O 152142Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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UNCLAS STATE 052030 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC
 
SUBJECT: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2 
CENTRIFUGE DESIGN (SBU) 
 
REF: A. A STATE 021770 
     ¶B. B STATE 039585 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 11. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) OBJECTIVES: To encourage Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) Participating Governments (PGs) to conduct outreach to 
manufacturers, law enforcement, and customs officials within 
their countries to make them aware of key commodities that 
Iran may attempt to acquire in support of its gas centrifuge 
program. Also, request PGs to reinforce within their 
industry, business, and law enforcement communities the 
restrictions detailed in United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR) 1737 and 1803 regarding transferring to 
Iran certain nuclear- and missile- related items, including 
some dual-use commodities.  Finally, request PGs to share 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other 
NSG governments their efforts to conduct outreach and any 
information on inquiries or denials. 
 
¶3. (SBU) BACKGROUND:  On 22 February 2008, IAEA Director 
General ElBaradei reported to the IAEA Board of Governors 
details of the installation of the first round of the next 
generation gas centrifuge (IR-2) at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, Iran. This report also highlighted 
other research and development work on different, and more 
advanced, centrifuge designs that Iran is undertaking.  These 
activities are in direct contravention of UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR) 1737, 1747, and 1803, which, inter alia, 
require Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activities. 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad recently visited Natanz. Photos 
posted on the www.president.ir website (and emailed to Posts) 
show the interior of the PFEP, including the newly installed 
IR-2 centrifuges. Also included are pictures of some of the 
component parts that make the IR-2 a vast improvement over 
the P-1 design.  Such improvements include a rotor tube made 
of carbon composite (carbon fiber and epoxy resin) rather 
than from high-strength aluminum alloy or maraging steel as 
used in earlier versions of Iran's centrifuges. Washington 
has identified a list of critical technologies (see para 12) 
that Iran will likely need to support its planned deployment 
of the IR-2, but which it cannot manufacture indigenously and 
therefore would need to procure from foreign suppliers. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In an effort to disrupt these Iranian procurement 
efforts for the IR-2, Washington would like to provide PGs 
with this list of critical commodities. Washington requests 
that PGs use this information to conduct aggressive outreach 
activities with their local commercial, law enforcement, and 
customs officials to ensure that they are aware of the 
possibility that Iran may be looking to their companies to 
supply or transship these materials. This information will be 
discussed in more detail during the upcoming NSG Plenary in 
Berlin, May 19-25. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Depending on their technical specifications, the 
commodities on this list may be on the NSG dual-use annex, 
which consists of items with both nuclear and non-nuclear 
applications.  Such items are subject to the NSG's 
"Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-Use 
Equipment, Materials, Software, and related technology" (See 
the IAEA Information Circular numbered INFIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 
2), which is available on the IAEA and NSG websites.  In 
addition, items that would be useful for certain sensitive 
nuclear activities (including some items not on the NSG 
control lists) have been included in procurement watch-lists 
that the U.S. has shared with NSG PGs. 
 
¶6. (SBU) UNSCR 1737 (23 December 2006) requires all States to 
prevent the transfer to Iran of NSG Trigger List items (as 
reflected in UN Security Council document S/2006/814), as 
well as any other items a state determines would contribute 
to proliferation sensitive nuclear activities (e.g., uranium 
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related 
activities). UNSCR 1803 strengthened the existing UNSCR 1737 
restrictions on the transfer of dual-use items to Iran by 
imposing an outright prohibition against the transfer to Iran 
of any NSG-controlled dual-use items, unless specifically for 
exclusive use in light water reactors or when necessary for 
IAEA technical cooperation projects. 
 
¶7. (SBU) By providing this information, the U.S. hopes to 
increase international awareness of the controlled 
commodities being sought by Iran.  Armed with this 
information, governments and companies will be able to take 
proactive steps to deny Iran the key commodities that it 
requires to advance its nuclear program, and thereby make it 
harder for Iran to secure such items.  This will also assist 
countries to comply with the prohibitions on the transfer of 
such items included in UNSCRs 1737 and 1803. 
 
