VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0396/01 1301606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091606Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1424
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000396 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR 
THREE WEEKS ENDING MAY 9, 2008 
 
This is CWC-17-08. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) The weeks following the CWC Second Review 
Conference (RevCon) have been fairly quiet, due no 
doubt in part to post-RevCon exhaustion as well as a 
series of official holidays.  The only consultations 
held were within the industry cluster, although two 
WEOG meetings, an Irish-hosted lunch, and a 
commemoration ceremony at the OPCW for victims of 
chemical warfare have offered ample opportunity for 
the delegation to begin gauging reactions to the 
process and outcome of the RevCon.  In WEOG in 
particular, delegations now seem to be making the 
psychological shift from dissecting the process to 
evaluating the impact of the final document on the 
future work of the Organization. 
 
¶2.  (U) Much of the reporting that follows is part of 
the continuing process of assessing the results of 
the Second Review Conference.  An initial U.S. 
assessment was released as THE HAGUE 349, and further 
detailed analysis of both the process and substance 
of the RevCon will be forthcoming. 
 
--------------- 
REVCON FEEDBACK 
--------------- 
 
WEOG Meeting April 22 
 
¶3. (SBU) At the WEOG meeting April 22, immediately 
following the Second Review Conference, it was clear 
that the experience of the preceding two weeks, 
particularly the last several days, had resulted in 
widespread disappointment and dissatisfaction with 
the process.  Several delegations noted their concern 
that negotiations have become much more politicized 
over the past several years, and that distrust 
between groups/blocs of countries (most notably the 
Non Aligned Movement/NAM) has increased.  A number of 
delegations also noted that the exclusivity of the 
negotiating group and the complete lack of 
transparency of process could easily lead to a result 
(report) of questionable legitimacy and long term 
loss of support for the Organization. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Negotiating tactics were also a subject of 
lengthy discussion.  Delegations admitted that, while 
frustrating, the NAM tactics had been quite 
effective, and that more coordinated WEOG efforts 
could be useful in future sessions.  Austria in 
particular noted that the NAM text presented as a 
counter-proposal to the Chair,s draft was an extreme 
position, whereas most WEOG members came in with 
fairly moderate suggestions, and that perhaps WEOG 
should also consider opening negotiations with more 
extreme positions.  There was also widespread 
agreement that the &NAM common position8 is anything 
but that, and that moderate NAM members are 
unfortunately reluctant to speak out against 
positions established almost solely by the most 
radical of the NAM membership.  Several delegations 
also raised the possibility of simply not having a 
concluding document of the Conference, as opposed to 
agreeing to something of little to no value (or, in 
the worst case scenario, harm) to the Organization. 
 
¶5. (SBU) When the group turned briefly to substance, 
Amb. Maarten Lak of the Netherlands noted several 
positive elements of the report, and suggested that 
upcoming WEOG meetings focus on how to use the EC to 
move the work of the Organization forward.  Although 
Canada noted its concern that the document is, in 
 
some areas, weaker than the report of the First 
RevCon, several other delegations acknowledged that 
the final report was probably the best possible 
outcome given the political dynamics. 
 
WEOG Meeting May 6 
 
¶6. (U) At the follow-up WEOG meeting on May 6, most 
delegations were clearly unprepared to talk about the 
implications of the RevCon report for the future work 
of the Organization.  The Netherlands and Italy noted 
the importance of a proactive approach to shaping 
upcoming EC sessions, as opposed to reacting to NAM 
proposals, but did not offer specific areas of focus. 
U.S. Del, drawing on informal guidance from 
Washington, outlined five possible areas the U.S. 
would like to pursue in the coming months:  enhancing 
the functioning and utility of the Scientific 
Advisory Board; improving the functioning of the EC; 
preparing the OPCW to address verification issues 
posed by advances in science and technology; 
increasing the use of the OPCW as a discussion forum 
for experts; and, continuing progress on national 
implementation.  This was well received, and prompted 
other WEOG members to respond to and expand on the 
list. 
 
¶7. (U) The Netherlands agreed that developing a more 
systematic approach to EC work was very important, 
and suggested addressing this in upcoming WEOG 
meetings.  German Amb. Werner Burkart noted that as 
incoming WEOG Vice Chair, he would be happy to assist 
in this effort, but would appreciate more specific 
advice from interested delegations.  Spain 
recommended that outreach to stakeholders be pursued 
vigorously as well, and WEOG coordinator Annie Mari 
suggested inviting OPCW Head of Media and Public 
Affairs Michael Luhan to address the group at the end 
of May.  Amb. Javits also solicited feedback on the 
Public Service Announcement that was shown late on 
the last night of the RevCon; from the mixed reaction 
and the late hour of the screening, it was clear that 
another screening in WEOG might be useful. 
 
