VZCZCXRO0587
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #1080/01 1430757
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 220757Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6778
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

"S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 001080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KPAL KWBG EG IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SHIN BET CHIEF FOCUSES 
ON ISRAEL'S ARABS, THE GAZA STRIP, AND OMAR SOLIMAN'S VISIT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) In a May 13 meeting covering a range of subjects, 
Israeli Security Agency (ISA, or Shin Bet) Chief Yuval Diskin 
told Ambassador Jones the following: 
 
-- Israel's Arabs are materially better off than many Arabs 
in neighboring countries, but increasingly feel disconnected 
from the State, and tend to identify themselves first as 
Arabs, and sometimes Muslims, rather than as Israelis. 
Arab-Israeli Knesset Members are not helping by flirting with 
enemy regimes in Syria and elsewhere, exploiting their 
parliamentary immunity.  Diskin and the ISA have been 
advocates within the GOI for doing more to reconnect 
Israeli-Arabs with Israel.  The many ideas Diskin and others 
have come up with to do this cost money, which the GOI does 
not have. 
 
-- The ISA understands the USG rationale for providing 
certain types of equipment to the Palestinian Authority 
Security Forces (PASF), but will approve transfer requests on 
a case-by-case basis, depending on the capabilities of the 
equipment, and how the PASF intend to use them.  The ISA 
cannot approve direct transfers of equipment to the PA 
Presidential Guard (PG) as the PG is now a GOI-designated 
terrorist organization as a result of activities by many of 
its officers during the Second Intifada.  If necessary, 
equipment could be transferred to the PG via a third party. 
 
-- Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman's visit opened up 
a very sensitive period.  Israel presented its conditions for 
a ""cooling down"", or cease-fire/tahdiya with Hamas, and now 
it is Hamas' turn to respond once Soliman conveys those 
conditions.  They include a complete cessation of terrorist 
activity in the Gaza Strip.  In addition, Israel will not 
tolerate any direction from the Gaza Strip of terrorist 
activities in the West Bank.  Passages between Israel and the 
Gaza Strip will be opened gradually as Hamas and the other 
terrorist groups cease their attacks.  Rafah Crossing can be 
opened, but PA President Abu Mazen must get credit for the 
opening.  Diskin and many in the GOI are skeptical that Hamas 
will agree to the tahdiya, or that it would last long.  Many 
in the GOI and IDF, including Diskin, believe Israel must 
re-enter Gaza in force sooner rather than later, to cut back 
the terrorists' growing capabilities there. 
 
¶2. (S) The Ambassador asked Diskin's assistance in ensuring 
the ISA's prompt approval of hundreds of entry permits for 
participants in the upcoming Bethlehem Conference.  Diskin 
promised ISA would work as quickly as possible and approve as 
many permits as possible.  At the Ambassador's request, 
Diskin also promised to help a Palestinian student in the 
Gaza Strip receive an entry permit so that he could attend 
his visa interview for college study in the U.S.  Diskin also 
said ISA would issue Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi entry permits 
for Jerusalem events one day at a time, ""as long as he 
behaves himself.""  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
DISKIN ON ISRAEL'S ARABS -- COMPLICATED, GROWING PROBLEM 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶3. (S) Responding to the Ambassador's question about Diskin's 
current assessment of the Arab-Israeli population -- 
especially in light of an incident May 8 during which an 
Arab-Israeli MK claimed he had been attacked by an undercover 
police officer -- Diskin initially expressed reluctance and 
discomfort in answering the question, explaining that how 
Israel treats its Arab citizens is its own internal affair. 
Then, opening up, Diskin proceeded to spend the next ten 
minutes describing his concerns about Israel's Arab-Israeli 
population.  According to the ISA chief, many of them ""take 
their rights too far,"" and the community itself is suffering 
from an identity crisis.  Most, he claimed, want to live in 
Israel.  At the same time, they see themselves first as 
Arabs, and then as Muslims.  (He acknowledged that a small 
percentage are Christians.)  He assessed that the 
Israeli-Arab political leadership is trying to take the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict in a new direction and give it a 
new ""national color.""  Thankfully, he observed, they are not 
succeeding, and their efforts are not filtering down to the 
general public, which is more concerned with daily life. 
Still, the ISA Chief said his agency is rightly concerned 
with this.  He added that the ISA is also monitoring other 
 
TEL AVIV 00001080  002 OF 005 
 
 
forms of extremism within Israel's population, including 
Jewish extremists.  He added that the ISA is also aware that 
there are problems among Israel's Bedouin and Druze. 
 
