R 121525Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 050050 
 
 
BUENOS AIRES FOR EST:A. SCHANDLBAUER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2033 
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL ETTC TSPL AR
 
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): 
 ARGENTINE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE (SLV) PROGRAM  (U) 
  
 REF: A. LA NACION ARTICLE OF 05 AUGUST 07 (AND SUBSEQUENT) 
      ¶B. 00 BUENOS AIRES 1211 (AND PREVIOUS) 
      ¶C. 00 STATE 43295 
      ¶D. 99 STATE 153139 (AND PREVIOUS) 
      ¶E. 99 BUENOS AIRES 4356 
      ¶F. 99 BUENSO AIRES 5768 
      ¶G. 99 BUENOS AIRES 657 
      ¶H. 99 BUENOS AIRES 694 
      ¶I. 99 BUENOS AIRES 598 
      ¶J. 99 STATE 261161 (AND PREVIOUS) 
      ¶K. 92 BUENOS AIRES 6466 
      ¶L. 92 BUENOS AIRES 4636 
      ¶M. 92 STATE 186032 
      ¶N. 93 STATE 33962 
      ¶O. 94 STATE 245377 
      ¶P. 94 BUENOS AIRES 2735 
      ¶Q. 94 BUENOS AIRES 6094 
      ¶R. 94 BUENOS AIRES 7658 
      ¶S. 00 STATE 1581 
      ¶T. 07 STATE 10771 
      ¶U. 07 BUENOS AIRES 1793 
      ¶V. 08 BUENOS AIRES 138 
      ¶W. 08 BUENOS AIRES 170 
      ¶X. 08 BUENOS AIRES 124 
      ¶Y. DURHAM-VAROTTO DISCUSSION OF 14 SEPTEMBER 07 
  
 Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
 Reason:  1.5 (B), (D). 
  
  
 ¶1.  (U)  Classified by ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.  Reason: 
 1.5 (B), (D). 
  
 ¶2.  (U)  This is an action request.  Embassy Buenos Aires, 
 please see paragraph 15. 
  
 ¶3.  (C)  BACKGROUND:  According to published reports (REF A), 
 the Argentine Commission for Space Activities (CONAE) is 
 overseeing an enterprise known as VENG to develop space 
 vehicles, particularly satellite launch vehicles (SLVs), and 
 launch services.  Pursuant to this effort, VENG has developed 
 and tested the Tronador I rocket.  Development of the 
 Tronador rocket and development of a hydrazine concentrate 
 pilot plant at Falda del Carmen also are underway.  Hydrazine 
 is a key substance in liquid rocket fuel, and the Falda del 
 Carmen plant was part of Argentina's dismantled Condor II 
 missile program.  Per REF V, this ""space program"" seems to 
 have approval from the Government of Argentina (GOA). 
  
 ¶4.  (C)  The GOA's/CONAE's plans to develop a rocket for 
 space launch purposes -- and to develop rocket propellant at 
 the Falda del Carmen facility -- is of interest to the U.S. 
 because it appears inconsistent with the understanding on 
 SLVs and dismantlement of the rocket motor production 
 facility at Falda del Carmen reached between Argentina and 
 the United States prior to Argentina becoming a member of the 
 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994. 
  
 ¶5.  (C)  In the 1980's/early 1990's, Argentina was actively 
 engaged in the development of the Condor ballistic missile 
 program, which clearly was intended to produce MTCR Category 
 I military missiles, including for export to Egypt and Iraq. 
 (NOTE:  An MTCR Category I missile system is one that can 
 carry a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 
 km. END NOTE.)  The Condor program represented a serious 
 missile proliferation concern and a major irritant in our 
 bilateral relationship.  This situation was further 
 aggravated by Argentina's attempts to camouflage - and 
 thereby maintain - the Condor program by calling it an SLV 
 program.  SLVs and ballistic missiles are almost identical in 
 design, fabrication, and function.  Their technologies are 
 essentially interchangeable, and there are virtually no 
 technologies that support SLV development that would not also 
 facilitate ballistic missile development.  Any rocket capable 
 of putting a satellite into orbit also is by definition an 
 MTCR Category I syste 
 m.  It also is inherently capable of delivering weapons of 
 mass destruction (WMD) against surface targets, and many 
 countries have used the same boosters to deliver both weapons 
 and satellite payloads. 
  