Chinese Request for U.S. Assessment of RevCon Results 
 
¶8. (U) On May 5, U.S. Del received a call from the 
Chinese delegate Gao Huijun, looking for the U.S. 
assessment of the Review Conference.  Del replied in 
general terms that the U.S. was satisfied with the 
outcome, and saw good scope for future work.  Gao 
noted that Beijing was also quite satisfied, and 
found the result balanced and perhaps even stronger 
than the report of the First RevCon.  He also 
expressed China,s appreciation for the constructive 
attitude and cooperation of the U.S. during the 
RevCon.  U.S. and Chinese delegations agreed that 
follow up bilateral discussions on post-RevCon 
analysis and priorities would be useful. 
 
&RevCon Post-Mortem8 Lunch 
 
¶9. (SBU) On May 8, Irish Ambassador Richard Ryan 
hosted a lunch to discuss the outcome of the RevCon, 
lessons learned, and how to proceed in the coming 
months.  Attendees included Director General Pfirter, 
Deputy Director General Freeman, and representatives 
from the U.S., UK, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Canada, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Initial discussions 
covered old ground in terms of the abysmal process 
and lack of leadership in the Committee of the Whole 
(COW).  The Director General and others spoke quite 
freely about the impact of the personality of the 
Chair of the COW (Algerian Amb. Dani), and the 
increasingly problematic role of the Non Aligned 
Movement in general, and Iran specifically. 
 
¶10. (SBU) An idealistic desire to come up with 
guidelines that would prevent similar problems in 
future gradually turned into a realistic desire to 
simply capture the lessons learned for the Chair of 
the next RevCon.  Amb. Javits noted the inevitable 
role personalities will play, and suggested that 
delegations focus on recommending improvements to the 
process that might mitigate this.  His suggestions 
included the early establishment of facilitators for 
certain groups of issues, well before the Conference 
itself.  A group of capable Ambassadors already 
familiar with the issues and various countries, 
positions would be invaluable, and could serve as a 
de facto &friends of the Chair8 group, which would be 
difficult to ignore in the way the General Committee 
was ignored by the Chairman of the COW at this 
Revcon. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The group discussed the transparency of the 
process, which was clearly lacking in the second 
week, but also acknowledged the fact that the group 
of eighteen SPs was a vast improvement over previous 
CSP and RevCon negotiations, which have often come 
down to a back room deal between two or three SPs. 
U.K. Amb. Parker also noted that despite its 
efficiency, the system of email submission of 
comments to the draft text also lacked transparency. 
He recommended that if this system is used again in 
the future, delegations submitting comments should 
also be willing to post them on the OPCW external 
server. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Discussions also covered the continued, and 
even growing, impact of Iran and a handful of other 
NAM members on the character of negotiations, and the 
use of consensus-based decision making as a de facto 
veto for those holding the most extreme positions. 
Delegations agreed that even threatening a vote on 
substance was dangerous, but several Ambassadors 
noted the European Commission method of operation, in 
which members understand that if an issue becomes 
bogged down, a simple majority can decide to move on 
(a procedural versus a substantive vote).  There was 
agreement that this was useful, but also a lack of 
clarity in terms of how it could be applied in the 
OPCW context. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In looking ahead, the Director General 
highlighted several aspects of the report.  He 
pointed to the absence of a reference to an actual 
office in Africa as a positive step.  He also stated 
that, in his view, Article X language leaves open the 
door for Iranian claims for indemnity of their 
victims of chemical warfare, and that he in 
particular has been assigned much of the 
responsibility for this issue.  He then highlighted 
several upcoming efforts in the area of universality, 
to include using the former Pakistani Ambassador as a 
consultant to visit high level persons in Myanmar 
with whom he has close relationships, and the 
possibility of another Mediterranean conference.  In 
his view, the decision not to hold such a conference 
might send the unfortunate signal that member states 
are not maintaining pressure on States Not Party to 
join the Convention. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Pfirter also outlined some of the more 
immediate issues coming up for the June session of 
the Executive Council.  He first mentioned the OPCW 
budget (both its introduction and the choosing 
facilitators), and the fact that the 2009 budget 
would again be zero nominal growth and contain a 
modest increase in OCPF inspections, while holding 
the number of inspections of other Schedules 
constant.  Other issues included choosing new 
facilitators for a number of consultations, the 
pending Russian facility agreements and verification 
 
plans for Maradykovsky and Leonidovka, and the 
upcoming EC visit to Shchuch,ye, apparently now 
scheduled to begin September 8. 
 