¶8. (SBU) States should review all requests to transfer any 
such items with a strong presumption of denial if there is 
reason to suspect that the end-user may be in Iran and to 
ensure that the items are not diverted to Iran.  Furthermore, 
states should ensure that they abide by the conditions 
established in paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1737 for the transfer of 
dual-use items under the LWR or IAEA assistance exemptions. 
These conditions are described in REF A, and include meeting 
the NSG's guidelines, obtaining end-use verification rights, 
and notifying the UNSC Sanctions Committee.  Washington 
believes that any such notification should include details 
about how the exporting state has satisfied these procedural 
requirements, in particular, post-shipment end-use and 
end-user checks.  If states are not in a position to execute 
their end-use verification rights, they should not/not 
transfer the items in question to Iran. 
 
¶9. (SBU) States should also be aware that, as evidenced by 
the number of Iranian front companies designated by the UNSC 
in Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803, Iran makes frequent use 
of deceptive tactics in order to obtain items and technology 
in furtherance of its nuclear program.  Furthermore, as 
described in IAEA Director General ElBaradei's report of 22 
February 2008, Iran has admitted to attempting to evade 
international sanctions in order to procure sensitive 
nuclear-related technologies.  States must remain vigilant to 
these tactics when considering transfers to ensure the items 
are not diverted to Iran's nuclear program. Their companies 
may be unwittingly assisting with Iran's efforts to procure 
relevant technology. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The U.S. has begun reaching out to U.S. companies 
that manufacture the commodities listed in the non-paper, and 
will issue a Department of Commerce Advisory stressing the 
potential that Iran will look to U.S. companies as suppliers 
for these critical commodities. 
 
¶11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Posts are requested to approach 
appropriate host government contacts at both the foreign 
ministry and other agencies responsible for export control 
issues to provide them with the detailed information on the 
types of commodities that would support Iran's expanded 
enrichment activities, as listed in the non-paper below (para 
12), leaving a copy of the non-paper and the attached 
pictures. Posts should also urge the host government to 
report back to the USG, the NSG, and the IAEA on any activity 
they find relative to Iran's procurement efforts for the 
listed commodities. A follow-on cable will be sent to posts 
where specific company information is available. 
¶12. (U) BEGIN U.S. NON-PAPER 
 
--  Iran continues to develop and test its uranium enrichment 
capabilities in violation of United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution 1737. 
 
--  At the same time Iran continues to refuse to acknowledge 
and disclose to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
its nuclear weaponization-related studies. 
 
--  Iran thus appears to be establishing a fissile material 
production capability while preserving its options to 
weaponize such material. 
 
--  It remains critical to the stability of the Middle East 
region and our shared global nonproliferation objectives, 
that Iran not succeed in developing a nuclear weapons 
capability. 
 
--  In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we 
would like to make you aware of critical commodities Iran may 
seek in support of its expanding uranium enrichment efforts, 
including expanding to a new, more advanced centrifuge 
design, the so-called "IR-2." 
 
--  We hope to increase international awareness of the 
commodities being sought by Iranian companies that are either 
controlled under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines 
or on individual countries' watch-lists. Governments and 
companies should take proactive steps to deny Iran key 
commodities it requires to advance its nuclear program.  In 
this way, we believe that countries will be better able to 
comply with the prohibitions on the transfer of such items 
included in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 
and 1803. 
 
--  Based on our assessments, as well as those of the IAEA 
Director General's report to the Board of Governors on 22 
February 2008, we believe that Iran will continue to actively 
pursue its procurement efforts for the commodities listed 
below. 
 
--  The images posted on the www.president.ir website of 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's recent visit to the Pilot 
Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz appear to further 
substantiate these findings. 
 
--  The commodities of most concern include: 
 
--  Carbon fiber - High-strength carbon fiber is controlled 
by the NSG for dual-use reasons (2.C.7) as it is a critical 
material necessary to fabricate composite rotors for gas 
centrifuges. Carbon fiber is also used in a wide variety of 
applications, including structural shapes or components for 
aircraft, missiles, bicycles, pressure vessels, sporting 
goods and automobiles. High-strength carbon fiber is included 
on the gas centrifuge procurement watchlist. 
 
--  Filament winding machines - Filament winding machines are 
controlled by the NSG for dual-use reasons (3.B.4) because 
they can be used to fabricate composite rotors for gas 
centrifuge applications.  They can also be used to 
manufacture aircraft parts, storage tanks, and pressure 
vessels, and are useful in fabricating sporting goods, such 
as golf club shafts, fishing rods, ski poles, and tennis 
rackets.  Filament winding machines are included in the 
gas-centrifuge procurement watchlist. 
 