 ¶6.  (C)  To address the concerns raised by the Condor 
 program, the United States insisted that Argentina dismantle 
 its existing missile facilities and agree to forego Category 
 I missiles.  In addition, because Argentina sought to 
 disguise the Condor program as an SLV program, we also 
 insisted on restrictions on Argentina's SLV activities.  The 
 United States -- and the MTCR as a whole -- sought and 
 obtained from the GOA written assurances that Argentina would 
 undertake specific actions to dismantle the rocket production 
 facilities at the Falda del Carmen plant.  The MTCR Partners 
 requested these actions to ensure that Argentina's MTCR-class 
 missile program could not be revived. 
  
 ¶7.  (C)  Accordingly, in 1992, the GOA assured U.S. officials 
 -- including then-Under Secretary Bartholomew -- that 
 Argentina had no SLV program and that Argentina did ""not now 
 or anytime in the foreseeable future"" contemplate development 
 of an SLV (REF K and REF L).  The GOA provided similar 
 assurances to the MTCR during April 1992 meetings with the 
 multinational MTCR outreach team.  While Argentina did not 
 state unequivocally that it would ""never"" pursue an 
 indigenous SLV capability, the diplomatic record indicates 
 that the United States has understood this to be the case 
 since 1992. 
  
 ¶8.  (C)  With regard to dismantlement of the Falda del Carmen 
 rocket-motor production facility, the GOA provided written 
 assurances to the MTCR in late 1993 that it would take 
 specific steps to dispose of the MTCR Category I missile 
 manufacturing equipment located at the Falda del Carmen plant 
 (REFS N-R).  These assurances were key to the MTCR Partners' 
 decision to admit Argentina to the Regime  and included 
 agreement to: 
  
 --seal the casting pits in such a way that they cannot be put 
 to their originally intended use (i.e., rocket motor 
 production); 
  
 --remove from the propellant mixer all sets of gears and 
 mixing blades; and 
  
 --relocate from the Falda del Carmen rocket motor plant 
 either the AP grinder or the X-ray machine, and use both 
 items only for non-missile (which includes non-SLV) purposes. 
  
 To our knowledge, Argentina has honored faithfully its 
 explicit commitments related to dismantlement of the Condor 
 II missile program. 
  
 ¶9. (C)  In 1999 (REF D), the GOA sought release from its 1992 
 commitments regarding SLV development, and expressed great 
 disappointment when the U.S. declined to do so.  The GOA 
 argued that the U.S. decision disadvantaged Argentina 
 vis-~-vis other MTCR Partners and infringed on Argentine 
 sovereignty.  It also argued that while Argentina did provide 
 assurances to the U.S. in 1992 regarding SLV development, it 
 had not permanently renounced its right to peaceful use of 
 space technologies, including SLV development.  Subsequently, 
 in late 1999/early 2000, following further discussion of the 
 issue, the GOA made clear that it had no intention of 
 pursuing development of an indigenous SLV capability, largely 
 due to financial concerns.  However, in an April 2000 
 non-paper (REF S), the GOA reiterated its view on SLV 
 development, noting that it believed it inappropriate to 
 limit Argentina's future ""peaceful pursuit"" of an SLV based 
 on past events.  It also indicated that U.S. dialogue on this 
 matter would continue. 
  
 ¶10.  (C)  After seeing press reporting in August 2007 on the 
 Tronador program, U.S. officials informally raised the launch 
 vehicle issue with the CONAE Director Dr. Conrado Varotto 
 (REF U and REF Y).  During those September 2007 discussions, 
 Varotto said Argentina has no intention of proliferating 
 missile technology but needs a reliable solution to its space 
 launch problem.  It has decided that contracting for launches 
 of its satellites on foreign boosters is too costly, and is 
 pursuing an SLV program as a cost-effective way to get its 
 satellites into orbit.  With regard to its 1992 commitments, 
 Varotto said the commitment on SLVs was for the ""foreseeable 
 future,"" not ""forever,"" and that the passage of time had 
 changed Argentina's situation.  At the same time, Varotto 
 said Argentina is serious about nonproliferation and its 
 commitments with regard to the Condor program.  The 
 facilities used in the Condor program have been completely 
 dismantled, and Argentina has developed a new facility (at 
 the same industria 
 l park) for the SLV program that does not implicate the old 
 Condor facilities.  Additionally, the Tronador SLV is a 
 liquid-propellant system whereas the Condor was a solid 
 propellant system. 
  