¶15. (U) U.S. Delegation distributed copies of 
Washington,s spreadsheet breakdown of tasks assigned 
by the Revcon, suggesting that perhaps it could be a 
useful tool in analyzing the results of the 
Conference and planning future work.  Amb. Javits was 
also asked to draft a short memo covering some of the 
lessons learned, and circulate it to the group for 
discussion. 
 
 
---------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER 
---------------- 
 
¶16. (U) On May 6, Delreps attended the regularly 
scheduled meetings of the Executive Council's 
Industry Cluster.  The two sessions were: (1) the 
Verification Information System (VIS), and (2) 
import/export transfer discrepancies. 
 
¶17. (U) The demonstration of the VIS was similar to 
what was presented on the margins of the Review 
Conference and in earlier settings.  What was new was 
a related presentation on the National Authority e- 
Declaration Software.  This Technical Secretariat- 
developed tool will allow States Parties (SP) to 
submit their periodic Article VI declarations in an 
electronic format, much as is being done currently by 
the U.S. and a few other SPs using their internally- 
developed software.  The first phase of this 
software, supporting OCPF and aggregate national data 
(AND) declarations, will be released during the last 
quarter of 2008.  Training for this tool will be held 
for delegations on December 1 in The Hague, between 
the Annual Meeting of National Authorities and the 
Conference of States Parties.  The second phase of 
this software, supporting Schedule 1, 2, and 3 
declarations, will be released during the first half 
of 2009.  The TS will be looking for SPs who are 
willing to test the new software and provide feedback 
for continual improvement of the tool. 
 
¶18. (U) The discussion of transfer discrepancies was 
rather disappointing.  India, which had expressed 
multiple concerns in the past, came to the meeting 
with instructions from capital to join consensus on 
the draft decision; this seemed to give a hope of 
success for this consultation.  However, South Africa 
then launched into a long series of fairly small 
changes, which led to (at times incoherent) Iranian 
suggestions that further muddied the waters.  In the 
end, the consultation came close to a stalemate, with 
delegations like Germany prepared to end further 
consultations.  The co-facilitators (Japan and 
Switzerland) adeptly kept the consultation alive by 
suggesting that they would do their best to 
accommodate all of the suggestions made in a new 
draft decision within two weeks.  The goal, at that 
point, will be to meet again to see if a consensus 
can be reached and a decision forwarded to the 
Executive Council for its meeting in late-June. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
SCHEDULE 1 FACILITY AGREEMENT 
----------------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) On April 24, Delrep presented to a 
representative of Policy and Review Branch (PRB, TS) 
a draft facility agreement for an industry Schedule 1 
facility in the U.S.  This draft, based on an earlier 
draft by the TS and formatted after last year's 
successfully finalized Schedule 2 facility agreement, 
 
 
contains relevant input from the facility.  PRB plans 
to lead the TS review of this draft over the next two 
weeks or so, with the goal of placing it on the 
agenda for the upcoming Executive Council (EC) 
meeting for consideration.  If this can be finalized 
and distributed well in advance of the EC meeting, 
the hope is that it will increase the chances of its 
being approved at the late-June meeting. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
DAY OF REMEMBRANCE FOR ALL VICTIMS OF CHEMICAL 
WARFARE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶20. (U) On April 29, the OPCW hosted a commemoration 
ceremony for the victims of chemical warfare.  The 
program included the laying of a wreath at the 
memorial site behind the OPCW, and speeches by 
Director General Pfirter, Amb. Idris (Sudanese Chair 
of the Conference of States Parties), Secretary 
General of the Dutch MFA Kronenburg, and Vice Mayor 
of The Hague Huffnagel.  Of note, the Director 
General,s speech made reference to the Article X 
section of the RevCon report that highlighted the 
RevCon,s mandate on assistance to the victims of 
chemical warfare. 
 
¶21. (U) Javits sends. 
Gallagher