¶4. (S) Diskin said that the main challenge for the GOI is to 
figure out how to ""connect"" these people with the State of 
Israel.  It is complex as it requires them to live their 
daily lives in contradiction.  Most of the time, he allowed, 
they have been loyal to the State over the previous sixty 
years -- even during the 1967 and 1973 wars and ""waves of 
terror"" that followed.  The percentage of families that have 
connections with ""bad people on the other side doing bad 
things"" is very low, he said.  He claimed that most of the 
Israeli-Arabs who have caused problems were refugees who were 
given permits to re-enter Israel in order to reunify with 
family members already living in Israel.  ""In these cases,"" 
he said, ""they brought their bad ideas with them, and then 
acted on them.""  He continued:  ""Allowing Palestinians to 
return over the past few years was foolish.  The Bedouin have 
brought women with them from the Gaza Strip and Jenin and now 
have many children.  We need to manage this immigration in a 
controlled way. It is hard for us to absorb large quantities 
of people the way we have been doing these last few years."" 
 
¶5. (S) Diskin noted that one of the main problems the GOI is 
facing now is that Arab-Israeli Knesset members are visiting 
enemy states, exploiting their parliamentary immunity in 
order to visit countries like Syria and mix with groups like 
Hizballah.  ""These people,"" he said, ""are not spreading the 
democratic values of Israel.  Instead, they are being 
co-opted by people like Bashar Assad.""  Diskin lamented that 
the ISA has to ""deal with them now,"" as -- in his words -- 
the Israeli National Police have failed to do what they were 
supposed to do.  Pointing to the high-profile case of MK Azmi 
Bishara, Diskin said, tongue in cheek, that Israel would 
""welcome his return"" from Syria, and that he would likely 
spend many years in an Israeli prison if he returns. 
 
¶6. (S) Diskin suggested that the ISA has been a voice for 
assisting Arab-Israelis constructively over the last several 
years.  He claimed that the ISA has been ""constantly pushing 
and prodding"" the GOI to ""prevent their issues from falling 
through the cracks.""  While the GOI has come up with many 
good ideas, Diskin observed, it nevertheless lacks funding to 
follow through on them.  He claimed he and President Peres 
had recently discussed the need for more high-tech employment 
opportunities for Arab-Israelis, as well as colleges and 
training centers.  He added that Prime Minister Olmert is 
""deeply involved,"" and noted that Olmert will chair a 
government-run conference in June on the situation of the 
Arab-Israeli population.  ""It will,"" he said, ""be a good 
start to making better policy on this issue."" 
 
¶7. (S) The Ambassador replied that the USG offers a small 
number of scholarships every year for Arab-Israelis to help 
them with graduate-level studies in the U.S.  He indicated 
that the embassy would be willing to consider candidates that 
the ISA brought to its attention.  The Ambassador observed 
that Israel's Arab and Druze minorities should be viewed as 
potential ""bridges"" to Israel's neighbors.  In the future, 
they could help to change thinking and promote reform in the 
Arab world. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
ISA CONSIDERING EQUIPMENT APPROVALS FOR PASF 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) The Ambassador raised the issue of GOI approvals for 
equipment the USG is providing to the Palestinian Authority 
Security Forces (PASF) for their training and use.  He noted 
that to date, the GOI has approved some of the equipment, and 
denied the provision of other pieces of equipment, including 
protective equipment like kevlar helmets, and vests.  The 
Ambassador observed that it is likely the USG will be 
submitting more equipment requests to the GOI in the future. 
He noted that many equipment requests form packages that are 
designed to provide specific capabilities that cannot be 
achieved if the equipment packages are only partially 
approved.  This was also the case with investment proposals. 
He urged Diskin to look at any investment proposals stemming 
from the Bethlehem Investment Conference sympathetically, and 
to take the benefits they would provide into account when 
deciding whether to approve them. 
 