 ¶11.  (C)  During REF Y discussions, the U.S. was skeptical of 
 Dr. Varotto's suggestion that building and maintaining an SLV 
 infrastructure would be less costly than contracting for 
 launches, but noted that the priority concern for the U.S. 
 was nonproliferation.  SLVs are MTCR Category I systems and 
 inherently capable of WMD delivery.  SLVs and ballistic 
 missiles also are essentially identical in design, form, and 
 fabrication and any developments in one area could be applied 
 to the other.  Given past concerns about Argentina trying to 
 disguise its missile program as an SLV program and the 
 interest of the U.S. and other MTCR countries in preventing 
 the spread of missiles and missile-related technology that 
 could potentially fall into the hands of proliferators and 
 terrorists, the U.S. hoped that Argentina would continue to 
 abide by its 1992 commitments.  U.S. officials also noted 
 that the United States has maintained a policy since 
 September 1993 of not encouraging MTCR member countries' 
 ""new"" SLV programs. (NO 
 TE:  In this context, ""new"" means SLV programs the United 
 States did not cooperate with prior to the advent of the MTCR 
 in 1987.  END NOTE.)  Argentina therefore should not expect 
 U.S. support for its program even if the United States and 
 Argentina simply agree to disagree about Argentina's 1992 
 commitment on SLVs.  Varotto hoped that the two sides could 
 think creatively about ways to resolve the issue, possibly 
 including by the United States agreeing to support 
 Argentina's SLV program if certain transparency measures were 
 implemented. 
  
 ¶12.  (C)  In light of sensitivities in the broad 
 U.S.-Argentina bilateral relationship, the United States has 
 not raised this issue formally with the GOA.  However, during 
 discussions with the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires in February 
 2008 (REF V), Dr. Varotto indicated that the SLV program 
 remains a high priority.  He also suggested strongly that the 
 GOA would be open to unobtrusive transparency measures, 
 including briefing the MTCR on the details of the program. 
  
 END BACKGROUND. 
  
 ¶13.  (C)  PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE: We support the peaceful pursuit 
 of space as outlined in the President's Space Policy. 
 Washington agencies have been considering how to balance its 
 response to Argentina's pursuit of a space launch vehicle 
 program in light of the understanding on SLVs and 
 dismantlement of the Condor missile program reached in 1992 
 between the United States and Argentina prior to Argentina 
 becoming an MTCR member.  That review has now concluded, and 
 the United States has determined that while the United States 
 and Argentina continue to hold different understandings of 
 Argentina's SLV commitments, there is little likelihood that 
 the GOA could be persuaded to abandon its SLV program and we 
 do not intend to pursue such an outcome.  Rather, given the 
 past history of the SLV issue and the ongoing priority we 
 place on missile nonproliferation, we want to seek full 
 transparency into the GOA's SLV program, including annual 
 consultations on the status of the program and the option for 
 periodic site/s visits 
 . We also want to request Argentina brief its SLV program to 
 the MTCR Partners and encourage the GOA to describe its 
 ongoing SLV efforts in its annual declaration to the Hague 
 Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
 (HCOC).  We believe this approach will keep this issue from 
 being an irritant in our bilateral relationship.  It also 
 will reinforce our broad missile nonproliferation objectives 
 by providing ongoing insight into the Argentine program and 
 opportunities to weigh in with the GOA if program 
 developments - including imports/exports relation to the 
 program - raise concerns. 
  
