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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000419 
 
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SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
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COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
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WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC FR
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): PARIS SEMINAR 
25-26 MARCH 2008: THE NEW CHALLENGES OF CHEMICAL 
PROLIFERATION - POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION AND THE OPCW 
 
REF: A. STATE 017328 
     ¶B. STATE 29828 
 
This is CWC-19-08. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) The French Ministry of Defense through its 
Delegation for Strategic Affairs and its Foundation 
for Strategic Research sponsored a seminar limited to 
Australia Group members plus China and Russia March 
25 and 26 at the Ecole Militaire in Paris.  The 
seminar was held to provide background information 
for the upcoming Chemical Weapons Convention Second 
Review Conference (CWC Second RevCon) in relation to 
the current threat presented by chemical stockpiles, 
how the CWC regime can take into account scientific 
and technological developments, and the emergence of 
non-state actors in the context of globalization. 
About 100 persons attended, representing 26 countries 
and 3 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  The 
conference was opened with a speech by Rogelio 
Pfirter, the Director-General of the OPCW, and closed 
with comments by Ambassador Lyn Parker of the UK, 
Chairman of the OEWG for the CWC Second RevCon. 
 
¶2. (U) In sum, the presentations and the discussions 
concluded that the existing chemical weapons (CW) 
stockpiles do not present a CW warfare threat, and 
advances in science and technology likely do not 
presage initiatives by States to develop new chemical 
weapons.  The likelihood of non-state actors being 
involved in CW developments based on advances in 
science and technology was considered remote, 
although it was still considered important for the 
OPCW to stay abreast of developments.  However, the 
interest by non-state actors in the use of industrial 
chemicals and chemical products for terrorist actions 
was considered real.  CEFIC, the European chemical 
industry interest group, has initiated activities to 
identify chemicals and chemical products with threat 
potential.  It was noted that the chemical industry 
is moving into developing countries.  The last decade 
has seen about a 10% production shift from 
traditional producing countries primarily to West and 
East Asia. Changes to the CWC in light of 
developments were considered unnecessary, and the 
view was expressed that the CWC in its current form 
provided the tools to deal with challenges, including 
terrorism. 
 
¶3. (U) The U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Eric M. 
Javits, included Don Clagett, Brian L'Italien, 
Abigail Robinson and Sarah Rodjom.  The following 
paragraphs abstract the formal presentations and the 
subsequent question and answer sessions. 
 
---------------------- 
OPENING OF THE SEMINAR 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) In his opening statement, Mr. Michel Miraillet 
(Director of Strategic Affairs for the French MOD) 
indicated that the OPCW has made much progress in 10 
years, but new developments have occurred including 
the importance of non-state actors and the necessity 
for the future focus of the OPCW to be on 
nonproliferation issues.  He said France wanted to 
reinforce the effectiveness of the tools available to 
the OPCW. 
 
¶5. (U) Director-General Rogelio Pfirter noted that 
currently, 36% of declared CW stockpiles have been 
destroyed under OPCW supervision, but that 2012 is 
 
 
 
approaching and that the U.S. and Russia must commit 
all possible resources to meet this 100% destruction 
deadline. He said that if there is evidence "near to 
2012" that the deadline will not be met, that an 
"extraordinary conference" could be convened. He 
concurred with Mr. Miraillet that nonproliferation 
will be the future of the OPCW, that much has changed 
in the ten years of OPCW existence, to include 
terrorist threats, science and technology advances, 
biotechnology applications in the chemical industry, 
incapacitating agent developments, among others. 
Particularly related to incapacitating agents, he 
stressed the use of the General Purpose Criterion, as 
it covers all toxic chemicals and not just Schedule 1 
chemicals.  And finally, he said that it is critical 
that the 12 countries still not States Parties to the 
CWC should accede without delay.  He named as 
examples North Korea, Myanmar, Israel and Syria. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ASSESSING THE THREAT OF CW USE TODAY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (U) Securing the Chemical Weapons Stockpiles and 
Verification by the OPCW.  Mr. Dominique Anelli, head 
of the OPCW's Chemical Demilitarization Branch, 
presented background information on the progress of 
CW and CWPF destruction and conversion (One CWPF to 
be destroyed in India and three to be converted )one 
in Russia and two in Libya). He noted 16 of 37 CWSFs 
remain. He digressed to Article VII issues noting 
that only 79 of 183 States Parties have complete 
implementing legislation. When asked whether industry 
inspections as currently executed were able to 
recognize new technological threats, Mr Anelli said 
that inspections are limited to facilities using 
scheduled chemicals and that the schedules needed to 
be "updated," or failing that, the general purpose 
criterion needs to be reinforced.  He added that 
perhaps the Second RevCon might find suitable 
language. 
 