¶9. (S) Diskin replied that the ISA also hopes that the 
Bethlehem Conference will succeed, and that the PA will 
progress on the economic front, as it would help to secure 
progress on the political front.  Diskin said he is worried 
 
TEL AVIV 00001080  003 OF 005 
 
 
that we may be asking for too much too quickly on the 
political front, and that it may lead to disaster in the West 
Bank.  While he agreed that creating better living conditions 
in the West Bank is a good idea, he stressed that we have to 
be very careful.  He pointed to incidents in the past to 
explain that arms, ammunition and vests given to the PASF can 
eventually make their way into Hamas' hands.  In the past, 
such equipment has included rifles and heavy machines guns 
that he claimed have been used against IDF helicopters and 
soldiers.  ""I do not think that we need more arms in the West 
Bank,"" he stressed, adding, ""We have given them too much 
ammunition already.""  As for vests, Diskin said that whether 
the GOI approves them depends on how the PASF will use them, 
and the capabilities of the vests themselves.  Admitting he 
did not know the MOD's position on the vests, Diskin said 
that the ISA did not object to their provision to the PASF. 
He noted, however, that the ISA strongly opposes bringing 
armored vehicles into the West Bank. 
 
¶10. (S) Diskin stressed that the ISA opposes providing 
equipment to the Presidential Guard (PG), as the PG is a 
designated terrorist organization as a result of its 
officers' activities during the Second Intifada.  Diskin 
recounted that he told PM Olmert that ""it would not be good"" 
for Israel to transfer arms and weapons to the PG directly. 
He said he told PM Olmert that such items could be given to a 
third party, and that they could then turn the items over to 
the PG.  Diskin added, ""We can find ways to give it to a 
third party."" 
 
¶11. (S) Reiterating the importance of equipping the PASF, the 
Ambassador stressed that the USG is requesting permission to 
turn over almost 3,000 vests and helmets for the graduates of 
U.S. training programs.  Diskin responded that the final 
answer is with the MOD:  ""ISA has no veto on this.  Sometimes 
the MOD opposes us.""  Reviewing USSC Dayton's request, Diskin 
said that the ISA agreed with the USSC, although it pointed 
out the problem of directly transferring equipment to the PG. 
 Diskin said that other pieces of equipment, including water 
trucks and ladders, are still being reviewed by the ISA, but 
indicated that he would approve most of them.  He added that 
he will oppose the provision of AK-47 rifles and ammunition 
to the PASF:  ""There are too many guns and ammunition in the 
West Bank already."" 
 
---------------------------------------- 
DISKIN ON GAZA AND OMAR SOLIMAN'S VISIT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) Asked about Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar 
Soliman's visit, Diskin noted that he had met with Soliman 
the day before (May 12).  Diskin characterized it as an 
""interesting meeting -- a good atmosphere swirling with many 
lies -- exactly what is to be expected in the Middle East."" 
The situation now, in the wake of Soliman's visit, is a 
sensitive one.  Soliman was surprised to hear that Israel was 
ready for a tahdiya, but only under certain conditions. 
According to Diskin, ISA played a key role in formulating the 
conditions.  Israel cannot accept a tahdiya without a 
commitment to stop weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. 
This requires Egypt's commitment, as it is a sovereign state. 
 While weapons entering the Gaza Strip are coming from Sudan, 
Eritrea, Yemen and other countries, Egypt is the last place 
they pass through before they enter the Strip.  Diskin 
cautioned:  ""We have been too patient about this.  We cannot 
tolerate this anymore."" 
 
¶13. (S) Diskin added that terrorist attacks from the Gaza 
Strip and in the West Bank must stop.  This includes, he 
stressed, the directing of terror attacks within the West 
Bank from the Gaza Strip.  Diskin said that the ISA knows 
that terrorist organizations in the West Bank have contacts 
with organizations in the Gaza Strip including Hamas, the 
Popular Resistance Committees, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and 
especially the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.  He claimed that 
Israeli security services have often found that terrorist 
infrastructure in the Gaza Strip provides funding and 
direction to operatives in the West Bank.  Diskin said that 
he told Soliman that if, under a tahdiya, there is an attack 
in the West Bank and Israel determines that there was no 
connection with the Gaza Strip, then Israel will not 
retaliate against targets in the Gaza Strip.  If, however, 
Israel determines that there is a Gaza Strip connection, then 
attacks will be carried out against Gaza Strip targets. 
Without elaborating, Diskin pointed out that, if the tahdiya 
is to start, Hamas will have to make commitments to Egypt. 
He said that Soliman seemed to understand the Israeli 
position.  He added that PM Olmert and DefMin Barak also made 
 
TEL AVIV 00001080  004 OF 005 
 
 
the same points to the Egyptian intelligence chief. 
 