 ¶14.  (C)  We therefore propose to raise the SLV issue 
 formally with the GOA, making clear that while the United 
 States and Argentina continue to hold different 
 understandings of Argentina's SLV commitments, we greatly 
 value Argentina's ongoing support for missile 
 nonproliferation and transparent approach to this matter and 
 do not want this issue to be a source of concern in our 
 bilateral relationship.  In that spirit, we also want to note 
 that while the United States does not support Argentina's 
 pursuit of an MTCR Category I SLV, we understand that 
 Argentina intends to go forward with development of such a 
 system.  Accordingly, we seek a GOA commitment to provide the 
 United States with full transparency into its SLV program, 
 including annual consultations on the status of the program 
 and on imports/exports relating to the program and the option 
 of periodic site/s visits.  This could take the form of a 
 letter from Dr. Varotto to Ambassador Wayne, for example.  As 
 an additional transparency measure, we also see 
 k Argentina's commitment to brief the MTCR Partners on its 
 SLV program - perhaps via a short information paper to all 
 MTCR Partners - and to describe its SLV efforts in its annual 
 declaration to the HCOC. 
  
 ¶15.  (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Drawing on the talking points 
 provided below and, as necessary and appropriate, the 
 information in paragraphs 2-14 above, request Embassy Buenos 
 Aires raise the SLV issue with CONAE Director Varotto and 
 appropriate Argentine MFA officials and seek GOA commitment 
 to providing the United States with full transparency into 
 its SLV program. 
  
 BEGIN TALKING POINTS: 
  
 (CONFIDENTIAL/RELEASABLE ARGENTINA) 
  
 --During the past several years our two governments have 
 cooperated closely on missile nonproliferation issues, and we 
 greatly value your leadership and support for the Missile 
 Technology Control Regime's (MTCR's) efforts to stem the flow 
 of missile technology and equipment worldwide. 
  
 --In the cooperative spirit of our nonproliferation 
 partnership, we would like to discuss with you Argentina's 
 development of a space launch vehicle (SLV). 
  
 --Specifically, we understand that the Commission for Space 
 Activities (CONAE) is working to develop the Tronador rocket 
 in order to launch satellites into orbit.  Such an SLV would 
 clearly be an MTCR Category I system, and raises questions 
 concerning Argentina's commitments to the United States 
 concerning SLV development. 
  
 --Our two governments have discussed issues relating to these 
 commitments on several occasions since 1992, and continue to 
 hold vastly different understandings of Argentina's SLV 
 commitments. 
  
 --However, despite these differences, the United States 
 recognizes and appreciates Argentina's efforts to pursue SLV 
 development in an open and transparent manner.  We also 
 continue to highly value Argentina's activism on missile 
 nonproliferation issues and look forward to continued 
 collaboration in this area. 
  
 --In this context, we want to advise your government that 
 while the United States does not support Argentina's pursuit 
 of an MTCR Category I SLV, we understand that Argentina 
 intends to go forward with development of such a system. 
  
 --We therefore would like to ask that as this effort 
 proceeds, Argentina undertake to provide the United States 
 with full transparency into its SLV program. 
  
 --In our view, such transparency would be in keeping with our 
 shared missile nonproliferation objectives and help to ensure 
 that this matter does not become a source of irritation in 
 our bilateral relationship. 
  
 --Specifically, we would urge your government to agree to 
 annual consultations on the status of Argentina's SLV program 
 -- to include, as necessary and appropriate, discussion of 
 potential imports/exports relating to the program -- as well 
 as the option of periodic site/s visits by U.S. officials. 
  
 --Additionally, we would like to ask that Argentina provide a 
 one-time briefing to the MTCR Partners on its intention to 
 pursue an SLV program.  We similarly would urge Argentina to 
 describe its SLV program in its annual declaration to the 
 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
 (HCOC). 
  
 --We know Argentina shares our commitment to international 
 nonproliferation efforts and look forward to continued close 
 cooperation with Argentina on issues of mutual concern.  We 
 hope we can work together to address the SLV issue in a 
 mutually satisfactory way. 
  
 END TALKING POINTS. 
  
 ¶16.  (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham 
 (Phone: 202-647-4931).  Please slug any reporting on this 
 issue for ISN and WHA. 
  
 ¶17.  (U) A word version of this document will be posted 
 AT WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/DEMARCHE. 
 RICE 
  
  
 NNNN 
  



 End Cable Text