¶7. (U) Possibility of Non-Declared Chemical Weapons 
States Parties to the Convention.  Richard Guthrie of 
CBW Events noted that there have been wild claims of 
States currently possessing active CW capability. 
For example report by Noaber (ed: Noaber Foundation, 
Lunteren, The Netherlands) indicated that seventeen 
States had such a capability, implying that five 
States Parties are in violation of the CWC. Guthrie 
further noted while cheating on CWC obligations is 
possible, it is improbable in that it is cheap to 
comply and expensive to cheat. He noted that no State 
Party has an overt CW program.  Still one must be 
alert to three cheating scenarios: undeclared past CW 
possession, undeclared current CW possession and 
undeclared future possession.  Any confirmed cheating 
detection would need to be dealt with at the highest 
levels. 
 
¶8. (U) In sum, he concluded that CW is no longer a 
currency of power, accession to the CWC reduces 
inclination to cheat, wild claims are 
counterproductive, and use of CW possession 
accusations for short term political gain must be 
measured against effects on long term global 
security. In response to the observation that NGOs 
primarily based in the developed world are viewed 
with suspicion by the developing world, Mr Guthrie 
said that some NGOs are working to broaden their base 
and are assisting growth of related NGOs in the 
developing world. 
 
¶9. (U) Chemical Threat represented by States not 
Party to the Convention.  Ambassador Serguei 
Batsanov, Director of the Pugwash Geneva Office, 
 
 
 
observed that the threat of use of CW in the 
traditional sense has declined and that threats of 
use of toxic chemicals by terrorists have increased. 
An additional threat lies in the fact that 12 States 
are still not party to the CWC (5 have signed but not 
ratified: Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, 
Israel and Myanmar) and 7 have not even signed 
(Angola, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia 
and Syria). In judging the CW threats posed by States 
Not Party, factors to be considered include reported 
use of CW in the past; manifested interest in CW and 
available industrial capability, and positions taken 
in relation to the CWC and the Geneva Protocol of 
¶1925. 
 
¶10. (U) Applying these criteria, the Bahamas, 
Dominican Republic and Guinea Bissau present only 
illegal chemical trafficking threats. Myanmar has 
pharmaceutical and fertilizer industries, is alleged 
to have interest in CW and thus may present a certain 
chemical threat.  Israel is widely perceived to have 
CW know-how and industrial capability, has an 
excellent WMD protection system, but has decided 
against CWC ratification.  However, there are no 
indications that it has any intention of creating a 
CW arsenal or has the need to use CW in a military 
conflict.  Iraq and Lebanon have had active contacts 
with the OPCW and are moving toward accession to the 
CWC. In Somalia, which is in a continual crisis, 
traditional CW threats are low, while the threat of 
use of toxic substances by terrorists is high. 
Angola is developing its chemical potential, but 
presents little threat. 
 