¶14. (S) Diskin explained how observation of the tahdiya would 
correlate with opening of the Rafah crossing and passages 
between the Gaza Strip and Israel.  As smuggling and 
terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip decline, then the 
passages can be gradually opened.  As for the Rafah crossing, 
in Israel's view, it is essential that PA President Abbas be 
involved in its opening, so that he receives credit for it. 
 
¶15. (S) Diskin said that Israel does not like the tahdiya -- 
seeing it as a means whereby Hamas and other groups can 
regroup and re-arm -- but also dislikes the current 
situation.  The ISA, he said, believes that the best option 
now is a large-scale ground incursion into the Gaza Strip 
that allows the IDF to take over the southern part of the 
Gaza Strip and to stop smuggling and increase pressure on 
Hamas.  ""If you do this, it will cause big problems for 
Hamas' survival in the Gaza Strip,"" he said.  ""We can do it,"" 
he added.  He continued:  ""None of us like the idea of a 
military operation in the Gaza Strip, but we also believe we 
cannot avoid it.  I do not believe in this 'cooling down' 
that the tahdiya would afford.  Even if it starts, it will 
not last long.  The way we are now treating the current 
situation is not effective.  It is a waste of time, money and 
life.  A ground invasion may lead to loss of life, but would 
be more effective.  We need to be ready to take over the 
southern Gaza Strip and hold on to it for as long as 
necessary.  Months and years if need be.  Strategically, all 
of us understand that we cannot avoid the Gaza Strip if there 
is to be a roadmap and a peace process.""  Diskin added, ""My 
job is to tell the inconvenient truth.  I am glad that others 
are finally realizing that the situation in the Gaza Strip is 
intolerable and getting worse every day.  The situation in 
Lebanon makes it easier for us to make our case.  We need to 
be very tough in dealing with the problem of the Gaza Strip. 
Egypt will not resolve the problem for us, and Abu Mazen will 
not and cannot."" 
 
¶16. (S) Diskin observed that Soliman looks at the Gaza Strip 
the way any Arab and Egyptian would -- with an eye towards 
kicking it down the road:  ""I believe his policy is to try to 
buy more time.  It is not to solve a problem, but to see what 
will happen down the road.""  Diskin lamented that there are 
so many problems in the Middle East that it prevents pursuing 
and implementing a long-term policy.  He concluded, ""It is 
hard to anticipate all the factors when formulating a course 
of action.  Events in other states -- things like the price 
of oil -- surprise you.  Everyone is surprised all the time. 
To survive in the Middle East, you have to be like a shark in 
the water.  You have to keep moving forward or you will die."" 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
DISKIN PROMISES TO ASSIST WITH ENTRY PERMITS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) The Ambassador requested Diskin's assistance in 
ensuring that entry permits for Bethlehem Conference invitees 
are issued as quickly as possible.  While noting our 
appreciation that more than 200 had been approved, the 
Ambassador pointed out that over 400 had been requested.  He 
stressed that invitees are anxious and may start canceling 
participation if they do not receive their permits by the end 
of the week.  Diskin said the ISA would do its best, and that 
he had told his staff two months ago to treat each request 
positively, unless an invitee posed a clear threat.  Diskin 
said he would work closely with the MOD on the permits, and 
asked to be informed if any problems emerged.  Diskin 
reiterated that he had given clear instructions to his staff 
to approve as many permits as possible. 
 
¶18. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin's assistance in 
obtaining an entry permit for Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi so 
that he could attend a May 27 interfaith meeting in 
Jerusalem.  The Ambassador noted that FM Livni is also 
invited to attend the meeting.  Diskin said Tamimi will 
receive a permit, but for that day only.  The Ambassador 
undertook to have a U.S. security officer accompany Tamimi 
while he is in Jerusalem, as had been done during his 
previous interfaith meeting in Jerusalem. 
 
¶19. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin's assistance in 
obtaining an entry permit for a Palestinian student in the 
Gaza Strip who needs to travel to Jerusalem in order to 
undergo a May 22 visa interview in connection with his 
acceptance to MIT.  Diskin promised to assist and requested 
all the information on the student. 
 
 
TEL AVIV 00001080  005 OF 005 
 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
JONES 
"