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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: PRO-GREEN SCHOLARS CRITIQUE MA YING-JEOU'S 
INAUGURAL ADDRESS 
 
REF: TAIPEI 698 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: In a recent panel discussion, several 
leading pro-Green scholars argued that President Ma 
Ying-jeou's May 20 inaugural address and his approach in 
general are rooted in the past, turning back to KMT policies 
from the early 1990s (when the party was in power) to address 
21st century issues.  The scholars charged Ma with continuing 
to play partisan politics in his speech by attacking rather 
than giving any credit to the DPP administration.  In their 
view, his foreign policy is confused, seeking to expand 
international space while simultaneously calling for a 
"diplomatic truce" with Beijing.  They also maintained that 
Ma's cross-Strait approach is naive, making major concessions 
to Beijing up front on the assumption that the PRC will 
reciprocate out of simple goodwill.  When major progress on 
fulfilling his lavish campaign promises fails to materialize 
in the coming months, Ma will begin to feel the heat from 
dissatisfied voters, the Green scholars predicted.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A group of leading pro-Green scholars sympathetic 
to the DPP analyzed KMT President Ma Ying-jeou's May 20 
inaugural address and the future of Taiwan politics at a 
panel discussion hosted by the Taiwan Thinktank on May 21. 
Professor Lo Chih-cheng, Chairman of the Political Science 
Department at Soochow University, moderated the discussion. 
The four discussants were Vincent Chen (National Chengchi 
University), Michael Hsiao (Academia Sinica), Lai I-chung 
(Taiwan Thinktank), and Steven Yang (Taiwan Institute of 
Economic Research).  The following paragraphs summarize some 
of the more interesting views presented during the session. 
 
Partisan Politics 
----------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Several scholars suggested President Ma Ying-jeou 
has not moved beyond the highly partisan politics of the past 
several years despite his campaign pledges to promote 
political reconciliation and harmony.  In his inaugural 
address, Ma had nothing good to say about former President 
Chen Shui-bian and his administration, instead implying the 
DPP was corrupt, incompetent, and even an impediment to 
democratic development.  This contrasted with President 
Chen's 2000 and 2004 inaugural addresses, which had 
acknowledged KMT contributions.  They maintained that Ma 
should have been more gracious and conciliatory, pointing to 
at least some of the DPP's major accomplishments, such as 
building the High Speed Railway. 
 
The Question of Sovereignty 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In the opinion of the scholars, Ma demeaned 
Taiwan's status by avoiding references to sovereignty or 
related concepts.  For example, Ma talked about Taiwan's 
"external relations" without referring to "diplomacy" 
(waijiao), a word that implies sovereignty.  In addition, he 
said Taiwan should strive for "dignity, autonomy, pragmatism, 
and flexibility."  Several of the academics criticized Ma's 
use of the word "autonomy" rather than "sovereignty" as a sop 
to Beijing that degrades Taiwan's international status.  In 
his desire to placate China, Ma showed himself naive, 
over-eager, and inconsistent, suggesting at one point that 
Taiwan must continue to expand its international space, but 
later saying the Taipei should reach a "truce" with Beijing 
over diplomatic competition.  The scholars argued that this 
formulation sends an ambiguous message to Taiwan's allies 
about Taipei's commitment to maintain diplomatic 
relationships. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) One scholar suggested Ma's approach to foreign 
relations indicates a strategic realignment in Taiwan's 
priorities.  Although Ma emphasized the importance of the 
U.S. as Taiwan's major security partner and promised to 
strengthen ties with the U.S., he made no mention of the 
relationship with Japan, Taiwan's other major ally.  The DPP 
 
TAIPEI 00000733  002 OF 003 
 
 
had focused on the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan relationship vis-a-vis 
China, but Ma's silence on Japan suggests he is thinking in 
terms of a U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship. 
 
Things Left Unsaid... 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) One scholar suggested the most positive elements of 
Ma's speech were things he left unsaid.  For example, Ma did 
not mention his controversial cross-Strait common market 
proposal, nor did he reiterate past statements suggesting 
that he would de-emphasize the maintenance of diplomatic 
relationships.  He also discussed Taiwan's international 
relations before taking up cross-Strait affairs.  Raising the 
issue in reverse order would have implied Taiwan's 
subservience to China in its external affairs. 
 
...And Words Mistranslated 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The academics criticized the official English 
translation of Ma's address, arguing that it distorted the 
meaning of the original text at several important points. 
Most notably, Ma stated at one point in his speech that 
Taiwan is concerned for the welfare of "Chinese compatriots," 
a passage that reads as the "people of mainland China" in the 
English text.  Ma also referred to those living on both sides 
of the Strait as belonging to "one Chinese nation," (zhonghua 
minzu) a phrase that is translated into English as people 
sharing a "common Chinese heritage."  The Chinese version is 
notable for using words that are conciliatory toward Beijing, 
while the English text, aimed at the Western audience, is 
more neutral. 
 
Honeymoon Over? 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) One academic argued that Ma's inaugural address 
showed he is out of touch with the views of Taiwan's people 
and unprepared to deal with the realities of the island's 
domestic and external political conditions.  Ma made no 
mention of Taiwan identity in his speech, despite the 
important social trend of increasing Taiwan identity over the 
past eight years.  Ma, who also failed to mention the need to 
reform the KMT in his speech, has been separating himself 
from the party to the greatest extent possible to protect his 
image.  This risks exacerbating tensions within the party as 
factions continue to compete for influence.  Ma's 
"honeymoon," which lasted from March 22 to his inauguration 
on May 20, is now over, one Green scholar concluded. 
 
Lowering Economic Expectations 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Ma's inaugural speech was short on economic policy 
specifics, which had been a central theme during the 
campaign.  Some of the scholars suggested Ma now understood 
he had exaggerated the extent of Taiwan's economic problems 
during the campaign.  Others observed he may now want to 
lower expectations, realizing his various economic programs 
would have only a limited effect on the economic situation. 
One economist suggested the Ma administration will need to 
take a pragmatic approach to address economic difficulties 
caused by weak domestic demand resulting from stagnant wages, 
slackening export growth due to currency appreciation, the 
global market downturn, and rising fuel and commodity prices. 
 Ma's plan to spur domestic consumption through 
infrastructure development is generally sound, but the key 
will be setting priorities and financing the projects. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Ma has given away Taiwan's bargaining leverage 
early on with no guarantees that Beijing will respond in 
kind, the Green scholars said, and he has overestimated the 
effect that weekend charter flights and expanding mainland 
tourism will have on reducing cross-Strait tension.  Ma's 
approach to cross-Strait negotiations is predicated on 
acceptance of the "1992 Consensus," which has failed to 
result in major breakthroughs in the past owing to China's 
unwillingness to recognize any interpretation of "one China" 
 
TAIPEI 00000733  003 OF 003 
 
 
other than its own.  When cross-Strait developments fail to 
meet expectations in the next six months, public opinion will 
begin to turn on Ma, the Green scholars predicted. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) These pro-Green scholars represent a significant 
segment of Taiwan opinion, which worries that KMT steps to 
enhance cross-Strait relations could compromise efforts they 
support to strengthen Taiwan's separate identity. 
Consequently, Ma's cross-Strait policies will be constrained 
in the coming months and years by a need to take into account 
the views of this important subset of the population. 
WANG