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Viewing cable 08STATE49804, GUIDANCE FOR 13 MAY 2008 UN SECURITY COUNCIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE49804 2008-05-09 23:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO0236
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #9804/01 1310002
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 092355Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1715
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1030
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 049804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PREL PGOV UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR 13 MAY 2008 UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
CONSULTATIONS ON UNAMID 
 
 
 1.  PURPOSE:  This is an action request.  The Department 
asks that USUN draw upon the following points for the United 
Nations Security Council briefing and consultations on the 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) on 13 May 2008. 
 
--We welcome Secretary-General Ban's 9 May 2008 report on the 
deployment of UNAMID.  Rapid and effective deployment of 
UNAMID is a fundamental element of the international 
community's strategy for peace in Darfur.  With that in mind, 
I would like to address four main issues:  1) the security 
situation, particularly the recent government of Sudan (GOS) 
bombings 2) UNAMID deployment, particularly the urgent need 
to implement the new enhanced deployment plan, 3) the 
political process, particularly the urgent need to appoint a 
full-time mediator, and 4) sanctions, particularly noting 
that the recent GOS bombings violated the UN arms embargo. 
 
---------------------- 
1.  SECURITY SITUATION 
---------------------- 
 
-- We continue to be gravely concerned by the security 
situation in Darfur.  We condemn the May 4 and other recent 
bombings by the government of Sudan (GOS) in north Darfur, 
including 
the GOS's bombing of civilian locations, such as a school, 
water installations, and a market where civilians 
(especially women and children were present) in the villages 
of Um Sidir, Ein Bassar and Shegeg Karo.  UNAMID 
reported that a number of people had been killed during these 
attacks, including children and women.  In addition, 
we utterly condemn the Sudanese Armed Forces' retaliation in 
response to a Justice and Equality Movement attack on 
April 12, which resulted in 62 civilian casualties. The 
GOS must end its use of violence immediately.  This very 
Security Council has demanded that the GOS cease 
conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur 
region.  The GOS must fulfill its responsibility to 
protect civilians and its commitments to disarm the janjaweed 
and provide professional police that can offer 
some baseline security.  Sudan must also cease support for 
Chadian rebels based in Sudan, and Chad must stop 
providing support for Sudanese rebels in the region. 
 
-- We understand that UNAMID played a helpful role in 
response to the recent north Darfur attacks, including 
assistance with medical evacuations.  The GOS must allow 
UNAMID full freedom of movement and not hamper UNAMID 
in carrying out its mandate, in accordance with the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA), and we urge the UN to take a 
strong stand against any violation of the SOFA.  These 
attacks also underscore the need for UNAMID to find an 
effective way to monitor the ceasefire.  We look forward to 
the work of the Ceasefire Commission in investigating 
these attacks and for UNAMID to press ahead in carrying out 
its mandate, which has protection of civilians at its 
heart. 
 
--An immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties 
remains the highest priority.  Sudan must fulfill its 
commitments and disarm the janjaweed.  Also among the highest 
priorities, all parties must comply with the 28 
March 2007 humanitarian communiqu,.  In addition, we 
emphasize we are closely watching the situation between 
northern and southern Sudan.  We are particularly concerned 
by violence in the oil-rich Abyei area, where several 
hundred people have died in recent clashes.  The GOS must not 
fuel the violence by arming the Misseriya militia. 
All parties must abide by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
including the findings of the Abyei Boundaries 
Commission. 
 
--------------------- 
2.  UNAMID DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------- 
 
--We continue to be deeply concerned by the slow deployment 
of UNAMID.  We welcome the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations' new enhanced deployment plan.  We 
strongly support the deployment of urgently 
needed engineering assets from all available sources to speed 
construction of infrastructure to allow for 
deployment of additional UNAMID units.  We also strongly urge 
the UN to use its ample budget to contract 
civilian assets to help meet critical engineering and 
 
STATE 00049804  002 OF 002 
 
 
logistics requirements.  Our Special Envoy Richard 
Williamson continues to work with the Friends of UNAMID to 
engage proactively with every major part of the 
process required for UNAMID deployment, including the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and troop- 
contributing countries (TCCs). The United States has devoted 
substantial resources to training and equipping 
TCCs.  Rwanda, for example, will be ready to deploy 647 new 
troops in June, and we urge UNAMID to be ready to 
absorb such deployments.  We strongly urge all Security 
Council members to support the UN goal of a substantial 
increase in troops and police for UNAMID this summer and 80 
percent of the full force by the end of the year. 
 
-We continue to seek missing assets that UNAMID desperately 
needs:  helicopters, transport units, 
multi-role logistics unit, one aerial reconnaissance unit, 
and multi-role engineering unit.  We urge member 
states to help fill these gaps. 
 
--The GOS must fully cooperate and end its obstructions to 
UNAMID's deployment.  In addition to ending its blatant 
use of force in Darfur including against civilians and 
UNAMID, the GOS must accept the UN-AU list of TCCs, allow 
night flights without time limits, provide access to land and 
water for UNAMID camps, and grant timely visas and 
customs clearances.  The GOS must ensure that attacks such as 
the 7 January 2008 unprovoked attack on a UNAMID 
convoy never happen again. 
 
--------------------- 
3.  POLITICAL PROCESS 
--------------------- 
 
-Although the primary obstacle to peace in Darfur is the will 
of the parties, the United Nations and member states 
must do more to push for rapid deployment of UNAMID, which 
would improve security on the ground and create a 
better space within which the United Nations-African 
Union-led political process can advance.  With a sense of 
urgency which we hope is shared by the UN and troop 
contributors, we look forward to the rapid implementation of 
the enhanced deployment plan.  The UN has ample funds to more 
robustly prepare for, and support, its 
TCCs deployment and it should use every authority at its 
disposal to meet these goals and carry out the Plan. 
 
--To advance this process for Darfur, we urge the immediate 
appointment of a Joint UN-AU Chief Mediator to 
be based in Sudan to lead the political process on a 
full-time basis. 
 
--We continue to urge the GOS and the government of Chad 
(GOC) to respect the 13 March 2008 Dakar Accord and are 
encouraged by developments made by the members of the Contact 
Group.  The GOS's attempt in February to overthrow 
the Chadian government by supporting Chadian rebels was 
utterly unacceptable as is Chadian support for Sudanese 
rebels.  Both the GOS and GOC must end support of rebel 
attacks across their border.  The GOS and GOC must instead 
protect civilians and cooperate with deployment of 
peacekeeping operations to provide robust protection.  We 
are also encouraged by the Contact Group's efforts to discuss 
implementation of a border force to monitor the 
Chad-Sudan border. 
 
--------------------- 
4. SANCTIONS 
--------------------- 
 
- We urge all member states to support and implement fully 
the existing UN arms embargo prohibiting arms 
transfers to the Government of Sudan in Darfur and to all 
non-governmental persons operating in Darfur wherever 
located and the targeted sanctions imposed against designated 
Sudanese individuals.  We urge any countries 
permitting arms sales to the GOS to share with the Council 
what assurances they have received that the weapons will 
not be used in the Darfur region and would appreciate 
information on how they will monitor end use.  We note 
that the movement by the GOS of arms and military equipment 
into the Darfur region, which enabled the April and May 
bombings of this reporting period, constitutes a violation by 
the GOS of the arms embargo, and is inconsistent with 
its other obligations and responsibility to facilitate safe 
delivery of humanitarian assistance.  Further UN 
measures must remain on the table to make facts on the ground 
match our rhetoric. 
RICE