--  Epoxy Resins and related hardening/accelerator agents - 
Epoxy resins are important "catch all" items because these 
adhesives are needed to bind the carbon fibers used in 
uranium enrichment centrifuges and missile structures.  The 
corrosion resistance of a resin is an important property for 
these applications, but epoxy resins are widely available and 
used in numerous military and commercial applications.  Epoxy 
resins are included in the gas-centrifuge procurement 
watchlist. 
 
--  Curing and Baking ovens/furnaces - Curing and baking 
furnaces (autoclaves) are essential elements for constructing 
composite structures by heating and "curing" the thermoset 
epoxy resin and carbon fibers into the finished carbon 
composite gas centrifuge rotor tube. Autoclaves are not 
unique to nuclear applications, and thus are covered under 
individual countries "catch all" controls, but the scale 
required for nuclear applications is much larger and the 
temperature-pressure controls more stringent than for other 
application (most notably for sporting equipment and 
lightweight automotive parts). The gas-centrifuge procurement 
watchlist lists curing and baking ovens/furnaces. 
 
--  Iran's IR-2 gas centrifuge also likely requires either 
maraging steel or high-strength aluminum alloy for the end 
caps and baffles of the rotor.  Thus, these two materials 
remain a critical import need for Iran for continued 
industrial-scale expansion of their gas centrifuge process. 
 
--  UNSCR 1737 prohibits states from transferring to Iran 
items controlled on the NSG's Trigger List (items especially 
designed and prepared for sensitive nuclear activities), as 
reflected in UN Security Council document S/2006/814, and any 
dual-use item that a state determines would contribute to 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. 
 
--  UNSCR 1803 strengthens this measure by explicitly 
prohibiting the transfer of any NSG-controlled dual-use item 
to Iran, unless for exclusive use in light water reactors or 
IAEA technical cooperation projects.  In those exempted 
circumstances where the items are to be used in a light water 
reactor, states must notify the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee 
and the IAEA in advance of the intended transfer. In 
addition, end-use verification in Iran, and compliance with 
NSG guidelines are required when such a transfer occurs. 
 
--  The strong risk of diversion in Iran suggests that states 
should handle requests for sensitive items by Iran and 
Iranian-associated firms with a strong presumption of denial. 
 Moreover, if a state is not in a position to execute its 
end-use verification rights, that state should not consent to 
the transfer. 
 
--  As evidenced by the number of Iranian front companies 
designated by the UNSC in Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803, 
Iran makes frequent use of deceptive tactics in order to 
obtain items and technology in furtherance of its nuclear 
program.  Furthermore, DG ElBaradei's 22 February 2008 report 
noted that Iran has admitted to attempting to evade 
international sanctions in order to procure sensitive 
nuclear-related technologies. States must remain vigilant to 
these tactics when considering transfers to ensure the items 
are not diverted to Iran's nuclear program.  Their companies 
may be unwittingly assisting with Iran's efforts to procure 
relevant technology. 
 
--  We would like encourage a strengthened international 
effort to share information that would assist governments to 
prohibit the transfer of these commodities to Iran.  For 
example, we would like to suggest that PGs share information 
on manufacturers, make/model numbers, and any other 
identifying information related to these critical commodities 
with customs inspectors and others in countries where these 
items might be transited or transshipped.  In this way, we 
can help facilitate legitimate commerce, while providing 
additional assurances that critical commodities can be 
identified and will be stopped. 
 
--  We encourage you to use the information provided above to 
conduct outreach to any companies within your country that 
have the capability to manufacture or transship these 
commodities to ensure they are aware of the prohibitions 
outlined in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.  We also encourage 
you to request your companies to inform your government of 
any suspicious procurement attempts of these commodities from 
Iran or third parties.We ask that you notify the U.S. 
government, the NSG, and the IAEA of any suspected 
procurement attempts by Iran so that we all can better track 
Iran's efforts. 
 
--  We are reaching out to other NSG members and outreach 
countries in the hopes that we can collectively make prevent 
Iran from acquiring any equipment that could provide a 
material contribution to its uranium enrichment programs. 
 
--  We appreciate your cooperation in this important matter 
and look forward to discussing this further during the 
upcoming NSG plenary in Berlin. 
 
END U.S. NON-PAPER. 
 
-------------------------- 
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POC 
-------------------------- 
 
(U)  Posts are requested to report any substantive responses. 
 Caroline Russell (ISN/CPI, 202-647-1296, 
russellca@state.sgov.gov) and Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 
202-736-4730, nephewrm@state.gov) are the Department's POC 
for this activity. 
RICE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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