¶11. (U) Syria and Egypt are on record against joining 
the CWC, citing Israel's nuclear threat and Israel's 
reluctance to join the CWC.  Egypt has been reported 
in the past to have used CW and to have had an active 
CW program, so there are reasons to suspect some sort 
of chemical threat in the regional context.  North 
Korea is widely assumed to have CW capability, but 
little reliable information exists. Amb Batsanov 
suggested that the situations of all these States not 
Party are different, and that tailored strategies 
should therefore be used to encourage them to accede 
to the CWC. Amb Batsanov was queried as to what 
tailored strategies to encourage ratification of the 
CWC might entail.  He responded that tailoring might 
contain the following elements: doing serious work to 
understand the countries' problems; determining what 
is possible to attain in the short to mid-term 
period; identifying political forces; understanding 
the financial forces; determining the assistance 
needed; and getting attention at the highest levels 
in the countries in question. Mr Guthrie added that 
consideration of domestic politics is very important. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
POSSIBILITIES FOR THE CWC VERIFICATION REGIME TO TAKE 
INTO ACCOUNT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶12. (U) The Dual Use Problem and Technical Changes: 
Chemical Research Laboratories, Misuse, and the 
General Purpose Criterion.  Dr. John R. Walker of the 
UK Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office), indicated that 
declared Schedule 1 laboratories pose negligible 
threats, and of the various laboratories conducting 
research activities in academia, chemical industry 
and the pharmaceutical industry, the smaller 
laboratories posed the greatest risk for toxic 
chemical and technology diversion, particularly to 
terrorist groups. Necessary controls need to be put 
in place, and the types of controls will in part be 
 
 
 
dependent on the terrorist threat. These might 
include promulgation of rules and regulations in 
relation to documentation, access to facilities, 
accounting for equipment and chemicals, physical 
security training and supervision.  Implementation of 
rules and regulations must include consideration of 
the general purpose criterion of the CWC.  Dr Walker 
was asked about whether challenge inspection would be 
useful against rogue laboratories to which he replied 
that it would. 
 
¶13. (U) Which Are Presently the Most Sensitive 
Technological Fields, and What Potential Risks Could 
Result from Convergence between Chemistry and 
Biology?  Professor Jean-Claude Tabet (Pierre and 
Marie Curie University, Department of Structural 
Chemistry and Biology) outlined the scientific and 
technological area that might pose risks to the CWC: 
accelerated chemical and drug discovery processes; 
nanoscience and technology; advances in production 
technologies; advances in delivery systems; 
bioengineering; and the convergence of chemical and 
biological science and technologies. All of the above 
can be considered building blocks for the development 
of new chemical and biological agents.  Professor 
Tabet stated his view that, of these, nanotechnology 
poses the greatest threat, but that in any case the 
threats are real now. It was pointed out that there 
is likely to be a rather large time gap between 
discovery of a new technology and its weaponization. 
Professor Tabet agreed and said that "now" could be 
as long as 10 years in the future. 
 
¶14. (U)  What Fair and Effective Controls Could Be 
Implemented to Further Strengthen the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Verification Regime?  Emmanuel 
Sartorius (HFDS, French Ministry of Economics, 
Finance and Employment) reviewed the experiences of 
France with the OPCW Article VI verification regime 
for Schedule 2, Schedule 3 and OCPF facilities during 
the past 10 years.  He noted that so far, France has 
received 53 inspections (32 Schedule 2, 11 Schedule 3 
and 10 OCPF).  He observed that the emphasis on 
Schedule 2 inspections may not be deserved as, in his 
opinion, the relevance of the Schedule 3 and OCPF 
sites to the interests of the Convention was about 
the same.  He noted France was concerned that 
advances in science and technology such as movement 
of industry to developing countries, the biological- 
chemical technological convergence, microreactor 
production technologies and modern process controls 
might not be taken into account by the OPCW.  He 
further noted that the OPCW had not yet observed 
noncompliance and asked whether this was because 
there had been no noncompliance, or because the 
verification regime was not capable of detecting 
noncompliance. 
 
