, changes in science and 
technology, and terrorism. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
CONSULTATIONS, COOPERATION AND FACT FINDING 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶32. (SBU) The debate on Article IX followed 
traditional lines.  The NAM, China and Russia implied 
that a challenge inspection could not be launched 
without either exhausting all other Article IX 
options first or resolving the "unresolved issues" 
from the Preparatory Commission.  The U.S., WEOG and 
others insisted that States Parties had the right, 
 
without prejudice, to request a challenge inspection. 
The inevitable result was a fairly neutral text that 
met U.S. objectives by reaffirming the right of 
States Parties to request a challenge inspection and 
continuing the TS mandate to maintain a high standard 
of readiness to conduct a challenge inspection.  Of 
note, however, was a slight shift in the 
characterization of the "unresolved issues."  The 
report of the First RevCon simply requested the 
Council to resolve these issues expeditiously; the 
new report repeated this but additionally noted that 
their resolution "is important for challenge 
inspections." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶33. (SBU) Like destruction, Article X was another 
area more noteworthy for the debate that did not 
occur.  Having assured delegations for weeks before 
the RevCon that they would "have some additional 
language" on assistance for victims of chemical 
warfare, the Iranians came forward fairly late with 
language that was clearly unacceptable to any 
delegation but their own.  However, in discussion of 
this section of the report, most of these proposals 
dropped out with little or no protest.  This was 
particularly surprising given the presence of Iranian 
victims of chemical warfare at the World Forum 
Convention Center manning an exhibit and setting the 
stage to somehow transform the tragedy of the Iraqi 
attack on Iran into an OPCW responsibility.  In the 
final report, the reference to victims was 
essentially a restatement of the CSP-12 decision, 
although this was complemented by Iranian language on 
"ensuring the availability of adequate resources" for 
the Director General to take measures of assistance 
for victims.  Even this was caveated as emergency 
assistance, thus not a real victory for Iran. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Despite its length and repetition, this 
section covered little else of substance.  However, 
two other themes did emerge.  One was an effort to 
broaden the mandate of Article X assistance, 
ostensibly only to cover incidents of terrorist use 
of toxic chemicals, but several proposals veered 
uncomfortably close to establishing a mandate for the 
OPCW in the case of industrial accidents.  The 
connection between assistance and protection under 
Article X and the OPCW's role in the fight against 
terrorism was also evident.  Despite resistance to 
acknowledgement of terrorism in the report as a 
whole, and certainly to any mention of UNSCR 1540, 
Iran allowed a specific reference to terrorists in 
the Assistance and Protection section. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶35. (SBU) Despite concerns that virtually every other 
section of the report would be held hostage to 
demands for an Article XI Action Plan, and a 
particularly problematic NAM alternative text for 
this section, the final text on Economic and 
Technological Development was far more reasonable 
than expected.  The debate ran along familiar lines, 
with the NAM calling for an almost unlimited and 
ever-increasing pool of financial and human resources 
to be devoted to international cooperation, in 
contrast to developed countries seeking to ensure 
relevant programs were carried out within reasonable 
guidelines and with objective assessments of 
effectiveness and efficiency.  The usual sub rosa 
Iranian/Cuban attack on the Australia Group as 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention 
 
was also present, but did not play a particularly 
significant role in the negotiations. 
 
¶36. (SBU) NAM alternative text sought rather 
blatantly to create new obligations where none 
existed in the Convention, and also to claim that 
international assistance needs, defined vaguely if at 
all, were not being met.  The final text, however, 
reflected their reluctant acceptance that assistance 
to States Parties in fulfilling their CWC obligations 
was in fact valuable assistance under Article XI. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ARTICLES XII TO XV AND FINAL CLAUSES 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶37. (SBU) This paragraph was never contested.  There 
was some concern initially that Iran would try to use 
the provisions of Article XII to set the stage for 
accusing the U.S. of being in non-compliance with the 
Convention after April 2012 because of ongoing 
destruction efforts.  Those concerns never 
materialized. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶38. (SBU) This was another relatively non- 
controversial section of the report.  There was some 
unexpected resistance to language welcoming the 
progress made on the Verification Information System, 
which may have been based on actual concerns 
regarding the protection of electronically submitted 
data, but also seemed to be in keeping with a general 
refusal on the part of the NAM to acknowledge 
positive steps or progress in any area since the 
First RevCon.  One practical step forward in this new 
text was to request a recommendation from the 
Secretariat on the long-term handling of confidential 
information, an issue that languished in 
consultations for years, thanks to Iran. 
 
----------------------------------- 
THE GENERAL FUNCTIONING OF THE OPCW 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶39. (U) In addition to covering some of the more 
administrative aspects of the Organization, this 
section of the report also became the de facto 
recipient of other issues that were either too 
contentious or not significant enough to receive 
their own heading.  Terrorism, falling into the first 
category, was relegated to a mention here.   Language 
on the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), focusing 
primarily on procedure as opposed to substance, also 
landed here and seemed to serve as a substitute for a 
more in-depth assessment of the impact of advances 
since the First RevCon in science and technology on 
the work of the Organization. 
 
¶40. (SBU) Compromise language on the SAB gave India 
and Iran the "meeting of government experts" that 
they both sought to discuss the SAB's report to the 
RevCon.  While many viewed a similar meeting that had 
been held in conjunction with the First RevCon to 
have been a colossal waste of time and energy, the 
compromise limited the exercise to one meeting as 
opposed to setting up a standing body as envisaged by 
India.  The compromise further prevented the SAB's 
future work from falling victim to this practice, 
instead requesting the Director-General to provide 
advice on the best way to enhance interaction between 
the SAB and States Parties in the future.  In keeping 
with a U.S. proposal, SAB language also called for 
increased funding of the SAB through the regular 
budget to include two regular meetings annually, as 
 
well as two meetings annually of SAB temporary 
working groups. 
 
¶41. (SBU) The sole reference to terrorism stressed 
the OPCW's independence before simply taking 
cognizance of UN resolutions on combating terrorism. 
Previous French insistence for stronger language on 
terrorism was placated with a reference to the Open- 
ended Working Group on Terrorism, which is chaired by 
France. 
 
¶42. (SBU) In discussions of TS staffing, a familiar 
developed/developing world debate also played out in 
characterization of the attention that should be 
given to equitable geographical representation.  The 
report also recognized, in light of the tenure 
policy, the need to maintain a high level of 
expertise, specifically CW-related. 
 
¶43.  (U) Javits sends. 
Gallagher