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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000305 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR BEYRLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA NEEDS U.S. SUPPORT TO BREAK AIR FORCE 
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  Summary.  Rapidly losing capability, the 
Bulgarian Air Force is in dire need of modernization, but 
meaningful transformation is made impossible by Bulgaria's 
overwhelming dependence on Russian airframes.  The use of 
aging Russian aircraft not only limits Bulgarian 
capabilities, but maintains a crippling dependence upon 
Russia for parts and maintenance.  Russia has routinely 
withheld these in order to exert pressure and extract 
favorable decisions.  Bulgaria is keenly aware of this 
dependency and is reaching out to allies for suggestions on 
affordable, NATO-interoperable airframes. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF)  Four outcomes are possible:  1) Bulgaria has no 
Air Force, 2) it has a weak and Russian-dependent force, 3) 
it cobbles together a fleet of limited capacity with European 
fighters such as Swedish Grypens, 4) it adopts a U.S. fighter 
and becomes a capable, interoperable ally in air operations. 
A U.S. multi-role fighter is the only option that will enable 
Bulgaria to have an effective Air Force over the longer-term. 
 Transitioning Bulgaria to a U.S. airframe would drastically 
improve Bulgaria's capabilities and draw our two armed forces 
into even closer cooperation.  Most critically it would 
eliminate Russian influence over an entire section of the 
Bulgarian military and reduce its leverage over the Ministry 
of Defense as a whole.  Post has requested DOD provide a 
concrete proposal to the Bulgarians for acquisition of a U.S. 
aircraft, with the goal of formally presenting this to the 
Bulgarians during high-level meetings this summer.  End 
Summary. 
 
CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  Saddled with pre-1989 equipment and doctrine, the 
Bulgarian Air Force is poorly led, poorly funded and 
increasingly unable to perform effectively as a NATO ally. 
Their transport fleet is small.  It was recently bolstered 
with the addition of one C-27J, but the rest consists of a 
handful of old non-NATO compatible Soviet AN-12s.  With the 
exception of 12 non-combat capable Eurocopter AS 532 Cougars, 
the helicopter fleet is also in poor shape with only six 
MI-17s (equivalent to the Russian MI-8 HIP), six Bell 
206B-3,s and two operational MI-24 HINDS.  Worst off is 
Bulgaria's tactical fighter fleet.  Bulgaria maintains a 
handful of MiG-21s which will retire by mid-2009.  They have 
12 fully mission capable Su-25s but have budgeted very 
limited funds to fly them this year ) less than 10 hours per 
airframe.  The Bulgarians rely entirely on 12 aging MiG-29s 
to do all NATO Air Policing.  As a result, they were forced 
to sign a ten million dollar contract with Russia for 
depot-level maintenance work required to keep them flying. 
 
 
THE PROBLEM:  DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA AND MiGS 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  The MiG airframe is the major obstacle to the 
transformation of the Bulgarian Air Force.  It limits 
Bulgaria's capabilities, but more significantly it fosters an 
unhealthy dependence on Russia.  Because it is still using 
Cold War aircraft, Bulgaria lacks western operational 
instructions, relying instead on outdated Soviet tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) and logistics. Virtually 
nothing in the Bulgarian Air Force has moved forward since 
¶1989.  Because of the MiG airframe, the Bulgarian tactical 
Air Force is forced to maintain a robust relationship with 
Russia simply to keep their tactical fleet in the air.  This 
allows Russia tremendous influence over Bulgarian Air Force 
policies, operations and procurement decisions.  So long as 
Russian aircraft remain the backbone of the Bulgarian Air 
Force it cannot fully transform, modernize or integrate into 
NATO. 
 