¶15. (U) Sartorius suggested that the verification 
regime could be strengthened by: improved 
declarations (quality control, frequency of updates, 
nil declarations as appropriate); improving the 
Technical Secretariat's efficiency (enhanced 
declaration analysis and feedback to States Parties; 
declarations of OCPFs to contain more activity 
information such as multipurpose/dedicated, 
continuous/batch, linkage between government and 
industry); increased numbers of industry inspections; 
increased numbers of OCPF inspection with concomitant 
reduction in Schedule 2 inspections; improved 
geographic distribution of inspections; improved 
selection of plant sites for inspection (taking into 
account quality of information in the declaration, 
prior inspection information, level of State Party 
cooperation, technical changes in the plant site, use 
of relevant open source data); reduced costs of 
 
 
 
inspection by reducing inspection team sizes; and 
adapting inspection procedures to account for 
advances in science and technology including 
microreactors, biotechnology and advice of the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). 
 
¶16. (U) Sartorius noted that sampling and analysis 
should be employed only where needed, and as required 
beyond Schedule 2 facilities to include Schedule 3 
facilities and OCPFs. Sampling should be done at 
valid sample points, and there should be an 
operational mode between open and blinded modes. 
Further, sampling and analysis should include 
quantification, and sampling and analysis equipment 
should be modernized. Mr Sartorius suggested that the 
Verification Division should be augmented by a 
Documentation Center whose role would be to locate 
information from open sources to augment declared 
information of plant sites and track developments in 
science and technology. He hoped that the Second 
RevCon would take his points into account. It was 
observed that changes in Technical Secretariat 
structure would require financial and organizational 
means.  The importance of the SAB in addressing 
advances in science and technology was generally 
supported. And it was pointed out that use of open 
source information could have difficulty finding 
political support, but that additional information 
would be a valuable resource to the Technical 
Secretariat for improving the efficiency of the 
inspection regimes. 
 
¶17. (U) The Importance of Taking into Account Non- 
State Actors.  Mr. Claude Wachtel, of the French 
Secretary General's Office of National Defense, noted 
that terrorist attacks using chemicals, whether the 
Tokyo attack of 1995 or the chlorine attacks in Iraq 
have been crude and non-optimized.  However, the 
scenarios are different, and this creates the problem 
of how to prepare for an attack with an effective 
security plan. There is the risk of overestimation. 
Balance is required. With non-state actors we are 
facing a very wide range of chemical possibilities, 
blurred boundaries between terrorism and crime which 
might be motivated by maliciousness, vengeance, 
rebellion against society, and criminal intent. The 
spread of knowledge is also a problem, and the 
availability of skilled technician and high-level 
scientists for recruitment by non-state actors 
increases the threat. Thus, involvement of non-state 
actors creates complexity and uncertainty for which, 
to date, there is no easy solution. As a suffix to 
other comments suggesting OPCW involvement in anti- 
terrorism activities, Amb. Javits commented that the 
OPCW cannot go beyond the tools provided by the CWC 
and that the Second RevCon can address how to apply 
these tools, one of the most potent of which is 
investigation of alleged use. 
 
¶18. (U) Mapping of New Flows Involving Chemical 
Products.  Mr. Neil Harvey (Head International Trade, 
UK Industries Association) presented background 
information on the chemical industry that was 
collected by CEFIC, the European chemical industry 
trade organization, that was current as of 2006. He 
noted that the chemical industry in the EU alone 
produced over 30,000 products that fell into 4 
groups: basic (42.7%), pharmaceuticals (27.9%), 
specialties (19.2% and consumer (10.2%). Of these, 
the specialty chemicals would offer the best 
resources for terrorist chemical activities although 
consumer products are, of course, more readily 
available. World wide, $1.6 trillion worth of 
chemicals were produced in 2006. The relative values 
of production globally are: Asia (33%), EU (29%), 
NAFTA (25%), Eastern Europe (5%), Latin America (5%), 
 
 
 
Others (2%). These figures include a shift of 
approximately 10% in production from the EU and NAFTA 
mainly to Asia in the past decade, which is likely to 
continue, as GDP growth is the driver for chemical 
industry investment. 
 