 
THE SOLUTION:  U.S. AIRFRAME 
 
 
SOFIA 00000305  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  Transitioning away from Russian aircraft would 
have a far-reaching impact on Bulgarian military 
modernization.  The specific capabilities of a new airframe 
would be secondary to NATO interoperability and the 
development of a strong relationship with the United States 
Air Force.  Bulgaria has begun this process in its other 
services.  The purchase of a used Belgian Frigate was a 
catalyst for transformation of the Bulgarian Navy.  Through 
Belgian partnership, Bulgarian ships and crews, once entirely 
wedded to Russian equipment and doctrine, are now NATO 
certified and currently participate in major NATO exercises 
in the Mediterranean.  The Bulgarian Army has benefited from 
the provision of U.S. equipment and vehicles and has 
transformed itself considerably through its ongoing 
participation in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
Bulgarian Air Force, however, remains stuck in 1989. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  Bulgaria knows it can not continue down this 
path.  It is committed to maintaining a tactical Air Force 
and is actively searching for an affordable multi-role 
fighter.  It is in our interest to ensure that Bulgaria 
chooses a U.S. solution.  Moving the Bulgarians to a U.S. 
fighter would reduce Russian influence over Bulgarian defense 
policy, integrate Bulgaria further into NATO and ensure a 
long-term strategic relationship with the United States.  A 
switch to a European fighter such as the Eurofighter or 
Swedish Grypen would be an improvement, but still clearly a 
second-best solution since none of the Europeans have a 
history of providing the technical, logistical and tactical 
support Bulgaria desperately needs.  It is not a coincidence 
that Bulgaria's NATO neighbors Greece, Turkey and Romania 
have all opted for U.S. airframes.  Additionally, switching 
to a European fighter only addresses short-term needs and 
does not offer an eventual bridge the Joint Strike Fighter, 
the only long-term outcome that would enable Bulgaria to fly 
and fight effectively and interoperably with the United 
States. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)   Bulgaria has approached the United States 
formally in multiple forums requesting information on 
available U.S. aircraft.  Many top Bulgarian officials are 
anxious to transition to a U.S. fighter as soon as possible, 
but Russian ties run deep and staying with a Russian fighter 
has traction in other circles.  European countries have 
expressed interest in selling aircraft to Bulgaria and have a 
strong lobby.  Bulgaria is a special case due to its limited 
funds, Russian dependence and critical need for technical and 
logistical support.  Presenting the Bulgarians with the 
standard approach we roll out for other wealthier allies will 
not work, but a comprehensive, affordable, sustainable U.S. 
offer with full U.S. government support will almost certainly 
succeed.  Time is short because the Bulgarians are reaching 
the decision point: to stay with the Russian MiGs into an 
unforeseeable future, or transition to a new aircraft. 
 
¶8.  (C/NF)  Previous US Navy and USAF efforts have laid a 
good foundation.  Now more vigorous DoD contact is needed. 
In addition to a concrete offer to present to Bulgarians, a 
senior DoD visit for this specific topic in the next few 
months would be highly valuable.  Finally, we understand that 
release of the Joint Strike Fighter to Bulgaria has not been 
approved.  We need to revisit that decision.  This Embassy 
was not consulted in the original decision, and we still do 
not have clarity on the criteria or decision-making process 
that led to that determination. 
 
¶9.  (C/NF)  Final Comment:  Bulgaria has proved itself a 
steadfast ally and reliable partner in international 
security, currently ranking as the fourth largest EU troop 
contributor in Iraq.  Within many Bulgarian institutions, 
however, and particularly among the military, there is a 
split between younger transatlantic thinkers and older 
"default-Russia" forces.  It is crucial that we make efforts 
now to empower those forces inclined to look toward NATO and 
the United States.  The Bulgarian Air Force is at a 
crossroads.  Decisions made in the upcoming months will 
 
SOFIA 00000305  003 OF 003 
 
 
determine whether Bulgaria ends up with no Air Force, a very 
limited capability force, or a fully effective and 
interoperable force with a deep connection to the United 
States.  A U.S. commitment to identify an appropriate 
multi-role fighter will lead to a broad institutional shift 
inside the Bulgarian Armed Forces and pay very large 
dividends in the future.  Inaction is an invitation to 
Russia, already a dominant force in the Bulgarian energy 
sector, to continue to exercise control over significant 
sections of Bulgarian defense.  It is likely this issue will 
be raised when the Bulgarian Prime Minister travels to 
Washington and meets President Bush next month.  High-level 
engagement from Washington prior to this meeting will be 
crucial to developing a mutually beneficial proposal and 
ensuring a positive final outcome.  End Comment. 
Beyrle