¶19. (U) Mr. Harvey noted his concern that illicit 
chemical activities might be promoted in the 
increasing numbers of available closed chemical 
facilities in the Western World. In response to 
questions about what industry was doing to fight 
terrorism, Harvey said CEFIC had initiated a program 
to identify consumer chemical products that might 
find use in chemical devices and will seek to find 
ways of reformulating these products to reduce their 
potential.  He also noted that the International 
Association of Chemical Industries had promoted the 
idea of knowing your customer before you sell or ship 
chemicals, and that it is promoting membership to 
countries in the developing world. 
 
(U) Use of Chemical Products as Devices for Non- 
Conventional Terrorism.  Mr. Brian L'Italien 
(Intelligence Officer, U.S. Defense Intelligence 
Agency), focused on terrorist organizations' interest 
in poisons and chemical warfare, particularly by 
Islamic extremist groups in Iraq.  He noted that the 
terrorists tend to rely on conventional explosives 
for attacks due to their easy accessibility, 
familiarity, ease of use and perhaps, less perceived 
population backlash against the use of conventional 
rather than chemical devices.  Various groups have 
shared information on CBRN over the Internet.  Open 
press reporting cites ten attacks (including attacks 
on Coalition Forces) in Iraq since October 2006 that 
involved chlorine, an industrial chemical.  The last 
reported chlorine attack occurred in July 2007. Few 
people were killed by the chlorine, but the attacks 
received extensive publicity. There have been no 
reported chlorine attacks in Afghanistan.  The 
terrorists have not re-initiated chlorine attacks. 
 
¶20. (U) Terrorists have evidenced interest in 
traditional CW, especially in Iraqi pre-1991 legacy 
munitions. There has been some evidence of interest 
in homemade CW, as evidenced by captured documents in 
Afghanistan.  However, it is seen as unlikely that 
toxic chemicals and or CW agents will be widely used 
by terrorists and that conventional explosives will 
continue to be the weapons of choice. In response to 
a question about the threat recovered Iraqi CW 
munitions posed to Coalition Forces, L'Italien noted 
that their psychological impact was likely to be far 
greater than their lethal effects. 
 
--------------- 
CLOSING REMARKS 
--------------- 
 
¶21. (U) UK Ambassador Lyn Parker, Chairman of the 
Open Ended Working Group for Preparation of the 
Review Conference, indicated that preparations by the 
OEWG for the Second RevCon had been ongoing for one 
and one-half years with a goal to provide a draft 
report document with clearly delineated texts, parts 
of which had received consensus and some of which 
would continue to be debated.  This process had 
proved difficult.  Amb. Parker said that this was 
perhaps due to the OPCW being in a transitional 
period in which CW destruction is moving towards 
completion and nonproliferation is becoming more the 
focus of the Organization.  In spite of changes that 
have occurred since entry into force of the 
Convention, particularly developments in science and 
technology and changes in industry, he noted that the 
Second RevCon was unlikely to pursue significant 
 
 
 
 
initiatives, but would more probably recognize what 
the OPCW has achieved and consolidate what has been 
accomplished. 
 
¶22. (U) Ambassador Jean-Michel Gaussot, Permanent 
Representative of France to the OPCW, said that the 
OPCW had made significant progress since its 
inception, but not all goals had been achieved.  In 
his view, remaining goals included completion of CW 
destruction; universal adherence to the CWC; full 
implementation of Article VII obligations by all 
States Parties; achieving an efficient and improved 
verification system with increased emphasis on OCPFs 
(and even the possible installation of a 
Documentation Center with open source 
responsibilities); better coordination with the UN in 
relation to terrorism; and response to the new 
developments in science and technology. These are all 
challenges for the Second RevCon. 
 
¶23. (U) Javits sends. 
Gallagher